Case: Adams v. Carlson

This is a class action brought by four named plaintiffs on behalf of people incarcerated in the segregation unit at the maximum security federal prison in Marion, Illinois (USP Marion), challenging the procedures leading to their placement in segregation and the conditions in the unit. USP Marion was the most severe maximum security prison in the federal system and was where activists in other prisons were sent to be dealt with. In 1972, about 100 activists were transferred to Marion, in an effort to use “behavioral-modification techniques” on them, including isolation, beatings, and brainwashing. The plaintiffs claimed these amounted to torture. On July 17, 1972, there was a prison-wide strike to protest the violent beating of someone incarcerated at Marion. The strike lasted one week, shutting down all labor and resulting in a prison lockdown.

The named plaintiffs, who were the leaders of the strike, were put in segregation as punishment on July 24, 1972. About 100 others who partook in the strike were put in segregation soon after. The segregation unit was well-known for being one of the worst solitary confinement units in the country. On August 17, 1972, there was a fire in the unit, which the guards responded to by turning off the water and electricity and taking everyone’s possessions. The next day, the guards teargassed and assaulted people in the unit, and then refused to provide medical treatment. In response to this violence and inhumane treatment, the Political Prisoners Liberation Front organized to bring this lawsuit with the help of the People’s Law Office.

There were initially four separate complaints, which Judge Henry Wise consolidated into one. The consolidated complaint was filed in September 1972 in the District Court for the Central District of Illinois. Judge James Foreman was assigned to the case. The plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the warden and associate warden of Marion, and a correctional officer. They alleged they were put in segregation without proper procedural safeguard and denied access to courts in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and subjected to inhumane conditions in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The class was certified to include all individuals held in segregation on or since July 23, 1972, which included 115 people.

Initially the plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order, but their request was denied on October 24, 1972. So, they instead requested a preliminary injunction, damages, and attorneys’ fees and expenses. In the preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs sought to bar the defendants from 1) denying them adequate food, clothing, medical care, exercise, showers, and other life necessities, 2) gassing, suffocating, or using other physical/mental abuse on them, 3) confiscating and destroying their personal effects and legal papers, 4) denying them reasonable access to counsel, 5) placing them in punitive segregation without proper procedural safeguards, and 6) violating their First Amendment rights to religion and speech. The court consolidated these into four main issues: 1) cruel and unusual punishment, 2) access to courts, 3) procedural due process, and 4) freedom of speech and religion.

After denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss on October 27, 1972, the court held a hearing on the preliminary injunction on  November 2 and November 3, 1972. On January 15, 1973, the court denied the preliminary injunction for all issues except mail censorship. 352 F.Supp. 882. First, the judge found there was no cruel and unusual punishment, giving deference to prison officials and finding the conditions were not inhumane and were a necessary response to the disturbances. The court relied on opinions from the Second and Fourth Circuit for this reasoning. Second, the court found there was neither evidence legal materials had been destroyed nor that the plaintiffs’ access to counsel was interfered with because of partition walls in the visiting room. Third, the court found the defendants provided basic safeguards putting the plaintiffs in segregation, and that the plaintiffs did not show a probability of success on the merits or of irreparable harm. Next, the court found there was no undue restriction on the plaintiffs’ free exercise of religion in segregation. Finally, the court found the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their unlawful mail censorship claim in violation of the First Amendment. So, the court issued an injunction requiring that defendants give the plaintiffs their mail uncensored. 

The plaintiffs appealed the decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded on August 23, 1973. 488 F.2d 619. The panel included Chief District Judge Reynolds, Senior District Judge Grant, and Chief Judge Swygert. Chief Judge Swygert wrote the opinion. The court held that the plaintiffs were denied due process when put in segregation indefinitely without notice of their charges because of a new Seventh Circuit opinion, United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, which strengthened the due process requirements to put someone in punitive segregation. The court reversed and remanded for the district court to order the defendants to provide new hearings within 30 days that complied with Miller. Next, the court found the plaintiffs’ right to counsel and access to courts were violated by the use of glass partitions in the visitation rooms and the seizure of their legal papers. So, the court ordered the defendants to remove the barriers and return plaintiffs’ legal papers. Lastly, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that being held in segregation indefinitely was disproportionate under Weems v. United States. The court found there were insufficient facts to determine if the punishment was disproportionate, and that the new hearings ordered would answer that question. 

In response to the circuit court opinion, on September 7, 1973, the district court ordered the prison officials to 1) hold new hearings for the plaintiffs still in segregation, 2) remove the partitions from the visitation rooms, and 3) return the plaintiffs’ legal materials. The new hearings were held in September 1973. The memoranda from the hearings showed the plaintiffs were put in segregation as punishment for the work stoppage and other minor infractions. 

The court then conducted a consolidated hearing, which the parties agreed would only resolve the question of whether it was cruel and unusual punishment to hold the plaintiffs in segregation as punishment for the work stoppage. On December 12, 1973 , the court issued its opinion, finding that 16 months in segregation was disproportionate punishment for the work stoppage. 368 F.Supp. 1050. The court did not cite any cases in holding the punishment was disproportionate. The judge ordered the officials to release the 36 class members still in segregation within 7 days.

On April 29, 1974, the court addressed the remaining issues in the case, including 1) what should be done with the temporary injunctions, 2) the class and whether the court would retain jurisdiction if a class member was transferred, 3) whether the defendants complied with the Miller due process standard in the supplemental hearings, 4) whether the prison records for class members needed to be expunged, and 5) whether plaintiffs should receive attorneys’ fees and expenses. 375 F.Supp. 1228. 

First, the judge made permanent the temporary injunctions ensuring the plaintiffs received their mail and preventing the use of partitions in the attorney-client visitation rooms. Next, the court held it would retain jurisdiction if a class member was transferred because the Federal Bureau of Prisons controlled all federal institutions. Also, the court refused to expand the class to include anyone put in segregation after July 24, 1973 because there was no evidence of the procedures used to put them in segregation. As for the disciplinary hearings, the court held that Miller requires 48-hour notice of charges, an impartial investigator, a fair opportunity to explain and present witness testimony, and an impartial decision-maker, but not confrontation and cross-examination, appointed counsel, or hearing transcripts. The judge found the procedures of the re-hearings in 1973 did not meet the above requirements. Next, the court ruled that indefinite placement in segregation did not violate cruel and unusual punishment. As for expungement, the court held that class members’ records need only be modified to reflect the instant decision. Finally, the court denied attorneys’ fees and expenses because the defendants were covered by 28 U.S.C § 2412, which bars attorneys fees against federal officials unless otherwise authorized by statute.

The plaintiffs appealed the denial of attorneys’ fees. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. 521 F.2d 168. The panel included Circuit Judges Cummings, Pell, and Tone. Judge Pell wrote the July 29, 1975 opinion. The court held that plaintiffs could not receive attorneys' fees and that 28 U.S.C § 2412 did not violate equal protection. However, the court found the plaintiffs should receive witness expenses as outlined in 28 U.S.C § 1821 because 28 U.S.C § 2412 allows for expert expenses. The court remanded for the district court to determine the amount.

On February 28, 1983, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs’ request for cert. The case is now closed. The segregation unit at Marion was challenged again in Bono v. Saxbe.