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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
AT SEATTLE

Arturo MARTINEZ BAÑOS, Edwin  
FLORES TEJADA, and German VENTURA  
HERNANDEZ, on behalf of themselves as  
individuals and on behalf of others similarly  
situated,

Plaintiffs-Petitioners,

v.

Nathalie ASHER, Field Office Director;  
Sara R. SALDAÑA, Director, Immigration  
and Customs Enforcement; Jeh  
JOHNSON, Secretary of the  
Department of Homeland Security;  
Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General  
of the United States; Juan P. OSUNA,  
Director of Executive Office for Immigration  
Review; Lowell CLARK, Warden,

Defendants-Respondents.

Civil Action No. 2:16-cv-01454-JLR-BAT

Agency Nos.

A 089 091 010

A 098 225 790

A 206 104 257

AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF  
HABEAS CORPUS AND CLASS ACTION  
COMPLAINT

**I. Introduction**

1. Plaintiffs-Petitioners Arturo Martinez Baños (“Mr. Martinez”), Edwin Flores Tejada (“Mr. Flores”), German Ventura Hernandez (“Mr. Ventura”), and the class they seek to

1 represent (“Plaintiffs”) are subjected to unlawful and prolonged detention, without an  
2 opportunity for a custody hearing as a result of Defendants’ determination that Immigration  
3 Judges do not have jurisdiction to conduct custody hearings (also known as bond hearings) for  
4 persons fleeing persecution and torture, who are placed in “withholding only” proceedings  
5 under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(e).

6       2. Defendants’ erroneous interpretation of the statute directly flouts controlling case  
7 law from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, making clear that persons in immigration  
8 proceedings who face prolonged detention—detention of six months or longer—are entitled to  
9 a custody hearing. *See Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez III)*, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015),  
10 *cert. granted sub nom. Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016); *Diouf v.*  
11 *Napolitano (Diouf II)*, 634 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2011); *Casas–Castrillon v. Department of*  
12 *Homeland Security*, 535 F.3d 942 (9th Cir.2008); *Prieto–Romero v. Clark*, 534 F.3d 1053,  
13 1059 (9th Cir. 2008).

14       3. Plaintiffs are being unlawfully denied the opportunity to even seek a custody  
15 redetermination from a neutral arbiter who determines whether that individual presents a flight  
16 risk or threat to the community, or whether the noncitizen is entitled to be released during the  
17 lengthy immigration proceedings.

18       4. There is no legal authority for Defendants’ policy and practice of denying Plaintiffs,  
19 noncitizens in withholding only proceedings, custody hearings before an Immigration Judge  
20 when faced with prolonged detention, *regardless* of which immigration statute authorizes the  
21 initial detention. *See Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez II)*, 715 F.3d 1127, 1139 (9th Cir. 2013)  
22 (concluding that as suggested by *Diouf II*, “immigration detention becomes prolonged at the  
23 six-month mark regardless of the authorizing statute.”).

1           5. Moreover, Defendants’ interpretation also violates Plaintiffs’ right to obtain a  
2 custody hearing before an Immigration Judge when *first* transferred from the summary  
3 reinstatement proceedings to withholding only proceedings. Defendants’ assertion that  
4 noncitizens in withholding only proceedings are detained based on a final order pursuant to 8  
5 U.S.C. § 1231(a) is contrary to *Guerra v. Shanahan*, -- F.3d --, 2016 WL 4056035 (2d Cir. July  
6 29, 2016), the only federal court of appeals decision squarely addressing this issue.

7           6. Rejecting Defendants’ position, the Second Circuit determined that persons in  
8 withholding only proceedings are detained under 8 U.S. C. § 1226(a), as opposed to § 1231(a).  
9 This analysis is critical as it clarifies that Plaintiffs do not need to first suffer through six  
10 months of detention before obtaining a custody hearing from an Immigration Judge. Instead,  
11 once Defendants have referred Plaintiffs to withholding only proceedings, Plaintiffs are  
12 immediately eligible to request a custody hearing pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d).

13           7. While the Ninth Circuit has not yet squarely addressed this issue, several of its  
14 decisions strongly reinforce the Second Circuit’s analysis. *See Rodriguez III*, 804 F.3d at 1086  
15 (where immigration proceedings are still pending, including administrative or judicial review,  
16 “the non-citizen has not been ‘ordered removed,’ and the removal period has not begun, so §  
17 1231(a) is inapplicable” (*citing Owino v. Napolitano*, 575 F.3d 952, 955 (9th Cir.  
18 2009) (“[W]hile administrative proceedings are pending on remand, Owino will not be subject  
19 to a *final* order of removal, so § 1231 cannot apply.”))); *Ortiz–Alfaro v. Holder*, 694 F.3d 955,  
20 958 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that, in determining whether the Court has jurisdiction over a  
21 petition for review, where noncitizen was placed in withholding only proceedings, there is no  
22 final administrative order until after the IJ and BIA complete withholding only proceedings and  
23 any administrative appeal).

1 8. Defendants preclude Plaintiffs from obtaining custody hearings by refusing to  
2 acknowledge that noncitizens in withholding only proceedings are detained pursuant to 8  
3 U.S.C. § 1226, and thus eligible to seek a custody determination from an Immigration Judge  
4 pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d). Instead, Defendants continue to assert that Plaintiffs remain  
5 subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) because they have final orders of  
6 removal, even though Defendants have determined that Plaintiffs possess a reasonable fear of  
7 persecution or torture and accordingly have transferred Plaintiffs from summary reinstatement  
8 proceedings to withholding only proceedings before the Immigration Judge.

9 9. As a result of Defendants' policies and practices rejecting the authority of  
10 Immigration Judges to conduct custody hearings for Plaintiffs under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, persons  
11 in withholding only proceedings remain locked up in federal facilities and private prisons like  
12 the Northwest Detention Center for several months, often in excess of a year, and sometimes  
13 for multiple years.

14 10. Plaintiffs' detention without a custody hearing where they have the opportunity to  
15 demonstrate that they should be released on bond or on their own recognizance, violates both  
16 the Immigration and Nationality Statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 *et seq.*, and the United States  
17 Constitution.

18 11. Through this action Mr. Martinez, Mr. Flores, and Mr. Ventura, on behalf of  
19 themselves and proposed Class Members, request this Court declare that noncitizens placed in  
20 withholding only proceedings are not subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), but instead  
21 their detention is authorized by § 1226(a), and enjoin Defendants from denying Plaintiffs  
22 custody hearings pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d).

23



1 17. Defendant-Respondent Sara R. Saldaña is the Director of Immigration & Customs  
2 Enforcement. ICE is the agency within the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) that is  
3 responsible for apprehension, detention, and removal of noncitizens from the United States.  
4 Director Saldaña is a legal custodian of the named Plaintiffs and proposed Class Members.  
5 She is sued in her official capacity.

6 18. Defendant-Respondent Jeh Johnson is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland  
7 Security, an agency of the United States. He is named in his official capacity.

8 19. Defendant-Respondent Juan P. Osuna is the Director of the Executive Office for  
9 Immigration Review (“EOIR”), an agency within the Department of Justice responsible for the  
10 immigration courts and Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). He is named in his official  
11 capacity.

12 20. Defendant-Respondent Loretta E. Lynch is the Attorney General of the United  
13 States and the most senior official in the Department of Justice. She has the authority to  
14 interpret the immigration laws and adjudicate removal cases. By regulation, the Attorney  
15 General delegates this responsibility to the immigration courts and the BIA, which are  
16 administered by EOIR. She is named in her official capacity.

17 21. Defendant-Respondent Lowell Clark is the warden of the Northwest Detention  
18 Center, operated by the GEO Group, Inc., under contract with the Department of Homeland  
19 Security. Defendant Clark is sued in his official capacity because he has custody of detained  
20 Plaintiffs.

### 21 III. Custody

22 22. Mr. Martinez is currently released from the Northwest Immigration Detention  
23 Center and residing at his home in Othello, Washington. However, as the BIA has sustained

1 Defendant ICE’s appeal and declared that the Immigration Judge had no authority to conduct a  
2 custody hearing, Mr. Martinez is subject to immediate detention, at Defendants’ discretion. As  
3 such, he remains in the constructive custody of Defendant Asher, who directs ICE detention  
4 and enforcement operations in Washington State.

5 23. Mr. Flores has been detained at the Northwest Detention Center since December 21,  
6 2015, and is thus subject to the custody of Defendant Asher. On August 30, 2016—after 253  
7 days of detention—the Immigration Judge denied Mr. Flores’s request for bond on the ground  
8 that she lacked jurisdiction because he is in withholding only proceedings. Ex. B at 2.

9 24. Mr. Ventura has been detained at the Northwest Detention Center since October 18,  
10 2016, and is thus subject to the custody Defendant Asher.

11 25. Proposed Class Members, all of whom remain in custody at the Northwest  
12 Detention Center or are subject to an order of detention there, while in withholding only  
13 proceedings in the Western District of Washington.

#### 14 **IV. Jurisdiction and Venue**

15 26. This action arises under the Constitution of the United States, the Immigration and  
16 Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 *et seq.*, and the Administrative Procedure Act  
17 (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 701 *et seq.*

18 27. This Court has jurisdiction under Article 1, section 9, clause 2 of the United States  
19 Constitution (Suspension Clause); 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331  
20 (federal question), 1361, and 1651 (All Writs Act).

21 28. This Court may grant declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §  
22 2241, 5 U.S.C. § 702, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, and 28 U.S.C. § 2202.

1 29. Plaintiffs-Petitioners have exhausted any and all administrative remedies to the  
2 extent required by law.

3 30. Venue is proper in the Western District of Washington under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(e)  
4 and 1402 where Defendant Asher resides and where custody determinations are made with  
5 respect to the named Plaintiffs and proposed Class Members.

