Filed Date: Sept. 14, 2011
Closed Date: Sept. 22, 2017
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This is a case about a mandatory drug testing policy at Linn State, a public university. On September 14, 2011, several enrolled students at Linn State University filed this class action lawsuit in United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. The plaintiffs sued the Linn State President and several members of the Board of Regents under 42 USC § 1983. Represented by the ACLU, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. They claimed that the new mandatory drug testing policy violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. The case was assigned to Judge Nanette K. Laughrey and Magistrate Judge Matt J. Whitworth.
The new policy required the university's students to submit to mandatory drug testing as a condition of their continued enrollment. If students refused they would be withdrawn from the school. Students were charged a non-refundable $50 for the drug test. Students whose drug test came back positive had 45 days until they were tested again. If the second test was also positive the student was withdrawn from the school.
In their complaint the plaintiffs defined their class as "current, and future, students of Linn State Technical College who are, or will be, seeking degrees or certificates at the main campus of the College in Linn, Missouri or any other Linn State Technical College Locations."
In their complaint the plaintiffs alleged that the policy was unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. They argued that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy against the state in the chemical content of their urine and that the policy constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. They argued that the the policy required plaintiffs to submit to a search without any individualized suspicion and that the defendants could not show a special need for the policy that would sufficiently outweigh the individual privacy expectations of the plaintiffs.
On September 14, 2011 the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary retraining order and permanent injunction and motion to certify their class. On the same day the court granted the plaintiffs motion for temporary restraining order enjoining the defendants from collecting any further samples and from testing the ones already collected.
On September 21, 2011 the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint which removed one of the named plaintiffs from the listed parties. The plaintiffs also amended their requested relief to include damages as well as relief that would require the defendants to return or destroy any samples collected during the time in which the policy was not enjoined.
On September 23, 2011 the plaintiffs filed a consent motion to dismiss the claim for damages from the first amended complaint. The judge granted the order on the same day. On the same day the plaintiffs also filed an emergency motion requesting an order that would extend the temporary restraining order.The court granted the motion on the same day after the defendants had agreed to resolve the extension, but had subsequently made themselves unavailable. The court extended the TRO for 14 more days and clarified that it only applied to drug testing conduct pursuant to the policy adopted by the defendants in June 2011.
On September 29, 2011 the plaintiffs filed a motion to expedite consideration of their preliminary injunction motion since their TRO was due to lapse before the hearing for their preliminary injunction would occur. The TRO could only be extended further if the defendants consented and the plaintiffs stipulated that the defendants would only agree in exchange for certain conditions that the plaintiffs objected to. The plaintiffs asked the court to conduct the hearing before the expiration of the TRO or to enforce the defendants' agreement to consent to an extension of the TRO.
On September 29, 2011 the defendants asked the court to set aside the order extending the TRO. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs sought an emergency hearing for the TRO at a time when they knew the defendant was unavailable and when the TRO did not expire for another 5 days. The defendants asked the court to set aside the results of that hearing and that a new hearing should be held regarding any proposed extension of modification of the TRO.
On September 30, 2011 the court denied the motion to expedite and motion to set aside as moot. The parties had filed a joint stipulation regarding the TRO and by agreement of the parties the modification of the TRO language from September 23, 2011 was set aside and the TRO was extended to October 25, 2011.
On October 19, 2011 the plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice the individual claims of two of the named plaintiffs. On October 25, 2011 the court granted the plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction and extended the TRO until November 8, 2011.
On November 8, 2011 the court continued the TRO to which neither of the parties objected. The defendants agreed that Linn College would not collect any urine samples pursuant to the policy being challenged.
On November 9, 2011 the defendants filed a motion to dismiss party as to the student representative of the board of regents who had since left his position.
On November 15, 2011 the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the individual claims of two of the named plaintiffs. On the same day the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to certify their class. The court did not find the defendants argument, that some students might not object to the policy and thus a class was not appropriate, persuasive. The court determined this irrelevant to the question of whether the policy was an unreasonable search and seizure. The court held that the allegation against the university's drug testing policy affected the Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure of each student in the same way and thus a class certification was appropriate. 2011 WL 5822382.
On November 18, 2011 the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. The court determined that the plaintiffs would be irreparably harmed without an injunction because if they had to submit to the search and their constitutional rights were violated their only subsequent relief would be damages. The defendants on the other hand would not be harmed by maintaining the status quo of no drug testing which had been in operation since the 1960s. 2011 WL 5827783.
The defendants appealed this decision on December 16, 2011.
On February 28, 2012 the court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the student representative as a party. The student representative was sued in his official capacity as a part of the board of the regents and since the student had graduated in 2009 he was no longer in that position. The court dismissed the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The interlocutory appeal was heard by a panel from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit constituting Circuit judges Wollman, Beam, and Loken. On January 29, 2013 the Eighth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and held that the plaintiffs had not shown fair chance of prevailing on their facial Fourth Amendment challenge to the university's mandatory drug-testing policy. The appellate court found that the district court had erred in its analysis that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their case. The appellate court determined that because plaintiffs had launched a facial challenge to the policy and sought a preliminary injunction they had to prove that there were no set of circumstances under which the policy could comply with the Fourth Amendment. The court reasoned that the university could implement the policy in a reasonable way so as to comply with the Fourth Amendment. Since the drug testing results were not to be used by law enforcement the university merely had to pass a balancing test between their presumed interest propelled by the policy and the protected interests of the students. The court determined that the university's pubic safety interest in providing a safe environment for students could be found to outweigh the individual privacy interests of students. 705 F.3d 315.
On February 12, 2013 the plaintiffs filed motions once again for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. In response to the court of appeals decision the plaintiffs asked the court for a temporary restraining order because while the court of appeals said the policy was not facially unconstitutional they had reasoned it could have unconstitutional applications. The appellate court was scheduled to issue its mandate on February 18, 2013 and the plaintiffs sought relief before the order would take effect.
On February 19, 2013 the court of appeals mandated that the district court vacate the preliminary injunction. The next day the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a TRO. On March 11, 2013 the court extended the TRO for an additional fourteen days or until the court could rule on the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction.
On March 22, 2013 the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and enjoined the defendants from collecting or testing any urine samples from students. Once again the court's decision turned on whether the plaintiffs had shown that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their case. The court determined that the relevant standard was that the plaintiffs had a fair chance of prevailing on their claim. The court reasoned that this less stricter standard applied because the regulation in question had not undergone the usual legislative process that allows statutes to be tested under the less strict standard of "likely to prevail on the merits."
The defendants argued that the policy was not unconstitutional as applied because none of the students initially tested had petitioned for an exemption and therefore the policy was never applied in its entirety. The plaintiffs argued that the constitutional violation was the collection and testing of the urine sample and that just because they didn't apply for an exemption did not mean that the policy had not been applied to them. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and determined that the availability of a petition procedure might bear on the reasonableness of the policy, but did not preclude the plaintiffs from challenging the policy as it was applied to them.
The court held that there was a fair chance that the university's drug-testing policy was unconstitutionally applied in September of 2011 when the initial samples were taken. The university, undisputedly, lacked individualized suspicion when it initially tested students and the safety interest did not justify these searches because they were not enrolled in programs that posed significant safety concerns to others.
The defendants had argued that the concern of cross enrollment justified the policy of drug testing all students since they were allowed to take classes in different disciplines and might take a class in a subject area deemed dangerous. The court held that this concern did not justify testing all students because it was not clear if the classes they were enrolling in actually justified drug testing or if it was the upper level classes in that discipline that warranted the policy. The injunction applied to students who were not enrolled in the university's aviation maintenance, heavy equipment operations, and industrial electricity programs. 936 F.Supp.2d 1099.
The plaintiffs filed a motion to join an additional defendant who was a member of the board of regents on April 25, 2013 which the court granted on the same day. On May 21, 2013 the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the claims against this defendant for failure to state a claim.
On June 10, 2013 the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. The amended complaint addressed the points raised by the appellate court and asked for declaratory relief that would find the drug policy unconstitutional either facially or as-applied.
On September 13, 2013 the district court ruled that the drug policy was unconstitutional as applied to students enrolled in academic programs that did not include tasks that posed a significant safety risk to others, but was constitutional as applied to those in programs which did and whose program was in a heavily regulated industry in which drug testing was the norm. The court granted declaratory and injunctive relief.
The court found that the burden fell on the defendants to prove that there was a special need justifying the suspicion less search. If the defendants showed proof of a special need in regards to a particular program would it then be weighed against the plaintiffs' reasonable privacy expectations.
The court refused to uphold the policy on the basis that it sought to block students from harming themselves. There was no precedent that supported this interest, the Supreme Court had only upheld policies that protected students in dangerous positions from harming others with drug use. The court was concerned about illusory safety concerns that would mask unconstitutional purposes. "The six "program goals" adopted by the Board of Regents do not even mention preventing accidents or injuries caused or contributed to by drug use, and instead focus on goals like improving retention and graduation rates." The court determined that only students seeking accreditation in heavily regulated industries where drug testing was the norm did there exist a diminished expectation of privacy. For all other programs students had a full expectation of privacy because defendants had not provided any evidence supporting the contrary.
The court found that the policy itself was minimally intrusive, but heightened the intrusiveness because of the specific provision that would notify parents of students under 21 of positive results.
The court found the cross-enrollment argument "too abstract and unsubstantiated to constitute the kind of significant and concrete danger required to override the ordinary requirements of the Fourth Amendment." In regards to defendants' other argument that the petition process rendered the policy constitutional, the court disagreed that it overrode the Fourth Amendment concerns. The court found that if the petition process rendered the policy constitutional then any state actor could impose a drug testing policy as long as they also provided a petition process.
