

1 Clifford W. Berlow (Ill. Bar No. 6292383)
cberlow@jenner.com
2 Michele L. Slachetka (Ill. Bar No. 6297640)
mslachetka@jenner.com
3 JENNER & BLOCK LLP
353 North Clark Street
4 Chicago, Illinois 60654
Tel: (312) 222-9350
5 Fax: (312) 527-0484
(*Pro Hac* Admissions forthcoming)

6 Faaris Akremi (Cal. Bar No. 324557)
7 fakremi@jenner.com
Jenner & Block LLP
8 1099 New York Avenue NW, Suite 900
Washington, DC 20001
9 Tel: (202) 637-6325
Fax: (202) 639-6066

10 Christopher J. Rillo (Cal. Bar No. 112009)
11 crillo@jenner.com
Jenner & Block LLP
12 633 West 5th Street, Suite 3600
Los Angeles, CA 90071-2054
13 Tel: (213) 239-2250
Fax: (213) 239-5199

14 Counsel for *Amici Curiae*

15
16 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
17 **EASTERN DIVISION – RIVERSIDE**

18 FAOUR ABDALLAH FRAIHAT *et*
19 *al.*,

20 Plaintiffs,

21 v.

22 U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT *et al.*,

23 Defendants.

Case No. 5:19-cv-1546-JGB-SHK

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
AMICI CURIAE BRIEF**

Hearing

Date: May 4, 2020
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Courtroom: Riverside, Courtroom 1
Judge: Hon. Jesus G. Bernal

1 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on Monday, May 4, 2020, or as soon thereafter as the
3 matter may be heard in the George E. Brown, Jr. Federal Building and United States
4 Courthouse, Central District of California, located at 3470 Twelfth Street, Courtroom 1, 2d
5 floor, Riverside, California 92501, movant Public Health Experts (“Public Health”), will,
6 and hereby does, move for an order permitting them to file a brief as *amici curiae* on
7 Plaintiffs’ pending Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. 81), which is currently under
8 submission with the Court.

9 This motion is made on the grounds that the Court has inherent authority to allow the
10 participation of *amici curiae*. Public Health’s participation as *amici curiae* would be helpful
11 and desirable as it would facilitate a more complete understanding of the issues before the
12 Court. More specifically, Public Health’s *amici* brief, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit
13 A, provides this Court with context about the severity of the novel coronavirus (COVID-
14 19) and its unique dangers in the immigration detention context. This Motion is based on
15 this Notice of Motion, the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities and all
16 appendices and attachments thereto, all papers and pleadings on file in this action, and upon
17 such further evidence and argument as may be presented to the Court in connection with
18 the Motion.

19 Prior to filing this Motion, Public Health Experts contacted counsel for each party.
20 Plaintiffs’ gave their consent, while U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, et al.,
21 informed Public Health that they oppose this application.

22
23 Dated: April 9, 2020

Respectfully Submitted,

24 By: /s/ Christopher J. Rillo
25 Christopher J. Rillo (Cal. Bar No. 112009)
26 crillo@jenner.com
27 JENNER & BLOCK LLP
28 633 West 5th Street, Suite 3600
Los Angeles, CA 90071-2054
Tel: (213) 239-2250
Fax: (213) 239-5199

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cberlow@jenner.com
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mslachetka@jenner.com
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Fax: (312) 527-0484
(**Pro Hac* Admissions forthcoming)

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fakremi@jenner.com
JENNER & BLOCK LLP
1099 New York Avenue NW, Suite 900
Washington, DC 20001
Tel: (202) 637-6325
Fax: (202) 639-6066

Counsel for Amici Curiae

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on April 9, 2020, I filed the foregoing document via the Court’s CM/ECF system. The document will be served electronically on counsel of record for the parties.

/s/ Christopher J. Rillo
Christopher J. Rillo

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4 Chicago, Illinois 60654
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10
11 Christopher J. Rillo (Cal. Bar No. 112009)
crillo@jenner.com
Jenner & Block LLP
12 633 West 5th Street, Suite 3600
Los Angeles, CA 90071-2054
13 Tel: (213) 239-2250
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**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
AMICI CURIAE BRIEF**

Hearing

Date: May 4, 2020
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Courtroom: Riverside, Courtroom 1
Judge: Hon. Jesus G. Bernal

1 **I. PUBLIC HEALTH EXPERTS’ INTEREST IN THE CASE**

2 *Amici curiae* are experts in infectious diseases, healthcare policy, correctional
3 healthcare, human rights, and other related fields who have decades of cumulative
4 experience researching infectious diseases, crafting and evaluating public policy regarding
5 the medical care of prisoners and detained persons, and treating patients in clinical settings,
6 including in emergency departments. Based on their experience, and their review of the
7 available information about the COVID-19 pandemic, it is Amici’s view that Plaintiffs in
8 this action are at high risk of serious, life-threatening COVID-19 infection, and that
9 Plaintiffs’ continued confinement puts them—and the public—at a heightened risk of
10 contracting and further spreading COVID-19.

11 **II. ARGUMENT**

12 This Court has “broad discretion” to allow the filing of *amicus curiae* briefs.
13 *Hoptowit v. Ray*, 682 F.2d 1237, 1260 (9th Cir. 1982), *abrogated on other grounds by*
14 *Sandin v. Conner*, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). “[A]n individual seeking to appear as amicus must
15 merely make a showing that his participation is useful to or otherwise desirable to the
16 court,” but beyond that, there are “no strict prerequisites” that must be met prior to this
17 Court granting the application. *In re Roxford Foods Litig.*, 790 F. Supp. 987, 997 (E.D. Cal.
18 1991) (quoting *United States v. La.*, 751 F. Supp. 608, 620 (E.D. La. 1990)).

19 An *amicus* is particularly relevant “in cases of general public interest by making
20 suggestions to the court, by providing supplementary assistance to existing counsel, and by
21 insuring a complete and plenary presentation of difficult issues so that the court may reach
22 a proper decision.” *Newark Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Harrison*, 940 F.2d 792, 808
23 (3d Cir. 1991). An *amicus* brief is normally allowed “when (1) ‘a party is not represented
24 competently or is not represented at all,’ (2) ‘the amicus has an interest in another case that
25 may be affected by the holding in the present case,’ or (3) ‘the amicus can present unique
26 information that can help the court in a way that is beyond the abilities the lawyers for the
27 parties are able to provide.’” *AmeriCare MedServices, Inc. v. City of Anaheim*, Lead Case
28

1 No. 8:16-cv-1703-JLS-AFMx, 2017 WL 1836354, at *1 n.3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2017)
2 (quoting *Gabriel Techs. Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.*, No. 08CV1992 AJB (MDD), 2012 WL
3 849167, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2012)). While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
4 provide no guidelines for allowing or denying an *amicus* brief, the Third Circuit has
5 interpreted the relevant Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure at length in *Neonatology*
6 *Associates, P.A. v. C.I.R.*, 293 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 2002). There, then-Judge Alito advocated
7 in favor of allowing *amicus* participation. “I think that our court would be well advised to
8 grant motions for leave to file *amicus* briefs unless it is obvious that the proposed briefs do
9 not meet Rule 29’s criteria as broadly interpreted. I believe that this is consistent with the
10 predominant practice in the courts of appeals.” *Id.* at 133.

11 Given *amici* Public Health Experts’ experience and knowledge in infectious diseases,
12 healthcare policy, correctional healthcare, human rights, and other related fields, their
13 participation in this case is both useful and desirable. *Amici* seek to provide this Court with
14 background and context on the complex epidemiological risk faced by Plaintiffs in this case.

15 CONCLUSION

16 For the reasons stated above, Public Health Experts respectfully request leave to file
17 a brief as *amici curiae* in support of Plaintiffs’ pending Motion for Preliminary Injunction
18 (Dkt. 81).