## 6 **V. Legal Background**

### 7 **Reinstatement Proceedings and Withholding Only Proceedings**

8 31. Mr. Martinez, Mr. Flores, Mr. Ventura, and all putative Class Members are persons,  
9 who were previously ordered removed, thereafter re-entered the United States without  
10 inspection, and were subsequently encountered by U.S. immigration authorities. Consequently,  
11 they are all subject to an administrative removal process under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) known as  
12 a reinstatement of removal.

13 32. Pursuant to the implementing regulations, persons subject to reinstatement of  
14 removal are not provided an opportunity to appear in front of an Immigration Judge. 8 C.F.R. §  
15 241.8(a). Instead, they are placed through an expedited process where an ICE official issues an  
16 order of removal predicated upon the person's prior removal order and subsequent unlawful  
17 reentry. The person is then summarily removed from the country.

18 33. However, an "exception" to the summary removal process exists for a noncitizen,  
19 who expresses a fear of being persecuted or tortured if returned to their home country. 8 C.F.R.  
20 § 241.8(e). In such a case the noncitizen is interviewed by an asylum officer to determine if she  
21 or he has a reasonable fear of persecution or torture. *Id.* If an asylum officer determines that the  
22 person has a reasonable fear they are then transferred from the summary reinstatement process  
23 into full proceedings before an Immigration Judge called "withholding only proceedings." 8



1 C.F.R. § 208.31(e). *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 1208.2(c)(3)(i) (while the scope is limited to  
2 applications for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture, cases  
3 referred for withholding only proceedings “shall be conducted in accordance with the same  
4 rules of procedure as proceedings under 8 C.F.R. part 240, subpart A.”).

5 34. Because Defendants have already determined that Mr. Martinez, Mr. Flores, Mr.  
6 Ventura, and all Plaintiffs have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture, they have all been  
7 referred for full proceedings before an Immigration Judge where they have an opportunity to  
8 apply for withholding of removal and/or relief under the Convention Against Torture. *See* 8  
9 C.F.R. § 1208.31(e). Moreover, Plaintiffs have the right to an administrative appeal to the BIA  
10 (and thereafter to seek judicial review before the federal court of appeals) if they are not  
11 granted either withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), or relief under the  
12 Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c). *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(e).

13 **Statutory Authority for Detention in Withholding Only Proceedings.**

14 35. Notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiffs have been transferred to immigration  
15 proceedings before Immigration Judges, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs remain subject to  
16 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a).

17 36. Defendants assert that Immigration Judges have no jurisdiction to make custody  
18 determinations for persons subject to reinstatement of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).  
19 Defendants purport to detain persons subject to reinstatement of removal throughout the  
20 removal proceeding, relying on the authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2), which requires that  
21 noncitizens be detained “[d]uring the removal period.” The statute defines the removal period  
22 as beginning on the “date the order of removal becomes administratively final” (unless the  
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1 person seeks judicial review or is confined by authorities other than immigration officials). 8  
2 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B).

3 37. However, both binding case law and the controlling statute make clear that  
4 Plaintiffs are not subject to a final administrative order until the withholding only proceedings  
5 are concluded, including any administrative appeal. *See Rodriguez III*, 804 F.3d at 1086; *Ortiz-*  
6 *Alfaro*, 694 F.3d at 958; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B) (removal order is not final until both the  
7 Immigration Judge and the BIA complete review).

8 38. 8 U.S.C. § 1226 authorizes the detention of a noncitizen “pending a decision on  
9 whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.” Plaintiffs submit that  
10 because withholding of removal proceedings are now pending before the agency, their  
11 detention is governed by § 1226, not § 1231(a).

12 39. For a person detained under § 1226, subject to limited exceptions laid out in  
13 subsection (c), ICE may detain the noncitizen or release her subject to parole or a bond. If ICE  
14 elects to detain the noncitizen, the noncitizen may request a custody redetermination hearing  
15 before an Immigration Judge. 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1).

16 40. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), by contrast, only governs the detention of noncitizens, who are  
17 subject to a final order of removal. This section defines a 90-day “removal period” after a  
18 removal order becomes “administratively final”; during the removal period, detention is  
19 required. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)-(2).

20 41. “Where a [noncitizen] falls within this statutory scheme can affect whether his  
21 detention is mandatory or discretionary, as well as the kind of review process available to him  
22 if he wishes to contest the necessity of his detention.” *Prieto–Romero v. Clark*, 534 F.3d 1053,  
23 1057 (9th Cir. 2008).

1           42. The Second Circuit is the only Court of Appeals to squarely address whether a  
2 person in withholding only proceedings is detained pursuant to § 1226 or § 1231(a). *Guerra*.  
3 In *Guerra*, the Court of Appeals unequivocally held that § 1226, not § 1231, provides the  
4 statutory authority for any detention during withholding only proceedings because there are  
5 clearly ongoing administrative proceedings: “8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) permits detention of an  
6 [noncitizen] ‘pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United  
7 States.’ The statute does not speak to the case of whether the [noncitizen] is theoretically  
8 removable but rather to whether the [noncitizen] will actually be removed. An [noncitizen]  
9 subject to a reinstated removal order is clearly removable, but the purpose of withholding-only  
10 proceedings is to determine precisely whether ‘the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the  
11 United States.’ 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).” *Guerra*, at \*2.

12           43. The Court further explained, “8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) authorizes the detention of  
13 [noncitizens] whose removal proceedings are ongoing. By contrast, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) is  
14 concerned mainly with defining the 90-day removal period during which the Attorney General  
15 ‘shall remove the [noncitizen].’” *Id.* at \*3.

16           44. Even prior to the Second Circuit’s decision in *Guerra*, the Ninth Circuit addressed  
17 when the removal order of a person in withholding only proceedings is administratively final  
18 for purposes of seeking judicial review. The Court concluded that “the reinstated removal order  
19 does not become final until the reasonable fear of persecution and withholding of removal  
20 proceedings are complete.” *Ortiz-Alfaro*, 694 F.3d at 958. *See also Luna-Garcia v. Holder*, 777  
21 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2015) (same); *cf. Chupina v. Holder*, 570 F.3d 99, 103-04 (2d Cir. 2009)  
22 (agency order is not final where applications for withholding of removal or relief under the  
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1 Convention Against Torture are pending before the Immigration Judge or the BIA—even if  
2 there is no further ability to challenge the finding of removability).

3 45. Defendants contend that the analysis in *Ortiz-Alfaro* should be limited to  
4 determining the finality of a reinstated removal order for purposes of seeking judicial review,  
5 and disregarded with respect to determining “the finality of a reinstated removal order with  
6 respect to the . . . the source of the detention authority and the Immigration Judge’s jurisdiction  
7 to consider a custody redetermination request.” Ex. A BIA Order at 2.

8 46. However, as the Second Circuit succinctly stated, Defendants “point to no authority  
9 for this proposition, however, and we have never recognizes such ‘tiers’ of finality. Moreover,  
10 the bifurcated definition of finality urged upon us runs counter to principles of administrative  
11 law which counsel that to be final, an agency action must ‘mark the consummation of the  
12 agency’s decisionmaking process.’ *U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs v. Hawkes Co.*, 136 S.Ct. 1807,  
13 1813 (2016) (quoting *Bennett v. Spear*, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997)).” *Guerra*, at \*3.

14 47. While the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet directly addressed this issue,  
15 decisions from the Western District have split upon whether persons in withholding only  
16 proceedings are detained pursuant to § 1226 or § 1231. *See Martinez Mendoza v. Asher*, C14–  
17 0811JCC, Dkt. # 14 (W.D.Wash. Sept. 16, 2014) (individual was detained under § 1226 and  
18 entitled to a custody hearing); *Acevedo-Rojas v. Clark*, No. C14-1323-JLR, 2014 WL 6908540,  
19 at \*5 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2014) (ruling instead that § 1231(a) formed the basis of detention);  
20 *Giron-Castro v. Asher*, No. C14-0867JLR, 2014 WL 8397147, at \*2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 2,  
21 2014) (same); *Gonzalez v. Asher*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29710, \*12 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 16,  
22 2016) (deciding that the Court need not determine whether noncitizen is detained pursuant to §

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1 1226 or § 1231 as petitioner is entitled to bond hearing under either statute because he has been  
2 detained by ICE for more than six months).

3 48. However, *Acevedo-Rojas* and *Giron-Castro* did not have the benefit of the Second  
4 Circuit's analysis in *Guerra*. In addition, neither of those cases had the benefit of the Ninth  
5 Circuit's recent opinion in *Rodriguez III*, in which the Court clarified that there was no need  
6 for a separate § 1231(a) prolonged detention subclass, because individuals with pending  
7 immigration proceedings (persons in withholding only proceedings) continue to be detained  
8 under § 1226: "if a non-citizen has received a stay of removal from the BIA pending further  
9 administrative review, then the order of removal is not yet 'administratively final.' 8 U.S.C. §  
10 1231(a)(1)(B)(i). The non-citizen has not been 'ordered removed,' and the removal period has  
11 not begun, so § 1231(a) is inapplicable." *Rodriguez III*, 804 F.3d at 1086. As such, binding  
12 Ninth Circuit case law emphatically reinforces the Second Circuit's holding in *Guerra*.

13 49. Because persons in withholding only proceedings are detained under § 1226 and not  
14 § 1231 they are immediately eligible to seek a custody hearing before an Immigration Judge.  
15 *See Guerra*, at \*2 ("The answer to this question determines whether Guerra's detention is  
16 governed by § 1231(a) or instead by § 1226(a), and, in turn, whether he was eligible to be  
17 released on bond").

18 **Prolonged Detention Is Not Authorized by Either 8 U.S.C. §1226 or §1231**

19 50. Even where persons are subject to mandatory detention, the Ninth Circuit has  
20 repeatedly made clear that the general immigration statutes do not authorize prolonged  
21 detention without a custody hearing. *See, e.g., Rodriguez II*, 715 F.3d at 1133 ("the canon of  
22 constitutional avoidance requires us to construe the government's statutory mandatory  
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1 detention authority under Section 1226(c) and Section 1225(b) as limited to a six-month  
2 period, subject to a finding of flight risk or dangerousness.”).

3 51. There is simply no legal authority for Defendants to justify their refusal to afford  
4 the named Plaintiffs and proposed Class Members individualized custody hearings when they  
5 have been detained for six months. Rather, Defendants continue to flout controlling case law  
6 from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. *See Rodriguez III*, 804 F.3d at 1065 (“This is the  
7 latest decision in our decade-long examination of civil, i.e. non-punitive and merely  
8 preventative, detention in the immigration context.”).

9 52. In *Casas–Castrillon* and *Prieto–Romero* the Ninth Circuit first examined the  
10 interplay between § 1226 and § 1231 in removal proceedings. The Court ruled that persons  
11 who filed petitions for review and obtained a stay of removal, continued to be detained under §  
12 1226—even though the administrative order was now final. *See Prieto-Romero*, 534 F.3d at  
13 1060 (“§ 1231(a) authorizes detention only ‘[d]uring the removal period,’ § 1231(a)(2), and  
14 ‘beyond the removal period,’ § 1231(a)(6), it clearly does not provide any authority *before* the  
15 removal period.”); *Casas-Castrillon*, 535 F.3d at 947 (noncitizen originally detained under  
16 mandatory detention provision at § 1226(c) who files petition for review of final administrative  
17 order is then detained under discretionary detention provision at § 1226(a), not § 1241(a)).

18 53. The Ninth Circuit next concluded that even where there is already a final order of  
19 removal (i.e., there are no longer pending removal proceedings) and thus the noncitizen is  
20 detained pursuant to § 1231(a), that such a person is entitled to an individualized custody  
21 hearing before an immigration judge when facing prolonged detention. *Diouf II*, 634 F.3d at  
22 1092. The Court of Appeals further made clear that prolonged detention occurs when the  
23 noncitizen is detained for six months. *Id.* at 1091.

1           54. Then in a series of three separate decisions addressing a class action for detainees in  
2 the Central District of California facing prolonged detention under the general detention  
3 statutes, including 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226, and 1231(a), *see Rodriguez v. Hayes (Rodriguez*  
4 *I)*, 591 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 2010), the Court of Appeals definitively clarified that  
5 noncitizens detained pursuant to the general detention statutes are entitled to automatic custody  
6 hearings before an Immigration Judge if they are detained for six months or longer. *Rodriguez*  
7 *III*, 804 F.3d at 1085.

8           55. In addition, in the cases of prolonged immigration detention, the burden of proof  
9 transfers to the government, which must then demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence  
10 why the noncitizen should not be released. *Id.* at 1087, *citing Singh v. Holder*, 638 F.3d 1196,  
11 1203, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011).

12           56. Without the benefit of the Court of Appeals' decisions in *Guerra* and *Rodriguez III*,  
13 the Western District Court was split on determining the underlying statutory authority for  
14 detaining noncitizens in withholding proceedings. But *all* agreed that, regardless of the  
15 authorizing statute, noncitizens are entitled to an individualized bond hearing once they have  
16 been detained for six months by immigration authorities. For example, in *Giron-Castro* this  
17 Court granted the habeas petition ordering that the petitioner be granted an individualized bond  
18 hearing with 14 days of the date of the order based on his prolonged detention even though the  
19 petitioner was detained under § 1231(a). 2014 WL 8397147, at \*1. In *Gonzalez* this Court held  
20 it need not even determine whether the petitioner was detained under § 1226 or § 1231, as  
21 either way he was entitled to a bond hearing because he had been detained for more than six  
22 months. *Gonzalez*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29710, \*12.

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**VI. Factual Allegations**

**Plaintiff-Petitioner Martinez**

57. Plaintiff Martinez is a 36-year-old native and citizen of Mexico who is currently in withholding only proceedings based on his fear of persecution and torture if forcibly returned to Mexico.

58. Mr. Martinez first entered the United States around 1997 without any lawful status. Since that time he has lived primarily in Washington State, and currently lives on a small orchard with his former employers, who have taken him in as part of their family. He has worked for or lived with this same family since around 2006.

59. Mr. Martinez was placed in removal proceedings and ordered removed after having been convicted of possession of a controlled substance in 2009. He then returned to the United States without permission later in 2009 and was summarily removed. He then reentered without inspection, and in 2012 was convicted of Misprision of a Felony. While he was serving prison time for this conviction, he was accused by fellow defendants of providing information about them to U.S. law enforcement agents.

60. In 2013, after completing his sentence, Mr. Martinez was again removed to Mexico. In Mexico, he was kidnapped, beaten, sodomized, and psychologically tortured by uniformed police officers from Petatlan, who held him for ransom, which was ultimately paid by his former employers in Washington State.

61. After he was released from this ordeal, he attempted to enter the United States unsuccessfully three times before he was able to evade detection in mid-2013. However, in 2014, he was charged with Assault in the fourth degree, which charge was dismissed after Mr. Martinez complied with a Stipulated Order of Continuance.



1           62. In March of 2015, Mr. Martinez was apprehended by ICE and served with a Notice  
2 of Intent to Reinstate his 2009 removal order. He was detained at the Northwest Detention  
3 Center in Tacoma. He expressed fear of return to Mexico and underwent a Reasonable Fear  
4 Interview pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(b). The Asylum Office found that Mr. Martinez  
5 demonstrated a reasonable fear of torture by the Petatlan police, who previously tortured him  
6 with impunity, as well as by the members of the cartel related drug trafficking operation, who  
7 suspect Mr. Martinez of providing prejudicial information about them to U.S. law enforcement.

8           63. On October 8, 2015, after Mr. Martinez had been detained in immigration custody  
9 for over six months, the Immigration Court conducted a custody hearing, 196 days after Mr.  
10 Martinez was first placed in immigration custody.

11           64. Immigration Judge Fitting determined that in light of the ongoing withholding only  
12 proceedings based on the asylum officer's finding that Mr. Martinez possesses a reasonable  
13 fear of persecution or torture if returned to Mexico, and his strong community ties, and  
14 notwithstanding his past offenses, DHS had failed to carry its burden of demonstrating with  
15 clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Martinez presented either a flight risk or a danger to the  
16 community. As such, Judge Fitting set a bond in the amount of \$10,000, upon payment of  
17 which Mr. Martinez was released from the Northwest Detention Center and returned to live at  
18 his home, at the residence of his former employer.

19           65. However, ICE filed a notice of appeal to the BIA, challenging the Immigration  
20 Judge's authority to grant a bond to a person like Mr. Martinez, who is currently in withholding  
21 only proceedings.  
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1           66. On June 28, 2016, Mr. Martinez attended his non-detained preliminary withholding  
2 hearing at the Seattle Immigration Court. The Immigration Judge scheduled Mr. Martinez’  
3 merits hearings for September 28, 2018.

4           67. On July 27, 2016, a three-member panel of the BIA issued a split decision,  
5 reversing the Immigration Judge’s custody determination. The majority opinion found that “the  
6 Immigration Judge lacked jurisdiction to consider [Mr. Martinez’s] request to be released from  
7 custody.” *See* Exh. A, BIA Order at 1. Specifically the Board found that “[c]ontrary to the  
8 respondent’s argument on appeal, the DHS’s detention authority stems from 241(a) of the Act  
9 [8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)], not section 236(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)], because respondent is subject  
10 to an administratively final removal order that has been reinstated.” *Id.*

11           68. Further, the Board found that “[a]n Immigration Judge’s authority to redetermine  
12 custody conditions is limited to [noncitizens] who have been issued a Notice to Appear and  
13 placed into removal proceedings under section 240 [8 U.S.C. § 1229a].” Finally, the Board  
14 acknowledged that “while the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held  
15 that certain [noncitizens] are required to be provided custody redetermination hearings after  
16 180 days in detention, [noncitizens] detained under section 241(a) of the Act [8 U.S.C. §  
17 1231(a)] are specifically excluded from that class.” *Id.* at 2.

18           69. The Board vacated the Immigration Judge’s decision granting a \$10,000 bond and  
19 ordered that “[t]he respondent shall be detained without bond pending proceedings.” *Id.* at 3.

20           70. In a dissenting opinion Board Member Grant opined that “the clear language in  
21 *Rodriguez III* provides that a [noncitizen] such as [Mr. Martinez], whose removal is subject to  
22 further administrative review before an Immigration Judge on his application for withholding  
23

1 of removal, is not being detained pursuant to section 241(a) of the Act and thus is entitled to  
2 the bond redetermination hearing mandated by that decision.” *Id.* at 4.

3 71. As a result of the Board’s decision, Immigration Judges in Tacoma now deny  
4 custody redetermination requests by proposed Class Members who have been in detention for  
5 more than six months based on Defendants’ interpretation that the Immigration Judges do not  
6 have jurisdiction over such requests by persons in withholding only proceedings.

7 72. The Immigration Court in Tacoma now utilizes a bond template sheet that includes  
8 a check mark box for denying custody determinations based on “No Jurisdiction” with a  
9 category for “Withholding Only Proceedings.” *See* Exh. B.

10 **Plaintiff-Petitioner Flores**

11 73. Plaintiff Flores is a 35-year-old native and citizen of El Salvador who is currently in  
12 withholding only proceedings based on his fear of persecution and torture if forcibly returned  
13 to El Salvador.

14 74. Mr. Flores first came to the United States in 2001. In November 1999, before  
15 coming to the United States, Mr. Flores was brutally attacked by members of the Mara  
16 Salvatrucha (“MS-13”) gang for refusing to join them. The gang members beat him using  
17 sticks and rods, causing him severe injuries. Around two weeks later Mr. Flores fled to  
18 Mexico, where one of his brothers was living after also having fled from gang recruitment.  
19 After living in Mexico for around a year, in 2001, Mr. Flores entered the United States without  
20 inspection and began to live in Michigan.

