Case: Porter v. Clarke

On November 20th, 2014, four persons convicted of capital murder, sentenced to death, and awaiting execution of that sentence while confined on death row at Virginia’s Sussex I State Prison (SISP) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia. The plaintiffs sued the Virginia Department of Corrections and SISP under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs asked the court to extend the declaratory relief awarded to Mr. Prieto in Prieto v. Clarke to themselves, to enjoin defendants from failing to extend to the plaintiffs their rights and privileges afforded Mr. Prieto as a result of this court's order in his case. The plaintiffs also sought reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988.

The plaintiffs alleged two violations. First, they contended that the conditions of their confinement on death row and the procedures for placing them there violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Second, they argued that their permanent segregation subjects them to an inhumane existence unrelated to any legitimate penological goal, amounting to imposition of cruel and unusual punishment violating the Eighth Amendment.

On Feb 4, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. This motion was denied on April 17, 2015. On December 21, 2015 both parties filed motions for summary judgment.

On July 8, 2016, Judge Leonie M. Brinkema granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, denying plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as moot. 2016 WL 3766301. The court found that defendants made several significant changes to the conditions of SISP, resulting in new conditions of confinement that plaintiffs conceded do not violate the Eighth Amendment. The court also found that because the improvements voluntarily made by defendants have rendered plaintiffs' claims moot, it would be inappropriate under the specific facts of this action to reach the merits of plaintiffs' claims or to invoke the injunction authority of the court.

On August 4, 2016, the plaintiffs filed an appeal to U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, claiming that the improvements made to the conditions on death row did not moot their claims (16-07044). On January 25, 2017, the court (Judges Paul v. Niemeyer, William B. Traxler, Jr., and James A. Wynn, Jr.) heard oral arguments.

Judge Wynn delivered the opinion of the court on March 24, 2017, ruling that the improvements made did not render the plaintiffs’ claims moot. 852 F.3d 358. The case was reversed and remanded to the district court due to the defendants' unilateral capacity to reinstitute the challenged policies, their refusal to promise not to reinstitute said policies, and the defendants' outlining of certain instances when those policies might be reinstituted.

Back in the district court, the parties reopened discovery, and on August 25, 2017 both parties moved for summary judgment. On February 21, 2018, Judge Brinkema granted the plaintiffs' and denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment. 290 F.Supp.3d 518. Judge Brinkema declared that the pre-2015 conditions of the prison, including periods of isolation lasting up to 23 hours a day, were unconstitutional and in violation of the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment rights. It was further ordered that the defendants be enjoined from reinstituting the pre-2015 conditions. The injunction was to remain in place for two years, absent a finding that the prison reverted to pre-2015 conditions.

The defendants appealed the order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on March 13, 2018. On December 13, 2018, the court (Judges Paul V. Niemeyer, Robert B. King and James A. Wynn) heard oral argument. Judge Wynn delivered the opinion of the court on May 3, 2019, amending the opinion on May 6 and affirming the district court's decision. First, the court found that the district court's grant of summary judgment was appropriate. Under the undisputed facts, the challenged conditions of confinement on Virginia’s death row created a “substantial risk” of serious psychological and emotional harm, thus satisfying the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment analysis. Further, the court found that the subjective prong was also satisfied, as the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the risk of serious psychological and emotional harm. Second, the court upheld the district court's injunction against reinstituting the pre-2015 conditions. 923 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2019).

The defendants filed a petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc; it was denied on July 26, 2019, with five votes to grant rehearing en banc (Judge Wilkinson, Judge Niemeyer, Judge Richardson, Judge Quattlebaum, and Judge Rushing).

As of April 1, 2021, the case appears to be closed.