Case: Al-Jundi v. Mancusi

Background

This case is part of the Clearinghouse's special collection on the Attica Uprising. In September of 1971, incarcerated people in New York's Attica Correctional Facility took control of the prison and took several staff members hostage. The uprising ended when state police violently stormed the prison, killing over 40 incarcerated people and staff members. Attica was one of the most significant events in the American prisoners' rights movement and drew public attention to poor conditions in prisons across the country. The uprising, retaking, and their aftermaths spawned numerous lawsuits, many of which are included in this special collection.

This case concerns damages for the incarcerated people injured or killed during the retaking and reprisals.

The Complaint

This is a class action concerning liability and damages for the violence committed against incarcerated people at Attica during the retaking and reprisals. The class included all incarcerated people who were in D-Yard during the retaking. The complaint was initially filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on September 13, 1974, but then was transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York, where Attica is located. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on September 11, 1975. The case was assigned to District Judge John Elfvin.

The plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985(3), alleging violations of the Due Process and Equal Protections Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. The plaintiffs also alleged a conspiracy to violate these amendments. 

The amended complaint included eleven causes of action, which the court broke down into three main categories. The first category was allegations concerning the plan to retake the prison, including the failure to plan for medical care (“plan claims”). The second was the reprisals after the retaking (“reprisals claims”), which included the failure to provide medical care to those injured. The third was the prosecution of people involved in the uprising (“prosecution claims”). The plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages of more than $4 billion. 

The defendants included Governor Nelson Rockefeller, the Commissioner of Corrections Russell Oswald, the Superintendent of Attica Vincent Mancusi, the Assistant Deputy Superintendent of Attica Karl Pfeil, and state police Major John Monahan, as well as other state prison and law enforcement officials. The defendants were sued in their individual capacity. The court denied the defendants’ early motion to dismiss.

Liability Phase: Class Certification

The court granted the plaintiffs’ request for class certification on October 30, 1979. The class included “all persons who were on September 13, 1971 inmates of the Attica Correctional Facility, Wyoming County, N.Y., and who were present in D-yard of Attica on such date.” Approximately 1,281 people were part of the class. 

On October 30, 1979, the court narrowed the prosecution claim. In the same order, the court dismissed Mancusi and Pfeil from the plan claims and Pfeil from the prosecution claim.

Leading up to April 1980, the plaintiffs’ counsel, Bob Cantor, a Manhattan criminal defense attorney, sought to withdraw from the case because he felt he was unable to adequately represent the class. According to Heather Ann Thompson, this was because of the magnitude of the case and the fact that he was working from Manhattan. Blood in the Water, 462. On April 21, 1980, the court ordered the parties to begin discovery, but the plaintiffs failed to do so. 88 F.R.D. 244. 

By October 1980, the plaintiffs had still not started discovery. So, on October 27, 1980, the court said the case would be dismissed for failure to prosecute unless the plaintiffs began discovery within 120 days. In the same order, the court concluded Cantor was unable to adequately represent the class because he failed to begin discovery, so he was allowed to withdraw. 88 F.R.D. 244. Since the plaintiffs no longer had counsel, the court revoked the class certification order without prejudice, allowing the plaintiffs to recertify the class once they had adequate representation. 

Soon after, the plaintiffs obtained new counsel, Elizabeth Fink, who was part of the Attica Brothers Legal Defense efforts. The Attica Brothers Legal Defense were the attorneys who represented incarcerated people at Attica charged with crimes committed during the uprising. Later, attorneys Michael Deutsch, Joe Heath, Danny Meyers, and Dennis Cunningham, who also had prior experience with Attica litigation, joined the plaintiffs’ team. With new counsel, the plaintiffs began discovery. 

The plaintiffs waited to recertify the class until they had the evidence they wanted from discovery, which took several years. After various subpoenas and attempts by defendants to get protective orders to avoid having to answer requests to admit, 91 F.R.D. 590, the plaintiffs completed their discovery. Fink was even able to read the Meyer Report (referenced in Matter of Carey) because the records clerk in the office accidentally allowed her to view it. 

Once the plaintiffs had their complete discovery materials, they moved to recertify the class. The court granted the motion for recertification on June 24, 1985. The class remained the same: those in D-yard during the retaking. In response, the defendants moved to decertify the class, which the court denied on April 3, 1987. 1987 WL 8948. In the same opinion, the court denied the defendants’ request to dismiss the reprisals and prosecution claims, finding that the previous litigation concerning an injunction to stop reprisals and to require officials to prosecute state police (Inmates of Attica v. Rockefeller), did not collaterally estop the claims. 1987 WL 8948.

Liability Phase: Pretrial Motions

After April 3, 1987, all defendants filed motions for summary judgment. On September 28, 1988, the court granted the governor’s estate’s motion for summary judgment. 1988 WL 103346. The court found that because the governor was not present at the retaking, he did not inflict cruel and unusual punishment or violate due process, and there was insufficient evidence he engaged in a conspiracy to do so. The court found the governor was also entitled to qualified immunity because ordering the retaking did not violate clearly established law.