21 75. In 2005 Mr. Flores was convicted for operating a vehicle while impaired and  
22 sentenced to one day in jail. He was subsequently placed in removal proceedings. In 2006, he  
23

1 was ordered removed by an Immigration Judge, but did not depart until January 2014, when  
2 Mr. Flores was apprehended by immigration authorities and removed to El Salvador.

3 76. After returning to El Salvador, Mr. Flores was told by a friend that the MS-13 gang  
4 members were still investigating him. Around two weeks after arriving in El Salvador, Mr.  
5 Flores once again fled to Mexico. There, he was kidnapped and threatened for being  
6 Salvadoran. Around April 2014, after being released by the kidnappers, Mr. Flores returned to  
7 the United States. He was apprehended by Border Patrol officers, then convicted for improper  
8 entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1325 and sentenced to 75 days in jail. In July 9, 2014, Mr. Flores was  
9 removed to El Salvador, but he immediately returned to the United States out of fear. He began  
10 to live in SeaTac, Washington, with his family, including two children born in the United  
11 States.

12 77. On December 21, 2015, Mr. Flores was apprehended by ICE officers and  
13 transported to the Northwest Detention Center. On January 11, 2016, Mr. Flores underwent a  
14 Reasonable Fear Interview pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(b). The Asylum Office found that  
15 Mr. Flores demonstrated a reasonable fear of torture by the MS-13, who previously persecuted  
16 him on account of his membership in his nuclear family.

17 78. On August 30, 2016, after 253 days in detention, Mr. Flores appeared before the  
18 Immigration Court for a custody redetermination hearing. Immigration Judge Fitting denied his  
19 request for a bond hearing on the basis that she lacks jurisdiction to order his release because  
20 he is in withholding only proceedings. Ex. B at 2.

21 79. Mr. Flores appealed the Immigration Judge's denial. That appeal is currently  
22 pending before the BIA.

23

1 **Plaintiff-Petitioner Ventura**

2 80. Plaintiff Ventura is a 23-year-old citizen and national of Mexico who is currently in  
3 withholding only proceedings based on his fear of persecution and torture if forcibly returned  
4 to Mexico.

5 81. In January 2014, Mr. Ventura was beaten and threatened by residents of a rival  
6 town and members of its football team. He reported the incident to the police, but the police  
7 did not take any measures. Men from the rival team subsequently returned to his house with  
8 weapons, threatening to kill him for reporting them to the police. For several weeks, Mr.  
9 Ventura continued to receive death threats at his home. In March 2014, the attackers  
10 encountered Mr. Ventura at a market, beat him with rocks, and attempted to run him over with  
11 a car.

12 82. Mr. Ventura fled from Mexico and entered the United States without inspection  
13 around March 16, 2016. He was apprehended by immigration authorities near the border and  
14 removed to Mexico. Around 10 days later, Mr. Ventura returned to the United States and  
15 entered without inspection.

16 83. On June 1, 2016, Mr. Ventura was convicted for driving under the influence of  
17 alcohol in Oregon. He was sentenced to a 12-month diversion program and immediately began  
18 to comply with the court-ordered sentence.

19 84. On October 18, 2016, Mr. Ventura was apprehended by ICE officers at his home  
20 and transported to the Northwest Detention Center. On November 3, 2016, Mr. Flores  
21 underwent a Reasonable Fear Interview pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(b). The Asylum Office  
22 found that Mr. Ventura had demonstrated a reasonable possibility of torture upon removal to  
23 Mexico. Ex. C at 1.

1 85. Pursuant to Defendants' policy and practice, Mr. Ventura is not eligible for an  
2 individualized custody redetermination hearing before an Immigration Judge even though he  
3 has been referred to the Immigration Court for withholding only proceedings.

4 **V. Class Action Allegations**

5 86. Plaintiffs–Petitioners bring this action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure  
6 23(a) and 23(b) on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated. The proposed  
7 class is defined as follows:

8 All individuals who are placed in withholding only proceedings under  
9 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(e) in the Western District of Washington who are  
detained or subject to an order of detention.

10 87. The requirements of Rule 23(a)(1) are met in this case because the class is so  
11 numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Upon information and belief there are  
12 currently over eighty individuals detained at the Northwest Detention Center who fall within  
13 the proposed class and several hundred are detained at the Northwest Detention Center over the  
14 course of a year. Moreover, the inherent transitory state of the putative Class Members further  
15 demonstrates that joinder is impracticable.

16 88. The proposed class meets the commonality requirements of Federal Rule of Civil  
17 Procedure 23(a)(2) because the mandatory detention of individuals within the proposed class is  
18 the result of Defendants' unlawful interpretation of the detention statutes and removal  
19 provisions at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226, 1231.

