Case: Duran v. Martinez

On 11/15/1977, prisoners of the Penitentiary of New Mexico, represented by the National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties Union, filed a Section 1983 class action suit in the District of New Mexico against the Governor of New Mexico and officials of the New Mexico Department of Corrections. In the first amended complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that "the totality of the overcrowding and other conditions at PNM fall beneath standards of human decency, inflict needless suffering on prisoners and create an environment which threatens prisoners' mental and physical well-being, and results in the physical and mental deterioration and debilitation of the persons confined therein which is both unnecessary and penologically unjustifiable." The case was assigned to Judge Juan G. Burciaga.

In 1979, the parties reached a settlement agreement–sometimes known as the Duran Consent Decree–which was adopted by the court. The original plaintiff was released and began a life as an advocate for prisoners. In February 1980, 12 days after the plaintiff was released, a massive prison riot broke out and the decree was modified. The modified decree focused on fourteen issues: correspondence, attorney visitation, food services, legal access, visitation, classification, living conditions, activity, medical care, mental health care, staffing and training, administrative segregation, discipline, and pre-hearing detention/disciplinary segregation. As part of the decree a special master was required to file a report every six months evaluating defendants' compliance.

There was periodic litigation throughout the 1980s regarding the implementation of the consent order. In 1986, the plaintiffs successfully sought a preliminary injunction to halt prison staff layoffs with respect to medical care, mental health care and security. Duran v. Anaya, 642 F. Supp. 510 (D.N.M. 1986).

In 1988, prison officials moved to vacate portions of the consent decree. Judge Burciaga denied the motion to vacate, holding that by presenting to the court an agreed remedial order, state officials waived their their ability to object to the full scope of equitable remedies. Duran v. Carruthers, 678 F. Supp. 839 (D.N.M. 1988). The defendants appealed. The Tenth Circuit (Judge McWilliams) affirmed the lower court decision, holding that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the consent decree, even if some of the relief could not have been granted by the court under the Eleventh Amendment had the case gone to trial. Duran v. Carruthers, 885 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1989).

Following renewed litigation, the parties agreed to a new settlement agreement in June 1991. The settlement agreement established new restrictions on overcrowding and modified provisions of the existing injunctive decree. The settlement agreement also established a timetable for monitoring and reporting by a special master. The monitoring process continued through the mid-1990's with Vincent M. Nathan and W. David Arnold acting as special masters.

In December 1994, the plaintiffs sought contempt sanctions and further remedial orders; the parties settled the enforcement dispute in March 1995, with additional stipulated relief. But in January 1996, New Mexico began to move prisoners to Texas. The plaintiffs argued that this violated the prior agreements, and the court granted a temporary restraining order enjoining the transfer. In March of that year, the parties agreed that the transfer of 350 medium security prisoners could go forward if the Texas facilities satisfied certain minimal standards, set out in the stipulation. The parties amended the agreement in August 1997.

During late 1996 or early 1997, Governor Gary Johnson vetoed a bill that would have set up a commission to oversee prison releases to deal with overcrowding at state prisons. At that point, the plaintiffs sought a population cap for the New Mexico Penitentiary, and Chief Judge Conway agreed to convene a three-judge district court to consider the request, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (which limits such orders to narrow circumstances and requires they be considered by a specially convened three-judge panel). The panel met in March 1997 and scheduled an evidentiary hearing for September 1997. With that as the deadline, the parties reached an interim settlement, designed to reduce population by measures including increased use of diversion by drug courts and allowing prisoners to regain lost good time under certain circumstances. The agreement was filed in August 1997; it put off any additional hearing on overcrowding for a few months. It seems that even though the agreement included population caps, the state agreed not to challenge them until April 1998.

Later in 1997, the parties agreed to a termination plan that provided "definitive, specific, and measurable tasks to be accomplished in order to achieve substantial compliance." The termination plan required the administration of check out audits by a special monitor and self-monitoring in all areas except for medical care. The termination plan also established December 1998 as a deadline for substantial compliance with the agreement. Following a finding of substantial compliance all orders were to be vacated.

The docket for this case only contains two entries from 1998 and 1999 regarding objections by defendants to a final report on mental health.

On December 9, 2015, a prisoner not listed in the original action filed a motion for an emergency injunction, contempt, and a request for counsel. The case was then reassigned to District Judge Kenneth J. Gonzales and Magistrate Judge Gregory B. Wormuth as the trial and pretrial judges. A few days later the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Kirtan Khalsa. On February 19, 2016, Judge Khalsa denied the plaintiff's motion for counsel and mailed a copy of the court's "Guide for Pro Se Litigants." Three days later the motion was refiled by the original class action plaintiffs.

The parties had settlement conferences before Chief Magistrate Judge Karen B. Molzen on May 27, 2016, and August 5, 2016, to resolve the issues raised in the plaintiffs' motion for emergency relief. At the second conference, they reached an agreement, and on August 31, 2016, the court granted the parties’ joint motion for approval of settlement agreement. The defendants agreed that any time they needed to put two occupants in a single cell, they would notify the court and plaintiffs' counsel 10 days prior. They agreed to meet and confer in order to take good faith efforts to avoid "double-celling" prisoners. The defendants also agreed to review and restore the good-time credits (credits prisoners receive for good behavior) prisoners lost for actions committed as a result of being doubled up in a single cell; the plaintiffs' counsel would review these determinations. The court retained jurisdiction over the interpretation and enforcement of this settlement agreement.

On October 31, 2016, another prisoner filed a motion for emergency relief and a motion to appoint counsel. On December 7, 2016, the court denied both motions. That same month, two plaintiffs filed separate motions for enforcement of the consent decree, and on January 4, 2017, the court again denied both of these motions.

On January 20, 2017, the plaintiffs moved for the court to enforce the settlement agreement reached between the parties specifically regarding defendants’ payment of attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses related to counsel’s work on the 2016 motion for emergency relief. The plaintiffs asked for $29,838.01 in attorneys’ fees. On March 17, 2017, Judge Gonzales granted in part and denied in part this motion. Specifically, the court found that the plaintiffs were entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees but noted that the amount requested was not reasonable.

On July 5, 2017, the plaintiffs moved for declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking an order from the court declaring that the defendants had violated the settlement agreement and enjoining them to comply with the agreement. In May 2018, the plaintiffs brought two additional motions for declaratory, injunctive, and remedial relief.

While these motions were pending, the parties engaged in settlement negotiations throughout 2018 and into 2019. The parties filed a joint motion to approve an amended settlement agreement on August 21, 2020. The settlement set new occupancy limits, required renewed efforts to reduce understaffing, and awarded good time relief. Many class members filed objections to the proposed amended agreement, which they claimed relaxed occupancy targets that were in place under the prior settlement and provided inadequate relief, and also filed motions to stay and terminate the fairness hearings. The hearings continued despite these objections, and the court issued a final approval of the amended agreement on February 14, 2020. The revised settlement would terminate after the defendants established they were in substantial compliance with its terms for six months. In light of the new agreement, the order also denied as moot the pending motions for declaratory judgment and miscellaneous relief.

Many class members responded to the approval of the amended settlement agreement with objections. On March 6 and 11, 2020, two class members filed appeals in response to motion to approve the settlement. 

On July 31, 2020, the March 6th appeal was dismissed, and on April 22, 2021, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the District Court's settlement approval, stating that the claims raised in the March 11th appeal lacked merit.

About two months into the revised settlement agreement, plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order on April 10, 2020. The plaintiffs claim that the defendants violated the settlement agreement by failing to award five inmates the good time to which they are entitled, incarcerating nineteen inmates past their projected release dates as modified by the good time awards they did receive or should have received, awarding sixteen inmates remedial relief after the deadline for doing so expired, and refusing to award remedial relief to in-house parolees. The plaintiffs requested a TRO requiring the defendants to:  immediately release the nineteen inmates whose modified projected release dates have passed, apply the amount of any good time from which these inmates should have benefited, but did not, to reduce their parole terms, and award good time under SRSA to otherwise eligible in-house parolees.  

After a hearing held on April 17, the court denied the TRO motion on the 27th. In regard to the first claim, the court found that the Plaintiffs only showed how much good time the inmates did receive, and failed to show how much time they were entitled to receive. On the second allegation, the court held that the settlement agreement did not require the defendants to release any inmate, absent compliance with the requirements in the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The third allegation was conceded by the plaintiffs as they had no evidence that the defendants’ untimeliness harmed any of the inmates. Lastly, the only in-house parolee was released on April 15, 2020, and thus the plaintiffs were unable to provide the necessary elements for a TRO. 

Furthermore, the court instructed that both parties are to file briefs in regard to whether in-house parolees are categorically excluded from receiving remedial relief under the settlement agreement, no later than May 1, 2020. However, on April 28th, 2020, the parties entered a stipulation on the matter, and the court vacated the briefing deadlines a day later. 

After the defendants motioned for a finding of substantial compliance with paragraph four of the agreement, the court issued the requested order. Thus, on March 22, 2021, the court disengaged paragraph four and terminated its supervision over the provision. In the exact same fashion, paragraphs eleven and four were disengaged by the court on August 20 and October 21, 2021, respectively. 

After nearly two years of defendants successfully showing compliance with paragraphs in the agreement, on July 31, 2023, plaintiffs filed a motion for an order to show cause why defendants should not be found in contempt for violating the revised settlement agreement. The alleged violation pertains to paragraph twelve, which required defendants to ensure that class members are timely released on their certified release date following receipt of a parole board certificate, and if necessary, available space at a halfway house, transitional living center, or long-term residential treatment center. However, defendants had an informal but consistent policy of refusing to release class members on their certified release date when that date fell on a weekend or holiday. The court found that the defendants’ failure to adhere to paragraph twelve was based on a good-faith and reasonable, though incorrect, interpretation of paragraph twelve. As such, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs’ motion on October 20, 2023. The court ordered defendants to begin releasing class members on their date, not the next business day; however, the court did not order them to show cause as to why they were not in contempt. 

This case is ongoing as of October 25, 2025.