19 Dated: April 9, 2020

Respectfully Submitted,

20 By: /s/ Christopher J. Rillo
21 Christopher J. Rillo (Cal. Bar No. 112009)
22 crillo@jenner.com
23 JENNER & BLOCK LLP
24 633 West 5th Street, Suite 3600
25 Los Angeles, CA 90071-2054
26 Tel: (213) 239-2250
27 Fax: (213) 239-5199

28 Clifford W. Berlow*
cberlow@jenner.com
Michele L. Slachetka*
mslachetka@jenner.com
JENNER & BLOCK LLP
353 North Clark Street
Chicago, Illinois 60654

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Tel: (312) 222-9350
Fax: (312) 527-0484
(**Pro Hac* Admissions forthcoming)

Faaris Akremi (Cal. Bar No. 324557)
fakremi@jenner.com
JENNER & BLOCK LLP
1099 New York Avenue NW, Suite 900
Washington, DC 20001
Tel: (202) 637-6325
Fax: (202) 639-6066

Counsel for *Amici Curiae*

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EXHIBIT A

1 Christopher J. Rillo
crillo@jenner.com
2 JENNER & BLOCK LLP
Los Angeles, California
3 633 West 5th Street, Suite 3600
Los Angeles, California 90071-2054
4 Tel: (213) 239-2250
Fax: (213) 239-5199

5 Clifford W. Berlow*
6 cberlow@jenner.com
Michele L. Slachetka*
7 mslachetka@jenner.com
JENNER & BLOCK LLP
8 353 North Clark Street
Chicago, Illinois 60654
9 Tel: (312) 840-7366
Fax: (312) 527-0484
10 (*Pro Hac* admissions forthcoming)

11 Faaris Akremi
fakremi@jenner.com
12 JENNER & BLOCK LLP
1099 New York Avenue NW, Suite 900
13 Washington, DC 20001
Tel: (202) 637-6325
14 Fax: (202) 639-6066

15 Counsel for *Amici Curiae*

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23 Defendants.

Case No. 5:19-cv-1546-JGB-SHK

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE
PUBLIC HEALTH EXPERTS

Date: April 9, 2020

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INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE

Amici curiae are experts in infectious diseases, healthcare policy, correctional healthcare, human rights, and other related fields who have decades of cumulative experience researching infectious diseases, crafting and evaluating public policy regarding the medical care of prisoners and detained persons, and treating patients in clinical settings, including in emergency departments. Based on their experience, and their review of the available information about the COVID-19 pandemic, it is their view that Plaintiffs in this action are at high risk of serious, life-threatening COVID-19 infection, and that their continued confinement puts them at a heightened risk of contracting and further spreading COVID-19.

Parveen Parmar, M.D., M.P.H., is the Chief of the Division of Global Emergency Medicine at the University of Southern California Keck School of Medicine, where she is an Associate Professor of Clinical Emergency Medicine, and the founder of Southern California Physicians for Health Equity, a group committed to protecting access to care for all patients, including undocumented immigrants. Dr. Parmar’s research has focused on the study of health and human rights violations in refugees and internally displaced populations. Dr. Parmar has supported health care for refugees and other vulnerable persons globally in multiple settings – on issues such as emergency care delivery, maternal and child health, gender-based violence, and primary care provision. Currently Dr. Parmar is researching deaths in ICE detention centers nationally over the past decade, and she has extensive experience reviewing medical records of individuals currently in ICE detention.

Katherine P. Anderson, M.D., is an Assistant Professor of Family Medicine at the University of Colorado, Anschutz Medical Campus. Dr. Anderson has expertise in preventative medicine in underserved populations and has worked in federally qualified health centers in Colorado for twenty-three years. Dr. Anderson has worked extensively to assist training and coordination of clinician volunteers conducting forensic medical exams for detained persons at the Aurora, Colorado facility.

1 Lilia Cervantes, M.D., is an Associate Professor in the Department of Medicine at
2 the University of Colorado, Anschutz Medical Campus. Dr. Cervantes has conducted
3 extensive research and published on topics that highlight the worse outcomes faced by
4 undocumented immigrants with poor access to care and has worked with key health policy
5 and community stakeholders in the state of Colorado to change health policy and expand
6 access to care for undocumented immigrants.

7 Annelies De Wulf, M.D., M.P.H., is an Emergency Medicine Physician at the
8 University Medical Center of New Orleans. She is the Director in International Emergency
9 Medicine and an Associate Program Director for the Spirit of Charity, Louisiana State
10 University Emergency Medicine Residency in New Orleans. She is also the President-Elect
11 of the American College of Academic International Medicine, a group focused on
12 improving quality of medical care worldwide. She has researched and published on the
13 topics of interpersonal violence and risk reduction, ethics of international medicine
14 programs, and emergency care capacity building in resource-limited settings. Much of her
15 teaching is focused on patient centered care, social determinants of health, and advocacy
16 for vulnerable populations.

17 Carlos Franco-Paredes, M.D., M.P.H., is an Associate Professor of Medicine at the
18 University of Colorado in the Department of Medicine, Division of Infectious Diseases.
19 Dr. Franco-Paredes holds a public health degree with a concentration on the dynamics of
20 global infectious disease epidemics and pandemics and from 2006 to 2009 participated in
21 developing international guidelines for pandemic influenza preparedness and response as
22 well as a global health action plan with the World Health Organization. He has written and
23 published extensively on the topics of infectious diseases pandemics and epidemics,
24 particularly in influenza. He also has experience providing care to individuals in civil
25 detention centers in the United States (US) and has performed medical forensic
26 examinations and medical second opinion evaluations for patients in ICE custody.

27
28

1 Dr. Mark Earnest is a Professor of Medicine at the University of Colorado School of
2 Medicine where he serves as the Chief of General Internal Medicine. Dr. Earnest has taught
3 Health Policy and published in areas related to Health Policy and health equity. He currently
4 serves as the chairman of the Health Policy Committee of the Society of General Internal
5 Medicine.

6 Matthew Gartland, M.D., is an Attending Physician in the Division of General
7 Internal Medicine at Brigham and Women's Hospital in Boston, MA, the Department of
8 Pediatrics at Newton Wellesley Hospital, Newton, MA, and the Department of Medicine at
9 Harvard Medical School. He has participated in inpatient clinical care of adult and pediatric
10 COVID-19 patients and is a contributor to the authorship of Brigham and Women's
11 Hospital's clinical protocols for the care of patients with COVID-19, open access at
12 covidprotocols.org. He is also the Director of the Massachusetts General Hospital Asylum
13 Clinic, and in this capacity has conducted numerous medical and psychological evaluations
14 of persons seeking asylum in the United States including individuals in ICE detention.

15 Marcia Glass, M.D., is an Associate Professor of Internal Medicine at Tulane
16 University. Dr. Glass provides inpatient consultations as a member of the New Orleans VA
17 Hospice and Palliative Medicine group and also provides care for hospitalized medical
18 patients as part of the UMC hospitalist group, as well as teaching for medical students and
19 residents. Dr. Glass has worked internationally with Doctors Without Borders, the
20 Yale/Stanford Johnson and Johnson Global Health Program, Columbia University, UCSF,
21 and Partners in Health. Dr. Glass also is the coauthor of the recently published Oxford Field
22 Manual for Palliative Care in Humanitarian Crises.

23 Rohini J. Haar, M.D., M.P.H., is a Lecturer at the University of California at Berkeley
24 School of Public Health in the Division of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, Berkeley CA
25 and an emergency medicine physician at Physician, Kaiser Medical Center in Oakland,
26 California. Dr. Haar is also a medical adviser to Physicians for Human Rights and has
27 expertise in the fields of health and human rights. In addition to being a practicing physician
28

1 in Oakland, California, her research and advocacy work focuses on the protection of human
2 rights in times of complex humanitarian crisis particularly for vulnerable populations. She
3 teaches on global health ethics and health and human rights, with a focus on torture and the
4 health impacts of human rights violations. She has specific expertise in documenting torture
5 and has taught and written on the Istanbul Protocol, including working on the 2020 update
6 to the Istanbul Protocol manual. She has conducted more than 100 evaluations of torture
7 survivors and asylum seekers both in and out of detention.

8 Danielle Loeb, M.D., M.P.H, is an Associate Professor of Medicine at the University
9 of Colorado School of Medicine, where she works as a primary care physician and
10 healthcare services researcher. Dr. Loeb is a practicing physician and has researched and
11 published on topics related to the delivery of care for patients with complex care needs,
12 especially those with chronic medical and mental health conditions.

13 Jaime Moo-Young, M.D. is a primary care physician in Denver and an Assistant
14 Professor of General Internal Medicine at the University of Colorado School of Medicine.
15 She is the co-founder and co-medical director of Colorado's first Human Rights Clinic,
16 which provides medical and mental health forensic evaluations for immigrants seeking
17 asylum and other legal statuses in the United States. She also co-founded the Colorado
18 Human Rights Consortium, a non-profit alliance of healthcare and legal professionals
19 collaborating to address the intersecting medical and legal needs of immigrants across the
20 state. She has extensive clinical experience working with refugee and immigrant
21 populations, including detained immigrants in the GEO ICE Processing Center in Aurora,
22 Colorado.

23 Todd Schneberk, M.D., is an assistant professor of clinical emergency medicine and
24 an assistant program director of the LAC+USC Emergency Medicine Residency program.
25 He completed his residency in emergency medicine at LAC+USC Medical Center and
26 subsequently earned a fellowship in health policy and research at the University of
27 California Los Angeles. His research and advocacy interests include social determinants of
28

1 health, immigration status as a health barrier, opioid use disorder and leveraging the
2 emergency department to address upstream factors affecting the health and stability of
3 vulnerable populations.

4 Sophie Terp, MD, MPH is an Assistant Professor of Clinical Emergency Medicine
5 at the USC Keck School of Medicine. Dr. Terp is an emergency physician and health
6 services researcher who studies access to emergency care for vulnerable populations. She
7 works with incarcerated populations in the emergency department at LAC+USC Medical
8 Center and is currently studying facility compliance with ICE Performance-Based National
9 Detention as it pertains to deaths of persons in ICE custody.

10 Susi Vassallo, M.D., is a Clinical Professor at the Ronald O. Perelman Department
11 of Emergency Medicine and NYU Langone Health. Dr. Vassallo is a nationally recognized
12 expert in toxicology and emergency medicine.

13 Matthew Wynia, MD, MPH is a Professor of Medicine and of Public Health at the
14 University of Colorado and the Director of the CU Center for Bioethics and Humanities.
15 He has long-standing expertise in ethical issues in disasters and sits on the National
16 Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine's Forum on Medical and Public Health
17 Preparedness for Disasters and Emergencies, and he has published widely on the ethics of
18 triage and crisis standards of care.

19 Janine Young, M.D., FAAP, is an Associate Professor of Pediatrics at the University
20 of Colorado School of Medicine and an expert in immigrant and refugee health. Dr. Young
21 has continuously worked with immigrants and refugees over her twenty-year career and is
22 a founding member of the Colorado Human Rights Consortium. In that capacity, she has
23 provided her expertise, *pro bono*, for immigrants held in detention. She has spoken
24 nationally, published articles, and presented webinars on healthcare for immigrant children
25 and adults, including refugees, unaccompanied minors, and undocumented immigrants.

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1 *Amici* seek to inform this Court about the direct injuries to personal health that
2 Plaintiffs are likely to suffer absent the requested relief. Additionally, *Amici* seek to inform
3 the Court about the impact to the broader public if those injuries are not mitigated.¹

4 **ARGUMENT**

5 Rarely has this Nation faced so great a challenge. COVID-19 is an extremely
6 infectious disease and its effects for many are serious enough to warrant hospitalization and
7 all too often are fatal nonetheless. Given those basic realities, the rapid spread of COVID-
8 19 across the globe has created an unprecedented international health crisis. In the United
9 States, the epidemic has led to the adoption and implementation of unprecedented, but
10 necessary, mitigation strategies, including the canceling of public events, the closing of
11 schools and businesses, and stay-at-home orders to the general public. At present, there is
12 no vaccine or cure for COVID-19.

13 It is imperative to the national interest that the spread of COVID-19 within detention
14 facilities be managed aggressively. Such facilities, including those operated by Immigration
15 and Customs Enforcement (ICE), are enclosed environments, which makes them, like cruise
16 ships, highly susceptible to epidemics. That is because the now all too familiar tools for
17 managing the spread of COVID-19—firm social distancing measures and aggressive
18 hygiene protocols—are all but impossible in a detention facility setting, in which detained
19 persons are crowded together, sharing bathroom products, and where sanitizing products
20 are infrequently used. So without an immediate and substantial change to that *status quo*, it
21 is a matter of time before the ICE detention facilities experience an outbreak of COVID-19
22 that will jeopardize the safety and well-being of those who are confined there, including
23 Plaintiffs.

24 *Amici* believe that ICE has not—and cannot—take measures sufficient to blunt the
25 spread of COVID-19 in ICE detention facilities. This is of grave concern not just to
26 Plaintiffs and detention facility staff, but to the entire Nation. If, and when, an outbreak

27 ¹ The opinions expressed in this brief are solely those of the *amici curiae* and should not be construed to
28 represent the views of the various institutions with which they are affiliated.

1 occurs at these facilities, a significant number of the detained persons and staff alike will
2 require hospitalizations that cannot be provided at the ICE facilities themselves. Instead,
3 the burden to care for these individuals will fall to local hospital systems. This will create a
4 significant risk of local hospitals being overrun, thereby preventing all those who need
5 critical care from receiving it.

6 The only way to prevent a public health crisis in the communities located near ICE's
7 detention facilities is to immediately reduce the density of the detention centers and
8 significantly reform the prophylactic measures in place at such facilities for the detained
9 persons who remain. The urgency for the Court to mandate these steps cannot be overstated.
10 Given the speed with which COVID-19 is spreading, permitting ICE to delay these
11 necessary reforms will place countless lives in danger. Allowing the *status quo* to endure is
12 a recipe for a public health disaster.

13 **I. Under Current Conditions, It Is Only A Matter Of Time Before There Will Be**
14 **A Dangerous Outbreak Of The Highly Contagious COVID-19 Virus At ICE**
15 **Detention Facilities.**

16 **A. COVID-19 Is A Dangerous Disease That Requires Aggressive And**
17 **Proactive Measures To Curb Its Transmission.**

18 The COVID-19 pandemic is an ongoing pandemic of coronavirus disease 2019 that
19 is caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). As of
20 April 8, 2020, there were 1,353,361 confirmed cases and 79,235 confirmed deaths
21 worldwide.² In the United States, there were 395,011 confirmed cases and 12,754 confirmed
22 deaths.³ Due to the apparent ease with which COVID-19 spreads, it is expected that these
23 numbers will continue to rise exponentially.⁴

24 COVID-19 is highly transmissible. Recent estimates suggest that, on average in
25 community settings, each infected person transmits the virus to an additional 2.79 people

26 ² See World Health Organization, *Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Pandemic* (2020),
<https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019>.

27 ³ See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, *Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Cases & Latest*
Updates, <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html>.

28 ⁴ See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, *Situation Summary* (2020),
<https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/summary.html>.

1 (i.e., the reproductive number).⁵ If that figure is correct, a single infected person can be
2 responsible for 28,579 infections after just ten iterations of infection.

3 There are multiple reasons why COVID-19 has proven to be so communicable. *First*,
4 even asymptomatic individuals can transmit the disease to others,⁶ meaning that separating
5 from others only those who exhibit symptoms will not stop the infection’s spread. *Second*,
6 the virus has been found to have an incubation period of fourteen days,⁷ allowing infected
7 (and potentially asymptomatic) individuals to unwittingly infect others for weeks. *Third*,
8 the virus can survive outside the body for prolonged periods of time—for example, COVID-
9 19 has been detected for up to seventy-two hours on plastic and stainless steel, twenty-four
10 hours on cardboard, four hours on copper, and three hours as an aerosol.⁸

11 The effects of COVID-19 also are potentially life-threatening. One-fifth of all cases
12 cause serious illness, including respiratory damage that requires hospitalization and
13 mechanical ventilation, and can permanently harm those who survive.⁹ As of April 6, the
14 U.S. mortality rate was 3.13%.¹⁰ By contrast, heart disease, which consistently ranks as the
15 leading cause of death in the United States, has a death rate over eight times smaller
16 (0.2%).¹¹ The risk is even greater for those who are over the age of 65, and those of any age
17

18 ⁵ Ying Liu et al., *The Reproductive Number Of COVID-19 Is Higher Compared To SARS Coronavirus*,
19 27 J. Travel Med. 1, 1 (Feb. 13, 2020), <https://academic.oup.com/jtm/article/27/2/taaa021/5735319>.

20 ⁶ Yan Bai et al., *Presumed Asymptomatic Carrier Transmission Of COVID-19*, JAMA (Feb. 21, 2020),
<https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/article-abstract/2762028>.

21 ⁷ Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, *Interim Clinical Guidance For Management Of Patients
With Confirmed Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)*, <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/clinical-guidance-management-patients.html>.

