1	BLAISE & NITSCHKE, P.C.			
2	HEATHER L. BLAISE, ESQ. (SBN 261619)			
	123 N. Wacker Drive, Suite 250			
3	Chicago, IL 60606 Telephone: 312, 448, 6602			
4	Telephone: 312-448-6602 Email: hblaise@blaisenitschkelaw.com			
5	Attorneys for Plaintiffs,			
6	JANE DOE and JOHN DOE, individually and			
7	on behalf of others similarly situated			
8	UNITED STATES I	DISTRICT COUR	T	
9	CENTRAL DISTRIC			
10	SOUTHERN	DIVISION		
11	JANE DOE and JOHN DOE, individually	CASE NO: 8:20-	cv-00858-SVW-JEM	
12	and on behalf of others similarly situated,	Assigned to the Hon. Stephen V. Wilson		
13	Plaintiffs,	PLAINTIFFS'	OF MOITIZONGO	
14	PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO V. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO			
15	DONALD J. TRUMP, in his individual	DISMISS		
16	and official capacity as President of the United States; MITCH MCCONNELL, in			
17	his individual and official capacity as a			
18	Senator and Sponsor of S. 3548 ČARES Act; and STEVEN MNUCHIN, in his	Hearing Date:	July 13, 2020	
	individual and official capacity as the Acting Secretary of the U.S. Department	Time:	1:30 p.m.	
19	of Treasury; CHARLES RETTIG, in his	Courtroom: Location:	10A 350 W. 1 st Street	
20	individual and official capacity as U.S. Commissioner of Internal Revenue; U.S.		Los Angeles, CA	
21	DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY;		90012	
22	the U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE; and the UNITED STATES OF	Action Filed: Ma	v 6, 2020	
23	AMERICA, Defendants.	1 1001011 1 110 00 111	<i>y</i>	
24	Defendants.			
25				
26				
27	- i	_		
28	PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEF		S	

1		TABLE OF CONTENTS
2	TABL	E OF CONTENTSi
	TABL	E OF AUTHORITIESii
3	PROCI	EDURAL HISTORY
4	INTRO	DDUCTION
5	ARGU	MENT
6	I.	Sovereign Immunity is Waived by the APA Regardless of Whether a Claim "Arises Under" the APA
7	II.	Plaintiffs' Claims are not Barred by the Anti-Injunction Act or the
8		Declaratory Injunction Act
9	<i>A</i> .	Refundable Tax Credits are Not Taxes, and Do Not Implicate the AIA or the DJA
10	B.	CARES Act Amendments to the Internal Revenue Code Expressly Providing
11		that the CARES Act Payments are Subject to Deficiency Procedures
12		Remove Any Doubt that the Credit is Not a Tax12
	III.	In the Alternative, Plaintiffs' Case Does "Arise Under" the APA
13	A.	The Agency Action at Issue is Final1
14	В.	No Adequate Alternatives for Challenging the Agency Action Exist14
15	IV.	Plaintiffs Have Standing and their Claims are Ripe for
16		Judicial Review Now
17	V.	The FCA States a Claim for Relief
	A.	Section 6428(g) violates the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution20
18	B.	Section 6428(g) violates the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution2
19	C.	Section 6428(g) violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
20	CONC	Constitution
21	CONC	LUSION2.
22		
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		::
28		- ii - Di ainthees' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

2	Cases		
3	Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)24		
3	Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d. 593 (9th Cir. 1984)24		
4	Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S., at 171-172 (Frankfurter, J.,		
5	concurring)22		
5	Blagojevich v. Gates, 519 F.3d 370 (7th Cir. 2008)		
6	Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974)9		
7	Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)20, 22, 24		
	Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)22, 24		
8	Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988)7		
9	Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)24		
1.0	Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978)22		
10	Church of Scientology of Celebrity Ctr., Los Angeles v. Egger,		
11	539 F. Supp. 491 (D.D.C. 1982)		
10	CIC Services, LLC v. Internal Revenue Service, Docket No. 19-930 (Sup. Ct. 2020)11		
12	Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974)21		
13	Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717 (D.C. Cir. 2011)9		
1 /	Delano Farms Co. v. California Table Grape Com'n,		
14	655 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2011)		
15	Department of Homeland Security et al. v. Regents of the University of California		
16	Wolf v. Vidal, No. 18-587, 2020 WL 3271746 (U.S. June 18, 2020)		
10	Fla. Bankers Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury,		
17	799 F.3d 1065 (D.C. Cir. 2015)		
18	Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. CV13-5693 PSG (GJSx), 2016 U.S.		
	Dist. LEXIS 185233 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 8, 2016)23 Freedom from Religion Foundation v. Shulman,		
19	961 F. Supp.2d 947 (W.D. Wis. 2013)passim		
20	Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)		
	Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)		
21	Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)		
22	Heckler v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984)		
23	<i>In re First Alliance</i> , 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25925, 2003 WL 2153009623		
23	<i>In re Statham</i> , 483 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1973)21		
24	<i>In re Talmadge</i> , 832 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1987)21		
25	Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2014)21		
	M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996)21		
26	Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)21		
27	Michigan v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 667 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2011)7, 8		
	- iii -		
28	PLAINTIEFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS		

1	National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012)9
2	Nelson v. Regan, 731 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1984)
3	Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)20
4	San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)20
•	Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975)22
5	Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964)22
6	Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)21, 24
7	Sorenson v. Sec'y of Treasury of U.S., 475 U.S. 851 (1986)
7	Sorenson v. Sec'y of Treasury of U.S., 752 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1985)
8	Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973)21, 22 Takahashi v. Fish & Game Com., 334 U.S. 410 (1948)24
9	The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1989)7
	Thunder Basin Coal Company v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994)
10	<i>Trudeau v. Federal Trade Com'n</i> , 456 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
11	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016) .13, 14, 15
12	<i>United States v. Kras</i> , 409 U.S. 434 (1973)21
	<i>United States v. Windsor</i> , 570 U.S. 744 (2013)22, 23
13	Statutes
14	5 U.S.C. § 702
15	5 U.S.C. § 704
	18 U.S.C. § 287
16	28 U.S.C. § 13315
17	28 U.S.C. § 1367
1 0	28 U.S.C. § 2201
18	I.R.C. § 6201
19	I.R.C. § 6211
20	I.R.C. § 6428
	I.R.C. § 6662
21	I.R.C. § 6671
22	I.R.C. § 7201
23	I.R.C. § 74219
	I.R.C. § 742212, 15
24	Other Authorities
25	BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)23
26	CARES Act, § 2201(e)
	S. 3548, 116th Cong. (2020)
27	
28	- iV -

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 6, 2020, Plaintiff Jane Doe, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, filed a class action complaint challenging the Coronavirus Aid, Economic Relief, and Security Act (the "CARES Act" or "Act") and alleging violations of her constitutional rights. *See* Dkt. 1. Plaintiff subsequently filed her Emergency Motion seeking emergency declaratory and injunctive relief. ("Em. Mot."). *See* Dkts. 9 & 11. Defendants objected to the granting of Plaintiff's Emergency Motion (*see* Dkts. 22, 23), and Plaintiff filed her Reply in Support of her Motion on June 2, 2020 ("TRO Reply"). *See* Dkt. 26. The next day, Plaintiffs Jane Doe and John Doe filed their First Amended Complaint ("FAC"). *See* Dkt. 28. On June 15, 2020 Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss ("MTD") based on lack of jurisdiction, a motion which pays lip service to the allegations included in the FAC but completely ignores the basis for jurisdiction addressed in the TRO Reply. *See* Dkt. 30. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference their Em. Mot. and TRO Reply herein.

INTRODUCTION

The outbreak of COVID-19, also known as Coronavirus, wreaked unprecedented havoc on the United States and its economy (the "Pandemic"). Michael R. Sisak et al., 'We Need Help': Economic, health crises grow as cases top 1M, ASSOCIATED PRESS (April 2, 2020), https://apnews.com/
7c8c65a74daaf0ada3582d3b3161b35f (last visited June 20, 2020). Leading up to the CARES Act passage, extraordinary numbers of Americans lost their jobs. Id. Schools across the country were cancelled. Cory Turner, Half of U.S. Public School Students are Home for the School Year, NPR (April 16, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/04/16/835941050/nearly-half-of-u-s-public-school-students-are-home-for-the-school-year (last visited June 22, 2020). Courts closed first to persons who travelled to certain countries outside the United States, and then

closed entirely except for hearings on criminal duty matters. See C.D. Cal. General Order No. 20-03, March 13, 2020; Order of the Chief Judge No. 20-042, March 19, 2020; and General Order No. 20-05, April 13, 2020. The Pandemic inflicted unheard of economic ramifications, and Congress responded in an unprecedented way, enacting the largest economic stimulus package in United States history. Jordan Fabian and Justin Sink, Trump Signs \$2 Trillion Virus Bill, Largest Ever U.S. Stimulus, BLOOMBERG (March 27, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 2020-03-27/trump-signs-2-trillion-virus-bill-largest-ever-u-s-stimulus (last visited 8 June 19, 2020). On March 25 and 26, 2020, Congress passed the CARES Act. CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, March 27, 2020, 134 Stat 281. The next day, 10 11 President Donald J. Trump signed the CARES Act into law. *Id*. 12 Congress provided for immediate distribution of funds to combat multiple 13 issues – not just record unemployment, but also record job elimination. *Id.* The 14 Pandemic caused sharp declines in retail sales and in individuals' abilities to pay 15 housing and food expenses. Heather Long and Renae Merle, Many Americans' 16 Biggest Worry Right Now is April 1 Rent and Mortgage Payments, WASHINGTON 17 Post (March 22, 2020) https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/03/22/april-18 rent-due-coronavirus/ (last visited June 19, 2020). The CARES Act pushed 19 emergency funds into the hands of desperate Americans, so that they could pay 20 necessary living expenses – right away. The record-breaking relief measure helped 21 to prevent unprecedented evictions, foreclosures, health care emergencies, and 22 starvation threatening hundreds of millions of Americans. Long, supra. Microsoft co-23 founder Bill Gates said: "It is impossible to overstate the pain people are feeling 24 25 ¹ According to the Internal Revenue Service, necessary living expenses include food & clothing, housing and utilities, healthcare, and transportation. Collection Financial 26 Standards, IRS.GOV (March 30, 2020) https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-27 businesses-self-employed/collection-financial-standards (last visited June 19, 2020).

5

6

10

11

12

13

14 15

16

17

18

19

20 21

22

23

24 25

26

27

now and will feel for years to come." Sandi Doughton, 'It is Impossible to Overstate the Pain': Fight Against Coronavirus Will Define Our Era, Bill Gates Says, THE SEATTLE TIMES (April 23, 2020), https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/it-isimpossible-to-overstate-the-pain-fight-against-coronavirus-will-define-our-era-billgates-says/ (last visited June 19, 2020) (emphasis added).

The CARES Act sought to ease this pain for individuals and jump-start the economy by creating a refundable tax credit for any eligible individual who holds a social security number ("SSN") by adding 26 U.S.C. § 6428 to the Internal Revenue Code. S. 3548, 116th Cong. (2020) ("Section 6428"). Section 6248 provides for an Economic Impact Payment to be made in the form of an Advance Payment to all individuals who are eligible to receive the credit on or before December 31, 2020 (the "Advance Payment"). Congress mandated the Advance Payments to be made "as rapidly as possible," and directed the Secretary of the Treasury to conduct a public awareness campaign regarding "information about availability of the credit and rebate." CARES Act, § 2201(e). While Section 6428(e) requires a "truing up" of the Advance Payment with an individual's income tax return based on the actual amount of the 2020 credit permitted (computed based on 2020 filing status and liability), if an eligible individual receives an overpayment it is not required to be repaid. I.R.C. § 6428(e). In other words, the Advance Payment is a benefit conferred to United States citizens who meet certain income eligibility requirements, and they may retain it even if it later turns out they were not eligible. *Id*.

Recognizing the dire circumstances faced by many families and the threat to our national economy, Congress directed that any Advance Payment must be paid before December 31, 2020, or not at all, because Congress expressly forbid the Commissioner of Internal Revenue from issuing any Advance Payment later: "[n]o refund or credit shall be made or allowed under this subsection after December 31,

2020." I.R.C. § 6428(f)(3)(A).

However, under the exclusion provision found in § 6428(g)(1)(B) (the "Exclusion Provision"), Plaintiffs and the Putative Class are not eligible for Advance Payments under the Act because they filed taxes jointly with their spouses, who do not hold SSNs. I.R.C. § 6428(g). American citizens who are married to other American citizens and met the income eligibility requirements in 2019 will receive the Advance Payment even if it turns out that their income in 2020 exceeds the statutory income ceilings. The same is true of unmarried American citizens, as well as American citizens married to non-citizens who have a social security number. Only Plaintiffs and the Putative Class – American citizens married to individuals who do not have an SSN who file joint income tax returns but otherwise meet all eligibility requirements – are excluded from receiving the Advance Payment based solely on whom they married.

Depriving U.S. citizens of an emergency benefit that has been distributed to over one hundred million Americans (and counting), does not need to be repaid by other Americans who are later determined to be ineligible to receive it, and – by its own terms – must be issued on or before December 31, 2020, or not at all, based purely on whom those chose to marry violates the United States Constitution. *See* Treasury, IRS release latest state-by-state Economic Impact Payment figures for May 22, 2020 IR-2020-101, May 22, 2020, attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit A. Plaintiffs could request the credit (thereby risking potential criminal liability), file an administrative claim for refund, and litigate the propriety of the Exclusion Provision in the years to come. But doing so would not and could not afford them equal treatment under the law as compared to their fellow American citizens: eligibility to receive an Advance Payment, before December 31 of this year, that does not require repayment regardless of later eligibility determinations.

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Defendants take the same incorrect legal position in the MTD as they did in their Opposition to the TRO motion. See Dkt. 23. Defendants argue, and Plaintiffs agree, that in the tax context, there are limited circumstances under which suit can be brought against the government. See Dkt. 30 at 6. If the Advance Payment were a tax, Plaintiffs would be in jurisdictional trouble. But just as pointed out by Defendants, the Advance Payment isn't a tax, it is a refundable tax credit. See id. at 7. Because Plaintiffs' claim relates to a refundable tax credit, and not a tax, jurisdiction is unequivocally established here.

