Filed Date: June 9, 2025
Case Ongoing
Clearinghouse coding complete
This case challenged the federal deployment of the California National Guard to protect federal property and immigration officials from protesters in Los Angeles and the surrounding area. On June 9, 2025, Governor Gavin Newsom and the State of California filed suit in the Northern District of North California, challenging recent actions by President Trump in deploying the National Guard in the Los Angeles area. On June 6, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers carried out multiple enforcement actions in and around Los Angeles, leading to the arrest of around 44 persons with 70-80 people detained. The same day as the arrests, crowds gathered at the federal courthouse in Los Angeles to protest the Trump Administration and its immigration agenda. The complaint alleged that, while some protestors engaged in violence against property and law enforcement, the majority were peaceful and non-violent. Protests continued on June 7 and June 8.
The complaint alleged that Los Angeles police and sheriffs had responded to the protests and had dispersed several crowds at various places during the three days of protests. However, on the evening of June 7, despite a message on social media by Gavin Newsom stating that it was unnecessary, President Trump issued a memorandum that said because of "numerous incidents of violence and disorder" that had taken place in response to ICE actions, he was calling into service members of the National Guard. Under 10 U.S.C. § 12406, the President is allowed to call out the National Guard if one of three conditions is met: (1) the United States, or any of the Commonwealths or possessions, is invaded or is in danger of invasion by a foreign nation; (2) there is a rebellion or danger of a rebellion against the authority of the Government of the United States; or (3) the President is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States.
Citing this statute, President Trump authorized the Secretary of Defense to (1) "coordinate with the Governors of the States and the National Guard Bureau in identifying and ordering into Federal service the appropriate members and units of the National Guard under this authority,” (2) call out up to 2,000 National Guard personnel for up to 60 days, and (3) use them to perform protective activities for the protection of federal personnel and property.
That same evening, Pete Hegseth, the Secretary of Defense, sent a memorandum to the Adjutant General of California, who commands the California National Guard under the Governor. Relying on President Trump's memo, and without the consent of the Governor, Secretary Hegseth called into service 2,000 members of the California National Guard for 60 days of service. Control of the Guard members was handed over to the General of the U.S. Northern Command, and the Guard began to arrive in Los Angeles on June 8. On June 9, Secretary Hegseth called into federal service another 2,000 Guard members, again without the consent of the California Governor.
Represented by the State's Attorney General, the plaintiffs sued President Trump, the Secretary of Defense, and the Department of Defense. The plaintiffs alleged that the President's and the agency's actions were ultra vires and exceeded the scope of their authority under 10 U.S.C. § 12406 and the Posse Comitatus Act. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants violated the Tenth Amendment and Article I, § 8 of the Constitution. Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that the agency's action violated the Administrative Procedure Act. Therefore, the plaintiffs asked the court to declare President Trump's memo, and both of Secretary Hegseth's orders relying on it, to be unlawful, to enjoin the Department of Defense from deploying the National Guard, and to award court costs.
The case was assigned to Judge Charles R. Breyer. On June 10, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO), asking the court to maintain the status quo "by temporarily enjoining Defendants from ordering or deploying the active-duty members of the military and federalized National Guard soldiers to patrol communities or otherwise engage in general law enforcement activities beyond the immediate vicinity of federal buildings or other federal real property." The court scheduled a hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for June 12. After the hearing, the court issued a TRO ordering the defendants to return control of the California National Guard to the plaintiffs. 786 F.Supp.3d 1235. The court first found that the case was justiciable and not a political question over which the courts have no oversight.
Turning next to Section 12406, the court rejected the defendants' argument that there was a rebellion sufficient to sustain Section 12406, since "violence is necessary for a rebellion, but it is not sufficient," and there is no evidence "that any of the violent protestors were attempting to overthrow the government as a whole." The court also disagreed that Section 12406 is triggered "when the President faces obstacles that cause him to underperform in executing the laws," or when "the President faces some risk in executing the laws." Instead, the statute requires the President to be "unable" to execute the laws, and the court found that "did not happen here." Finally, the court found that the defendants had failed to comply with the statute's procedural requirement that any orders federalizing state National Guard members be issued through the governor of the state. The court held that typing the phrase "THROUGH: THE GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA" at the top of the document sent to California's adjutant general was insufficient to meet the statute's requirement.
The court also agreed with the plaintiffs that the defendants had likely violated the Tenth Amendment, finding that, given its holding that the defendants had unlawfully mobilized the National Guard under Section 12406, "the unlawful federalization of those members has interfered with the state's legitimate police power, and thus it violates the Tenth Amendment." Therefore, the court ordered the defendants to return control of the National Guard to Governor Newsom; however, the court stayed its order until noon the following day to provide the defendants with the opportunity to appeal.
The defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that same day, asking the court for an immediate administrative stay and for a stay pending appeal. Without explaining its reasoning, the court granted an immediate administrative stay the night of June 12. Having received briefing and heard oral argument on the defendants' motion for a stay pending appeal, the court granted the stay on June 19. 141 F.4th 1032. While the court of appeals agreed with the district court that the case is judicially reviewable, the court stated that any review under Section 12406 should be "highly deferential" to any determination made by the President.
Applying that standard of review, the court found that the defendants were likely to prevail on their argument under Section 12406's provision enabling the President to federalize the National Guard when he "is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States." Contrary to the district court's holding, the court of appeals found that "Section 12406 does not have as a prerequisite that the President be completely precluded from executing the relevant laws," nor does it require "that activation is inappropriate so long as any continued execution of the laws is feasible." Here, the defendants presented sufficient evidence that was sufficient interference with federal agents to support the President's finding.
