Filed Date: May 4, 2017
Case Ongoing
Clearinghouse coding complete
On May 4, 2017, two residents of Detroit, Michigan, filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the Secretary of State for the State of Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiffs, represented by the Sugar Law Center and Equal Justice Under Law, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. This case was assigned to District Judge Linda V. Parker. The plaintiffs claimed that, in automatically and indefinitely suspending the driver’s licenses of people who owe court-ordered fines, costs, fees, and assessments, even if they simply cannot afford pay, the defendants had violated their equal protection and substantive and procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
On the same day as filing the complaint, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin the defendant from suspending the driver’s licenses of people who are unable to pay their court debts.
On July 17, 2017, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, or, alternatively, a motion for summary judgment. The defendant asked the court to dismiss all claims, arguing that the claims lacked subject matter jurisdiction and lacked merit as a matter of law.
On December 14, 2017, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. Judge Parker reasoned that, while the plaintiffs were unlikely to establish equal protection or substantive due process violations, the court found a strong likelihood that the plaintiffs would succeed in establishing a procedural due process violation. 2017 WL 6379676. The defendant appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
The defendant also filed an emergency motion to stay court proceedings pending the appeal, arguing that the preliminary injunction is substantively improper where the defendant, not the plaintiffs, will suffer irreparable harm, and that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits. On December 21, 2017, disagreeing, Judge Parker denied the motion to stay noting the defendants failed to establish irreparable harm. 2017 WL 6540926.
In response to this denial, the Sixth Circuit entered an order on December 28, 2017, granting a thirty day stay of the preliminary injunction. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the injunction was too broad in scope and provided too little direction as to what specific actions should have been taken to comply with the constitutional due process requirements. As such, the appeals court remanded to the district court for the limited purpose of modifying the injunctive relief granted, after any necessary briefings or evidentiary hearings, to provide direction to the defendant as to the type of process required by the district court’s order.
In light of the Sixth Circuit order to stay the injunction, Judge Parker gave an order amending the preliminary injunction and scheduling a hearing so that the parties may raise any questions or concerns they have regarding the district court’s intended modification of the injunctive relief. After the hearing, reasoning that the Sixth Circuit’s December 2017 remand order did not invite it to revisit the merits of the plaintiff’s claims, Judge Parker gave specific instruction as to what was required by the preliminary injunction on January 24, 2018.
The district court enjoined the defendant from suspending any further driver’s licenses of individuals because of nonpayment and required the defendant to (1) offer drivers the option to request a hearing where they have the opportunity to demonstrate their inability to pay a fine, cost, fee and/or assessment; (2) provide a hearing when requested; (3) provides reasonable notice to drivers of the hearing opportunity; and (4) institutes alternatives to full payment for those unable to pay (e.g., realistic payment plans or volunteer service). In response to this decision, the defendants filed another appeal.
On February 7, 2018, the Sixth Circuit entered an order granting a stay of the amended preliminary injunction and, finding that the district court’s jurisdiction over this case was unclear, remanded to the district court to address the plaintiffs’ standing. The judges were Circuit judges Judge Ralph B. Guy, Jr. and Ronald Lee Gilman and District Judge Joseph M. Hood sitting my designation.
On April 11, 2018, the district court issued an opinion and order to address the plaintiffs’ standing and ruled on the plaintiffs’ motion seeking leave to filed an amended complaint and a motion for class certification. 2018 WL 1737122. Ultimately, the district court found that the plaintiffs had standing. With regard to the plaintiff’s motion, however, Judge Parker found that the motion to certify class was premature. While the district court found that at least one of the plaintiffs had standing to pursue this lawsuit on behalf of the putative class, that finding undoubtedly will be included as an issue for review by the Sixth Circuit in the pending appeal. As such, the court found it would make little sense for it to decide whether that plaintiff was typical of the putative class and whether she was an adequate class representative. Additionally, the district court found that it would be futile for the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint to add plaintiffs because the parties the plaintiffs seek to add would lack standing.
On May 8, 2019, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s order enjoining the driver’s license suspension law. In her opinion, Circuit Judge Alice Batchelder (joined by Circuit Judge Amul Thapar) held that the policy does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Judge Batchelder admitted that the plaintiffs' argument had some merit as a matter of policy but fell short as a constitutional argument because the court's review of state legislative choices is deferential. In her dissent, Circuit Judge Bernice Bouie Donald contended that the plaintiffs had a protected property interest in continued possession of a driver's license. In balancing the relevant interests, Judge Donald argued that the license-suspension scheme violated the plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights.
On December 3, 2019, the Sixth Circuit denied the plaintiffs' petition for a rehearing en banc.
In the district court, Judge Parker ordered that the case be dismissed on February 24, 2020, pursuant to a settlement agreement stipulated to by the parties. The case was dismissed without prejudice and without costs or attorney fees to any party. As of March 2, 2020, the Clearinghouse does not have access to the terms of the settlement agreement.
Summary Authors
Jake Parker (6/8/2018)
Aaron Gurley (10/8/2019)
For PACER's information on parties and their attorneys, see: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/6150244/parties/fowler-v-johnson/
Batchelder, Alice Moore (Ohio)
Alexander, Celia M. (Michigan)
Barton, Denise C. (Michigan)
Bryan, William Paul (Michigan)
Bursch, John J. (Michigan)
Alexander, Celia M. (Michigan)
Bryan, William Paul (Michigan)
Cavanagh, Timothy John (Michigan)
Clement, Rebecca Claire (Michigan)
Dirks, Charles Leopold (Michigan)
Froehlich, Joseph T. (Michigan)
Grossi, Christina M. (Michigan)
Himebaugh, Kevin R. (Michigan)
Ho, Joseph Yung-Kuang (Michigan)
Lerminiaux, Keith J. (Michigan)
McGlothlin, Lauren B. (Michigan)
Meingast, Heather S. (Michigan)
Philips, Harry Joseph (Michigan)
Sizemore, James Paul (Michigan)
Sorich, Michael Jude (Michigan)
See docket on RECAP: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/6150244/fowler-v-johnson/
Last updated April 21, 2025, 12:37 p.m.
State / Territory: Michigan
Case Type(s):
Public Benefits/Government Services
Special Collection(s):
Fines/Fees/Bail Reform (Criminalization of Poverty)
Key Dates
Filing Date: May 4, 2017
Case Ongoing: Yes
Plaintiffs
Plaintiff Description:
All Michigan residents whose driver’s licenses are currently suspended or will be suspended solely because of inability to pay court debts, including, but not limited to, traffic fines, court costs, assessments and fees.
Attorney Organizations:
Public Interest Lawyer: Yes
Filed Pro Se: No
Class Action Sought: Yes
Class Action Outcome: Pending
Defendants
Defendant Type(s):
Case Details
Causes of Action:
Title VI, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.
Constitutional Clause(s):
Available Documents:
Outcome
Prevailing Party: None Yet / None
Nature of Relief:
Source of Relief:
Content of Injunction:
Implement complaint/dispute resolution process
Issues
General/Misc.: