Case: James v. Cascos

This case challenges the constitutionality of Texas Election Code § 192.005, governing the process of electing presidential elector candidates.

An individual Texas voter filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas on December 14, 2016. Proceeding pro se, Plaintiff sued Texas Secretary of State Carlos H. Cascos in his official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief and attorneys' fees and costs. The injunctive relief sought was an order that Defendant seat Texas' 38 presidential electors on a proportional basis (no more than 20 electors supporting Trump and no fewer than 16 electors supporting Clinton, based on the percentage of the statewide vote each candidate received). Plaintiffs asserted that § 192.005 violates other sections of the Texas Election Code by contradicting the plain language in those sections and results in an "illegal and constitutional" "perversion of democracy" because it allows the candidates for president and vice-president receiving the most votes to take all elector candidates statewide. Plaintiff’s first count alleged violations of other sections of Texas Election Code because those sections stated individuals vote for individual “electors” rather than § 195.005’s “set of electors.” The second count alleged violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because allowing the winner of a plurality of votes to take all electors violates the Clause’s one-person-one-vote principle. The third and final count alleged violation of Texas’ Equal Protection Clause on similar one-person-one-vote grounds.

The same day as he filed the complaint, Plaintiff also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction.

Five days after its filing, District Court Judge Robert Pitman denied this motion. First, Plaintiff failed to demonstrate irreparable injury warranting a TRO and to explain why notice to the Defendant was not required. Second, because Plaintiff argued in his application for a TRO that only his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim had a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, the court focused on that claim in determining whether to grant Plaintiff's motion. Judge Pitman found Plaintiff's argument lacking—that Texas' winner-takes-all approach to selecting electors violates the "one person one vote" principle of the Equal Protection Clause—because Article II of the U.S. Constitution grants states considerable discretion in determining the selection of electors. The Court emphasized that the Equal Protection Clause only prohibits weighting individual votes based on (1) where the individual lives, (2) whether the individual belongs to an identifiable racial group, or (3) whether the individual belongs to an identifiable political group. Graham v. Fong Eu, 403 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff’d. 423 U.S. 1067 (discussing the uniform and historical practice of states electing presidential electors on a statewide “winner-take-all” basis and upholding the validity of California’s “winner-take-all” system). Because Plaintiff did not claim discrimination on one of these bases and failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, the court denied the motion for TRO and preliminary injunction.

Since January 2017, there have been no further developments to this case.