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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

ANGEL DE JESUS ZEPEDA RIVAS,  
BRENDA RUBI RUIZ TOVAR,  
LAWRENCE KURIA MWAURA,  
LUCIANO GONZALO MENDOZA  
JERONIMO, CORAIMA YARITZA  
SANCHEZ NUÑEZ, JAVIER ALFARO,  
DUNG TUAN DANG,

Petitioners-Plaintiffs,

v.

DAVID JENNINGS, Acting Director of the  
San Francisco Field Office of U.S. Immigration  
and Customs Enforcement; MATTHEW T.  
ALBENCE, Deputy Director and Senior  
Official Performing the Duties of the Director  
of the U.S. Immigration and Customs  
Enforcement; U.S. IMMIGRATION AND  
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT; GEO GROUP,  
INC.; NATHAN ALLEN, Warden of Mesa  
Verde Detention Facility,

Respondents-Defendants.

**CASE NO. 3:20-CV-02731-VC**

**REPLY IN SUPPORT OF  
PETITIONERS-PLAINTIFFS'  
MOTION FOR CLASS  
CERTIFICATION**

**JUDGE VINCE CHHABRIA**

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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

The Court should grant provisional class certification so it can adjudicate the common question of whether Defendants’ failure to implement safe social distancing for hundreds of similarly situated detainees at Yuba County Jail (“Yuba”) and Mesa Verde ICE Processing Facility (“Mesa Verde”) violates their Fifth Amendment rights.

Defendants do not dispute that COVID-19 poses a grave risk to all detainees. Instead, Defendants claim that Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the elements of Rule 23 because, according to Defendants, Plaintiffs seek divergent and individualized relief: either being released or remaining in detention in a less crowded facility. (Opposition Brief, ECF 37 “Opp.” at 26). But this framing is a straw man that mischaracterizes the common question at the heart of this case: whether Defendants’ failure to implement safe social distancing violates *all* class members’ Fifth Amendment rights. When viewed through the proper lens, Defendants’ attack unravels. All class members have suffered the same injury—the substantial risk of contracting COVID-19 due to the lack of social distancing—and all class members would benefit from the same remedy—an order requiring social distancing at Yuba and Mesa Verde.

The proposed class meets the Rule 23 requirements and an injunction ordering adequate social distancing at Yuba and Mesa Verde benefits *all* class members, regardless of how the order is implemented or who is released first. The Court should provisionally certify the proposed class.<sup>1</sup>

## **II. THE PROPOSED CLASS MEETS RULE 23(A) REQUIREMENTS.**<sup>2</sup>

### **A. The Proposed Class Meets the Commonality Requirement.**

When assessing commonality, courts seek to determine whether Defendants’ policies or practices “violate class members’ rights in a systematic way.” *Saravia v. Sessions*, 280 F.Supp.3d 1168, 1204 (N.D. Cal. 2017). For the reasons set forth more fully in Plaintiffs’ TRO

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<sup>1</sup> Defendants also contend the Court should not certify the proposed class because of the provisional prior class certification order in *Frailhat v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement*, No. 19-1546-JGB (C.D. Cal.). As explained in Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Stay, filed contemporaneously herewith, the provisional class in *Frailhat* is substantially different from the putative class here, and the issues in the two cases are substantially different.

<sup>2</sup> Defendants do not dispute that the proposed class is sufficiently numerous.

papers, all class members suffer the same deprivation of their constitutional rights because they are unable to achieve social distancing. *See, e.g.*, TRO Brief, ECF 5 at 5-8. Defendants’ conduct “violate[s] class members’ rights in a systematic way” by exposing all of them to the risk of COVID-19 due to the lack of social distancing at Yuba and Mesa Verde. *See Saravia*, 280 F.Supp.3d at 1204.

Defendants contend that differences in the health and age of class members, differences in facility conditions, the underlying reasons for class members’ detainment, and the administration of class-wide relief defeat commonality. *See Opp.* at 21-22. Each of these arguments fails.

**First**, Defendants’ focus on variations in class members’ health conditions and age presupposes that only those with existing health conditions or elderly class members have a right to social distancing. *Opp.* at 22. But the undisputed expert testimony demonstrates that younger adults and people without known underlying conditions are also at risk of serious complications or death if they contract COVID-19. *See Greifinger*, ECF 5-2 ¶ 8. Accordingly, even a “significant variation among the Detainees does not defeat commonality or typicality” because “a common question of law and fact in this case is whether the government must modify the conditions of confinement—or, failing that, release a critical mass of Detainees—such that social distancing will be possible and all those held in the facility will not face a constitutionally violative ‘substantial risk of serious harm.’” *Savino v. Souza*, 2020 WL 1703844, at \*7 (D. Mass. Apr. 8, 2020) (citation omitted). As the Ninth Circuit acknowledged in *Parsons v. Ryan*, “although a presently existing risk may ultimately result in different future harm for different inmates—ranging from no harm at all to death—every inmate suffers exactly the same constitutional injury when he is exposed to a single statewide [] policy or practice that creates a substantial risk of serious harm.” 754 F.3d 657, 678 (9th Cir. 2014); *see also Postawko v. Mo. Dep’t of Corrections*, 910 F.3d 1030, 1038-39 (8th Cir. 2018) (“Here the physical symptoms eventually suffered by each class member may vary, but the question asked by each class member is susceptible to common resolution.”).

**Second**, Defendants erroneously suggest that commonality among these detained class

members does not exist because “the circumstances within each facility are not uniform.” Opp. at 22. But variances between and within the facilities do not defeat class certification because each proposed subclass independently meets class certification requirements and, within each facility, all class members are deprived of minimally adequate social distancing. Courts have routinely found common issues of fact and law in classes comprised of detainees in such circumstances, including for those housed in different facilities. *Parsons*, 754 F.3d at 676 (finding commonality met where “policies and practices of . . . systematic application expose[d] all inmates in [ten state prison facilities] to a substantial risk of serious harm”); *Savino*, 2020 WL 1703844, at \*7 (certifying class alleging unconstitutional conditions at two ICE facilities); *Rosas v. Baca*, 2012 WL 2061694, at \*3 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (provisionally certifying class alleging unconstitutional deliberate indifference by staff at three interconnected jails).

**Third**, the underlying reason for each class members’ detention has no bearing on the adjudication of their class-wide claims. See Opp. at 22-23. Indeed, “[t]he specific reason *why* each Petitioner and putative class member is being detained is immaterial, here. The issue before the Court is whether *the manner* of their detention—the conditions of confinement—violates their Fifth Amendment substantive due process rights.” *Roman v. Wolf*, CV-20-768, ECF 52 at 4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2020).<sup>3</sup> The Ninth Circuit has affirmed class certification of immigration detainees to address common constitutional violations, notwithstanding that class members were held under different statutory provisions. See *Rodriguez v. Hayes*, 591 F.3d 1105, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The nature of the particular statute authorizing the detention of individual class members will play some role in determining whether class members are entitled to relief, as well. Nonetheless, the constitutional issue at the heart of each class member’s claim for relief is common.”).

**Fourth**, Defendants conflate the common class-wide *violation*—whether Defendants’ failure to provide social distancing violates class members’ Fifth Amendment rights—with how the Court should administer *relief*. Defendants mistakenly argue that commonality is defeated

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<sup>3</sup> Plaintiffs note that the preliminary injunction in *Roman* has been administratively stayed by the Ninth Circuit.

because “[s]ome class members will be released under plaintiff’s proposed TRO, and many will not.” Opp. at 22. Commonality exists when a class-wide proceeding has the capacity “to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) (Opp. at 21). When, as here, “the lawsuit challenges a system-wide practice or policy that affects all of the putative class members[,]” “commonality is satisfied[.]” *Rosas*, 2012 WL 2061694, at \*3 (quoting *Armstrong v. Davis*, 275 F.3d 849, 868 (9th Cir. 2001)) (certifying class alleging constitutional violations stemming from Sherriff’s deliberate indifference to violence against inmates at three jails).

Here, an order that Defendants enable adequate social distancing benefits all class members. Consider a small room housing three detainees: if adequate social distancing could be achieved with two detainees remaining in the room, releasing one detainee would remedy the constitutional violation for all three detainees.

Notably, Defendants do not contend that class members’ constitutional *claims* are different; instead, they focus on which class members might receive prioritized review for relief. But Plaintiffs’ proposed order is just that: a common-sense proposal for the Court to fashion class-wide relief requiring social distancing at Yuba and Mesa Verde to protect class members’ common constitutional rights. While the Court may grant relief in a way that prioritizes certain detainees in its implementation of an injunction, as the court did in *Savino*, 2020 WL 1703844, at \*8-9, the Court “has broad discretion to fashion injunctive relief.” *Melendres v. Maricopa County*, 897 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 2018). The Court is free to impose any process that remedies Defendants’ failure to implement social distancing at Yuba and Mesa Verde.

Defendants’ cited cases are off-base. Unlike a case requiring an individualized showing that each consumer viewed a disputed advertisement to demonstrate the reliance prong of a consumer-protection claim, *Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co.*, 666 F.3d 581, 596 (9th Cir. 2012) (Opp. at 23), or a case requiring a showing that millions of independent employment decisions discriminated against every female employee in a national retailer on the basis of sex, *Wal-Mart*, 564 U.S. at 352 (Opp. at 22), this case presents a common question posed by similarly situated detainees that is amenable to a common answer.

**B. The Proposed Class Meets the Typicality Requirement.**

The proposed class also meets the typicality standard of Rule 23(a)(3). Here again, Defendants’ attack focuses on a proposed *order*, rather than the nature of the class representatives’ *claims*. Opp. at 24. If the Government’s view were correct, no class action could ever be certified in any action challenging unconstitutional conditions such as prison overcrowding if the result was the release of only some class members. But the Supreme Court has approved the use of prison depopulation orders in class cases, even though the relief sought required the release of some but not all prisoners. *See, e.g., Brown v. Plata*, 563 U.S. 493, 502-03 (2011) (affirming class-wide injunction of court-mandated population limit to remedy constitutional violations caused by overcrowding). Courts have implicitly rejected Defendants’ black-and-white logic. *See Pierce v. Cty. of Orange*, 526 F.3d 1190, 1196, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) (describing injunctive relief, including jail population caps and affirming that “population caps may be an appropriate remedy when overcrowding rises to the level of constitutional violation”); *see also Duran v. Elrod*, 713 F.2d 292, 297 (7th Cir. 1983) (affirming district court order requiring release of certain pre-trial detainees to address overcrowding in class action on behalf of all pre-trial detainees); *Inmates of the Allegheny Cty. Jail v. Wecht*, 565 F. Supp. 1278, 1297 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (reducing overcrowding “is within our power to correct the constitutional violations”).

Indeed, Defendants’ opposition contravenes controlling case law and this Court’s decision recognizing the propriety of class litigation to establish constitutional processes for release from unlawful confinement, even if all individuals ultimately do not win release under the process established. *Rodriguez*, 591 F.3d at 1123-24 (finding common underlying constitutional claim to bond hearing process warranted certification); *Saravia*, 280 F.Supp.3d at 1204 (holding common underlying constitutional claim to release or bond hearing warranted certification).

Tellingly, Defendants do not cite any cases holding that claims like those asserted by the class representatives here are atypical of the absent class members. Instead, Defendants argue only that the ability of courts to make individualized determinations in habeas petitions brought

by individuals prevents class relief. *See, e.g., Sacal-Micha v. Longoria*, 2020 WL 1518861, at \*6 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2020) (collecting cases); *see also* Opp. at 24-25 (same). But those cases have no bearing on whether these plaintiffs’ claims are representative of the rest of the proposed class. If anything, different individual habeas outcomes weigh in favor of certifying the class. *See Rodriguez*, 591 F.3d at 1123 (certifying class because answering a common constitutional question would “render management of these claims more efficient for the courts” and “obviate[e] the severe practical concerns that would likely attend [class members] were they forced to proceed alone”).<sup>4</sup>

At bottom, “Petitioners’ claim and the claim of the putative class members are the same—a Fifth Amendment substantive due process claim—and the remedy sought is the same—a reduction in [Defendants’] detainee population.” *Roman*, ECF 52, at 5. Defendants’ efforts to unravel typicality by focusing on the proposed mechanism to order social distancing is misguided, and the Court should find that the proposed class meets the typicality requirement.

### **C. The Proposed Class Meets the Adequacy Requirement.**

Courts deny challenges to adequacy that merely repeat arguments against commonality and typicality. *See Rodriguez*, 591 F.3d at 1125 (rejecting Defendants’ “challenge [to] Petitioner’s adequacy only by re-asserting their commonality and typicality arguments”). No conflict exists between proposed class representatives and absent class members. Defendants conjure a hypothetical conflict in which class representatives will urge their own release over absent class members, but that has no support in the record or reality. Indeed, Plaintiffs proposed a process that would afford discretion to the Court to determine who should be released.

Once again, Defendants attempt to reframe the mechanism of relief as a request for multiple injunctions. Opp. at 26. But the class seeks a single order requiring social distancing. Accordingly, the proposed class representatives adequately represent the class because all class members seek the same injunction and declaratory judgment, and all class members stand to benefit from an order requiring social distancing.

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<sup>4</sup> Moreover, even if the Court were to accept Defendants’ contention that inconsistent individual adjudications are inimical to (b)(2) class certification, the better result would be to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(1).

### III. THE PROPOSED CLASS MEETS THE REQUIREMENT OF RULE 23(B).

As with their challenge under Rule 23(a), Defendants' argument under Rule 23(b)(2) targets the proposed mechanism for administering class-wide relief rather than the reality that requiring social distancing benefits all class members. Opp. at 21-22. Notably, Defendants have not cited a single case holding that a proposed process to address a class-wide constitutional violation destroys Rule 23(b)(2) certification. Indeed, while Plaintiffs do propose a workable process here, such a proposal is unnecessary: "Plaintiffs do not need to specify the precise injunctive relief they will ultimately seek at the class certification stage." *B.K. by next friend Tinsley v. Snyder*, 922 F.3d 957, 972 (9th Cir. 2019). Defendants quibble with *who* should be released first. But even those who remain detained stand to benefit from less-crowded facilities.

It is noteworthy that despite taking issue with Plaintiffs' specific proposed order, Defendants do not contend that "crafting uniform injunctive relief will be impossible." *B.K.*, 922 F.3d at 973. In fact, they have done the opposite. If the Court finds preliminary relief appropriate, "Defendants propose that the Court order defendants to reduce the populations at MVDF and YCJ to numbers that permit social distancing. Defendants would then determine which class members would be released and provid[e] weekly updates to the Court regarding the class members released and the current populations at MVDF and YCJ." Opp. at 29. Defendants' own proposal demonstrates that final injunctive relief or declaratory relief is viable on a class-wide basis. *See* Rule 23(b)(2).

A "preliminary injunction [that] clarifies how the federal government must treat those people [in detention,]" meets the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) because it "can protect all class members' . . . rights . . ." *Saravia*, 280 F.Supp.3d at 1205. Consistent with that principle, courts around the country have provisionally certified classes of detainees alleging violation of their Fifth Amendment rights because of ICE's failure to provide social distancing at other ICE facilities. *See Savino*, 2020 WL 1703844, at \*7 (certifying class of immigrant detainees alleging Fifth Amendment violations because of risk of contracting COVID-19 at ICE facility); *Roman*, ECF-52, at 6-7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2020) (same); *also Wilson v. Williams*, 2020 WL 1940882, at \*8 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 22, 2020) (certifying subclass of medically vulnerable inmates seeking

habeas relief because of risk of contracting COVID-19 at detention facility). This case should be no exception. The proposed class satisfies Rule 23(b)(2).

**IV. CONCLUSION.**

For the reasons stated in the opening brief and above, this Court should provisionally certify the proposed class and subclasses.

Dated: April 27, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

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