The plaintiffs appealed the decision. On December 15, 1989, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 885 F.2d 1060. The panel included Circuit Judges Jon Newman and Roger Miner and District Judge Robert Ward. Circuit Judge Miner wrote the opinion. The court agreed the governor’s involvement in the retaking was insufficient to establish liability under § 1983, that there was no basis for supervisor liability, and that the governor was entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the governor’s estate was dismissed from the case.

On June 26, 1990, the court denied Oswald, Mancusi, and Pfeil’s motion for summary judgment, finding they were not entitled to qualified immunity. However, the court did dismiss Mancusi and Oswald from the prosecution claim because of insufficient evidence. 1990 WL 97729. 

Oswald, Mancusi, and Pfeil appealed. On February 17, 1991, the U.S Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. 926 F.2d 235. The panel included Circuit Judges Jon Newman, Irving Kaufman, and Joseph McLaughlin. Circuit Judge Newman wrote the opinion. The court held the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity except for the plan claims pertaining to medical care and the reprisals claim. The court found there was sufficient evidence to show the defendants knew about the reprisals even though they did not participate in them. The Supreme Court denied the defendants’ petition for certiorari on October 7, 1991. 

Defendant Monahan’s estate also moved for dismissal based on qualified immunity. The court dismissed Monahan from the prosecution claim, but otherwise denied the motion. 1990 WL 130555. 

Liability Trial & Aftermath

Prior to trial, the court decided to bifurcate the case into two phases: one for liability and one for damages. After the court resolved the defendants’ pretrial motions, the remaining claims for the liability trial were: 1) the plan claim against Commissioner of Corrections Oswald for failure to plan for medical treatment after the retaking, 2) the plan claim against Major Monahan for supervising the state police during the retaking and failing to provide medical care, and 3) the reprisals claims against Oswald, Superintendent Mancusi, and Assistant Deputy Superintendent Pfeil for failing to stop the reprisals. 

The parties took those claims to trial in 1991. The trial ran from late 1991 until January 9, 1992. The jury was instructed to determine 1) whether reprisals had occurred and 2) which defendants caused the reprisals. The jury issued its verdict February 4, 1992, finding there had been reprisals and an unconstitutional failure to provide medical care after the retaking. The jury could not reach unanimous verdicts for the reprisals claim against Oswald or Mancusi or the plan claims against Monahan and Oswald, meaning a retrial would be needed to establish liability.

However, the jury did return a verdict against Pfeil, finding he was liable for the reprisals because he condoned them. The verdict sheet asked the jury, if they found there were reprisals, did the plaintiffs prove that Pfeil was “liable to the plaintiffs or any of them for any injury…resulting from such reprisals.” Prior to trial, Oswald and Pfeil’s counsel had objected to this language in the verdict sheet, arguing the language “plaintiffs or any of them” was insufficient to establish class-wide liability. They would later raise the same challenge on appeal. 

After the jury returned its verdict, all defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law. The court denied Pfeil’s motion on January 16, 1993, finding there was no error in jury instructions, the verdicts were not based on evidence outside the record, and that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find Pfeil liable. 1993 WL 22829. The court similarly denied Mancusi and Oswald’s motions on January 19, 1993, and Monahan’s motion on February 22, 1993. 1993 WL 22818. 

Damages Phase: Pre-Trial Negotiations

After post-trial litigation was complete, the parties moved on to resolving damages against Pfeil, as he was the only defendant found liable. According to Thompson, Fink wanted to pursue settlement negotiations, so she contacted Judge Elfvin’s boss, Chief Judge Michael Telesca, to broker the settlement. Telesca suggested Magistrate Judge Edmund Maxwell, who oversaw the liability trial, handle the negotiations. Blood in the Water, 483. On April 8, 1992, the court transferred the case to Maxwell to handle settlement negotiations. However, negotiations broke down and ended in November 1992. 

So, the parties had to proceed with the damages phase of trial against Pfeil. The plaintiffs only pursued damages against Pfeil because he was the only defendant found liable, which was sufficient for the plaintiffs to obtain damages. Also, the state would be paying the damages regardless. In January 1993, the court encouraged the plaintiffs to “focus on their claims against Pfeil in order to facilitate the fashioning of an appealable final judgment.” 186 F.3d 252. For the next year and a half, the parties considered various subclasses and selected “typical” plaintiffs to try to expedite determining damage amounts. 

In August 1994, the court scheduled the liability trials. However, the defendants refused to stipulate that Pfeil was liable for the entire class given the language in the verdict sheet saying “plaintiffs or any of them.” So, the damage trials were postponed. On November 17, 1994, the court advised Pfeil that an interlocutory appeal was the appropriate method to resolve the question of class-wide liability, but Pfeil wanted to wait until the damage trials to appeal so he could argue he was not liable at the damage trial. So, the plaintiffs tried to secure a ruling on class-wide liability they could appeal. However, the court refused to grant that ruling on May 2, 1995. The same day, the court proposed to decertify the class and hold individual trials for each plaintiff. According to Thompson, this was because Elfvin was tired of the plaintiffs pressuring him to quickly resolve damages, so he instead threatened to make them hold separate trials. Blood in the Water, 480.

In response to the court’s effort to decertify the class, the plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus from the Second Circuit. The writ was denied without prejudice on June 30, 1995 as long as the court immediately scheduled the damage trials. In response, Elfvin rescheduled the trials. However, Elfvin said he would allow Pfeil to challenge his liability for individual plaintiffs at the damage trials. 

Back in the district court, on June 6, 1995, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint to secure liability against Mancusi and Monahan based on what they argued was proved at trial. The court reasoned that neither claim was specifically tried and that amendment would prejudice Mancusi and Monahan. 1995 WL 353159. So, the damages trial continued only against Pfeil. 

Based on Elfvin’s statement that Pfeil would be allowed to challenge his liability at the damages trial, the plaintiffs moved the Second Circuit to reconsider the writ of mandamus. The plaintiffs were concerned that Pfeil would have another chance to argue he was not liable, which would violate the Seventh Amendment by letting the damage jury reconsider the liability jury's finding. Before the Second Circuit could rule on that, Elfvin changed his position. Elfvin stated that prima facie, the trial verdict “must be construed as imposing an all-encompassing responsibility upon Pfeil but allowing him to tender, but not necessarily to adduce, evidence that some particular hurt or deprivation from reprisals was so ‘out-of-the-mainstream’ ... as to be beyond Pfeil's responsibility.” On November 16, 1995, the Second Circuit denied the motion for reconsideration of the mandamus petition. Pfeil later challenged the liability finding in his appeal after the damage trials. 

The court then moved forward with the damages trials. The parties selected two plaintiffs who would be representative of the high-end and low-end of damages. The high-end damages trial included the plaintiff Smith, who was one of the leaders of the uprising and one of the most severely injured. The second plaintiff was selected because his injuries were typical of most class-members. In both trials, the jury was instructed to accept as true that reprisals had occurred and that Pfeil was liable for the injuries caused by the reprisals. However, the jury was told they must determine what specific acts counted as reprisals in assessing damages for the plaintiffs.

Smith’s trial was held from May 29 to June 4, 1997. The jury awarded $4 million in monetary damages. The second trial was held from June 23 to June 26, 1997. The jury awarded $75,000 in monetary damages. The court denied Pfeil’s motion to set aside both verdicts. 

Liability Phase: Post-Trial Motions and Appeals

After both verdicts, Pfeil moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, which the court denied on October 2, 1997. 1997 WL 613232. The court found the jury instructions were proper, that Pfeil was liable for his “knowing and wanton failure to protect inmates” from reprisals, that any erroneously admitted evidence was harmless error, and that the awards were not too large. The court then granted the plaintiffs’ motions for entry of partial final judgments on November 4, 1997. 1997 WL 736690.   

Pfeil then appealed the judgments against him, both the damage determinations and the liability finding. On August 3, 1999, the U.S Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded. 186 F.3d 252. The panel included Chief Judge Ralph Winter, Circuit Judge Rosemary Pooler, and District Judge Peter Dorcey. Chief Judge Winter wrote the opinion. 

The court held the jury instructions in the liability trial were permissible because they correctly stated that Pfeil could be held liable for being deliberately indifferent to the reprisals. However, the court found the liability verdict did not establish class-wide liability based on the quoted language above. On its face, the verdict sheet did not require findings sufficient to establish class-wide liability. Accordingly, the court reversed the damage awards. 

Next, the court found the bifurcated trial violated the Seventh Amendment because it enabled the damage juries to reexamine issues decided by the liability jury, namely what specific acts counted as reprisals. Finally, the court ordered the district court to reconsider if the case should be a class action since retrial seemed inevitable. The court said common issues of law and fact did not appear to predominate over individual ones.

Final Settlement Discussions and Distribution of Funds

After the Second Circuit’s reversal, the parties entered into settlement discussions with the help of Judge Telesca. The parties submitted a proposed settlement agreement on January 4, 2000 in which the state agreed to put $8 million in a damages fund to be apportioned by the court. However, the state did not admit liability. The state also agreed to put $4 million in a fund for attorneys’ fees. 

Judge Telesca then took over the case. On February 14, 2000, the court held a fairness hearing for class members to share their opinions on the settlement offer. The court issued a preliminary approval of the settlement agreement on February 15, 2000. Class members were ordered to submit claim forms to participate in the settlement. The court received 581 claims. 200 class members testified about their claims from May to August 2000. Ultimately, the court found there were 502 valid claims. 

The court issued a final approval and plan for distribution of the settlement on August 28, 2000. 113 F.Supp.2d 441. The court held that the settlement was fair and equitable. In dividing up the settlement, the court created five categories of class members, ranging from those who were moderately injured, to those who were killed. The court established a sliding scale for damages from $6,500 to $125,000. The appendix of the opinion included a summary of all the claims and the violence endured.

The court then dismissed the case with prejudice and ordered the clerk to direct the distribution of the funds once the time for appeal of the decision expired. Some class members attempted to appeal, but such appeals were withdrawn with prejudice on December 19, 2000. The case is now closed.