As to Section 12406's procedural requirement, the court found that it was likely met "because the federalization order was issued through an agent of the Governor in the Governor's name." Since the order was sent to the adjutant general, who then relinquished command and forwarded the order to Governor Newsom, the court found the requirement satisfied. Given these findings, the court found that the defendants were likely to prevail on the merits, and therefore a stay was warranted. The court also ordered further briefing on the appeal to conclude, at the earliest, by August 19.
Meanwhile, back in the district court, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on June 16. After the Ninth Circuit's ruling on June 19, the plaintiffs filed a supplement to their brief arguing that the district court retained jurisdiction over issues not currently on appeal, such as their arguments (not reached by the Ninth Circuit) that the defendants had violated the Posse Comitatus Act and that the deployment of the National Guard must be tied to, and last no longer than, the exigency claimed as support for the orders. The plaintiffs also requested the court to allow for discovery prior to ruling on their motion for a preliminary injunction. The court granted expedited discovery and held a bench trial on August 11-13, 2025.
On September 2, the court issued an order finding that the defendants had violated the Posse Comitatus Act and granting injunctive relief. It cited the history of the Act, which was passed in 1878 as a response to systemic federal military involvement in domestic law enforcement. The court next determined that plaintiffs had standing to bring this action, citing the federal government's infringement on the state's police power as a legally cognizable injury. Next, the court rejected the defendants' assertion that 10 U.S.C. § 12406(3), which provides that the President can federalize the National Guard “[w]henever … the President is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States," was an exception the Posse Comitatus Act, such that the Act did not apply, reasoning that such an exception would nullify the Act. Finally, the court held that the defendants had violated the Posse Comitatus Act. It explained that the test for a violation of the Act is "whether the military has executed domestic law or actively assisted with the execution of domestic law, which would violate the Act, or whether the military’s involvement is so indirect as to not violate the Act." It concluded that the National Guard's conduct in and around Los Angeles violated this test, citing evidence that Task Force 51 was expressly instructed to engage in certain law enforcement activities and executed domestic law in prohibited ways, including setting up traffic blockades, using riot shields and military vehicles, and performing crowd control. The court noted that these violations were intentional, "part of a top-down, systemic effort by Defendants to use military troops to execute various sectors of federal law (the drug laws and the immigration laws at least) across hundreds of miles and over the course of several months—and counting." Finding that injunctive, ultra vires relief could properly issue, the court enjoined the defendants "from deploying, ordering, instructing, training, or using the National Guard currently deployed in California, and any military troops heretofore deployed in California, to execute the laws, including but not limited to engaging in arrests, apprehensions, searches, seizures, security patrols, traffic control, crowd control, riot control, evidence collection, interrogation, or acting as informants" unless they met the requirements of a valid exception to the Posse Comitatus Act. The court entered judgment for the plaintiffs on the Posse Comitatus Act claims but stayed the injunction until September 12.
Also on September 2, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin defendants from implementing an August 5, 2025 order federalizing and deploying 300 members of California’s National Guard for ninety days and to return control of the California National Guard to Governor Newsom. The Trump Administration immediately appealed and sought a stay from the Ninth Circuit. On September 4, the Court of Appeals (Judges Mark Bennett, Eric Miller, and Jennifer Sung) granted an administrative stay, noting that the stay "is only intended to preserve the status quo until the substantive motion for a stay pending appeal can be considered on the merits, and does not constitute in any way a decision as to the merits” of the appeal."
The case is ongoing.
Summary Authors
Jeremiah Price (6/25/2025)
Clearinghouse (9/8/2025)
For PACER's information on parties and their attorneys, see: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/70496361/parties/newsom-v-trump/
Attorney, Mr. Christopher
Akerman, Mr. Martin
Attorney, Shilpi Agarwal,
Attorney, Sarvenaz Bahar,
Attorney, Simon Christopher
Benbrook, Bradley A. (California)
Bentrott, Jane Petersen (California)
Brown, Diamond J. (California)
Carrillo, David A. (California)
Carter, Margaret Louise (California)
Craig, Matthew J. (California)
Duvernay, Stephen Michael (California)
Eisen, Norman Larry (California)
Heintz, Tera Marie (California)
Jenkins, Mack Eric (California)
Kolb, Joshua Gabriel (California)
Matevosyan, Arman (California)
Paradis, Michel Paradis (California)
Stracener, Brandon V. (California)
Sugerman, Jeremy Joseph (California)
See docket on RECAP: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/70496361/newsom-v-trump/
Last updated Oct. 14, 2025, 4:19 p.m.
State / Territory: California
Case Type(s):
Presidential/Gubernatorial Authority
Special Collection(s):
Trump Administration 2.0: Challenges to the Government
Key Dates
Filing Date: June 9, 2025
Case Ongoing: Yes
Plaintiffs
Plaintiff Description:
State and Governor of California.
Plaintiff Type(s):
Public Interest Lawyer: No
Filed Pro Se: No
Class Action Sought: No
Class Action Outcome: Not sought
Defendants
United States (- United States (national) -), Federal
Department of Defense (- United States (national) -), Federal
Defendant Type(s):
Case Details
Causes of Action:
Ex Parte Young (Federal) or Bivens
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.
Ex parte Young (federal or state officials)
Constitutional Clause(s):
Federalism (including 10th Amendment)
Available Documents:
Injunctive (or Injunctive-like) Relief
Outcome
Prevailing Party: None Yet / None
Nature of Relief:
Preliminary injunction / Temp. restraining order
Source of Relief:
Content of Injunction:
Order Duration: 2025 - None
Issues
Immigration/Border:
Presidential/Gubernatorial Authority: