Case: In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Circuit Public Defender

This case arose following a series of judicial orders issued by the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, that unsuccessfully attempted to tackle the large backlog of appeals assigned to the Public Defender of Florida's Tenth Judicial Circuit. Those orders had provided liberal deadlines to public defenders to file briefs in old pending appeals. However, when some filing deadlines transpired and the appeals were dismissed, the court denied motions to reinstate. The backlog of appeals continued to expand, and in a letter to the court dated March 24, 1989, the Tenth Judicial Circuit Public Defender stated that 1,005 cases were awaiting briefing by his office. Additionally, an average of 150 new criminal appeals were filed each month, many of which were ultimately assigned to his office. In his communications with the court, the Tenth Judicial Circuit Public Defender also acknowledged that due to his inability to timely process all appeals, he was forced to choose which of his appellants' appeals would be pursued according to the severity of their sentences. In response, the court found that "[w]hen an attorney representing indigent defendants is required to make choices between the rights of the various defendants, a conflict of interest is inevitably created."

Additionally, in response to the court's previous orders, a special legislative committee authorized by the Florida Judicial Council and chaired by the chief judge of the court had been appointed to consider the problem of public defender appellate backlog statewide. The committee returned a report describing the "inability of the appellate public defenders to presently cope with the massive number of appeals" and recommending adequate funding for public defenders.

For these reasons, the en banc Second District Court of Appeal entered an order on May 12, 1989, divesting the Tenth Judicial Circuit Public Defender of future appeals assignments beginning on May 22, 1989. Additionally, the court ordered the reinstatement of all those cases previously dismissed in which the appellants might suffer prejudice by a failure to reinstate.

Six Florida counties (Pinellas, Manatee, Charlotte, Hillsborough, Lee, and Collier), in five consolidated cases, challenged the May 12, 1989, order on two grounds. First, the counties argued that their procedural due process rights had been violated because the order would have a substantial financial impact on the counties, and they were given neither notice nor an opportunity to be heard before the order was issued. Second, the counties challenged the court's order prohibiting the Public Defender for the Tenth Judicial Circuit from accepting appeals from other judicial circuits, and mandating that “[t]he circuit judges within each circuit shall appoint that circuit's public defender to handle such appeals.” The counties argued that this order represented an impermissible redefinition of the duties of the public defender in a manner inconsistent with those established by the legislature.

The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the Public Defender's excessive caseloads were requiring public defenders to choose between the rights of clients, creating a conflict of interest and a violation of the right to counsel. Therefore, the court concluded that the District Court properly invoked the inherent power of the judiciary in issuing its May 12, 1989, order. However, the Florida Supreme Court modified the procedure adopted by the lower court to make it more consistent with existing legislative directions. Specifically, the court ordered lower courts to appoint alternate counsel upon public defender motions to withdraw and stated that the legislature should appropriate sufficient funds for a “massive employment of the private sector on a one-shot basis.” The court further advised that if sufficient funds were not appropriated within sixty days, the state courts would entertain motions for writs of habeas corpus from indigent appellants whose appellate briefs were delinquent by sixty days or more.