Case: United States ex rel Wolfish v. Levi

The plaintiffs were people detained at the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC). They brought this habeas action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on November 28, 1975. They were represented by the Federal Defender Services Unit of New York's Legal Aid Society, and their class was certified on December 23, 1975. They alleged that their conditions, including alleged overcrowding, double-celling, deadlocking practices, inadequate religious services, and inadequate exercise and visiting arrangements were unlawful. 

The plaintiffs class was certified on December 23, 1975. The class was defined as “all persons confined at the MCC, pretrial detainees and sentenced prisoners alike.”

The MCC was a federal jail designated primarily for pretrial detainees directly abutting the SDNY courthouse. 32% of detainees remained there for 60–620 days. It did not feature outdoor spaces and was designed to be "modular," such that the detained would not interact much, but also such that locking them in for a long time would not be necessary. Initially, the plaintiffs had at least a 21-hour window in which six designated people could visit, in any combination and for any length of time. On or about January 13, the jail announced that effective January 17, there would be a new limit of two visits a week for a maximum of one hour each, that the visiting windows would be reduced, and that only immediate family (but with a maximum) plus two designated friends would be allowed to visit. After the jail announced these plans to cut visiting privileges further, the plaintiffs motioned for a preliminary injunction on January 16, 1976 and a temporary restraining order was granted on the same day halting the implementation of the policy. Judge Marvin Frankel decided the case and granted the preliminary injunction against the new visiting restrictions, holding that these restrictions were not justified by "necessity" or even "a plausible showing of great convenience" because the visitors' rooms were mostly necessary. He also held that the petitioners had experienced irreparable injury from the policy change and thought they had a chance to prevail on the merits eventually. 406 F.Supp. 1243. At some point, the plaintiffs also won interlocutory relief against restrictions on their telephone services.

The petitioners motioned for summary judgment. Judge Frankel held double occupancy, the prohibition against all reading material not directly from publishers, and the practices of seizing inmates' property without receipt and opening inmates' outgoing mail unlawful and enjoined MCC against these practices. 428 F. Supp. 333.

On September 15, 1977 Judge Frankel issued an opinion in the case and ruled the following:

1. Some overcrowding would be required to be alleviated
2. Newly established visiting hours were sufficient
3. Opportunities for visiting attorneys were sufficient
4. Strip searches of inmates after they had been in the visiting areas were permissible, but could not extend to anal and genital searches
5. Pretrial detainees, but not convicted inmates, were entitled to be present during searches of their quarters
6. It was a taking of property without due process for prison officials to assert and exercise the right to confiscate any item upon a determination by the confiscating officer that it was contraband and to give no receipt and provide no method for return of the item. 

Judge Frankel emphasized the obligation the federal judiciary held towards federal prisoners, and the lack of obstacle in ruling change was necessary (as compared to the deference federal judges would usually show to states regarding state prisons). He held that MCC's failure to classify/distinguish prisoners based on threat level and guilt determination was rationally unsupportable, violated due process, and resulted in excessive and indiscriminate confinement.  The court ordered that pretrial detainees be separated from sentenced inmates; and the physically dangerous who might be violent or attempt to escape from others. Second, Judge Frankel held that prisoners could not be held against their will at the MCC for more than 60 days, given that the MCC's facilities lacked a gym, outdoor space, chapel, auditorium, library, and other facilities; and that these conditions were tolerable for short periods, but not longer. 

On the other hand, Judge Frankel found the current rooftop arrangement with indoor exercise within the modules when there was bad weather permissible, given that under his other orders inmates would not involuntarily stay for more than 60 days. He also called the limited religious services, given that detainees could not move to the services, "not ideal," but permissible for under 60 days; yet ordered that Muslims be served pork-free meals, as the MCC served Jewish detainees pork-free meals. He found the library inadequate that it did not list all the available materials, lacked some legal materials detainees may want, and was cramped; but ordered only that the MCC accommodate, using a method of its choosing that it must report to the court, pretrial pro se detainees. The Judge enjoined MCC's prohibition against typewriters, because the prohibition was arbitrary and capricious, but dismissed every aspect of the petitioner's complaint about duplication of papers and did not grant petitioners their requested central library. He did not order improvement in MCC's educational offerings; but granted petitioners' desire for a commissary, order form choices, and speedier cashing of checks; and prevented MCC from cashing checks and money orders without detainees' consent. 

Overcrowding

The plaintiffs had asserted complaints against two conditions: 1) the housing of 20 inmates in dormitories designed for 10 and 2) the use of common areas for sleeping men on cots, or even on floors. The court found that they should prevail on both complaints. MCC had been built to house 449 inmates and this served as strong evidence in the court’s eyes of discerning whether or not the conditions were satisfactory. MCC’s defense that their facilities were insufficient to house all of the prisoners assigned to them was rejected by the court. First, the court ordered MCC to use the dormitories as they were intended and to house 10 men each, with flexibility allowed for emergency influxes of prisoners. Second, the court forbid the use of MCC’s common areas as sleeping quarters finding it a violation of the statutory duty to  “provide suitable quarters and provide for the safekeeping, care, and subsistence of all” federal detainees, sentenced inmates, and witnesses in custody, 18 U.S.C. § 4042(2), and, more broadly, the kind of arbitrary and capricious action correctible under the Administrative Procedure Act.

Visiting

Respondents, during the course of the lawsuit, had agreed to extend the visiting hours that had been sharply reduced without notice. They also agreed to station an additional guard to cut down on wait times for visitors proceeding through security before their visit. The Judge enjoined the respondents from decreasing visiting hours unless they gave notice to both the court and petitioners with a showing of good cause not less than 30 days after giving such notice. Petitioner’s concerns regarding attorney visits were no longer a concern because MCC, since the bring of the suit, had designated five attorney conference rooms and created new procedures to ease prisoner’s access to their attorneys. The judge also ordered that co defendants must be able to meet with each other unless there was a court order forbidding it. The judge also rejected petitioners’ argument that they held a constitutional right to conjugal visits. 

Telephones

Under the subject of the telephones the court concluded 1) that the sign-up requirement for collect calls was a reasonable and valid measure, 2) the adequacy of telephone service was generous given the setting, and 3) that the petitioners’ complaint about the monitoring of telephone calls had not been properly raised to warrant relief. The preliminary injunction granted earlier in the case therefore remained since respondents had not appealed the order and petitioners had not been granted any additional relief by the court. 

Mail

The court held, in regards to mail, that the respondents had acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to forward mail and ordered the relief that the petitioners sought. 

Searches

The court concluded that strip searches would no longer be allowed to include anal and genital inspections after visits. If petitioners wanted to conduct an anal and genital inspection they would need to provide probable cause in writing, upon sworn statements of first-hand knowledge. As to room searches the court concluded that the practice of conducting room searches without allowing inmates to witness the search was unconstitutional as applied to pre-trial detainees, but not as applied to sentenced inmates. 

Personal Property

The court held that there must be some procedure for property that was taken from inmates. The procedure was required to provide the following: 1) a brief statement to the inmate of the asserted justification of the seizure, 2) a notice of the right to respond in some reasonably simple and convenient fashion and assert grounds, if any, why the seizure is claimed to be unwarranted, 3) some suitable opportunity to meet and answer controverted evidence thought to warrant confiscation, and 4) a decision, with reasons, however brief. The court also held that MCC’s policy that forbade inmates from receiving packages, other than one on Christmas day, was arbitrary and capricious since the respondents had made no showing for why they employed such a harsh policy. 

Clothing

The court ordered the following regarding the clothing policies at MCC: pre-trial detainees will be permitted to wear their own clothing unless they volunteered to wear the uniforms issued by the MCC, uniforms for both men and women would consist of standard items, sentenced inmates would either be permitted to wear their own clothing or, unless they volunteered to wear one of the existing supply of jumpsuits, would be issued uniforms. They also ordered that issued clothing would fit the wearer with reasonable accuracy and that inmates may wear their own undergarments or be issued new ones. 

Food

The court only sustained the petitioners’ complaint in regards to the sanitation of the food. The respondents were ordered to address the lack of coverings for both the hair and hands of inmates who cooked the food. 

Discipline

The court found that respondents had failed to follow their own policies when it came to the imposition of administrative detention. Respondents’ rule that inmates placed in administrative detention be given a hearing within 48 hours had repeatedly been broken. The court issued only a warning to the respondents since the few instances provided were not enough to find a pattern and the individual inmates had not brought forth claims on the issue. 

Staff

As to the complaints brought about the staffing at MCC, the court only ordered that the prison create suitable regulations whereby entry was forbidden into rooms or bathroom facilities by officers of the opposite sex unless there was an emergency or sufficient warning was given. 

Admissions and Transfers

The court found the respondents’ revised policy for transfers adequate and refused to issue an injunction since the petitioners had not raised this concern in their complaint and therefore chose to rely on the good faith of the respondents that they would implement the policy. 

Language

The court found that the  relief requested by the petitioners was excessive and that there were adequate resources for the non-english speakers in the prison. 

Grievances

The court could not grant petitioner’s requested relief for the grievance procedures of MCC because they would require judgments of policy. 

Sanitation

Petitioner’s complaints about sanitation were dismissed for lack of support as evidenced by walk-throughs of MCC that refuted their complaints.

Ventilation and Temperature 

The court concluded that MCC’s environmental control systems, while faulty in the past, had since been the recipient of federal funds and were operating reasonably. 

Furloughs and Job Interviews

Both furloughs and the handling of job interviews were within the discretion of prison officials and not the court. 

Medical Care

The petitioners had brought forth complaints that medical care at MCC was inadequate. After the report from the appointed medical panel was received late the court considered the issues unresolved since they were unable to come to an agreement. The court determined that the record was incomplete on the issue and that a Magistrate would sit in on an evidentiary meeting to resolve the issue. 

439 F.Supp. 114. 

On January 24, 1978, the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion in the case. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s ban on double-celling as applied to pretrial detainees, but remanded for reconsideration as applied to sentenced inmates. The appellate court pointed to the fact that sentenced inmates were housed in different sized cells from pretrial detainees and necessitated the trial court to reconsider if this was an Eighth Amendment violation. The court affirmed the district court’s prohibition on the practice of inmates sleeping in common areas. As to the issue of the dormitories, the appellate court remanded it to the district court disagreeing with their refusal to consider whether there was a number of inmates beyond the rated capacity that would be constitutional for the dormitory to house. The appellate court disagreed with the district court’s imposition of a sixty day limit on the stay of inmates and found the number arbitrary since most unsentenced inmates are released within three months and the district court had ordered respondents to create new classification standards to allow greater movement within the institution. The appellate court ordered the respondents to prepare the new standards and remanded the issue of the sixty day limit to the district court in light of the new standards. The appellate court also decided that the limit shouldn’t be applied to sentenced inmates unless the new limit was found to be a violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

The appellate court affirmed the district court’s rulings which banned the practice of reading out-going nonprivileged mail and the practice of only allowing inmates to receive books from publishers directly. The appellate court also affirmed the district court’s prohibition on the removal of inmates during room searches and bodily strip searches. The district court’s order as to packages was also affirmed, but the appellate court reasoned that the respondents were allowed to place a ceiling dollar value on the goods received in order to satisfy their security concerns. The district court’s order that inmates should be allowed typewriters was reversed by the court for lack of constitutional right to possess a typewriter as respondents’ security concerns. The district court’s order to allow inmates to wear their own clothes unless they volunteered to wear the provided jumpsuits was reversed as the appellate court found that the prison’s need to quickly identify prisoners outweighed the inmates’ desire to control their own appearance. Lastly, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s orders as to attorney visits. 573 F.2d 118. 

On May 14, 1979, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in the case and reversed and remanded the appellate court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the double-bunking practice did not violate due process, the “publisher-only” rule did not violate the First Amendment, and the prohibition against outside packages was not a due process violation. They also held that visual body-cavity searches did not violate the Fourth Amendment and neither did the rule requiring pre-trial detainees to remain outside their room during searches. 

In regards to the double-bunking practice, the Court determined that the proper inquiry was whether the condition amounted to a punishment of the detainee. Because the practice did not amount to a punishment, it was not a Fifth Amendment due process violation. Next, the “publisher-only” rule was deemed a rational response to clear security issues within the prison and not a First Amendment violation. The rule also operated in a neutral fashion since it was not based on the content of the material and was limited to a maximum period of only 60 days. The prohibition against outside packages was also not a due process violation since these packages were possible devices for smuggled contraband. Both the rule prohibiting attendance during room searches and body-cavity searches were not Fourth Amendment violations when security interests were taken into consideration. None of the security measures constituted punishment and were therefore not Fifth Amendment due process violations because they were reasonable responses to legitimate security concerns and were also limited in duration as applied to pretrial detainees. 99 S.Ct. 1861. 

This case is closed.