Filed Date: June 4, 1965
Case Ongoing
Clearinghouse coding complete
This is the case in which the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals took the firm position that "freedom of choice" plans could be legally insufficient to meet the constitutional obligations of a formerly de jure segregated school system to convert from "dual" to "unitary" schools. 372 F.2d 836 (1966) (Judge John Minor Wisdom), and that the Department of Health Education and Welfare's approach to school desegregation planning was appropriate. It stood in contrast to the opposite view taken by the lower court in Briggs v. Elliot, ("Nothing in the Constitution or in the decision of the Supreme Court takes away from the people freedom the choose the schools they attend. The Constitution, in other words, does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimination.") 132 F.Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C.1955). Not until 1968 did the Supreme Court take a side in this debate, coming down firmly (and unanimously) against freedom of choice as alone sufficient, in Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
On June 4, 1964, an action on behalf of a class of black schoolchildren was filed against the Jefferson County (AL) Board of Education in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., sought to desegregate the public schools of Jefferson County, Alabama. Finding that the school board maintained a racially segregated school system, the district court entered an unpublished order requiring the board to submit a desegregation plan. Following submission of the board's plan, the United States intervened as an additional plaintiff, represented by counsel from the U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division. Intervention was pursuant to Section 902 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000h-2.
On July 27, 1965, District Judge Seybourn H. Lynne entered an unpublished order approving the Board's plan and overruling objections filed by the plaintiffs and the United States. The plaintiffs and the United States appealed and, on August 17, 1965, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court order and remanded the case for further consideration in light of certain recently-decided appellate cases. United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 349 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1965) (per curiam).
Upon remand, the board filed an amendment to its school desegregation plan which was approved by the district court on August 27, 1965. On October 25, 1965, the United States again appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The appeal was consolidated, for briefing purposes, with similar appeals in six other school desegregation cases (United States v. Board of Education of the City of Fairfield; United States v. Board of Education of the City of Bessemer; United States v. Caddo Parish School Board; United States v. Bossier Parish School Board; Johnson v. Jackson Parish School Board; and Banks v. Claiborne Parish School Board). All the cases were from federal district courts in the Northern District of Alabama and the Western District of Louisiana.
A panel of the appellate court reversed the rulings below, and found that the desegregation standards set by guidelines of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) were within the rationale of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and the congressional objectives of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F.2d 836 (1966) (Circuit Judge John Minor Wisdom). Relying on language in the Supreme Court's second decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), Judge Wisdom wrote that the Constitution compels formerly de jure segregated public school systems based on dual attendance zones (and using what were called "permissive freedom of choice" plans) to shift to unitary, non-racial systems, with or without federal funds. The court found it appropriate for the federal government to condition local schools' receipt of federal funds on the schools' compliance with the HEW desegregation guidelines (which, according to Judge Wisdom, restated the judicial standards applicable to disestablishing de jure segregation in the public schools) or upon a school's agreement to comply with an applicable court desegregation order. The panel opinion observed that the Constitution is color blind in the sense that "a classification that denies a benefit, causes a harm, or imposes a burden must not be based upon race. But the Constitution is color conscious to prevent discrimination being perpetuated and to undo the effects of past discrimination." Id., at 876. The court then discussed specific elements of a freedom of choice plan which would be mandatory, annual and available to all students, regardless of race. An appendix attached to the opinion consisted of a proposed decree to be entered by the district courts, upon remand, and modified only upon proof of exceptional circumstances.
The appellate panel's opinion was adopted by the full Fifth Circuit's subsequent en banc review of the case. United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967) (en banc) (per curiam). The proposed decree was revised in this review, in accordance with updated HEW guidelines. The decree addressed topics including speed of desegregation, exercise of choice, prospective students, transfers, services, facilities and activities, and programs, school equalization, new construction, faculty and staff, and reports to the court. The court emphasized that it was not enough for school boards to offer the opportunity for black children to attend formerly all-white schools. Overcoming the effects of the unconstitutional dual school systems required integration of faculties, facilities, and activities, as well as students. Id.
Details of this case's activity in the district court during the next few years are not currently available to the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse; however, by 1971 an unpublished district court ruling resulted in another appeal to the Fifth Circuit. In a brief order, the appellate court vacated the district court's ruling and directed that, on remand, the district court must require the school board (including the boards of any splinter districts created since the filing of the original action) to implement a student assignment plan compliant with recent Supreme Court precedent. The district court was told (1) to not recognize the creation under state law of splinter school districts having the effect of thwarting the implementation of a unitary school system, (2) to fully implement recent Fifth Circuit precedent relating to faculty and staff desegregation, transfer policy, transportation, school construction and site selection, and attendance outside system of residence, and (3) to require the school board to file semi-annual status reports. Stout v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 448 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam). The appellate ruling was followed by District Judge Sam C. Pointer's issuance of an amended order, on September 8, 1971, addressing details, per attendance zone and otherwise, of the school board's obligations under the decree.
For a time, near-yearly appeals to the Fifth Circuit followed, sometimes involving multiple cases consolidated on appeal. In 1972, a panel of that court upheld Judge Pointer's order, affirming his direction that a county school board take over the operations of a splinter school district when the latter's board refused to comply with the district court's decree. The appellate court required the district judge's annual review of the non-compliance, however, so that local control of schools could be re-established as soon as possible. In its decision, the Fifth Circuit also revised, or required the district court to study and revise, limited aspects of Judge Pointer's order addressing transportation, transfers and school construction. Stout v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 466 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). In 1973, an appeal resulted in an opinion that affirmed the district court's order modifying certain attendance zones and transforming, at the county school board's request, a formerly all-black high school into an integrated center for exceptional children. Stout v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 483 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). On remand, Judge Pointer addressed additional attendance zones within the school district. Then, when one high school's subsequent attendance figures suggested a white boycott was occurring, the school board sought modification of the judge's orders. Judge Pointer denied the request and the board appealed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding the board could not show an abuse of discretion had occurred, since the district judge's action resulted from an in-chambers, unreported hearing. Stout v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 489 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam). The writ to the Supreme Court was denied. 411 U.S. 930. 410 U.S. 928.
During the period following issuance of the 1971 decree, the United States also appealed. Once, when Judge Pointer refused to modify attendance zones for two elementary schools in accord with a federal proposal, his decision resulted in maintaining the schools as all black. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that the district judge acted in the context (1) of already-achieved dismantling of the dual public school system in Jefferson County, (2) of concern for the risk to children stemming from lengthy bussing over busy roads and through mountains, and (3) with an experienced-based assessment that his decision minimized the risk of further white boycotting of the schools. Stout v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 537 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1976) (Circuit Judge Thomas Gibbs Gee). The appellate court observed, however, that this limited existence of single-race schools in the county's now unitary school system warranted continued scrutiny of the school system by the district court. Id. The United States' application for rehearing or for rehearing en banc was denied. Stout v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 544 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1976) (Circuit Judge Gee).
Over a decade later, the unitary status of Jefferson County's public remained an issue. By this time, the former Fifth Circuit had been divided into two courts, one retaining the Fifth Circuit appellation and the newer one forming as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. With Alabama included in the Eleventh Circuit's boundaries, the new court had jurisdiction over an appeal resulting from Judge Pointer's action. In his district court in August 1987, a group of black schoolchildren filed as plaintiffs. They lived in an area recently annexed from the county into a city. This led to their being assigned to attend heavily black city schools, with the county schools the plaintiffs would have attended then being predominately white. Plaintiffs sought an injunction allowing them to remain in the county school system. Judge Pointer denied the requested relief in an unpublished order. He relied upon the fact that the city schools had been declared unitary, that the county school board did not cause the change in attendance districts, and that that board had been following a consistent policy applied in all cases of annexation.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. Circuit Judge Phyllis A. Kravitch, writing for the court, noted that the plaintiffs wrongly sought interdistrict relief without demonstrating both an interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect, contrary to Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). The argument that, despite the involvement of two school systems, the plaintiffs actually sought intradistrict relief (with the requested injunction simply being a means to ensure the effectiveness of the original desegregation order applicable to the county) also failed, since the city system had already been declared unitary and the plaintiffs sought essentially permanent relief, depriving a locality of control over its schools without a finding of a constitutional violation. As for Jefferson County's school system, Judge Kravitch noted the Fifth Circuit's 1976 ruling (above) declaring that the county now operated a unitary system, the qualification of that declaration via the continuation of court supervision over the district, and a later Eleventh Circuit statement (in a different case, Brown v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 808 F.2d 1445 (11th Cir. 1987)) that the county system had yet to be declared unitary. Stout v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 845 F.2d 1559 (5th Cir. 1988).
Again, over a decade passed. On September 15, 2000, prompted by the proposed closure of two schools, a consent order proposed by the parties was signed by District Judge Inge Prytz Johnson. The order, which included supporting data, required certain attendance zone modifications and student reassignments. The order cited the defendant school board's acknowledgment that it had failed to appropriately monitor intra-district transfers for compliance with applicable court rulings and set out plans to remedy that shortcoming.
Over forty years after this case began, the district court continued to require compliance by Jefferson County's public schools with constitutional standards and the 1971 remedial order. In May 2005, Judge Johnson approved an unpublished consent order (twice modifying it that August) which approved the operation, within Jefferson County, of the City of Trussville's newly-formed school system. The order reflects that counsel for the plaintiffs, for the United States and for the defendants were all apprised, in advance, of the planned new system and given the opportunity to review relevant information concerning its formation, operation and impact, so that the court could ensure that there would be no impediment to the desegregation process. The order included an inter-district transfer policy, a pupil transportation policy, and plans for attendance zone issues arising during the transitional period. Acknowledging the impact of new legislation, the order also addressed the impact of transfers which might result from requirements imposed on schools by provisions of the federal "No Child Left Behind Act of 2001," 20 U.S.C. §§ 6316. The consent order explicitly observed that the new district was subject to the court's 1971 order and imposed detailed reporting requirements for the Trussville school board. One of Judge Johnson's August 2005 modifications approved certain student transfers requested under the No Child Left Behind Act, noting that transfer obligations the Act imposed on the board can fundamentally conflict with transfer guidelines in prior desegregation orders issued by the court.
In an unpublished August 7, 2007, order, upon motion from the county school board, Judge Johnson again approved proposed student transfers for the upcoming school year, as had been requested under the No Child Left Behind Act. Court supervision continued, with Judge Johnson approving, in an unpublished August 24, 2007, order, a joint motion seeking approval of the county board's plan to build a new middle school. In following months, school boards subject to court supervision in this case continued to file status reports with the court.
On May 26, 2009, the Court approved a modification to school zone lines; on January 1, 2010 approved more construction projects; and on April 14, 2011, approved a grade reconfiguration and classroom construction.
On July 29, 2011, the Court issued an order modifying the existing desegregation order to allow transfers under No Child Left Behind that fundamentally conflicted with the existing desegregation order for the 2010-2011 school year.
Between 2011 and 2016, status reports continued to be filed and the court oversaw the school district’s plans for student assignment and district rezoning. The student assignment chart described placement of each student in elementary, middle, and high school schools within in the district for the academic year. Additional plans for district rezoning were also submitted to the court for approval. The court granted a motion to reconfigure certain grades and to introduce a middle school IB program for the district on July 25, 2016 in a memorandum opinion and order. 2016 WL 3971429. Also in 2016, the case’s docket number was changed for administrative purposes and easier access to no. 2:16-mc-00199. The orders and status reporting from the prior docket were refiled. Continuing from 2016 until the latest case update in 2019, status reports, motions for student assignments, motions for district rezoning, and motions for transfer plans of students continued.
During March 2014, the Gardendale Municipal School System was created, intending to separate from the Jefferson County systems. Consulting firms and a national search for a superintendent were part of an effort to change the environment in Gardendale, where there had been complaints that classes were too large and test scores were too low. The separation was highly problematic in that it would separate one of the high schools with the most resources from the district, a school that was 90% white with above a 90% graduation rate.
On April 24, 2017, the court ordered that the Gardendale Municipal School district’s proposals for separation and ratios were motivated by race and had attempted to evade the valid desegregation order, not including two elementary schools that warranted separation for practical considerations. The court also stated that the county had successfully attracted a racially and geographically diverse student body to the school through the county's good faith efforts to comply with the desegregation order, comporting with basic notions of fairness. 250 F.Supp.3d 1092 (N.D. Ala.)
The case was subsequently appealed. On February 13, 2018, the court affirmed the finding of the lower court that the separation plan violated the constitution by impeding the desegregation efforts of the Jefferson County Board. 882 F.3d 988. The case was remanded with instructions to deny the motion of the Gardendale board to secede.
On May 4, 2018, both the school district and the United States of America filed status reports regarding the “Green Factor Assessment,” based upon Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968), as a tool for assessing a school district’s compliance with a desegregation order: student assignment, faculty and staff assignment, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities, stating that compliance could not be fully measured until new measures of transportation were imposed.
On June 21, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion to substitute the named class representatives, which was granted on the 26th.
As of November 27, 2019, the enforcement of desegregation measures against the school district continued with regular required status reports and the district being required to request permission from the court for all changes to zoning, student assignment, faculty and staff assignment, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities.
The case remains ongoing, with yearly status reports submitted to the court.
Summary Authors
Mike Fagan (4/22/2008)
Claire Lally (4/3/2015)
Emma Himes (2/7/2020)
Johnson v. Jackson Parish School Board, Western District of Louisiana (1965)
United States v. Lincoln Parish School Board, Western District of Louisiana (1966)
For PACER's information on parties and their attorneys, see: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/5628976/parties/stout-v-jefferson-cty-bd-ed/
Ainsworth, Robert Andrew Jr. (Louisiana)
Adams, Oscar W. Jr. (Alabama)
Amaker, Norman C. (New York)
Airhart, Teddy W. Jr. (Louisiana)
Allain, William A. (Mississippi)
Ainsworth, Robert Andrew Jr. (Louisiana)
Bell, Griffin Boyette (Georgia)
Brown, John Robert (Louisiana)
Carswell, George Harrold (Florida)
Coleman, James Plemon (Louisiana)
Garza, Reynaldo Guerra (Texas)
Gewin, Walter Pettus (Alabama)
Godbold, John Cooper (Louisiana)
Goldberg, Irving Loeb (Louisiana)
Haikala, Madeline Hughes (Alabama)
Henderson, Albert John (Georgia)
Henley, Jesse Smith (Missouri)
Ingraham, Joe McDonald (Texas)
Kravitch, Phyllis A. (Georgia)
Pointer, Sam Clyde Jr. (Alabama)
Simpson, John Milton Bryan (Florida)
Anderson, Rueben V. (Mississippi)
Banks, Fred L. Jr. (Mississippi)
Barrett, St. John (District of Columbia)
Berman, Amy I. (District of Columbia)
Billingsley, Orzell Jr. (Alabama)
Bleveans, John (District of Columbia)
Bronstein, Alvin J. (Mississippi)
Chachkin, Norman J. (New York)
Collins, Robert Frederick (Louisiana)
Days, Drew S. III (District of Columbia)
Doar, John (District of Columbia)
Dunbaugh, Frank M. III (District of Columbia)
Dunne, Sarah A. (District of Columbia)
Finkelstein, Joel M. (District of Columbia)
Flannery, J. Harold (District of Columbia)
Garrish, Theodore J. (District of Columbia)
Gaston, A. Lattimore (District of Columbia)
Gorman, Walter (District of Columbia)
Graves, William C. (District of Columbia)
Gregory, David D. (District of Columbia)
Hancock, Paul F. (District of Columbia)
Herbert, GeDa' Lea Jones (District of Columbia)
Holmes, Jennifer Amelia (District of Columbia)
Katzenbach, Nicholas de B. (District of Columbia)
Kemmitt, Christopher (District of Columbia)
Kleinman, Rachel Miriam (New York)
Kohrman, Daniel B. (District of Columbia)
Landsberg, Brian K. (District of Columbia)
Leifer, Elihu (District of Columbia)
Leonard, Jerris (District of Columbia)
Leventhal, Melvyn R. (New York)
Lewin, Nathan (District of Columbia)
Lin-Luse, Monique N. (New York)
Loper, Merle W. (District of Columbia)
Maurer, Michael S. (District of Columbia)
Maxey, John L. II (Mississippi)
Mayer, Kristan S. (District of Columbia)
Miller, Pauline A. (District of Columbia)
Nabrit, James M. III (New York)
Nesson, Charles R. (District of Columbia)
Newton, Demetrius C. (Alabama)
Norman, David L. (District of Columbia)
Pergam, Albert S. (District of Columbia)
Pollak, Stephen J. (District of Columbia)
Pottinger, J. Stanley (District of Columbia)
Queen, Jesse H. (District of Columbia)
Rankin, D. Battle (District of Columbia)
Roberts, Robert P. (Louisiana)
Robinson, William L. (District of Columbia)
Ross, Alexander C. (District of Columbia)
Scall, Lester (District of Columbia)
Seay, Solomon S. Jr. (Alabama)
Shaheen, Edward L. (Louisiana)
Simons, Valerie (District of Columbia)
Somerville, William G. Jr. (Alabama)
Stone, Jesse N. Jr. (Louisiana)
Strickler, George Marion Jr. (Louisiana)
Sweeney, Donald B. Jr. (Alabama)
White-Spunner, Charles S. Jr. (Alabama)
Wright, Marian E. (Mississippi)
Airhart, Teddy W. Jr. (Louisiana)
Allain, William A. (Mississippi)
Cannada, Robert C. (Mississippi)
Colvin, Gerald D. Jr. (Alabama)
DeJean, Kenneth C. (Louisiana)
Falkenheiner, W. C. (Louisiana)
Gremillion, Jack P.F. (Louisiana)
Johnson, Carl E. Jr. (Alabama)
Johnston, J. Bennett Jr. (Louisiana)
Kilbourne, Richard H. (Louisiana)
Lassiter, Albin P. (Louisiana)
McEniry, J. Howard Jr. (Alabama)
McFerrin, Thomas Sr. (Louisiana)
Philips, Abram L. Jr. (Alabama)
Pipes, William F. Jr. (Louisiana)
Richardson, John A. (Louisiana)
Rudloff, Andrew Ethan (Alabama)
Rutherford, Russell J (Alabama)
Satterfield, John C. (Mississippi)
Schuler, William P. (Louisiana)
Beauchamp, Peter W (District of Columbia)
Falkinburg, Thomas (District of Columbia)
Gardner, Kelly D. (District of Columbia)
Gray, Fred David Sr. (Alabama)
McDonald, Yawanna Nabors (Alabama)
Michaud, Melissa Julia (District of Columbia)
Percia, Veronica R (District of Columbia)
See docket on RECAP: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/5628976/stout-v-jefferson-cty-bd-ed/
Last updated April 3, 2024, 3:11 a.m.
State / Territory: Alabama
Case Type(s):
Special Collection(s):
Civil Rights Division Archival Collection
Key Dates
Filing Date: June 4, 1965
Case Ongoing: Yes
Plaintiffs
Plaintiff Description:
African American school children in Jefferson County, Alabama; United States Department of Justice
Plaintiff Type(s):
U.S. Dept of Justice plaintiff
Attorney Organizations:
U.S. Dept. of Justice Civil Rights Division
Public Interest Lawyer: Yes
Filed Pro Se: No
Class Action Sought: Yes
Class Action Outcome: Granted
Defendants
Jefferson County (Jefferson), County
Defendant Type(s):
Facility Type(s):
Case Details
Causes of Action:
Constitutional Clause(s):
Available Documents:
Injunctive (or Injunctive-like) Relief
Outcome
Prevailing Party: Plaintiff
Nature of Relief:
Injunction / Injunctive-like Settlement
Source of Relief:
Form of Settlement:
Court Approved Settlement or Consent Decree
Content of Injunction:
Develop anti-discrimination policy
Order Duration: 1971 - None
Issues
General/Misc.:
Discrimination Basis:
Affected Race(s):