The Department of Justice sued the City of Philadelphia for declaratory and injunctive relief on August 13, 1979, alleging a pervasive pattern of police abuse by the Philadelphia Police Department. Similarly, the DOJ claimed that the police department facilitated these illegal practices with their policies and procedures for investigating police misconduct. The DOJ further alleged that the disputed practices had an unlawfully disproportionate impact on Black and Latino persons. This case was the first real legal attack on institutionalized police misconduct, and the DOJ’s attempted intervention on behalf of individual citizens did not fit squarely within existing frameworks for suit. Although the DOJ asked for specific declaratory and injunctive relief, it also impliedly asked the court to create a new cause of action to support its Fourteenth Amendment allegations. The DOJ’s other discrimination claims arose under federal statutes prohibiting discrimination in programs receiving federal funding—but notably, not under the Civil Rights Acts.

The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and assigned to Judge John William Ditter Jr. Judge Ditter dismissed all but one of the DOJ’s claims on October 30, 1980, after finding that the DOJ lacked statutory authority to sue over violations of the Fourteenth Amendment rights of individuals. 482 F.Supp. 1248. In a separate opinion, the court found that the DOJ did not allege claims under two federal statutes with sufficient particularity. Those statutes were the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Safe Streets Act) and the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 (Fiscal Assistance Act). 482 F.Supp. 1274. That said, Judge Ditter permitted the DOJ to proceed with its charge that PPD “discriminated on the basis of race, color, or national origin in distributing the benefits of certain unspecified federally funded programs,” because the DOJ’s authority to bring such charges was undisputed.

The DOJ appealed to the Third Circuit on April 22, 1980. It disputed the district court’s determination that the United States did not have implied authority to sue a city and its officials for an injunction against violations of the Fourteenth Amendment rights of individuals. The DOJ also argued that, contrary to the district court’s second opinion, it stated a claim for relief under the Safe Streets Act and Fiscal Assistance Act.

The Third Circuit rejected the DOJ’s first argument for implied authority to sue in an opinion filed December 29, 1980. 644 F.2d 187. The court found that congressional silence and an alleged absence of “adequate” remedies was not enough to imply a right of action. It explained that Congress created numerous mechanisms for the redress of denials of due process, including criminal prosecution, which meant that the court did not need to create a new remedy. The Third Circuit also determined that the DOJ’s allegations of racial discrimination in the administration of certain programs funded under the Safe Streets and Fiscal Assistance Acts were vague, conclusory, and inconsistent. It therefore affirmed the district court’s judgment that the DOJ did not state a claim in this respect.

The resolution of the remaining claim brought by the United States is unknown to the Clearinghouse.