Case: United States v. Knippers and Day Real Estate, Inc.

The Attorney General filed suit on behalf of the United States, alleging that the defendants had engaged in a pattern of racial discrimination in the sale of houses in the subdivisions in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, violating Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act. The case was filed on July 22, 1968, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Specifically, the complaint alleges that the defendant have refused to sell homes to Black buyers on account of their race, have represented to Black families that homes were not available for sale when they were, discriminate with respect to terms or conditions of the sale of dwellings, and made dwellings available to White buyers on terms and conditions not available to Black buyers with comparable financial qualifications. The plaintiffs ask for an injunction preventing the defendants from failing or refusing to sell dwellings, or the negotiation or the sale of dwellings, on the basis of race; discriminating on the basis of race in the terms, conditions, or privileges of the sale, representing that dwellings are not available when they are, and failing to take reasonable and adequate steps to correct the effects of their past discrimination. 

The complaint arose out of the experiences of a Black man attempting to buy a home in Baton Rouge. He alleged that he reached out to three real estate companies: Myer Yarbrough, Gully Agency, and Knippers and Day Real Estate. Before learning that he was Black, each company indicated that they were willing to sell him a house. However, upon learning his race, they refused to complete the sale. The homes that he attempted to buy were all either in subdivisions approved by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or Veterans’ Administration (VA), where many houses had been sold with loans guaranteed by the federal government, or in subdivisions where the real estate companies advertise the availability of these loans. 

The defendants moved to dismiss the case, and alternatively for summary judgment, on the grounds that the houses that they sold did not fall within the coverage of Title VIII because dwellings in the subdivisions named in the complaint have not been provided with the aid of loans, advances, grants or contributions made by the Federal Government, and that such dwellings are not provided in whole or in part by loans insured, guaranteed or otherwise secured by the credit of the Federal Government within the meaning of Sections 803(a)(1)(B) and (C) of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. In the alternative, they argued that the few business dealings they had with Black customers meant that they had not engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination. 

At the District Court, Chief Judge West granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgement. Title VIII states that it applies to houses sold before December 31, 1968 only if the houses were “provided in whole or in part with the aid of loans, advances, grants, or contributions made by the Federal Government.” Chief Judge West held that mere tentative approval or possible survey of reality by the FHA or VA, or possible issuance of a certificate of reasonable value by those agencies, did not amount to a ‘contribution’ within the meaning of the Fair Housing Act. Therefore, because the dwellings were not subject to the provisions of the Fair Housing Act at the time of the alleged acts of discrimination, there was no valid claim. 298 F.Supp. 551 (1969). 

The United States appealed this ruling to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act states that after January 1, 1969, all sales of all houses by realtors came specifically within the coverage of the Act. Thus, the court held that, since this date had passed, the case was now moot. The court declined to decide whether the Title VIII, as in effect prior to 1969, had covered the particular dwellings at issue. Thus, the court vacated the District Court’s judgment, and remanded it with directions to dismiss the case as moot. 25 F.2d 1081 (1970).