Case: Capitol People First v. Department of Developmental Services

On January 25, 2002, several developmentally disabled residents of California filed a lawsuit against the State of California and its Department of Developmental Services in the California Superior Court for the County of Alameda. The lawsuit was filed under California's Lanterman Act; the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq.; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of a class of California residents with developmental disabilities who are institutionalized or at risk of institutionalization, alleging that the state failed to place class members in the least restrictive environment commensurate with their needs, creating unnecessary institutionalization.

Although the Superior Court (Judge Ronald Sabraw) denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, the California appellate court (Judge Timothy Reardon) reversed the trial court's decision and granted class certification. Capitol People First v. Dep't of Developmental Serv., 2007 WL 2772868 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. Sep. 25, 2007) (No. A113168). The trial court found that there was insufficient commonality of issues, that the representative plaintiffs would not adequately represent the putative class members, and that a class remedy would be less appropriate than individual remedies.

As to the commonality requirement, the appellate court faulted the trial court for focusing too narrowly on the details of allegations relating to the representative plaintiffs, "rather than taking a broader, systemic view concentrating on respondents' policies and practices." The appellate court found that the trial court's belief that the individualized nature of each plaintiff's individual program plan would unduly restrict the use of statistical proof at trial "would turn all pattern and practice class litigation upside down."

As to adequacy of representation, the trial court cited an argument made by a group of intervening institutionalized residents who argued that the relief sought by the plaintiffs would result in some people being removed from institutions who desired to remain there. The appellate court rejected this argument, noting that the interveners represented no more than a fraction of the class and that, at any rate, the interveners' argument went to the merits of the case and to "different philosophical perspectives on the issue of institutionalization," as opposed to any "legally cognizable antagonism."

Lastly, the appellate court found that the individual remedies proposed by the trial court were inadequate. The court reasoned that, before improved assessment and services tailored to the unique needs of individuals may be realized, "the policies that undergird decisionmaking and allocation of resources must be changed."

On April 24, 2009, the Superior Court (Judge Robert Freedman) approved a settlement agreement reached by the parties. According to a Disability Rights California press release, "The settlement provides for additional funds for case management to assist class members in state-run institutions called developmental centers (DC); improved information to class members and training for DC staff about community living options; increased state-level coordination of services for people diagnosed with developmental and mental health disabilities; and continued funding and program efforts to provide community living alternatives for class members." The settlement was set to remain in effect for three years, during which time Disability Rights California would monitor the state's performance of the settlement terms.

We have no further information on this case, but it is presumed closed.