ARGUMENT

Sovereign Immunity is Waived by the APA Regardless of Whether a I. Claim "Arises Under" the APA

Plaintiffs' claims arise under the Constitution of the United States, and accordingly 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("Section 1331") confers jurisdiction to this Court. Section 1331 provides "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws [...] of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Section 1367 similarly allows jurisdiction over any supplemental claims "that are so related to claims in the action within [the court's] original jurisdiction that they form a part of the same case or controversy." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

The Supreme Court's newly-issued decision in Department of Homeland Security et al. v. Regents of the University of California Wolf v. Vidal, No. 18-587, 2020 WL 3271746 (U.S. June 18, 2020) ("Regents") eliminates any doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims. In Regents, an immigration relief program known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals ("DACA") provided a means for certain individuals who are not citizens or legal permanent residents to remain in the United States. Id. at *3. The Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") rescinded the program, and the Department's Acting Secretary issued a memorandum terminating the program. Id. Affected individuals and third parties

5

8

10

11 12

13

14

15

16

17

18 19

20

21

22 23

24 25

26

28

27

challenged the rescission, arguing, inter alia, that the termination violated the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). Regents, 2020 WL 3271746, at *3.

Like here, in *Regents*, the government argued that the agency action at issue fell "outside this Court's jurisdiction." *Id.* at 7. The Supreme Court rejected that contention because § 702 of the APA's "basic presumption of judicial review for one suffering legal wrongs because of agency action" applied, and that the Court had jurisdiction. *Id*. (internal citations and quotations omitted). The government has not argued here, as it did in *Regents*, that the Treasury or IRS's actions are "committed to agency discretion by law," thus falling under the rare exception to the broad grant of judicial review over agency action. *Id*. Indeed, such an argument would fail here, because the Exclusion Provision does not provide for agency discretion.

Where, as here, Plaintiffs raise a valid claim that arises under federal law, the federal government is the defendant, and the suit does not seek money damages, "jurisdiction is secure." Blagojevich v. Gates, 519 F.3d 370, 371 (7th Cir. 2008). The APA waives sovereign immunity for the kind of relief Plaintiffs seek, so long as the federal statute at issue authorizes review of agency action. *Id.* at 372. The APA provides an express waiver of sovereign immunity where, as here, the plaintiffs seek equitable relief. 5 U.S.C. § 702. Section 702 provides in relevant part:

An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency [. . .] acted or failed to act [...] shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States or that the United States is an indispensable party.

In Blagojevich v. Gates, the then-governor of Illinois sued the Secretary of Defense under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1346(a)(2). The District Court for the Central District of Illinois dismissed the suit *sua sponte* because the government had not waived sovereign immunity and thus, the court lacked jurisdiction. Blagojevich, 519

F.3d at 370. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case, holding § 702 of the APA is generally applicable, regardless of whether a claim is "under the APA;" and § 702 governs when "any federal statute authorizes review of agency action." Id. at 372 (citing Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988)) (emphasis in original). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion when, in *The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)* v. *United States*, the court reversed and remanded a case to the District Court of Arizona. 870 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1989). The Ninth Circuit rejected an attempt by INS to limit § 702 to agency action, holding, "nothing in the language of the [1976] amendment to [\{ 702}] suggest that the waiver of sovereign immunity is limited to claim challenging conduct falling within the narrow definition of 'agency action." Id. at 525.

Provisions such as "5 U.S.C. § 701(a), and § 706(2)(A) allow[] a court to set aside agency action that is 'not in accordance with law," and that law is not limited to "another portion of the APA." *Id.* The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has reached the same conclusion. In *Trudeau v. Federal Trade Commission*, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") sought to dismiss a lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the court had no jurisdiction over the infomercial producer plaintiff's First Amendment claims against it. *Trudeau v. Federal Trade Com'n*, 456 F.3d 178, 184-185 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The Court of Appeals held that Section 1331 provided jurisdiction. *Id.* at 185. The APA's "waiver of sovereign immunity applies to any suit whether under the APA or not." *Id.* at 186. *See also Delano Farms Co. v. California Table Grape Com'n*, 655 F.3d 1337, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("We hold that section 702 of the APA waives sovereign immunity for nonmonetary claims against federal agencies, subject to the limitations in subsections (1) and (2). It is not limited to 'agency action' or 'final agency action,' as those terms are defined in the APA."); *Michigan v. United States Army Corps of Engineers*, 667 F.3d

5

8

10

11

12 13

15

16

17

18

19

20 21

22

23

24

25

26

27 28

765 (7th Cir. 2011) (sovereign immunity waived when "any federal statute authorizes review of agency action, as well as in cases involving constitutional law.").

Claims challenging Department of Treasury and Internal Revenue Service action – such as distributing billions of dollars of Advance Payments to United States persons but unconstitutionally excluding U.S. persons who are married to individuals who do not have SSNs – have fared the same. For example, in *Freedom from* Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Schulman, the District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin held that the APA waived sovereign immunity when the Plaintiff challenged IRS policy "pursuant to the Fifth Amendment's equal-protection clause and the Establishment Clause." 961 F. Supp.2d 947, 954 (W.D. Wis. 2013). Despite the lack of final agency action or action committed to agency discretion, the court held "the second sentence of § 702 still waives the United States's [sic] sovereign immunity [...] because that sentence is not limited to claims brought under the APA 14 | itself but is generally applicable to any action for prospective relief, including an action involving a constitutional challenge." *Id.* (emphasis added). Section 702 applies here because Defendants have issued Advance Payments to over one hundred million Americans, but Plaintiffs are unconstitutionally ineligible.

Plaintiffs' Claims are not Barred by the Anti-Injunction Act or the II. **Declaratory Injunction Act**

A. Refundable Tax Credits are Not Taxes, and Do Not Implicate the AIA or the DJA.

Defendants admit that the CARES Act creates a "refundable tax credit." See Dkt. 30 at 7. Because it created a refundable tax *credit* and not a tax, neither the Anti-Injunction Act ("AIA") nor the Declaratory Judgment Act ("DJA") bar this Court's review of the claims. Both the AIA's text and its prior conclusive judicial interpretation make clear that Plaintiffs' claims cannot be construed as an attempt to

"restrain[] the assessment and collection of any tax [...]" within the meaning of the statute, thereby removing the essential predicate for applying the AIA.

The AIA does not bar this suit because Plaintiffs and the Putative Class do not seek to restrain assessment or collection of any *tax*. The AIA provides:

Except as provided [...] no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.

I.R.C. § 7421(a). The CARES Act creates a refundable tax credit to be distributed as an Advance Payment. Providing equal access to the Advance Payment to Plaintiffs will not restrain assessment or collection of tax. I.R.C. § 6428(f)(3)(A). The DJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), which generally bars federal courts from granting declaratory judgments "with respect to Federal taxes," has been deemed to be "coterminous" with the AIA. *Fla. Bankers Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury*, 799 F.3d 1065, 1067 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (*citing Cohen v. United States*, 650 F.3d 717, 730-31 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (*en banc*)); *see also Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon*, 416 U.S. 725, 733 n.7 (1974). Accordingly, neither the AIA nor the DJA inhibit this Court's jurisdiction or the APA's waiver of sovereign immunity.

While the AIA denies a court's jurisdiction from maintaining a "suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax," I.R.C. § 7421 (emphasis added), Defendants concede that the Advance Payment is not a tax. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the term "tax" in AIA's text in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 543-46 (2012) ("NFIB"), when it considered whether the AIA precluded the Court from reaching the merits of a constitutional challenge to the Affordable Care Act before payment of the shared responsibility payment. The Court noted the "decision to label this exaction a 'penalty' rather than a 'tax' is significant." NFIB, 567 U.S. at 544.

The AIA applies only when the item at issue is an "exaction," i.e., an amount due the Government, when Congress chooses to call that exaction a "tax." The D.C. Circuit took that rationale to its logical conclusion in *Florida Bankers Association v. U.S. Department of the Treasury*, 799 F.3d 1065, 1067 (D.C. Cir. 2015), declining to reach the merits of a challenge to a regulation imposing reporting requirements on banks, a "penalty" codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6721(a). Then-Judge Kavanaugh explained, "any reference in this title to 'tax' imposed by this title shall be deemed also to refer to the penalties and liabilities provided by this subchapter." *Id.* at 1068. He went on, "[i]f the penalty here were not itself a tax, the Anti-Injunction Act would not bar this suit." *Id.* at 1069.

Defendants compare the Earned Income Tax Credit ("EITC") to the CARES Act Advance Payment. *See* Dkt. 30 at 7. The EITC is a refundable tax credit intended "to negate the disincentive to work caused by Social Security taxes." *Sorenson v. Sec'y of Treasury of U.S.*, 475 U.S. 851, 858 (1986). It is precisely for that reason – that the EITC is a refundable tax credit *and not a tax* – that courts have unequivocally held that the AIA and the DJA do not apply to bar class action lawsuits based upon refundable tax credits. For example, in *Nelson v. Regan*, 731 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1984), a certified class sought declaratory and injunctive relief where refundable portions of the EITC were being intercepted pursuant to § 6402(c) of the I.R.C. to satisfy past due child support obligations. On appeal, the Second Circuit held that neither the AIA nor the DJA prevented a hearing on the merits, because "the tax intercept program [seizing past due child support] does not apply to refunds or payments of earned income credits." *Id.* at 110-12.

A circuit split developed on the issue when the Ninth Circuit came out the other way in *Sorenson v. Sec'y of Treasury of U.S.*, 752 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1985), holding that EITCs *were* subject to being intercepted under § 6402(c). The Ninth's

Circuit's holding was premised on the conclusion that the EITC was "undisputedly owed to petitioner and undisputedly not owed to the United States as taxes." Sorenson, 752 F.2d at 1437 (emphasis added). Eventually, the Supreme Court resolved that split by siding with the Ninth Circuit in Sorenson v. Sec'y of Treasury of U.S., 475 U.S. 851 (1986), holding that the EITC was subject to the past due child support intercept program. Tellingly, the Government abandoned their jurisdictional challenges under the AIA and the DJA before the Supreme Court.² Thus, every court to hear a challenge to the propriety of including refundable EITCs in tax refunds intercepted and directed toward back child-support obligations proceeded to the merits thereof, notwithstanding the AIA or DJA.

Similarly, in Church of Scientology of Celebrity Ctr., Los Angeles v. Egger, the District Court for the District of Columbia denied the Commissioner's Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on a claim that the IRS consider and rule promptly on applications for ministers to receive certain tax-exempt status, 539 F. Supp. 491, 494 (D.D.C. 1982). The court denied the IRS's motion on the relevant count, because neither the AIA nor the DJA bar actions "where the litigation did not threaten to deny anticipated tax revenue to the Government." Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted, emphasis added). The Government anticipates no tax revenue here. The AIA and DJA simply do not apply.³

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

² In its brief to the Supreme Court, the government acknowledged that jurisdictional contentions to district courts were "based chiefly on the Anti-Injunction Act, the tax exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act, procedural limitations on refund suits, and sovereign immunity To the extent the government renewed these arguments on appeal, the Ninth Circuit likewise rejected them ..., and we have not sought review of those questions here." Brief for the Respondents, p. 4, fn. 1 (internal citations omitted).

³ On May 4, 2020, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to CIC Services, LLC v. Internal Revenue Service, Docket No. 19-930 (Sup. Ct. 2020) to resolve an apparent

1112

13

1415

16

1718

19

2021

2223

24

25

2627

28

B. CARES Act Amendments to the Internal Revenue Code Expressly Providing that the CARES Act Payments are Subject to Deficiency Procedures Remove Any Doubt that the Credit is Not a Tax.

Finally, Congress made additional amendments to the Internal Revenue Code when establishing the Advance Payment that eliminate any possible argument that the CARES Act Advance Payment is a tax that implicates the AIA or the DJA. Subtitle F of the Internal Revenue Code provides for procedure and administration thereof. Within Subtitle F, Chapter 63 provides for the Secretary's assessment authority (§ 6201 et seq.) and deficiency procedures (§ 6211 et seq.). In general, when a taxpayer disagrees about the amount of tax or additions to tax that are due, the IRS will determine a deficiency and issue a Notice of Deficiency, affording the taxpayer a right to contest the IRS's determination in United States Tax Court ("Tax Court"), a pre-payment forum. I.R.C. §§ 6211, 6212. Or, if the IRS has determined that certain "assessable penalties" apply, the IRS may assess the penalties and the taxpayer must pay the disputed amount in full and file a claim for refund with the IRS and then in either District Court or the Court of Federal Claims. I.R.C. §§ 6671, 7422. If a taxpayer does not file a timely petition in Tax Court after receiving a Notice of Deficiency, paying the disputed tax and filing a claim for refund is often the only means to obtain judicial review. I.R.C. § 7422.

If the CARES Act created a tax, § 7422 would provide the proper avenue for judicial review. However, in addition to creating the credit contained in § 6428, the CARES Act also amended § 6211 of the Internal Revenue Code. The amendment to § 6211 now provides that the CARES Act rebate is subject to deficiency procedures and allows taxpayers to contest adverse determinations regarding CARES Act

Circuit Split between the Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits on the question of whether the Anti-Injunction Act bars challenges to unlawful regulatory mandates issued by administrative agencies when those mandates are not taxes.

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

eligibility in Tax Court. This change to § 6211 creates administrative ease both for the taxpayer and for the Internal Revenue Service. If the CARES Act credit was a tax that triggered the AIA, Congress would not have needed to expressly provide that it is subject to deficiency procedures in § 6211(b)(4)(A), because all tax is already subject to deficiency procedures under § 6211(a). Giving meaning to every word in the statutes Congress enacted requires the conclusion that the CARES Act created a tax credit, not a tax, and a suit preventing Defendants from depriving Plaintiffs equal access to that credit would not restrain assessment or collection of any tax. Instead, the Advance Payment under § 6428 is a refundable credit—the inverse of an exaction or a tax.

In the Alternative, Plaintiffs' Case Does "Arise Under" the APA

Agency action reviewable under § 704 of the APA, unlike § 702 of the APA, must be "final" and there must be no other adequate remedy for judicial review. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016) ("U.S. Army Corps"). Section 702 of the APA creates a general waiver of the government's sovereign immunity, regardless of the cause of action. See Section I, supra. However, even if that were not the case, despite what Defendants argue in pages 11 to 14 of the MTD, Plaintiffs have stated a claim pursuant to the APA under § 704 as well as under § 702. U.S. Army Corps, cited in Defendants' MTD at 11, illustrates exactly why Plaintiffs will prevail, even if they were required to establish that agency action is final and that no other adequate review of agency action exists (which, as explained above, they are not required to do).

The Agency Action at Issue is Final. A.

Agency action is "final" for purposes of § 704 of the APA if it "mark[s] the consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process," and "the action must be one by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal

B. No Adequate Alternatives for Challenging the Agency Action Exist.

In *U.S. Army Corps.*, (cited in MTD at 11), the Supreme Court held that "parties need not await enforcement proceedings before challenging final agency action where such proceedings carry the risk of serious 'civil and criminal penalties." 136 S. Ct. at 1815. As Plaintiffs explained in detail in pages 14 to 15 of the TRO Reply, such is the case here. If Plaintiffs are not provided with the Advance Payment, to claim the credit, Plaintiffs must file a tax return after filing season opens

27

28

20

21

22

23

24

25

9 10

11 12

13 14

15 16

17

18 19

20

21 22

23

24 25

26 27

28

on or about February 1, 2021. Plaintiffs would either need to (A) file a tax return claiming the credit and file a statement explaining they are not entitled to the credit but are claiming it, and contesting the unconstitutional aspects of the law, or (B) file a tax return that does not claim the credit, pay their taxes in full, and months later file an amended return claiming the credit as a claim for refund following the procedures in I.R.C. § 7422. No matter what avenue Plaintiffs choose, they will never receive the emergency Advance Payment, which must be issued by December of 2020, and the earliest potential judicial intervention is years away.

If Plaintiffs select option A, they open themselves up to potential civil and criminal liability, see, I.R.C. §§ 6662, 7201, and must litigate the right to the credit in United States Tax Court. I.R.C. § 6212. If Plaintiffs select option B, as suggested by Defendants, they must wait until at least November 2021 before they can even file suit. Refund claims the IRS deems false are subject to severe criminal and civil penalties. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 287, Internal Revenue Manual 9.1.3.4.7.1 (05-15-2008) (5) ("Application of 18 U.S.C. § 287 is particularly appropriate in instances where a false claim for refund has been filed. It is only necessary to prove the defendant filed the claim for refund knowing that he/she was not entitled to receive it." (emphasis added)). Moreover, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the notion that long, arduous, and expensive litigation is an adequate alternative to an injunction prohibiting agency action. U.S. Army Corps, 136 S.Ct. at 1815-1816.

Plaintiffs Have Standing and their Claims are Ripe for Judicial Review IV. Now

Plaintiffs and the Putative Class have been denied a benefit that has already been provided to over one hundred million other American citizens. See Exhibit A. The only thing distinguishing Plaintiffs and the Putative Class from those eligible to receive the Advance Payment is whom they married. See Dkt. 28 ¶ 58. American

citizens who are not married to non-SSN holders need not wait to file a 2020 tax return in 2021 and file a claim for refund to receive the Advance Payment—it was automatically issued to them. *See* IR 2020-61, March 30, 2020, attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit B. And if those American citizens who are not married to individuals who lack an SSN end up earning too much money in 2020 to qualify for the credit, it need not be repaid. I.R.C. § 6428(e).

Conversely, U.S. citizens who are married to individuals who do not have an SSN and file jointly are not eligible to receive the Advance Payment. Absent this Court's intervention, they will never receive it, because it must be issued by December 31, 2020 or not at all. An administrative claim for refund followed by expensive refund litigation will thwart Congressional intent to prevent Plaintiffs' suffering *right now*, including the risk of homelessness, starvation for them and their families including young children, inability to seek medical treatment, and lack of basic necessities such as food, medicine, and clothing. *See* Dkt. 28 ¶ 90. The IRS has issued Advance Payments to 152,167,600 Americans, including almost 750,000 Americans residing outside of the United States, totaling over \$257,954,545,196.00. *See* Exhibit A. A claim for refund will not address Plaintiffs' deprivation of unequal treatment, **right now.**

Defendants made the same two fatally flawed arguments here, that Plaintiffs have not been denied an Advance Payment and that Plaintiffs may become eligible for the Advance Payment, that Plaintiffs demonstrated to be absolutely meritless in pages 10 to 15 of the TRO reply at Dkt. 26. Rather than repeat those arguments here, Plaintiffs direct the Court to that document. Another case that illustrates the absolute fallacy of Defendants' arguments is *Freedom from Religion Foundation v. Shulman*, 961 F. Supp.2d 947 (W.D. Wis. 2013).

In *Freedom from Religion Foundation*, a tax-exempt organization filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the IRS, alleging that the IRS employed disparate treatment when enforcing a policy requiring tax-exempt organizations to refrain from participating in or intervening in political campaigns.

961 F. Supp.2d at 950. The IRS moved to dismiss, contending that the organization lacked standing to sue and that the suit was barred by sovereign immunity. *Id*. The District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin's careful analysis of the standing claim is particularly instructive here.

To prove that he has standing to seek injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show that he is under threat of suffering "injury in fact" that is concrete and particularized; the threat must be actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; it must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and it must be likely that a favorable judicial decision will prevent or redress the injury.

Freedom from Religion, 961 F. Supp.2d at 950 (internal citations omitted). The court found that each and every requirement was met. As is particularly relevant here, "[i]f it is true that the IRS has a policy of not enforcing the prohibition on campaigning against religious organizations, then the IRS is conferring a benefit on religious organizations (the ability to participate in political campaigns) that it denies [...] to the Foundation." Id. at 951. "As a victim of the IRS's alleged discrimination, the Foundation has suffered injury in fact." Id. (citing Heckler v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728, 738-40 (1984)). Here, as in Freedom from Religion, the IRS confers a benefit in the form of an Advance Payment (that does not have to be repaid even if eligibility is later determined to be lacking) on U.S. Citizens other than Plaintiffs and the Putative Class. Plaintiffs are now the victims of the Defendants' discrimination, and they too have suffered an injury in fact. And, just as in Freedom from Religion, "because the [...] IRS's policy is ongoing, the injury is more than actual and imminent," and Plaintiffs "are being deprived of equal treatment right now." Id. The Treasury

Department and the Internal Revenue Service are the agencies responsible for making the Advance Payment to Americans, other than Plaintiffs and the Putative Class. So as in *Freedom from Religion*, the injury is fairly traceable to those agencies and Defendants who are responsible for implementing this policy. *Id.* Finally, even Defendants do not argue, nor could they, that an injunction prohibiting the IRS and the Treasury Department from continuing the policy of discriminating against Plaintiffs and the Putative Class would not prevent further injury. *Id.* Accordingly, Plaintiffs have standing, and their injuries that are happening *right now* are ripe for adjudication. *Id.* Defendants' misguided citation to *Thunder Basin Coal Company v. Reich*, 510 U.S. 200 (1994) (MTD at 9-10) for the proposition that courts are reluctant to find pre-enforcement challenges ripe has no bearing on the instant facts, where a benefit has been conferred on hundreds of millions of Americans and indisputably will not be conferred on Plaintiffs and the Putative Class. Simply put, *discrimination itself* is a cognizable injury. *Id.* at 952.

