Case: Pinzon v. Lane

1:87-cv-04542 | U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois

Filed Date: May 19, 1987

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Case Summary

On May 19, 1987, a class of Illinois parolees arrested on new criminal charges and afforded no opportunity for a preliminary parole revocation filed this suit in the northern district of Illinois. The plaintiffs sued the Illinois Department of Corrections under state law and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Represented by pro bono counsel, the plaintiffs asked the court for a preliminary injunction preventing the Department from ho…

On May 19, 1987, a class of Illinois parolees arrested on new criminal charges and afforded no opportunity for a preliminary parole revocation filed this suit in the northern district of Illinois. The plaintiffs sued the Illinois Department of Corrections under state law and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Represented by pro bono counsel, the plaintiffs asked the court for a preliminary injunction preventing the Department from holding in custody any parolee arrested on a new criminal charge without providing a preliminary parole revocation hearing within 10 days, as well as other suitable relief.

According to the plaintiffs’ complaint, members of the Department of Corrections were implicated in denying the plaintiffs timely preliminary hearings. On November 10, 1987, the Illinois Review Board sent a letter to the Department of Corrections notifying them that their personnel would “no longer be needed as designees of the [Prisoner Review] Board to act as Preliminary Release Revocation Hearings Officers in Cook County.” The court (Judge Milton I. Shadur) would later remark that the letter had “the obvious look of an effort to frustrate [the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois]’s jurisdiction and shirk the [Department]’s constitutional responsibilities.” 675 F. Supp. 429, 432. On November 18, 1987, the plaintiffs filed a motion to add the Illinois Review Board and its members as defendants.

On November 20, 1987, the court certified the plaintiff class, which consisted of “all parolees and mandatory supervised releases of the Adult Division of the Illinois Department of Corrections who have been or will be arrested on a new criminal charge in Cook County, Illinois and who are or will be imprisoned in Cook County Jail pending a final parole revocation hearing pursuant to a parole violation warrant issued and executed by the defendants.”

On December 10, 1987, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction primarily because of a strong likelihood of success on the merits. The court noted that, per an Illinois administrative regulation (20 Ill. Adm. Code IV, § 1610.140(b)(3)) the state was required to provide preliminary hearings within ten days. In fact, the class representatives had waited “from over a month to nearly two years.” 676 F. Supp. at 431.

Furthermore, the court cited a Supreme Court case, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), which both parties agreed demarcated the scope of the parolees’ constitutional interests. In Morrissey, parolees were promised a preliminary parole revocation hearing “at or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation or arrest and as promptly as convenient after the arrest.” 408 U.S. at 485. Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit had previously stated that Morrissey “seemed to be contemplating an almost immediate hearing.”

The facts of this case were slightly different than Morrissey because they dealt with parolees who were arrested for new criminal charges as opposed to technical violations of parole conditions. New Illinois legislation no longer required preliminary parole revocation hearings for parolees when a judicial finding of probable cause had been made at a preliminary hearing for that parolee on a new charge. The defendants, however, had also established a practice of denying a preliminary parole revocation hearing to all indicted defendants. This policy was impermissible in the eyes of the courts because there was no judicial probable cause determination.

Furthermore, the court asserted that the defendant could not legitimately claim any harm, so the balance of harms weighed in the plaintiff’s favor. Additionally, the public interest was determined to be served by an injunction because meaningful parole revocation processes benefit society according to the Supreme Court.

Because all the preliminary injunction factors weighed in the plaintiffs’ favor, the court granted the injunction against the original defendants. Additionally, to ensure that the Illinois Review Board would be affected by the outcome of the judgment, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion to add the Illinois Review Board and its members as defendants. The Court also issued an identical Temporary Restraining Order against the Board, and the parties were directed to make an appearance on December 18, 1987 to discuss how, procedurally, to enforce a preliminary injunction against the newly-named defendants.

In its preliminary injunction order, which was entered on December 23, 1987, the court enjoined the defendants from holding in custody, without providing a preliminary parole revocation hearing within the statutorily prescribed reasonable time frame, any parolee from Department who is arrested on a new criminal charge and imprisoned in Cook County Jail pursuant to a parole violator warrant. The appropriate time frame with ten days, unless the defendants could show that a delay of up to 14 additional days was necessary to obtain evidence or produce witnesses. The defendants were also enjoined from denying preliminary parole revocation hearings to those parolees indicted on new charges.

The parties eventually agreed on a settlement. The settlement reflected some of the provisions described in the preliminary injunction, including a ten business day limit on the imprisonment of a parolee/release without preliminary parole revocation hearing subject to (1) waiver, (2) requested continuance by the parolee, (3) judicial finding of probable cause on the original criminal charge that prompted the parole revocation hearing or a new charge, (4) unavailability of the parolee due to physical or mental health reasons, and (5) a hearing officer’s fourteen-day extension to produce witnesses or procure evidence. If the ten-day limit was exceeded, the settlement stipulated that was to be a written record of the reasons for the delay.

Additionally, the settlement stipulated that arrested parolees were to be notified that they were to be provided preliminary parole revocation hearing within 10 business days of imprisonment.

There is no reason to believe this case is ongoing.

Summary Authors

Megan Brown (4/10/2017)

Related Cases

King v. Walker, Northern District of Illinois (2006)

People


Judge(s)

Shadur, Milton Irving (Illinois)

Judge(s)

Shadur, Milton Irving (Illinois)

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Documents in the Clearinghouse

Document

1:87-cv-04542

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Dec. 10, 1987

Dec. 10, 1987

Order/Opinion

675 F.Supp. 675

1:87-cv-04542

Consent Decree

None

None

Order/Opinion

Docket

Last updated Jan. 24, 2024, 3:09 a.m.

Docket sheet not available via the Clearinghouse.

Case Details

State / Territory: Illinois

Case Type(s):

Criminal Justice (Other)

Key Dates

Filing Date: May 19, 1987

Case Ongoing: No reason to think so

Plaintiffs

Plaintiff Description:

All parolees of the Illinois Department of Corrections who have been or will be arrested on a new criminal charge in Cook County, Illinois and who are or will be imprisoned in Cook County Jail pending a final parole revocation hearing.

Plaintiff Type(s):

Private Plaintiff

Public Interest Lawyer: Yes

Filed Pro Se: No

Class Action Sought: Yes

Class Action Outcome: Granted

Defendants

Illinois Department of Corrections, State

Illinois Prisoner Review Board, State

The State of Illinois, State

Case Details

Causes of Action:

42 U.S.C. § 1983

Constitutional Clause(s):

Due Process

Available Documents:

Injunctive (or Injunctive-like) Relief

Any published opinion

Outcome

Prevailing Party: Plaintiff

Nature of Relief:

Injunction / Injunctive-like Settlement

Preliminary injunction / Temp. restraining order

Source of Relief:

Settlement

Litigation

Form of Settlement:

Voluntary Dismissal

Content of Injunction:

Preliminary relief granted

Recordkeeping

Issues

General:

Parole grant/revocation