Filed Date: Feb. 5, 2025
Case Ongoing
Clearinghouse coding complete
This is a challenge to the second Trump administration's termination of Gwynne Wilcox, the Chair of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). (To see the Clearinghouse's collection of civil-service-related legal challenges to the second Trump administration, click here.)
The plaintiff in this case was fired on January 27, 2025 by President Trump from her positions as Chair and member of the National Labor Relations Board, even though her term was not set to expire until 2028. She filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia a week later, on February 5, 2025, against President Trump and the new, Trump-appointed NLRB Chair, claiming that they had violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 153(a). The NLRA allows the President to remove NLRB members only “upon notice and hearing” and only “for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office, but for no other cause.” The complaint explains that President Trump fired her via email without pointing to any neglect of duty or malfeasance in office and without giving her notice or a hearing.
Represented by the law firm Gupta Wessler LLP, the plaintiff sought: (1) a declaration from the court that her removal from the NLRB violated the National Labor Relations Act, (2) a court order requiring the new NLRB Chair to reinstate the plaintiff as a board member, and (3) any other relief due. The case was assigned to District Judge Beryl A. Howell on February 5, 2025.
On February 10, 2025, the plaintiff filed a motion for expedited summary judgment. The motion was supported by the Constitutional Accountability Center in an amicus brief. On February 21, 2025, the defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. An amicus brief in favor of the defendants was filed by Tennessee and another was filed by Florida and 19 other states.
On March 6, 2025 the court granted summary judgment in the plaintiff's favor, declaring that defendants unlawfully terminated the plaintiff in violation of the NLRA, that the plaintiff shall remain on the NLRB and continue serving her term, that the NLRB is enjoined from removing the plaintiff from the NLRB, and that the NLRB must give the plaintiff the access she needs to fulfill her NLRB member duties. 775 F.Supp.3d 215.
The defendants appealed the order on March 7, 2025, in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (case No. 25-5057). On March 7, the defendants also filed a motion in district court to stay the order pending appeal. The district court denied the defendants' motion on March 8.
On March 10, 2025, the defendants filed an emergency motion in the court of appeals to stay the underlying order of the district court pending the appeal. The court—Judges Henderson, Millett and Walker—held oral argument on March 18. On March 28, the court of appeals granted the emergency motion for stay in this case (and, in the same order, granted an emergency motion for stay in Harris v. Bessent (No. 25-5055), which the Clearinghouse is following here). Judge Walker and Judge Henderson wrote separate concurring statements, and Judge Millett wrote a dissenting statement. 2025 WL 980278. The same day, the plaintiff filed an emergency motion for an administrative stay pending request for an initial hearing en banc, which the defendants opposed. On March 30, the court denied the motion for administrative stay.
On April 1, 2025, the plaintiff filed a petition asking the court of appeals to vacate its March 28 decision to grant the defendants' emergency motion for a stay pending appeal; grant an initial review en banc of the merits; and grant rehearing en banc of the March 28 stay. On April 2, the defendants filed an opposition to the plaintiff's petition, asking the court to deny the petitions for en banc rehearing of the stay order and initial hearing en banc on the merits and—if the court decided to vacate the March 28 stay or reinstate the plaintiffs (Wilcox and Harris) to office—requesting a seven-day stay to seek emergency relief from the Supreme Court.
On April 7, 2025, the court of appeals, sitting en banc, vacated its March 28 stay of the district court rulings that had reinstated the plaintiffs (Harris and Wilcox) to their federal positions. 2025 WL 1021435. The court denied the defendants' motions for a stay pending appeal, holding that longstanding Supreme Court precedents (notably Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), and Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958)) remain binding with respect to removal protections for members of multimember adjudicatory boards. The court emphasized that only the Supreme Court can overrule such precedent. The court also stated that the defendants failed to make the required strong showing of likely success on appeal or "on the merits of its claim that there is no available remedy for Harris or Wilcox, or that allowing the district court's injunctions to remain in place pending appeal is impermissible." Additionally, the court found that the defendants did not make a showing of irreparable harm. Dissenting judges argued that the removals were within presidential authority under Article II and criticized the district courts’ remedies as unprecedented and overreaching. The defendants' request for a temporary seven-day stay was also denied. The same day, April 7, the court of appeals denied the plaintiff's petition for initial hearing en banc.
On April 9, 2025, the defendants filed an application with the Supreme Court to stay the judgments of the district court and requested an administrative stay while that application was considered. (The Supreme Court docket number for this case is 24A966 and the docket and filings are available here.) The same day, Chief Justice Roberts entered the requested administrative stay of the district court's March 6 order in this case and March 4 order in the Harris case pending further order of the Chief Justice or Supreme Court. On April 11, the State of Tennessee filed an amicus brief in support of the government, as did a group of 23 states and the Arizona State Legislature. The amici argued that the president should have plenary removal power over agency officials who exercise considerable executive power and warned that limiting the removal power constituted a violation of the Separation of Powers. On the other hand, a group of law professors filed a brief in support of Wilcox and Harris, arguing that a ruling in favor of the government would call into question the existence of the Federal Reserve Board as an independent agency, thereby threatening the economic stability of the country.
On May 22, the Court granted a longer-lasting stay during the disposition of the case in the D.C. Circuit and any review in the Supreme Court. 145 S.Ct. 1415. Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Sotomayor and Justice Jackson, dissented. The Court's unsigned majority opinion stated:
The stay reflects our judgment that the Government is likely to show that both the NLRB and
MSPB exercise considerable exective power. But we do not ultimately decide in this posture whether the NLRB or MSPB falls within . . . a recognized exception; that question is better left for resolution after full briefing and argument.
Meanwhile, the court of appeals heard oral argument on the case on May 16. The Supreme Court declined the petition for writ of certiorari before judgment.
On December 5, 2025, the D.C. Circuit Court reversed the District court's findings, ruling that Congress cannot restrict the President’s ability to remove NLRB or MSPB members. Circuit Judge Katsas wrote the opinion for the Court. Under Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), Congress may restrict the President’s ability to remove principal officers who wield only quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial powers. But under Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. 197 (2020), Congress may not restrict the President’s ability to remove principal officers who wield substantial executive power. The Court found that the NLRB and MSPB wield substantial powers that are both executive in nature and different from the powers that Humphrey’s Executor deemed to be merely quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial.
The Court reasoned that the NLRB had "substantial [executive] power" for the reasons that follow:
Taking all of these together, the Court found that because the NLRB’s rulemaking, adjudicatory, remedial, enforcement, and election-administration powers are not solely quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial, the agency falls well outside the Humphrey’s Executor exception. For these reasons, Congress may not restrict the President’s ability to remove NLRB members.
This case is ongoing.
Summary Authors
Sylvia Al-Mateen (4/21/2025)
Clearinghouse (5/22/2025)
Jeremiah Price (7/15/2025)
Jinan Abufarha (9/27/2025)
Claire Pollard (12/6/2025)
Harris v. Bessent, District of District of Columbia (2025)
For PACER's information on parties and their attorneys, see: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/69612129/parties/wilcox-v-trump/
Attorney, Eric Dean
Attorney, Michael S.
Akremi, Faaris
Attorney, Dennis Fan,
Attorney, Jeffrey Paul
See docket on RECAP: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/69612129/wilcox-v-trump/
Last updated Dec. 17, 2025, 4:22 a.m.
State / Territory:
Case Type(s):
Presidential/Gubernatorial Authority
Special Collection(s):
Trump Administration 2.0: Challenges to the Government
Key Dates
Filing Date: Feb. 5, 2025
Case Ongoing: Yes
Plaintiffs
Plaintiff Description:
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) member and Chair
Public Interest Lawyer: No
Filed Pro Se: No
Class Action Sought: No
Class Action Outcome: Not sought
Defendants
United States (Donald Trump) (- United States (national) -), Federal
Chair of National Labor Relations Board (- United States (national) -), Federal
Defendant Type(s):
Case Details
Causes of Action:
Other Dockets:
District of District of Columbia 1:25-cv-00334
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 25-05057
Supreme Court of the United States 24-A-00966
Available Documents:
Injunctive (or Injunctive-like) Relief
Outcome
Prevailing Party: Plaintiff OR Mixed
Relief Granted:
Injunction / Injunctive-like Settlement
Source of Relief:
Content of Injunction:
Reinstatement (job, contract, grant, etc.)
Issues
Presidential/Gubernatorial Authority: