Case: Morrissey v. Brewer

This is an older case about whether due process rights are violated when a parole board revokes someone's parole without a hearing. Two petitions for habeas corpus were filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa: Booher v. Lee County, filed on March 11, 1970 (docket number 70-20478); and Morrissey v. Brewer, filed on Sept. 12, 1969 (docket number 69-20468).

The petitioners, Morrissey and Booher, were individually convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa in the late 1960s; each was subsequently granted parole by the Iowa Board of Parole in 1968. Petitioner Morrissey was arrested as a parole violator in January 1969, after review of his parole officer's report by the Iowa Board of Parole. Petitioner Booher was arrested as a parole violator in August 1969, after a similar review of his parole officer's report. Each petitioner filed separate petitions for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the revocation of his parole by the Iowa Board of Parole without first receiving a hearing on the matter violated the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process guarantee. The district court in each case denied the petitions (Brewer's on April 15, 1970 and Booher's on June 10, 1970), and the U.S. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals consolidated the cases upon review.

On April 21, 1971, the Eighth Circuit, in an opinion authored by Chief Judge Marion Matthes, affirmed the district court rulings. The circuit court reasoned that the State Board of Parole, as a law enforcement agency, was vested with a wide discretion in controlling the persons committed to its custody--a discretion the court was not comfortable in challenging. While the circuit court recognized that the traditional view of parole--as a privilege rather than a vested right--was no longer dispositive, the court reasoned that the state's legitimate interest of effectively managing the custodial affairs of its prison population outweighed the individual's interest in obtaining early release. 443 F.2d 942 (1971).

The petitioners appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, which granted review in late 1971.

On June 29, 1972, the Supreme Court (in an 8-1 decision) reversed the Eighth Circuit. The Supreme Court reasoned that the interest at issue for the petitioners fell within the contemplation of the Fourteenth Amendment, thus due process concerns applied. While acknowledging the state's legitimate interest of effectively enforcing the laws, the Supreme Court found no state interest in revoking parole without procedural safeguards for the parolee. The Supreme Court further found society had an interest in not having parole improperly revoked, as doing so would make integrating the parolee back into society more difficult. The court concluded by evaluating the nature of what parole revocation consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment should constitute, including: (1) a determination by a third party that reasonable grounds exist for parole revocation; (2) notice of the grounds and the opportunity to bring evidence; and (3) an opportunity for a hearing, if so desired by the parolee. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).

The case was remanded back to the district court. No information is available about whether and for how long litigation continued subsequent to the Supreme Court ruling in 1972.