V. The FCA States a Claim for Relief

In a misguided attempt to sway this Court in favor of its position on the merits, Defendants ask this Court to dismiss the FAC because Acts of Congress are presumed to be constitutional (MTD at 14); section 6248(g) does not violate due process or equal protection principles (MTD at 15-18); section 6248(d) does not make distinctions based on alienage (MTD at 18); even if it did such distinction would only be subject to rational basis review (MTD at 20); and Plaintiffs have failed to state a cognizable legal theory (MTD at 20). Setting aside the deeply troubling inferences to be drawn from the United States government taking a position that allegations of discrimination do not state a claim on which relief can be granted in federal courts (MTD at 14-21), none of the arguments raised by Defendants establish a lack of jurisdiction or the failure to state a claim, and they do not warrant dismissal,

much less require it.

1

2

4

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

The FAC alleges, inter alia, that Defendants violated Plaintiffs' right of association, right to due process of law, right to equal protection under the law secured by the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as the penumbra of privacy rights secured by the First, Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments. See Dkt. 28 ¶ 58. The FAC also alleges that Plaintiffs are suffering and, absent this Court's immediate issuance of declaratory and injunctive relief, will continue to suffer irreparable harm, including failure to meet "basic necessities of life, including the ability to put food on the table, paying rent, insurance, health insurance, and loss of privacy, reputation in the community, and dignity." See Dkt. 28 ¶ 90. Notably, the ability to put food on the table, pay rent, insurance, and health insurance are all recognized by the IRS as "expenses that are necessary to provide for a taxpayer's (and his or her family's) health and welfare and/or production of income." Collection Financial Standards, IRS.GOV (March 30, 2020), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/collectionfinancial-standards (last visited June 16, 2020). Defendants' contention that Plaintiffs' allegations of Defendants depriving them of the ability to pay necessary living expenses and loss of privacy, reputation in the community, and dignity due to deprivation of constitutionally protected rights do not give rise to a cause of action is patently absurd. Indeed, as the court in Freedom from Religion pointed out in rejecting the IRS's contention that it would be "inappropriate for a court to issue an injunction that results in judicial supervision of the IRS's enforcement of the tax code," this "argument goes to the merits of the case" and does not impact standing or stating a valid claim on which relief can be granted. 961 F. Supp.2d at 953.

Defendants' arguments and reliance on caselaw demonstrating the ubiquity of discriminatory impacts resulting from a "scheme of taxation" are misplaced, and,

A.

Advance Payment.

indeed, fail to demonstrate any failure on Plaintiffs' part to state a claim for relief. Indeed, Plaintiffs have demonstrated (and Defendants cannot deny) that the Exclusion Provision is discriminatory on its face. While certainly this Court must consider the legislatures' "efforts to tackle problems," Defendants' own authority notes that this exercise is to be conducted "within the limits of rationality." *See* Dkt. 30 at 15 (*citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 1, 41 (1973). Even if this Court were to decide that rational basis review applies to the circumstances here, such a determination could not possibly result in a disposition at the pleading stage of the litigation. Plaintiffs further direct the Court to pages 15 to 22 of the TRO Reply, in which they addressed these same arguments previously advanced by Defendants.

The Exclusion Provision directly violates the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In *Griswold v. Connecticut*, the Court stressed the sanctity of marriage lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. *Griswold v. Connecticut*, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). The Exclusion Provision discriminates against Plaintiffs by invading the fundamental right to the sanctity of marriage and as a result of the disparate treatment, Plaintiffs are denied an

Section 6428(g) violates the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

The fundamental right of marriage evokes the freedoms of association embodied in our First Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. I. *Roberts v. United States Jaycees*, 468 U.S. 609, 619-20 (1984). Moreover, the Supreme Court has further established a statute may be held constitutionally invalid as applied when it operates to deprive an individual of a protected right although its general validity as a measure enacted in the legitimate exercise of power is beyond question. *Boddie v. Connecticut*, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971) ("[T]his Court has often held that a valid statute was unconstitutionally applied in particular circumstances because it

interfered with an individual's exercise of [First Amendment] Rights"). The First Amendment requires the Right of Privacy and the fundamental right to marry to be protected and the Exclusion Provision of the CARES Act violates it by intentionally discriminating against Plaintiffs based on whom they chose to marry.

Defendants' citations to support their argument that rational basis review applies are not remotely analogous to the instant matter. *See* Dkt. 30 at 16-17. They cite *In re Talmadge*, 832 F.2d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 1987) to support their conclusion that the distinction between married and non-married persons in bankruptcy are subject to rational basis review conveniently ignoring that a.) Plaintiffs, here, are married; and b.) unlike bankruptcy, marriage is a fundamental right. *Id.* (*In re Statham*, 483 F.2d 436, 437 (9th Cir. 1973) (*citing United States v. Kras*, 409 U.S. 434, 435 (1973)). *In re Talmadge*, 832 F.2d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, not only does *Talmadge* not apply, but any argument that rational basis review applies fails as a matter of law.

B. Section 6428(g) violates the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be "deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. V. The Supreme Court has reiterated in numerous contexts that the right to marry is a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause. *See*, e.g., *M. L. B. v. S. L. J.*, 519 U.S. 102, 116, 117 (1996); *Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur*, 414 U.S. 632, 639-640 (1974); *Griswold*, 381 U.S. at 486; *Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson*, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); *Meyer v. Nebraska*, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). Discrimination based on the right to marry is presumptively unconstitutional and subject to strict scrutiny. *Latta v. Otter*, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014) or *see*, e.g., *Sugarman v. Dougall*, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973). The Fifth Amendment protects freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family.

10 11

12

13

15

16 17

18

19

20 21

22 23

24

25

26 27

The Exclusion Provision denies Plaintiffs a right afforded to all other United States citizens who are *not* married to a spouse who lacks an SSN. It both impinges on the fundamental right to marry in defining their families through personal choice and is based upon an inherently invidious classification, subject to strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 642.

The Exclusion Provision deprives Plaintiffs of the right to equal protection and due process, which are "absolute" rights "in the sense that they do not depend upon the merits of Plaintiff's substantive assertions." Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978), (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1971)); Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S., at 171-172 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." USCS Const. amend. V. See also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1971). Although the Fifth Amendment contains no Equal 14 | Protection Clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause prohibits the Federal Government from engaging in discrimination that is "so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process." Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 500 n.3 (1975), quoting Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). See also, Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964).

Arguing that § 6428(g)(1) does not impact the fundamental right to marriage does not make it so. See Dkt. 30 at 17. The Exclusion Provision does disproportionately and negatively impact a taxpayer who chooses to marry someone who does not have an SSN. In *United States v. Windsor*, the Supreme Court held that the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"), which denied same sex couples the right to marry, "violated the basic due process and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government" under the Fifth Amendment. 570 U.S. 744, 769-70 (2013). In that case, as here, the plaintiff was already married to her chosen partner and was

,

2.1

denied a tax benefit because she was in a marriage that was valid under state law, but the federal government discriminated against. The Supreme Court found standing and jurisdiction. *Id.* The right to marry confers "a dignity and status of immense import." *Id.* at 768. Marriage is "more than a routine classification for purposes of certain statutory benefits [and is] subject to constitutional guarantees." *Id.* The Court held that DOMA's "principle effect is to identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal. The principal purpose is not to impose inequality[.]" *Id.* at 772. Similarly, the Exclusion Provision makes a subset of state-sanctioned marriages unequal by – as in *Windsor* – "den[ying] or reduces benefits allowed to families." *Id.* at 773. This Court can only conclude that while "Congress has great authority to design laws to fit its own conception of sound national policy, it cannot deny the liberty protected by [...] Fifth Amendment." *Id.* at 774.

C. Section 6428(g) violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

Plaintiffs' alienage challenge to the Exclusion Provision, as it relates to Plaintiffs' spouses' immigration status, appears to be a case of the first impression. *See* BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); *see also Quisenberry v. Compass Vision, Inc.*, 618 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1228 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (finding the case to be one of first impression in the jurisdiction where no California court had previously addressed the issue); *In re First Alliance*, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25925, 2003 WL 21530096, at *10 (finding a case of first impression where "there is no legal precedent by which [Defendant] could have expected liability from Plaintiffs[]"). *Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc.*, No. CV13-5693 PSG (GJSx), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185233, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 8, 2016).

The Fourteenth Amendment states that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. In addition, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

states that "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2. Though the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States, it has been construed to apply to the Federal Government through the Reverse Incorporation Doctrine via *Bolling v*. 4 Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) and its progeny. See Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 7 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to federal government on equal protection grounds). 8 Equal Protection and Due Process are implicated when laws discriminate against people for: whom they marry; alienage; poverty; and class. *Boddie v*. 10 Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 385 (1971), citing Takahashi v. Fish & Game Com., 334 11 U.S. 410 (1948), Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 12 U.S. 535 (1942). Indeed, the right to equal treatment guaranteed by the Constitution 13 is paramount. "[Classifications] based on alienage, like those based on nationality or 14 race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class are 15 a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority [...] for whom such heightened 16 judicial solicitude is appropriate." *Graham v. Richardson*, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) 17 (footnotes and citations omitted). 18 Defendants' reliance on alienage cases in its MTD is misplaced. See Dkt. 30 at 19 19. Defendants cite to Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d. 593 (9th Cir. 1984) to argue that 20 the Ninth Circuit has previously upheld a federal program in the face of an equal 21 protection challenge. See Dkt. 30 at 19. Defendants fail to acknowledge that not only 22 was the challenged statute neutral on its face (not the case here), but also, the 23 challengers were **not U.S. citizens**. Here, the U.S. citizen and child(ren) are being 24 discriminated against based on the immigration status of their spouse/parent. 25 Plaintiffs further direct the Court to pages 14 to 18 of the Em. Mot., in which they

similarly addressed the scrutiny required. Accordingly, such a suspect classification is

subject to elevated scrutiny and could not withstand even a rational basis review.

Dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims would give rise to a dangerous precedent: that in times of national or global emergency, the government may elect to deny life-saving relief to U.S. citizens as a direct consequence of whom they chose to marry and in violation of those Constitutional protections afforded to all. Plaintiffs implore this Honorable Court to ensure the protection of their most basic freedoms and to preserve and defend our Constitution as Defendants have failed to do here. The Exclusion Provision cannot stand.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, for the reasons stated herein above, Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, respectfully request that this Court enter an order denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in its entirety or, in the alternative, granting Plaintiffs leave to amend their First Amended Complaint, and for any and all such other relief as this Court deems necessary and proper.

DATED: June 22, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Heather L. Blaise

Chicago, IL 60606

JANE DOE and JOHN DOE, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated.

HEATHER L. BLAISE, ESQ. (SBN 261619)

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

By:

Email: hblaise@blaisenitschkelaw.com

Attorney for Plaintiffs

Telephone: 312-448-6602

123 N. Wacker Drive, Suite 250

BLAISE & NITSCHKE, P.C.

Lana B. Nassar (IL Bar No. 6319396) **

- 25 -

1	Thomas J. Nitschke (IL Bar No. 6225740) *
2	Elisabeth A. Gavin (IL Bar No. 6297740) *
	123 N. Wacker Drive, Suite 250
3	Chicago, IL 60606
4	T: (312) 448-6602
5	F: (312) 803-1940
6	lnassar@blaisenitschkelaw.com
7	MATERN LAW GROUP
8	Matthew J. Matern (SBN 159798)
9	Joshua D. Boxer (SBN 226712)
10	1230 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 200
	Manhattan Beach, CA 90266
11	T: (310) 531-1900
12	F: (310) 531-1901
13	mmatern@maternlawgroup.com
14	MOORE TAX LAW GROUP LLC
15	Guinevere M. Moore (admitted <i>pro hac vice</i>)
16	150 N. Wacker Drive, Suite 1250
	Chicago, Illinois 60606
17	T: (312) 549-9992
18	F: (312) 549-9991
19	guinevere.moore@mooretaxlawgroup.com
20	KHALAF & ABUZIR, LLC
21	Vivian Khalaf (IL Bar No. 6210668) *
22	Omar Abuzir (IL Bar No. 6257708) *
	20 N. Clark, Suite 720
23	Chicago, IL 60602
24	T: (708)-233-1122
25	F: (708)-233-1161
26	vkhalaf@immigrationjd.com
27	
28	- 26 -
20	PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

Case 8:20-cv-00858-SVW-JEM Document 32 Filed 06/22/20 Page 32 of 32 Page ID #:416

Internal Revenue Service

Public Contact: 800.829.1040 www.irs.gov/newsroom

Treasury, IRS release latest state-by-state Economic Impact Payment figures

IR-2020-101, May 22, 2020

WASHINGTON –The Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service today released updated state-by-state figures for Economic Impact Payments reflecting the opening weeks of the program.

"Economic Impact Payments have continued going out at a rapid rate to Americans across the country," said IRS Commissioner Chuck Rettig. "We remind people to visit IRS.gov for the latest information, including answers to the most common questions we see surrounding the payments. We also continue to urge those who don't normally have a filing requirement, including those with little or no income, that they can quickly register for the payments on IRS.gov."

Millions of people who do not typically file a tax return are eligible to receive these payments. Payments are automatic for people who filed a tax return in 2018 or 2019, receive Social Security retirement, survivor or disability benefits (SSDI), Railroad Retirement benefits, as well as Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Veterans Affairs beneficiaries who didn't file a tax return in the last two years.

For those who don't receive federal benefits and didn't have a filing obligation in 2018 or 2019, the IRS continues to encourage them to visit the Non-Filer tool at IRS.gov so they can quickly register for Economic Impact Payments. People can continue to receive their payment throughout the year.