22 ⁸ Neeltje van Doremalen et al., *Aerosol & Surface Stability Of SARS-CoV-2 As Compared With SARS-
CoV-I*, (letter to editor) *New Engl. J. Med.* (Mar. 17, 2020),
23 <https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMc2004973>.

24 ⁹ “While about 80% of cases manifest as a mild illness (i.e. non-pneumonia or mild pneumonia),
approximately 20% progress to a more severe illness, with 6% requiring specialist medical care,
including mechanical ventilation.” World Health Organization, *Preparedness, Prevention And Control
Of COVID-19 In Prisons And Other Places Of Detention: Interim Guidance*, 10 (Mar. 15, 2020),
25 [http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/434026/Preparedness-prevention-and-control-of-
COVID-19-in-prisons.pdf?ua=1](http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/434026/Preparedness-prevention-and-control-of-COVID-19-in-prisons.pdf?ua=1).

26 ¹⁰ Jason Oke & Carl Heneghan, CEBM, *Oxford COVID-19 Evidence Service* (updated Apr. 7, 2020),
27 <https://www.cebm.net/covid-19/global-covid-19-case-fatality-rates>.

28 ¹¹ Kenneth D. Kochanek et al., *Deaths: Final Data for 2017*, *Nat’l Vital Stat. Rep.*, 6 tbl. B (June 24,
2019), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr68/nvsr68_09-508.pdf.

1 with underlying health problems such as—but not limited to—weakened immune systems,
2 diabetes, and diseases of the lungs, kidneys, heart, and liver.¹²

3 Because of its high mortality rate and transmissibility, both the World Health
4 Organization (WHO) and the Centers for Disease Control & Prevention (CDC) consider
5 COVID-19 a public health emergency.¹³ To contain the disease, public bodies across the
6 globe have urged individuals and communities to implement two critical public health
7 practices. *First*, proper hygiene practices, including regular hand washing with soap for at
8 least twenty seconds, especially after coughing, sneezing, blowing one’s nose, using the
9 bathroom, eating, preparing food, taking medication, or touching garbage. Such practices
10 are vital to prevent COVID-19 transmission due to the virus’s ability to survive inside and
11 outside the body for long periods of time. *Second*, as a leading and frequently cited report
12 from the Imperial College London has suggested, “suppression will minimally require a
13 combination of social distancing of the entire population, home isolation of cases and
14 household quarantine of their family members.”¹⁴ Thus, the CDC has recommended that all
15 individuals engage in such “social distancing” by staying at least six-feet apart throughout
16 the duration of the pandemic.¹⁵ Keeping distance from others is especially important with
17 COVID-19 because asymptomatic individuals often are contagious without knowing it.
18 And when social distancing is not practical, the CDC recommends “cohorting”—the

19 ¹² Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, *People Who Are At Higher Risk For Severe Illness*,
20 <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-at-higher-risk.html> (last
accessed Apr. 8, 2020).

21 ¹³ World Health Organization, *Statement On The Second Meeting Of The International Health*
22 *Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee Regarding The Outbreak Of Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV)*
(Jan. 30, 2020), [https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/30-01-2020-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-\(2005\)-emergency-committee-regarding-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-\(2019-ncov\)](https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/30-01-2020-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-regarding-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov)); CDC, *Situation Summary*, Section entitled “Highlights of CDC’s Response,”
23 *supra* note 4.

24 ¹⁴ *See, e.g.*, Neil M. Ferguson et al., Imperial College London, *Impact Of Non-Pharmaceutical*
25 *Interventions (NPIs) To Reduce COVID-19 Mortality And Healthcare Demand 1* (2020),
[https://www.imperial.ac.uk/media/imperial-college/medicine/sph/ide/gida-fellowships/Imperial-College-](https://www.imperial.ac.uk/media/imperial-college/medicine/sph/ide/gida-fellowships/Imperial-College-COVID19-NPI-modelling-16-03-2020.pdf)
26 [COVID19-NPI-modelling-16-03-2020.pdf](https://www.imperial.ac.uk/media/imperial-college/medicine/sph/ide/gida-fellowships/Imperial-College-COVID19-NPI-modelling-16-03-2020.pdf).

27 ¹⁵ Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, *Interim Guidance On Management Of Coronavirus Disease*
28 *2019 (COVID-19) In Correctional And Detention Facilities*, Section entitled “Definitions of Commonly
Used Terms” (Mar. 23, 2020), [https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/correction-](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/correction-detention/guidance-correctional-detention.html#social_distancing)
[detention/guidance-correctional-detention.html#social_distancing](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/correction-detention/guidance-correctional-detention.html#social_distancing) (“*CDC Detention Guidance*”) (last
accessed Apr. 8, 2020).

1 practice of isolating groups of lab-confirmed cases rather than isolating individuals¹⁶—
2 although the CDC stresses that “[o]nly individuals who are laboratory confirmed COVID-
3 19 cases should be placed under medical isolation as a cohort.”¹⁷

4 Of course, rigorous adherence to these practices will not foreclose the possibility of
5 new infections. But it will help to achieve the vital public health goal of “flattening the
6 curve”—that is, slowing the exponential growth of infectious diseases by preventing initial
7 rapid onset. Flattening the curve allows the health care system to care for the same
8 individuals over a longer period of time and prevents the system from being overburdened
9 at any one instance.¹⁸ Outbreaks are anathema to this process because they cause large
10 numbers of simultaneous infections and trigger exponential hospitalization growth.

11 It is for precisely this reason that more than ninety percent of the U.S. population is
12 now under order to stay home by state or local government officials.¹⁹ This drastic,
13 unprecedented response is necessary to contain the spread of the virus as quickly as
14 possible. Without these measures, the worst-case scenario in the Imperial College London
15 study cited above indicates that the United States could suffer up to 2.2 million deaths as a
16 result of the COVID-19 crisis.²⁰

17 **B. There Is Good Reason To Believe That ICE Is Not Taking Adequate**
18 **Measures To Prevent The Spread Of COVID-19 Among Detained**
19 **Persons.**

20 ICE has put forward only the most threadbare of descriptions for how it proposes to
21 minimize the risk that COVID-19 will spread among detained persons. Notwithstanding
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23 ¹⁶ *Id.*

24 ¹⁷ *Id.*, Section entitled “Medical Isolation of Confirmed or Suspected COVID-19 Cases.”

25 ¹⁸ See Kara Gavin, *Flattening The Curve For COVID-19: What Does It Mean And How Can You Help?*,
26 Univ. Mich. Health (Mar. 11, 2020), <https://healthblog.uofmhealth.org/wellness-prevention/flattening-curve-for-covid-19-what-does-it-mean-and-how-can-you-help>; Brandon Specktor, *Coronavirus: What Is ‘Flattening The Curve,’ And Will It Work?*, Live Sci. (Mar. 16, 2020), <https://www.livescience.com/coronavirus-flatten-the-curve.html>.

27 ¹⁹ Nicole Chavez et al., *Nearly All Americans Are Under Stay At Home Orders But Fauci Says The US Needs More Coronavirus Restrictions*, CNN (Apr. 2, 2020), <https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/02/health/us-coronavirus-thursday/index.html>.

28 ²⁰ Ferguson, *Impact Of Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPIs) To Reduce COVID-19 Mortality And Healthcare Demand*, *supra* note 14, at 7.

1 that they are both vague and cursory, ICE’s representations raise great concerns as to the
2 adequacy of the protections in place at its various detention facilities.

3 ICE points to public guidance proposing that facilities manage the spread of COVID-
4 19 through “cohorting.”²¹ Review of that guidance shows that ICE categorizes detained
5 persons into three categories. First, “those who meet CDC’s criteria for epidemiologic risk
6 of exposure to COVID-19” and who present “with fever and/or respiratory symptoms” are
7 “isolate[d].”²² They are to be kept in “a single medical housing room, or in a medical
8 airborne infection isolation room specifically designed to contain biological agents.”²³
9 Second, those “who meet CDC’s criteria for epidemiologic risk of exposure to COVID-
10 19,” but are asymptomatic, are to be “housed separately from the general population,” either
11 “in a single cell, or as a group, depending on available space.”²⁴ Third, for those in the
12 general population, the guidance states only that detention facilities should “increase social
13 distancing,” which may include “staggered meals and recreation times in order to limit the
14 number of detainees gathered together.”²⁵

15 This cursory guidance raises concerns in multiple respects. Initially, it does not define
16 the “criteria for epidemiologic risk” that drives this “cohorting,” making it impossible to
17 assess the degree to which these groups are over- or under-inclusive. Nor does it describe
18 the methods by which individual detained persons are to be evaluated against those criteria,
19 making it similarly impossible to evaluate the efficacy of ICE’s evaluations. Indeed, this
20 flaw in the ICE guidance is critical because detained persons often lack full knowledge of
21 their medical condition to share with staff and often are reluctant to be transparent about
22 their medical histories with ICE personnel, a concern that is all the greater given the
23 growing social stigma surrounding COVID-19. Moreover, the ICE guidance does not
24 propose any measures with respect to those who present with symptoms consistent with

25 ²¹ U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, *ICE Guidance On COVID-19*, Section entitled
26 “Detention,” <https://www.ice.gov/coronavirus> (last accessed Apr. 8, 2020).

27 ²² *Id.*

28 ²³ *Id.*

²⁴ *Id.*

²⁵ *Id.*

1 COVID-19, but do not fit that unstated criteria. This creates a high risk that individuals with
2 COVID-19 will be introduced into the general population. Lastly, vaguely providing that
3 social distancing should be maximized is inadequate. Per the CDC, *everyone* should avoid
4 contact with others—full stop.²⁶ If conditions at a detention facility do not permit adequate
5 social distancing measures to be taken by all detained persons, regardless of their cohort,
6 the facility should not house detained persons.

7 In short, ICE’s guidance emphasizes testing of patients with known epidemiologic
8 risk factors (travel, contact with known cases, etc.) as well as symptoms.²⁷ This strategy will
9 not prevent outbreaks in ICE detention centers, as a significant proportion of COVID-19
10 carriers will not have known epidemiologic risk factors and may never have any symptoms,
11 meaning that under ICE’s guidance they may freely transmit the virus to dozens of other
12 individuals while in detention. Indeed, there is now widespread transmission of COVID-19
13 in communities across the Nation, making ICE’s continued reliance on epidemiologic risk
14 factors particularly indefensible. Further, ICE’s guidance still means those with
15 epidemiologic risk factors and who exhibit symptoms must be properly tested. Because
16 testing nationally is limited and slow at the present time, the ICE facility must wait for the
17 result while isolating the individual, which depending on the location and lab involved, may
18 take one hour to several days. Even then, COVID-19 tests are known to have a high rate of
19 false negatives.²⁸ And even though an individual tests negative for COVID-19 once, but has
20 a clinical presentation that is suspicious for COVID-19, expert consensus suggests that the
21 patient should be retested and maintained in isolation until the test has been negative twice,
22 the ICE guidance does not provide for any retesting.²⁹

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25 ²⁶ See generally Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, *How To Protect Yourself & Others*,
<https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/prevention.html>.

26 ²⁷ ICE Guidance on COVID-19, Section entitled “Detention,” *supra* note 21.

27 ²⁸ See Yicheng Fang et al., *Sensitivity Of Chest CT For COVID-19: Comparison To RT-PCR*, RSNA
(Feb. 19, 2020), <https://pubs.rsna.org/doi/full/10.1148/radiol.2020200432>.

28 ²⁹ Fact Sheet For Health Care Providers (updated Mar. 15, 2020),
<https://www.fda.gov/media/135662/download>.

1 The April 4, 2020 supplemental guidance provided by ICE does nothing to cure these
2 deficiencies. *See Angel Alejandro Heredia Mons et al. v. Kevin K. McAleenan*, No. 1:19-
3 cv-1593-JEB, ECF No. 66-1 (D.D.C.). Although the supplemental guidance does direct
4 detention facilities to identify detained persons at higher risk and to reassess whether those
5 at-risk individuals should be released under the INA’s discretionary custody provisions,
6 that guidance does not provide a timeline for its implementation, it is preliminary and does
7 not require any change in policy, and it excludes those who are in mandatory custody. *Id.*
8 So even assuming *arguendo* that all those who are eligible for reassessment under this
9 guidance are actually released, although there is no reason to make that assumption, the
10 population in ICE detention facilities and the conditions therein still create a powder keg
11 for the spread of infection.

12 The representations made by Defendants to the Court in this case also do not alleviate
13 these concerns. With respect to screening detained persons for COVID-19, ICE’s Action
14 Plan submitted to all detention wardens and superintendents indicates only that “IHSC
15 developed guidance for IHSC-staffed facilities to assist in the risk assessment and
16 management of detained individuals with potential exposure to COVID-19, and guidance
17 was disseminated to non IHSC-staffed ICE detention facilities for potential adoption of this
18 guidance at their respective sites. This guidance addresses intake medical screenings,
19 monitoring, encounters, laboratory testing, and public health actions.” (Dkt. No. 95-2 at 5.)
20 Notably, Defendants did not indicate whether any detention facilities had actually adopted
21 and implemented that guidance. At most, the memorandum requires that “[f]acilities ...
22 have updated pandemic plans and policies as well as established quarantine and/or isolation
23 areas within their facilities in the event they are needed.” (*Id.* at 2.) The Declaration of
24 Dr. Ada Rivera adds little. It simply describes the process of medical review during the
25 detained person intake process and then summarizes ICE’s cohorting plan. (Dkt. No. 95-3
26 at 3-4.)

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1 The same is true of the Declaration of Captain Jennifer Moon. (Dkt. No. 95-11 at 3-
2 4.) Indeed, Captain Moon’s declaration simply rehashes the same description of the
3 procedures used at Adelanto ICE processing center that Captain Moon provided to the court
4 in another case. *See generally Pedro Bravo Castillo & Luis Vasquez Rueda v. Barr et al.*,
5 No. 5:20-cv-00605-TJH-AFM (C.D. Cal.). But another member of this court already found
6 that description wanting when granting a temporary restraining order compelling the release
7 of certain ICE detained persons being held at Adelanto ICE processing center, the court
8 gave little credit to Captain Moon’s declaration. *Id.*, TRO & Show Cause Order (Mar. 27,
9 2020), ECF No. 32. That likely is for the reason the plaintiffs’ medical expert in that case,
10 Dr. Ranit Mishori provided: “I am not aware of any epidemiologist or any public health
11 expert who would consider these procedures to be sufficient preventative measures.” *Id.*,
12 Reply (Mar. 27, 2020), ECF No. 28-1 ¶ 2.

13 As for the private prison companies that operate the majority of ICE’s detention
14 facilities, although they have issued statements regarding COVID-19, none of them sets
15 forth clear protocols that would obviate the concerns regarding ICE’s guidance. For
16 instance, GEO released a press release acknowledging the risk, but without providing any
17 specific details regarding quarantine policies, separation, or social distancing.³⁰ Similarly,
18 another such company, CoreCivic issued a statement on their COVID-19 response that also
19 does not identify any specific protocols aimed at curbing the risk presented by COVID-19.³¹

20 ICE does not deserve the benefit of the doubt. ICE health facilities are not routinely
21 overseen or licensed by state departments of health and only some facilities are accredited,
22 on a voluntary basis, by the Joint Commission for Accreditation of Healthcare
23 Organizations (JCAHO), the National Commission on Correctional Healthcare (NCCHC)

24 ³⁰ See Press Release, GEO Group Is Working To Address The Risk Of Coronavirus To Those In Our
25 Care And Our Employees, https://www.geogroup.com/Portals/0/GEO_Coronavirus_Statement.pdf.

26 ³¹ See Press Release, An Update On CoreCivic’s Response To COVID-19 From President & CEO
27 Damon Hininger (Mar. 23, 2020), <https://www.corecivic.com/news/an-update-on-corecivics-response-to-covid-19-from-president-and-ceo-damon-hininger>. It appears that CoreCivic took down its initial tepid
28 response, but it was archived by the Wayback Machine. *See How CoreCivic Is Managing COVID-19*,
CoreCivic, [https://web.archive.org/web/20200403002946/https://www.corecivic.com/hubfs/_files/
CoreCivic%20Response%20to%20Covid-1.pdf](https://web.archive.org/web/20200403002946/https://www.corecivic.com/hubfs/_files/CoreCivic%20Response%20to%20Covid-1.pdf).