The court granted the following relief
1) Declaratory relief that the policy was unconstitutional as-applied to certain students enrolled at Linn State. The policy was unconstitutional as applied to students not enrolled in the following programs: Aviation Maintenance, Electrical Distribution Systems, Industrial Electricity, Power Sports, and CAT Dealer Service Technician programs.
2) A permanent injunction with respect to students whose Fourth Amendment rights were or would be violated by the policy as well as a reimbursement of those who previously had to pay the fee for drug testing and who the injunction applied to.
3) Attorneys fees.
976 F.Supp.2d 1104.
The plaintiffs filed a motion for attorneys fees on October 4, 2013 and the defendants filed a notice of their appeal of the court's September 13 decision with the U.S. Court of the Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on October 9, 2013.
On November 19, 2013 the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the September 13 judgement. They alleged that the defendants had refused to refund the drug test fees and destroy the samples previously collected. The plaintiffs argued that even though they had filed an appeal the defendants had not asked for a stay.
The court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs motion for attorneys fees on December 9, 2013. The court agreed that 2/3 of the attorneys had reasonable fees, but decreased the third attorney's fees because of the unreasonable amount of time designated to travel. Consequently, the court held that not all of the submitted travel was reasonable and awarded a total of $181,979.14 to the plaintiffs. 2013 WL 6920860.
The court stayed the case pending the resolution of the defendants' appeal and denied the plaintiffs' motion to enforce the judgment without prejudice on January 7, 2014. On the same day the defendants filed an appeal of the court's award of attorneys fees.
On December 7, 2015 the court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for dismissal. The appellate court held that the district court had erred in conducting an analysis of every program at Linn State to determine if the defendants' burden was met. The appellate court determined that the district court had limited and applied the earlier appellate opinion incorrectly. The district court's holding that indulging any other interest (other than safety) would promote the advancement of illusory safety concerns to mask the unconstitutional purposes was incorrect. The district court had "erred in declining to include harm to oneself in its special need analysis." The appellate court found that the university had a special need that justified conducting a balancing test of competing constitutional interests.
The Eighth Circuit also disagreed with the district court's dismissal of the cross enrollment argument and held that the expectation of privacy for all students of the university was somewhat diminished because even though some students were not entering fields with high regulation they were juxtaposed with those who were.
The court ultimately held that after balancing the interests the university's policy was reasonable and constitutional. In reversing and remanding for dismissal the district court's award of attorneys fees was also reversed in favor of the defendants. 807 F.3d 913.
On December 22, 2016 after a rehearing en banc the court of appeals affirmed and dismissed in part the previous appellate court opinion. The panel held that:
The appellate court reversed and vacated the order to the extent that it required the university to refund the fee paid by students who had been tested and dismissed the defendants' appeal of the tentative award of attorneys fees. 844 F.3d 727.
On March 2, 2017 the court of appeals awarded $39,566 in attorneys fees and $396.48 in costs to the plaintiffs.
On April 6, 2017 the defendants filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. On May 4, 2017 the court stayed the case pending resolution of the defendants cert petition. The Supreme Court denied cert on June 5, 2017. 137 S.Ct. 2216.
On July 7, 2017 the court granted the plaintiffs unopposed bill of costs as well as a supplemental motion for attorneys fees that the plaintiffs had filed on June 9, 2017. This resulted in an additional $12,815.44 awarded to the plaintiffs.
This case is closed.
Summary Authors
Rhea Sharma (2/27/2023)
For PACER's information on parties and their attorneys, see: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/4966214/parties/barrett-v-claycomb/
Laughrey, Nanette Kay (Missouri)
Doty, Grant R. (Missouri)
Rothert, Anthony E. (Missouri)
Brown, Kent L. (Missouri)
Moen, David J. (Missouri)
See docket on RECAP: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/4966214/barrett-v-claycomb/
Last updated Aug. 10, 2025, 3:28 a.m.
State / Territory: Missouri
Case Type(s):
Key Dates
Filing Date: Sept. 14, 2011
Closing Date: Sept. 22, 2017
Case Ongoing: No
Plaintiffs
Plaintiff Description:
Current, and future, students of Linn State Technical College who are, or will be, seeking degrees or certificates at the main campus of the College in Linn, Missouri or any other Linn State Technical College Locations
Plaintiff Type(s):
Attorney Organizations:
Public Interest Lawyer: Yes
Filed Pro Se: No
Class Action Sought: Yes
Class Action Outcome: Granted
Defendants
State Technical College of Missouri (Linn, Osage), State
Defendant Type(s):
Case Details
Causes of Action:
Constitutional Clause(s):
Due Process: Substantive Due Process
Unreasonable search and seizure
Available Documents:
Injunctive (or Injunctive-like) Relief
Outcome
Prevailing Party: Plaintiff
Nature of Relief:
Injunction / Injunctive-like Settlement
Preliminary injunction / Temp. restraining order
Source of Relief:
Content of Injunction:
Amount Defendant Pays: $224,052.40
Order Duration: 2013 - None
Issues
General/Misc.: