Case: Faheem-El v. Klincar

This is a case that challenged the Illinois parole revocation system procedures, specifically targeting preliminary parole revocation proceedings, questioning the constitutionality of the state’s denial of bail or service credits to individuals who had violated parole, and addressing the timeliness of final parole revocation hearings. On March 27, 1984, Faheem-El brought an action, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This case was filed in the Northern District of Illinois and presided over by Judge James B. Moran. The plaintiffs sued the Illinois Prison Review Board, Illinois Department of Corrections, Adult Community Services, and the Cook County Jail. The plaintiff was represented by Thomas Peters. This action was brought on four counts. Count I sought that the parole violation charge be withdrawn. Count II sought compensatory and punitive damages. Count III sought an immediate final parole revocation hearing. Count four, which was the class action count,  sought “prompt final revocation hearings, parole time credit for all incarcerated parolees awaiting a final parole revocation hearing, release of all parolees not offered bail hearings, and costs and attorneys’ fees”. On April 30, 1984, the plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. 

On December 19, 1984, the U.S. district court ruled on plaintiff’s motions for class certification and preliminary injunction. Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction pertained to the preliminary and final parole revocation hearings. Plaintiff presented three claims to the court. The first claim related to the defendants’ inadequate preliminary parole revocation hearing procedures. The court found a likelihood of success on the merits, and ruled in the plaintiff’s favor. The second claim pertained to defendants' refusal to allow bond for accused parole violators. The court did not rule on this and instead ordered the defendants to submit additional briefing in response to this claim. The third and final claim pertained to the delaying of final revocation hearings. The court found a likelihood of success for the plaintiff on this claim and granted a preliminary injunction. Additionally, the court granted the plaintiff’s class certification. Due to this injunction, the defendants were enjoined from continuing to deny parolees their right to call witnesses, present evidence, and confront and cross examine adverse witnesses at preliminary parole revocation hearings. 

On October 25, 1985, the district court ruled on whether the defendants should be enjoined from denying bail to alleged parole violators. The court granted the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction on this issue. Additionally, the court ruled on the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. In his motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff argued that there were three issues he was seeking to resolve: (1) permanent injunction pertaining to the parolee’s right to call witnesses at a preliminary parole revocation hearing; (2) an order vacating the Prison Review Board’s finding of a parole violation against the plaintiff due to plaintiff’s claim that he was prejudiced; (3) dismissal of charges because defendants violated plaintiff’s right to witnesses at the final revocation hearing. The court granted the plaintiff’s request on the first issue, permanently enjoining defendants from denying alleged parole violators. As it pertains to the second issue, the court denied the plaintiff's request. The plaintiff argued that the one-year delay of his parole revocation hearing affected the plaintiff's ability to present witness testimony. The court ruled that this was a fact-specific inquiry and thus could not be resolved via summary judgment. On the third issue the court did not dismiss the plaintiff’s parole violation charge, but the court did require a new parole revocation hearing. The district court also found that plaintiff had not exhausted his state remedies before bringing habeas claims in the action. Additionally, the court addressed whether it was constitutional to deny bail hearings to certified class members and concluded that the plaintiff class had a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of the eighth amendment, due process, and equal protection arguments. 

Following the district court’s ruling, the defendants appealed the court’s decision to grant a preliminary injunction regarding bail hearings to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. On February 25, 1988, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s ruling on the preliminary injunction requiring Illinois to consider members of class for bail following an en banc hearing. The Court of Appeals held that Illinois is not required to provide parolees with a hearing conducted by a judicial officer as it was not a violation of the Eighth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, the court determined that the disparate treatment of parolees and probationers in bail proceedings was not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The court did, however, mandate a hearing to determine whether due process required the state to provide additional procedures to protect parolee's liberty interests.

Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pertaining to his parole revocation charge in the Illinois Supreme Court. The court had to answer whether the parole length was limited to the length of the parole term.  On July 20, 1988, the Illinois Supreme Court denied the writ, stating that the length of parole term included the mandatory parole term of three years as well as the remaining period of parolee’s maximum term of imprisonment. 

This case was resolved by a consent degree. The decree established a framework for individualized consideration of parole violation warrants. The consent decree included various provision such as providing parolees with notice when there are allegations of a parole violation and allowing them to request a withdrawal of the parole violation warrant pending a final parole revocation hearing. Other provisions include the establishment of a process for hearing officers to recommend withdrawal to the Prisoner Review Board (PRB), and the PRB's obligation to render timely decisions based on factors such as public safety and flight risk. 

The case is closed.