	Economic Impact Payments, totals by State.		
State	State postal code	Total Number of EIP Payments	Total Amount of EIP Payments
Alabama	AL	2,332,771	\$ 3,988,469,624
Alaska	AK	333,429	\$ 580,774,111
Arizona	AZ	3,242,043	\$ 5,573,167,261
Arkansas	AR	1,428,624	\$ 2,496,524,966
California	CA	16,869,636	\$ 27,897,283,972
Colorado	CO	2,605,089	\$ 4,407,408,401
Connecticut	CT	1,601,397	\$ 2,609,644,445
Delaware	DE	463,653	\$ 778,262,906
District of Columbia	DC	308,306	\$ 421,734,460
Florida	FL	10,618,792	\$ 17,546,164,251
Georgia	GA	4,763,109	\$ 8,081,253,826
Hawaii	HI	691,424	\$ 1,179,264,436
Iowa	IA	1,477,214	\$ 2,660,402,672
Idaho	ID	808,118	\$ 1,512,453,150

Internal Revenue Service
Media Relations Office
Washington, D.C.

Media Contact: 202.317.4000 Public Contact: 800.829.1040 www.irs.gov/newsroom

Illinois	IL	5,729,351	\$ 9,630,495,809
Indiana	IN	3,174,698	\$ 5,613,824,661
Kansas	KS	1,310,151	\$ 2,359,448,490
Kentucky	KY	2,199,370	\$ 3,824,826,391
Louisiana	LA	2,186,332	\$ 3,680,836,165
Maine	ME	714,941	\$ 1,215,239,330
Maryland	MD	2,692,062	\$ 4,380,831,484
Massachusetts	MA	3,136,787	\$ 5,028,963,151
Michigan	MI	4,813,156	\$ 8,286,614,929
Minnesota	MN	2,613,771	\$ 4,577,086,990
Mississippi	MS	1,427,440	\$ 2,422,655,854
Missouri	MO	2,933,973	\$ 5,118,911,639
Montana	MT	527,902	\$ 932,003,084
Nebraska	NE	887,877	\$ 1,611,581,538
Nevada	NV	1,496,510	\$ 2,484,078,422
New Hampshire	NH	676,004	\$ 1,139,776,925
New Jersey	NJ	3,955,396	\$ 6,507,621,505
New Mexico	NM	997,072	\$ 1,684,917,178
New York	NY	9,341,632	\$ 15,034,060,259
North Carolina	NC	4,820,974	\$ 8,264,415,092
North Dakota	ND	354,768	\$ 632,983,746
Ohio	ОН	5,828,477	\$ 9,833,041,489
Oklahoma	OK	1,799,803	\$ 3,190,860,867
Oregon	OR	2,031,861	\$ 3,425,278,483
Pennsylvania	PA	6,258,107	\$ 10,596,406,088
Rhode Island	RI	536,218	\$ 869,615,684
South Carolina	SC	2,443,864	\$ 4,174,979,940
South Dakota	SD	416,962	\$ 759,483,658
Tennessee	TN	3,305,606	\$ 5,693,071,645
Texas	TX	12,396,590	\$ 21,635,810,592
Utah	UT	1,287,162	\$ 2,494,199,291
Vermont	VT	327,867	\$ 555,841,287
Virginia	VA	3,796,975	\$ 6,447,589,217
Washington	WA	3,453,810	\$ 5,876,091,642
West Virginia	WV	913,264	\$ 1,578,210,674
Wisconsin	WI	2,817,912	\$ 4,948,382,340
Wyoming	WY	270,626	\$ 488,905,666
Foreign Addresses		748,724	\$ 1,222,795,510

Internal Revenue Service
Media Relations Office
Washington, D.C.

Media Contact: 202.317.4000 Public Contact: 800.829.1040 www.irs.gov/newsroom

Economic Impact Payment help available on IRS.gov

IRS.gov has a variety of <u>tools</u> and resources available to help individuals and businesses navigate Economic Impact Payments and get the information they need about EIP and other CARES Act provisions.

Economic Impact Payment FAQs: The IRS is seeing a variety of questions about Economic Impact Payments, ranging from eligibility to timing. These <u>FAQs</u> provide an overview and are updated frequently. Taxpayers should check the FAQs often for the latest additions; many common questions are answered on IRS.gov already, and more are being developed.



Economic impact payments: What you need to know

Updated with new information for seniors, retirees on April 1, 2020. Also see Treasury news release.

Check IRS.gov for the latest information: No action needed by most people at this time

IR-2020-61, March 30, 2020

WASHINGTON — The Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service today announced that distribution of economic impact payments will begin in the next three weeks and will be distributed automatically, with no action required for most people. However, some taxpayers who typically do not file returns will need to submit a simple tax return to receive the economic impact payment.

Who is eligible for the economic impact payment?

Tax filers with adjusted gross income up to \$75,000 for individuals and up to \$150,000 for married couples filing joint returns will receive the full payment. For filers with income above those amounts, the payment amount is reduced by \$5 for each \$100 above the \$75,000/\$150,000 thresholds. Single filers with income exceeding \$99,000 and \$198,000 for joint filers with no children are not eligible. Social Security recipients and railroad retirees who are otherwise not required to file a tax return are also eligible and will not be required to file a return.

Eligible taxpayers who filed tax returns for either 2019 or 2018 will automatically receive an economic impact payment of up to \$1,200 for individuals or \$2,400 for married couples and up to \$500 for each qualifying child.

How will the IRS know where to send my payment?

The vast majority of people do not need to take any action. The IRS will calculate and automatically send the economic impact payment to those eligible.

For people who have already filed their 2019 tax returns, the IRS will use this information to calculate the payment amount. For those who have not yet filed their return for 2019, the IRS will use information from their 2018 tax filing to calculate the payment. The economic impact payment will be deposited directly into the same banking account reflected on the return filed.

The IRS does not have my direct deposit information. What can I do?

In the coming weeks, Treasury plans to develop a web-based portal for individuals to provide their banking information to the IRS online, so that individuals can receive payments immediately as opposed to checks in the mail.

I am not typically required to file a tax return. Can I still receive my payment?

Case 8:20-cv-00858-SVW-JEM Document 32-2 Filed 06/22/20 Page 2 of 2 Page ID #:421

Yes. The IRS will use the information on the Form SSA-1099 or Form RRB-1099 to generate Economic Impact Payments to recipients of benefits reflected in the Form SSA-1099 or Form RRB-1099 who are not required to file a tax return and did not file a return for 2018 or 2019. This includes senior citizens, Social Security recipients and railroad retirees who are not otherwise required to file a tax return.

Since the IRS would not have information regarding any dependents for these people, each person would receive \$1,200 per person, without the additional amount for any dependents at this time.

I have a tax filing obligation but have not filed my tax return for 2018 or 2019. Can I still receive an economic impact payment?

Yes. The IRS urges anyone with a tax filing obligation who has not yet filed a tax return for 2018 or 2019 to file as soon as they can to receive an economic impact payment. Taxpayers should include direct deposit banking information on the return.

I need to file a tax return. How long are the economic impact payments available?

For those concerned about visiting a tax professional or local community organization in person to get help with a tax return, these economic impact payments will be available throughout the rest of 2020.

Where can I get more information?

The IRS will post all key information on IRS.gov/coronavirus as soon as it becomes available.

The IRS has a reduced staff in many of its offices but remains committed to helping eligible individuals receive their payments expeditiously. Check for updated information on IRS.gov/coronavirus rather than calling IRS assistors who are helping process 2019 returns.

Page Last Reviewed or Updated: 16-Apr-2020