1 or the American Correctional Association (ACA). But there is no consequence for any of
2 the private companies that provide health care in these settings to lose that voluntary
3 accreditation. Additionally, it has been documented by the Department of Homeland
4 Security's Office of the Inspector General,³² as well as in reports by the ACLU, Human
5 Rights Watch, Human Rights First, and Disability Rights California,³³ that medical care
6 provided in ICE facilities is commonly below community standards. For instance, last year,
7 more than 5,200 detained persons were quarantined as ICE tried to contain outbreaks of
8 chickenpox and mumps at its detention facilities, with the CDC ultimately concluding that
9 most of those detained persons developed the illnesses while in federal custody, not before.³⁴
10 Further, a recent ProPublica review of seventy reports detailing deaths from medical
11 conditions in ICE detention over the last decade also found that staff often break strict rules
12 for testing contagious diseases, further exacerbating the limitations of the protocols in place
13 at these facilities.³⁵ And there is evidence that detained persons frequently lack access to
14 bathrooms, sinks, water, soap, cleaning supplies, and other equipment that can promote
15 good hygiene.³⁶

18 ³² Dep't Homeland Sec. Office Inspector Gen., *ICE Does Not Fully Use Contracting Tools To Hold*
19 *Detention Facility Contractors Accountable For Failing To Meet Performance Standards*, (Jan. 29,
2019), <https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2019-02/OIG-19-18-Jan19.pdf>.

20 ³³ Human Rights Watch, *US: Poor Medical Care, Deaths, In Immigrant Detention* (June 20, 2018),
21 <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/20/us-poor-medical-care-deaths-immigrant-detention>; Disability
22 Rights California, *There Is No Safety Here: The Dangers For People With Mental Illness & Other*
23 *Disabilities In Immigration Detention At GEO Group's Adelanto ICE Processing Center* (Mar. 2019),
[https://www.disabilityrightsca.org/system/files/file-attachments/DRC_REPORT_ADELANTO-](https://www.disabilityrightsca.org/system/files/file-attachments/DRC_REPORT_ADELANTO-IMMIG_DETENTION_MARCH2019.pdf)
24 [IMMIG_DETENTION_MARCH2019.pdf](https://www.disabilityrightsca.org/system/files/file-attachments/DRC_REPORT_ADELANTO-IMMIG_DETENTION_MARCH2019.pdf); Human Rights First, *New Report Documents Mental,*
25 *Physical, Legal Impact Of Increased Detention In California* (Jan. 15, 2019),
[https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/press-release/new-report-documents-mental-physical-legal-impact-](https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/press-release/new-report-documents-mental-physical-legal-impact-increased-detention-california)
26 [increased-detention-california](https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/press-release/new-report-documents-mental-physical-legal-impact-increased-detention-california).

24 ³⁴ Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, *Notes From The Field: Mumps In Detention Facilities That*
25 *House Detained Migrants-U.S., Sept. 2018-Aug. 2019* (Aug. 2019),
<https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/68/wr/mm6834a4.htm>.

26 ³⁵ ProPublica, *Ice Has Repeatedly Failed To Contain Contagious Diseases, Our Analysis Shows It's A*
27 *Danger To The Public* (Mar. 20, 2020), [https://www.propublica.org/article/ice-has-repeatedly-failed-to-](https://www.propublica.org/article/ice-has-repeatedly-failed-to-contain-contagious-diseases-our-analysis-shows-its-a-danger-to-the-public)
28 [contain-contagious-diseases-our-analysis-shows-its-a-danger-to-the-public](https://www.propublica.org/article/ice-has-repeatedly-failed-to-contain-contagious-diseases-our-analysis-shows-its-a-danger-to-the-public).

27 ³⁶ Caitlin Dickerson, *'There Is A Stench': Soiled Clothes And No Baths For Migrant Children At A Texas*
28 *Center*, N.Y. Times (June 21, 2019), [https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/us/migrant-children-border-](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/us/migrant-children-border-soap.html)
[soap.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/us/migrant-children-border-soap.html).

1 Lastly, the inadequacy of the preventative measures at detention centers is bolstered
2 by the anecdotal evidence presented by Plaintiffs in this case. One detained person, a trained
3 medical doctor, reports that his dormitory at an Aurora, Colorado facility operated by GEO
4 is running at virtually full capacity, that new detained persons have been brought in without
5 additional precautions during the outbreak, that facilities for handwashing are wholly
6 inadequate, and that detained persons are not allowed hand sanitizer. (Decl. of Mikhail
7 Solomonov, Dkt. 81-3, ¶¶ 6-9.) That detained person also reports that administrators are
8 “doing nothing to ensure sanitation in our dorm,” which is shared by eighty detained
9 persons. (*Id.* ¶¶ 6, 9.) Detained persons held at other facilities report similar and related
10 problems, including failures by administrators to explain basic precautions and safety
11 protocols to detained persons, provide essentials like soap and hand sanitizer, prevent sick
12 employees from coming to work, clean or sanitize high-traffic areas like bathrooms, or
13 screen individuals transferred into and out of these facilities. (*See, e.g.*, Decl. of Keren
14 Zwick, Dkt. 81-7, ¶¶ 9-13, 15-25, 28-30; Decl. of Francis L. Conlin, Dkt. 81-9, ¶¶ 5-14;
15 Decl. of Elissa Steglich, Dkt. 81-10, ¶¶ 5-9; Decl. of Anne Rios, Dkt. 81-13, ¶¶ 7-9, 14-16,
16 22-23.) It appears, therefore, that these problems are widespread and that ICE’s paltry
17 efforts to curb the risk have been ineffective.

18 **C. Regardless Of The Measures ICE Takes, The Detention Facilities**
19 **Inherently Create A Heightened Risk Of COVID-19 Spread.**

20 Detention centers are, by their very nature, enclosed environments. This makes it
21 impossible to implement and enforce the sorts of social distancing protocols that are
22 necessary to arrest the spread of COVID-19. So even if ICE mandated that all detention
23 facilities optimized its policies, which it has not, an outbreak *still* would be highly probable.

24 Studies show that a significant portion of the current pandemic is driven by
25 asymptomatic carriers passing the virus in close quarters.³⁷ Given that fact, it is impossible
26 to implement the mitigation efforts inside immigration facilities that have become a

27 ³⁷ U.S. Nat’l Library Med., Nat’l Inst. Health, *Estimating The Asymptomatic Proportion Of Coronavirus*
28 *Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Cases On Board The Diamond Princess Cruise Ship, Yokohama, Japan, 2020*
(Mar. 12, 2020), <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7078829>.

1 necessary safeguard of life outside those facilities. Detention facilities, by their very nature,
2 require detained persons to share close quarters, such as dining halls, bathrooms, showers,
3 and other common areas. Further, these spaces often are poorly ventilated, which further
4 promotes the spread of diseases. Detained persons thus are stripped of the primary weapon
5 in the war against COVID-19 by the enforced inability to practice meaningful social
6 distancing.

7 Hygiene-based preventative measures also are frequently ineffective in detention
8 facilities, as detained persons typically lack access to sufficient soap and alcohol-based
9 sanitizers to engage in the kind of frequent hand washing encouraged throughout the rest of
10 the country. Staff also often do not clean or sanitize high-touch surfaces with sufficient
11 frequency, like door handles and light switches. Indeed, Plaintiffs in this case have provided
12 evidence that detention facility staff often do not undertake cleaning tasks *at all*. (Decl. of
13 Keren Zwick, Dkt. 81-7, ¶ 24 (“In Aurora, an NIJC client reports that immigrants in
14 detention also continue to bear responsibility for daily cleaning the bathrooms and floors.
15 They are not provided with masks or other safety supplies, and only sometimes get
16 gloves.”).) These issues are further exacerbated by the fact that staff, contractors and
17 vendors all pass between communities and these shared spaces, with each group able to
18 bring infectious diseases into those facilities. The populations of detention facilities
19 experience constant turnover, as detained persons come and go, with each new detained
20 person potentially carrying COVID-19 and introducing it into the facility’s population. This
21 problem is especially acute in the context of immigration detention facilities, where it is
22 common to see detained persons transferred between facilities, which creates a risk of
23 detention facilities spreading the virus throughout the system.³⁸

24 These limitations are inherent with respect to all infectious diseases but are especially
25 concerning in the context of COVID-19. As discussed above, it is difficult to identify and
26 isolate those who are infected with COVID-19 because, while any given individual may

27 ³⁸ *CDC Detention Guidance*, Section entitled “Quarantining Close Contacts of COVID-19 Cases,” *supra*
28 note 15 (last accessed Apr. 8, 2020).

