Case: United States v. State of Mississippi

District Court Decision (229 F. Supp. 925, March 6, 1964)

This is a case about Mississippi’s voter registration laws that prevented Black citizens from voting. The United States, through the Attorney General, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Jackson Division, against the State of Mississippi, the three members of the Mississippi State Board of Election Commissioners, and six county Registrars of Voters. The complaint alleged that the defendants had impaired and denied the right of Black citizens of Mississippi to vote, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a), the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and Article I of the Constitution. The government sought declaratory relief against the challenged state laws; a finding that those laws had been used to deny Black citizens the right to vote as part of a pattern and practice of racial discrimination; injunctive relief barring enforcement of the challenged laws; and an order requiring defendants to register any Black applicant who met basic eligibility criteria.

The government’s complaint alleged that in 1890, a majority of the qualified voters in Mississippi were Black, but that in that year a constitutional convention adopted a new state constitution with the chief purpose of restricting the Black franchise and establishing white political supremacy. The complaint alleged that this plan had reduced the percentage of qualified voters who were Black from over 50% to about 9% by 1899, and that by 1954, only about 5% of Black voting-age Mississippians were registered. The complaint further alleged that Mississippi had repeatedly amended its constitution and statutes to increase the barriers to Black voter registration. These amendments included a 1954 constitutional amendment requiring applicants to read, copy, and interpret the state constitution; a 1960 amendment adding a “good moral character” requirement; a 1960 statute repealing the permanent public records requirement for registration applications; and a package of 1962 legislation that required applications to be completed without error or assistance, barred registrars from explaining the reasons for rejection, and required publication of applicants’ names in local newspapers.

The District Court, in an opinion by Circuit Judge Cameron joined by District Judge Cox (with Circuit Judge Brown dissenting), dismissed the complaint in its entirety. The majority held that 42 U.S.C. § 1971 did not authorize the United States to bring this type of facial attack on Mississippi's voter qualification laws. The court reasoned that the statute's protection of citizens "otherwise qualified by law to vote" presupposed the existence of valid state requirements and did not empower the federal government to invalidate those requirements wholesale. The court further held that the Election Commissioners were not proper defendants because only the county registrars were charged with enforcing the challenged statutes, and that the six registrars could not be sued jointly because no conspiracy or concerted action among them was alleged, as each registrar's conduct was separate and distinct. The court also rejected the government's substantive challenges, concluding that each of the challenged constitutional provisions and statutes was facially valid and that the mere existence of racial disparities in registration, without an allegation of discriminatory application, did not state a cognizable claim.

Supreme Court Opinion Reversing (380 U.S. 128, March 8, 1965)

The case was argued on January 26, 1965, and decided on March 8, 1965. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. The Court found that the complaint charged a long-standing, intentional, and successful plan to bar Black citizens from voting in Mississippi. The Court framed the central question as whether the District Court's dismissal for failure to state a claim had been proper, and reversed on every ground.

First, the Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1971 expressly authorized the United States to bring the suit. The District Court had emphasized the statute’s phrase “otherwise qualified by law to vote” to conclude that § 1971 only allowed the government to challenge the discriminatory application of facially valid laws, not to attack the validity of state voting laws themselves. The Supreme Court rejected that construction, holding that the phrase meant voters must possess the qualifications required by valid state or federal law, and that Congress could not have intended to allow a State to disqualify Black citizens through laws that themselves violated the Constitution. The Court also rejected the argument that the State of Mississippi could not be made a defendant, holding that § 1971(c) authorized the United States to join the State and that Congress had constitutional power under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment to do so. The Court noted that suits by the United States against states have a long history and that nothing in the Constitution has ever been seriously understood to bar them.

The Court reversed the dismissal of the Election Commissioners, holding that under state law they had the power, authority, and responsibility to administer the voter registration laws. Specifically, they supervised the preparation of application forms and the tests designed to measure applicants’ ability to read and interpret the state constitution, understand the duties and obligations of citizenship, and demonstrate good moral character—all of which were central to the government's constitutional challenge. The Supreme Court also held that the six county registrars had been properly joined as defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a), because the complaint alleged they were carrying out activities that were part of a statewide system designed to enforce the registration laws in a way that inevitably deprived Black citizens of the right to vote, presenting common questions of law and fact. The Court reversed the dismissal of the complaint and remanded the case for prompt proceedings on the merits.

District Court Decision on Remand (256 F. Supp. 344, May 21, 1966)

Following the Supreme Court’s remand, two significant developments affected the case: the enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and amendments to the Mississippi Constitution and state statutes that eliminated the interpretation and understanding test and substituted a literacy requirement based on the ability to read and write. The United States filed an amended complaint focused primarily on actions by state election officials that allegedly frustrated the effective use of voter eligibility lists and Certificates of Eligibility issued by federal examiners in several Mississippi counties. Among the actions challenged were four Chancery Court injunctions that the Mississippi Attorney General had obtained, enjoining county and municipal registrars from filing or giving recognition to any such federal voter list or Certificate of Eligibility. The case was submitted on a stipulated record, which showed that through March 19, 1966, federal examiners had listed 31,906 persons as eligible to vote in eighteen counties. The three-judge court, consisting of Circuit Judge Brown and District Judges Cox and Clayton, recognized this as critically important in light of upcoming primary elections scheduled for June 7, 1966.

State election officials raised several objections to the federal voter lists and Certificates of Eligibility. They argued primarily that the oath on the federal application form—which required subscribers to affirm information as “true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief” rather than as an unqualified, absolute truth—was inconsistent with Mississippi law and therefore invalid. The court rejected this and the other objections, holding that the federal scheme operated as a complete, self-contained system of federally prescribed forms carrying federal sanctions, and that the perjury provisions of the Voting Rights Act adequately addressed the concern that applicants needed to swear absolutely to the truth of their statements. The court also rejected the argument that holders of Certificates of Eligibility still needed to appear before the registrar and sign the registration book oath. It held that eligibility is determined at the time of application and that the Act is self-executing once the applicant is listed and the certificate issued, meaning the four state Chancery Court injunctions purporting to block recognition of the federal lists were null, void, and without force or effect under the Supremacy Clause.

The court agreed with the government that Mississippi's 1965 repeal of the statute providing assistance to illiterate voters at the polls had created a gap requiring remedy, reasoning that Congress intended the Voting Rights Act to protect not just registration but the full exercise of the right to vote, including the casting of a ballot. Although the court granted the government substantially all of the relief it sought, it declined to issue an injunction and instead entered declaratory relief. The declaratory judgment declared Mississippi's literacy-based voter registration provisions to have no force or effect during the Voting Rights Act's suspension period; declared the four state Chancery Court injunctions null and void; ordered that all persons certified by federal examiners be placed on the registration and poll books in time to vote in the June 7, 1966 primary; and declared that precinct officials must provide reasonable assistance to any illiterate voter who requests it.