20 89. The proposed class meets the typicality requirements of Federal Rule of Civil  
21 Procedure 23(a)(3) because the claims of the named Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the  
22 class. The named Plaintiffs and the class of individuals they seek to represent have all been  
23 subjected to mandatory detention despite being placed into ongoing removal proceedings after

1 asylum officers have determined that they possess a reasonable fear of persecution or torture if  
2 returned to their home countries. As such, they are not subject to a final order under 8 U.S.C. §  
3 1231(a) but instead are subject to the detention provisions at § 1226. Moreover, all are  
4 similarly “entitled to automatic bond hearings after six months of detention.” *Rodriguez III*,  
5 804 F.3d at 1085.

6 90. The proposed class meets the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure  
7 23(a)(4) on adequacy of representation. The named Plaintiffs seek the same relief as the other  
8 members of the class, namely the right to an individualized custody determination by an  
9 Immigration Judge, and do not have any interests adverse to those of the class as a whole. In  
10 addition, the proposed class is represented by counsel from the Northwest Immigrant Rights  
11 Project. Counsel has extensive experience litigating class action lawsuits, including lawsuits on  
12 behalf of immigration detainees.

13 91. Finally, the proposed class satisfies Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2)  
14 because the immigration authorities have acted on grounds generally applicable to the class in  
15 applying an erroneous interpretation of § 1231(a) to members of the proposed class. Thus,  
16 final injunctive and declaratory relief is appropriate with respect to the class as a whole. *Cf.*  
17 *Rodriguez I*, 591 F.3d at 1119-20 (8 U.S.C. § 1252(f) does not bar declaratory relief, nor  
18 injunctive relief where “Petitioner here does not seek to enjoin the operation of the immigration  
19 detention statutes, but to enjoin conduct it asserts is not authorized by the statutes.”).

## 20 VI. Claims for Relief

### 21 **First Cause of Action—Violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1226 for failure to Provide Immediate 22 Custody Hearings.**

23 92. The foregoing allegations are realleged and incorporated herein.

1 93. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) authorizes Defendants to release non-citizens who have pending  
2 removal proceedings, including Plaintiff and Class Members who are placed in withholding  
3 only proceedings under 8 C.F.R. 1208.31(e), “[e]xcept as provided in [1226] subsection (c).”

4 94. *Guerra, Rodriguez III*, and *Ortiz-Alfaro*, all confirm that Plaintiffs-Petitioners and  
5 putative Class Members are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), based on their  
6 ongoing immigration proceedings. As they do not have final orders, they are not subject to  
7 detention pursuant to § 1231(a).

8 95. Defendants’ policy and practice of detaining Class Members without the  
9 opportunity for an individualized bond hearing violates 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and is therefore  
10 unlawful.

11 **Second Cause of Action— Violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1101 *et seq.* for failure to Provide**  
12 **Automatic Custody Determinations at Six Months of Detention.**

13 96. The foregoing allegations are realleged and incorporated herein.

14 97. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution  
15 requires that detention be reasonably related to its purpose. Prolonged detention without an  
16 individualized determination of an individual’s dangerousness or flight risk is constitutionally  
17 doubtful. *Rodriguez II*, 715 F.3d at 1137-38. In order to avoid the constitutional concerns the  
18 detention statutes must be construed to contain an implicit reasonable time limitation.  
19 *Rodriguez III*, 804 F.3d at 1079.

20 98. Accordingly, the named Plaintiffs and putative Class Members are all “entitled to  
21 automatic bond hearings after six months of detention.” *Rodriguez III*, 804 F.3d at 1085.

22 Defendants’ policy and practice of mandatorily detaining the named Plaintiffs and Class  
23



1 Members who are subjected to prolonged detention violates the clear holdings of the Court of  
2 Appeals requiring Defendants to justify prolonged detention beyond six months.

3 **Third Cause of Action—Violation of Due Process Clause.**

4 99. The foregoing allegations are realleged and incorporated herein.

5 100. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States  
6 Constitution requires that civil immigration detention be limited to its purpose of preventing  
7 flight risk and danger to the community, and is accompanied by strong procedural protections  
8 to ensure that detention is serving those goals.

9 101. Mandatory detention is not reasonably related to its purpose when applied to  
10 individuals such as Plaintiffs-Petitioners and Class Members, who have been placed in full  
11 immigration proceedings after being found by asylum officers to have a reasonable fear of  
12 persecution or torture pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(e), and who retain the right to file an  
13 administrative appeal and seek judicial review before the Federal Court of Appeals if they are  
14 not granted protection from removal by the Immigration Judge or BIA.

15 102. Defendants' policy and practice of denying Plaintiffs-Petitioners and Putative  
16 Class Members individualized custody determinations before an Immigration Judge violates  
17 the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, and is therefore unlawful.

18 **VII. Request for Relief**

19 Plaintiffs-Petitioners request this Court to grant the following relief:

- 20 1. Grant a writ of habeas corpus ordering Defendants to refrain from vacating the  
21 Immigration Judge's custody determination for Mr. Martinez;
- 22 2. Certify this case as a class action lawsuit, as proposed herein, appoint the named  
23 Plaintiffs as class representatives, and appoint the undersigned counsel as class counsel;



**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that today, January 31, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to all parties of record.

s/ Leila Kang

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