1 suffer only from mild symptoms or be asymptomatic, that person may well be carrying and
2 spreading the disease. Moreover, detention facilities lack the capacity to perform the kind
3 of broad-based, systematic, and ongoing testing required to significantly lower the risk that
4 COVID-19 will enter and spread throughout the facility.

5 These are not theoretical concerns. It is well documented that communicable diseases
6 are far more prevalent in detention facilities than in the public as a whole.³⁹ For example, a
7 2005 study found that, nationwide, the prevalence of HIV among incarcerated populations
8 is ten times that of the general population, and inmates are *2,500 times* more likely to suffer
9 from tuberculosis.⁴⁰ Another study found that during the H1N1-strain flu outbreak in 2009
10 (known as the “swine flu”), jails and prisons experienced a disproportionately high number
11 of cases.⁴¹

12 The evidence all but confirms that the same will be true of COVID-19. The recent
13 spread of COVID-19 in New York City jails bears this out: On March 20, there were
14 nineteen confirmed cases; on March 21, there were thirty-eight; on March 25, there were
15 seventy-five; on March 29, there were 139; on April 3, there were 231—a more than 1,100%
16 increase in confirmed cases in just two weeks.⁴² Indeed, the chief doctor at Rikers Island has
17 called the spread of COVID-19 at the prison a “public health disaster unfolding before our
18

19 ³⁹ E.g. Bianca Malcolm, *The Rise Of Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus In U.S. Correctional*
20 *Populations*, J. Corr. Health Care (May 13, 2011),

21 <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3116074>; Stephanie M. Lee, *Nearly 900 Immigrants*
22 *Had The Mumps In Detention Centers In The Last Year*, BuzzFeed News (Aug. 29, 2019),

23 <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/stephaniemlee/mumps-ice-immigrant-detention-cdc>.

24 ⁴⁰ Zulficar Gregory Restum, *Public Health Implications Of Substandard Correctional Health Care*, 95
25 *Am. J. Pub. Health* 1689, 1689 (Oct. 2005), <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1449420>.

26 ⁴¹ David M. Reutter, *Swine Flu Widespread In Prisons And Jails, But Deaths Are Few*, Prison Legal
27 *News* (Feb. 15, 2010), <https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2010/feb/15/swine-flu-widespread-in-prisons-and-jails-but-deaths-are-few>.

28 ⁴² Michael Rezendes & Robin McDowell, *38 For Coronavirus At Rikers, NYC Jails*, Associated Press
(Mar. 23, 2020), <https://apnews.com/54dbc9d47f62cf0c0240314310cfe909>; Andrew Denney, *New*
29 *Coronavirus Cases In NYC Jails Outpacing Rest Of The City*, NY Post (Mar. 25, 2020),
30 <https://nypost.com/2020/03/25/new-coronavirus-cases-in-nyc-jails-outpacing-rest-of-the-city>; Christina
31 Carrega, *Shampoo, Watery Soap To Disinfect: Conditions On Rikers Island During COVID-19 Unsafe,*
32 *Some Inmates Say*, ABC News (Mar. 29, 2020), <https://abcnews.go.com/Health/shampoo-watery-soap-disinfect-conditions-rikers-island-covid/story?id=69767859>; Julia Craven, *Coronavirus Cases Are*
33 *Spreading Rapidly On Rikers Island*, Slate (Apr. 2, 2020), <https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/04/rikers-coronavirus-cases-increase.html>.

1 eyes.”⁴³ Similarly, it was recently reported that the Cook County Jail in Chicago, Illinois has
2 emerged as the nation’s largest known source of COVID-19 infections.⁴⁴ Furthermore, data
3 regarding the spread of COVID-19 in the analogous high-density living conditions of a
4 cruise ship bolsters the risk detained persons face. A recent study of the spread of COVID-
5 19 on the Diamond Princess cruise ship modeled the virus’s basic reproduction rate to be
6 14.8 (rather than the already high 2.79 rate⁴⁵ in the ordinary population—that is, four times
7 higher than normal), absent countermeasures such as isolation and quarantine.⁴⁶ And this
8 already unfathomable rate is likely lower than what prisons and detention facilities will
9 actually experience because the cruise ship passengers would have been able to spend most
10 of their time alone or in small family units, use private bathrooms with access to soap, and
11 have meals delivered.

12 **II. Any Outbreak Of The COVID-19 Virus At A Detention Facility Will**
13 **Overwhelm And Overburden Local Health Facilities.**

14 It is imperative that all steps be taken to avoid an outbreak of COVID-19 at detention
15 facilities, not just because of the impact on those being detained within those facilities and
16 the staff, but because of the stress such an outbreak will place on the Nation’s health
17 infrastructure.

18 As discussed above, it is imperative that the Nation to the greatest extent possible
19 adopt policies that will “flatten the curve.” “The idea is to ... slow the spread of the virus,
20 so that you don't get a huge spike in the number of people getting sick all at once. If that
21 were to happen, there wouldn’t be enough hospital beds or mechanical ventilators for
22

23 ⁴³ Meagan Flynn, *Top Doctor At Rikers Island Calls The Jail A ‘Public Health Disaster Unfolding Before*
24 *Our Eyes,* Wash. Post (Apr. 5, 2020), [https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/03/31/rikers-island-](https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/03/31/rikers-island-coronavirus-spread)
[coronavirus-spread](https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/03/31/rikers-island-coronavirus-spread).

25 ⁴⁴ Timothy Williams & Danielle Ivory, *Chicago’s Jail Is Top U.S. Hot Spot As Virus Spreads Behind*
Bars, N.Y. Times (Apr. 8, 2020), [https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/08/us/coronavirus-cook-county-jail-](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/08/us/coronavirus-cook-county-jail-chicago.html)
[chicago.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/08/us/coronavirus-cook-county-jail-chicago.html).

26 ⁴⁵ Liu, *The Reproductive Number Of COVID-19 Is Higher Compared To SARS Coronavirus,* *supra* note
27 5.

28 ⁴⁶ J. Rocklöv et al., *COVID-19 Outbreak On The Diamond Princess Cruise Ship: Estimating The*
Epidemic Potential And Effectiveness Of Public Health Countermeasures, J. Travel Med.,
<https://academic.oup.com/jtm/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jtm/taaa030/5766334>.

1 everyone who needs them, and the U.S. hospital system would be overwhelmed.”⁴⁷ An
2 overwhelmed U.S. hospital system would force medical providers to make difficult
3 decisions as to who will receive the suddenly scarce commodity of medical care.⁴⁸

4 ICE detention facilities are not hospitals. ICE detention facilities generally do not
5 have the ability to treat the one-fifth of COVID-19 patients whose symptoms are moderate
6 to severe.⁴⁹ In Wuhan, China, for instance, 15-20 percent of COVID-19 patients required
7 not just hospitalization but also admission to intensive care, and 3.2 percent required
8 mechanical ventilation.⁵⁰ ICE knows that it does not have the capacity to provide this care.
9 That is why ICE’s own guidance provides that “ICE transports individuals with moderate
10 to severe symptoms, or those who require higher levels of care or monitoring, to appropriate
11 hospitals with expertise in high-risk care.”⁵¹

13 As another federal district court recently recognized, this is not a panacea because it
14 means an outbreak in an ICE detention facility has the potential to trigger an avalanche of
15 cases that overwhelm local health systems. In an order granting a temporary restraining
16 order compelling the release of detained persons, a judge in the Western District of New
17 York observed that:

18 a COVID-19 outbreak at a detention facility could result in
19 multiple detainees—five, ten or more—being sent to the local

21 ⁴⁷ Maria Godoy, *Flattening A Pandemic’s Curve: Why Staying Home Now Can Save Lives*, NPR (Mar.
22 13, 2020), <https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/03/13/815502262/flattening-a-pandemics-curve-why-staying-home-now-can-save-lives>.

23 ⁴⁸ Ezekial J. Emanuel et al., *How The Coronavirus May Force Doctors To Decide Who Can Live And Who Dies*, (Opinion) N.Y. Times (Mar. 12, 2020),
<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/12/opinion/coronavirus-hospital-shortage.html>.

24 ⁴⁹ “While about 80% of cases manifest as a mild illness (i.e. non-pneumonia or mild pneumonia),
25 approximately 20% progress to a more severe illness, with 6% requiring specialist medical care,
including mechanical ventilation.” World Health Organization, *Preparedness, Prevention And Control
26 Of COVID-19 In Prisons And Other Places Of Detention: Interim Guidance*, *supra* note 9.

27 ⁵⁰ Lingzhong Meng et al., *Intubation And Ventilation Amid The COVID-19 Outbreak: Wuhan’s
Experience*, *Anesthesiology* (Mar. 26, 2020),
<https://anesthesiology.pubs.asahq.org/article.aspx?articleid=2763453>.

28 ⁵¹ *ICE Guidance on COVID-19*, Section entitled “Detention,” *supra* note 21.

1 community hospital where there may only be six or eight
2 ventilators over a very short period. As they fill up and
3 overwhelm ventilator resources, those ventilators become
4 unavailable for all the usual critical illnesses. And ventilators
5 used to treat detainees cannot be used to treat others who contract
6 the virus.

7 *Jones v. Wolf*, No. 20-CV-361, 2020 WL 1643857, at *13-14 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2020)
8 (internal quotation marks and record citations omitted).

9 This is the exact scenario described by Dr. Scott Allen and Dr. Josiah Rich, two
10 medical subject matter experts for the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Civil
11 Rights and Civil Liberties, in a March 19, 2020 letter to Congress. As Dr. Allen and Dr.
12 Rich explained,

13 social distancing is an oxymoron in congregate settings, which
14 because of the concentration of people in a close area with limited
15 options for creating distance between detainees, are at very high
16 risk for an outbreak of infectious disease. This then creates an
17 enormous public health risk, not only because disease can spread
18 so quickly, but because those who contract COVID-19 with
19 symptoms that require medical intervention will need to be
20 treated at local hospitals, thus increasing the risk of infection to
21 the public at large and overwhelming treatment facilities. As local
22 hospital systems become overwhelmed by the patient flow from
23 detention center outbreaks, precious health resources will be less
24 available for people in the community.⁵²

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26
27 ⁵² Letter from Dr. Scott A. Allen & Dr. Josiah Rich to Congress (Mar. 19, 2020) at 4,
28 <https://whistleblower.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Drs.-Allen-and-Rich-3.20.2020-Letter-to-Congress.pdf>.

1 The risk of this “tinderbox” scenario at ICE detention facilities is all the more concerning
2 because “dozens of immigration detention centers are in remote areas with limited access
3 to health care facilities. Many facilities, because of the rural locations, have only one on-
4 site medical provider. If that provider gets sick and requires being quarantined for at least
5 fourteen days, the entire facility could be without any medical providers at all during a
6 foreseeable outbreak of a rapidly infectious disease.”⁵³ So in this scenario, “many people
7 from the detention center *and the community* die unnecessarily for want of a ventilator.”⁵⁴

8 An example of this phenomenon is playing out in Illinois. Stateville Correctional
9 Center, home to more than 4,100 inmates, has a rapidly growing outbreak of COVID-19.
10 AMITA Health St. Joseph’s Medical Center in Joliet is treating all forty-nine (as of April
11 3) inmates who have tested positive so far, eight of whom are on ventilators, limiting the
12 availability of resources for all members of the community. “An emergency room physician
13 described the hospital as a ‘war zone,’” and there is now an acute shortage of nursing staff.⁵⁵
14 This pattern is expected to play out at prisons across the Nation.⁵⁶

15 As Dr. Allen and Dr. Rich summarized, “[i]n the alternate scenario where detainees
16 are released from high risk congregate settings, the tinderbox scenario of a large cohort of
17 people getting sick all at once is less likely to occur, [] the peak volume of patients hitting
18 the community hospital would level out,” and “survival is maximized as the local mass
19 outbreak scenario is averted.”⁵⁷ Put another way, in this time of already strained resources,
20 it is contrary to the national interest for there to be an outbreak at an ICE detention facility.
21 Given that the status quo makes it all but certain that such an outcome will occur, it is
22 imperative that Plaintiffs receive the injunctive relief they are seeking. To deny them that

23 ⁵³ *Id.*

24 ⁵⁴ *Id.* (emphasis in original).

25 ⁵⁵ Josh McGhee, *Stateville Prison Outbreak Signals COVID-19 Threat To Inmates, Surrounding Hospital Systems*, Chi. Reporter (Apr. 3, 2020), <https://www.chicagoreporter.com/stateville-prison-outbreak-signals-covid-19-threat-to-inmates-surrounding-hospital-systems>.

26 ⁵⁶ Danielle Ivory, *‘We Are Not a Hospital’: A Prison Braces For The Coronavirus*, N.Y. Times (Mar. 17, 2020), <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/17/us/coronavirus-prisons-jails.html> (quoting prison staff members who explained that “if the prison had multiple cases, some would need to be sent to a nearby hospital for treatment.”).

27 ⁵⁷ Letter from Drs. Allen & Rich to Congress, *supra* note 52.

1 relief jeopardizes the lives and well-being of not just the detained persons, but of the tens
2 of thousands of Americans living in close proximity to these facilities.

3 **CONCLUSION**

4 For the foregoing reasons, *amici curiae* respectfully request that this Court grant
5 Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction.

6 Dated: April 9, 2020

Respectfully Submitted,

7 By: /s/ Christopher J. Rillo
8 Christopher J. Rillo
9 crillo@jenner.com
10 JENNER & BLOCK LLP
11 Los Angeles, California
12 633 West 5th Street, Suite 3600
13 Los Angeles, California 90071-2054
14 Tel: (213) 239-2250
15 Fax: (213) 239-5199

16 Clifford W. Berlow*
17 cberlow@jenner.com
18 Michele L. Slachetka*
19 mslachetka@jenner.com
20 JENNER & BLOCK LLP
21 353 North Clark Street
22 Chicago, Illinois 60654
23 Tel: (312) 840-7366
24 Fax: (312) 527-0484

25 Faaris Akremi
26 fakremi@jenner.com
27 Jenner & Block LLP
28 1099 New York Avenue NW, Suite 900
Washington, DC 20001
Tel: (202) 637-6325
Fax: (202) 639-6066

Counsel for Amici Curiae

*Pro Hac Vice Application Forthcoming

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on April 9, 2020, I filed the foregoing document via the Court’s CM/ECF system. The document will be served electronically on counsel of record for the parties.

/s/ Christopher J. Rillo
Christopher J. Rillo

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1 Clifford W. Berlow (Ill. Bar No. 6292383)
cberlow@jenner.com
2 Michele L. Slachetka (Ill. Bar No. 6297640)
mslachetka@jenner.com
3 JENNER & BLOCK LLP
353 North Clark Street
4 Chicago, Illinois 60654
Tel: (312) 222-9350
5 Fax: (312) 527-0484
(*Pro Hac* Admissions forthcoming)

6 Faaris Akremi (Cal. Bar No. 324557)
7 Jenner & Block LLP
1099 New York Avenue NW, Suite 900
8 Washington, DC 20001
Tel: (202) 637-6325
9 Fax: (202) 639-6066
fakremi@jenner.com

10 Christopher J. Rillo (Cal. Bar No. 112009)
11 Jenner & Block LLP
633 West 5th Street, Suite 3600
12 Los Angeles, CA 90071-2054
Tel: (213) 239-2250
13 Fax: (213) 239-5199

14 Counsel for *Amici Curiae*

15
16 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
EASTERN DIVISION – RIVERSIDE**

17 FAOUR ABDALLAH FRAIHAT *et*
18 *al.*,

19 Plaintiffs,

20 v.

21 U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
22 CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT *et al.*,

23 Defendants.

Case No. 5:19-cv-1546-JGB-SHK

**[PROPOSED] ORDER
GRANTING LEAVE FOR
AMICI PUBLIC HEALTH
EXPERTS TO FILE BRIEF**

The Honorable Jesus G. Bernal

1 On April 9, 2020, Public Health Experts filed a motion for leave to file an *amici*
2 *curiae* brief in support of Plaintiffs' pending Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. 81).

3 **GOOD CAUSE** showing, the Court **GRANTS** the motion.

4 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

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6 Dated:

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8 Honorable Jesus G. Bernal
9 United States District Judge
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