Filed Date: Oct. 1, 2016
Case Ongoing
Clearinghouse coding complete
In 2016, the FBI sought and obtained a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant against Trump 2016 campaign foreign policy advisor Carter Page. The warrant applications against Page alleged that he had contact with Russian officials to collect compromising information on Trump's 2016 opponent, Hillary Clinton.
After substantial litigation, these classified FISA warrants and related documents were disclosed. This Clearinghouse entry includes those underlying applications and renewals. There are 4, each with a different Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) docket number:
This entry will also discuss efforts by the FISC to protect the classified information contained in the warrants. These filings appear on docket 16-1182.
For more information on the litigation in the FISC and U.S. District Courts to release these documents, see this link. For more information on reform of the overall FISA warrant process inspired by the Carter Page case, see this link.
FISA requires the government to obtain a warrant from the FISC before it may conduct any domestic electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information. The warrant applications are made ex parte and must include a sworn statement by a federal officer of the facts and circumstances relied upon to justify the government's belief that the target of surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Once a FISC judge receives a warrant application, the judge can order approval of the surveillance only if the judge finds that there is probable cause to believe that the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Because the orders only authorize surveillance up to 90 days, the government must file an application for an extension that meets the same requirements as the initial warrant application and obtain a renewal order from the FISC for continued surveillance. For the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse collection of FISA matters, see our special collection.
I. The Contents of the Warrants
On July 21, 2018, in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, the Department of Justice (DOJ) released the FISA warrant applications related to the surveillance of Trump campaign advisor Carter Page. The New York Times, which filed the FOIA request, released the documents in an article published on the same day; the FISC did not release the warrants.
Although the documents are heavily redacted, they revealed that in October 2016, the FBI submitted an application to the FISC to wiretap Page because the FBI believed that Page had been the "subject of targeted recruitment by the Russian government . . . [redacted] undermine and influence the outcome of the 2016 U.S. Presidential election in violation of U.S. criminal law." The FBI believed that Page had "established relationships with Russian government officials, including Russian intelligence officers" and that "the Russian government's efforts are being coordinated with Page and perhaps other individuals associated with" then-presidential candidate Trump.
According to the FBI, Page had traveled to Russia in July 2016 to deliver a commencement address at a school. During that trip, Page also met with at least two Russian officials. The FBI asserted that one of its confidential informants, who had a history of reliability, reported that Page "had a secret meeting with Igor Sechin," who is "a close associate to Russian President Putin." The FBI's confidential informant also relayed that Page had secretly met with Igor Divyekin, a Russian official who is believed by U.S. officials to have responsibility for intelligence collected by Russian agencies about the U.S. election, and that "their agenda for the meeting included Divyekin raising a dossier or 'kompromat' that the Kremlin possessed on" Hillary Clinton and the "possibility of it being released" to presidential candidate Trump.
Sometime in October 2016, FISC judge Rosemary M. Collyer found that on "the basis of the facts submitted in the verified application, there is probable cause to believe" that Page "is an agent of Russia." This is the initial warrant, docketed as 16-1182. She authorized the warrant, which was to expire sometime in January 2017.
In January 2017, the FBI renewed its warrant application, which FISC judge Michael Mosman granted later that month under docket 17-52. The renewal was set to expire sometime in April 2017.
In April 2017, the FBI submitted a second renewal application, which FISC judge Anne C. Conway granted later that month under docket 17-375. This second renewal was set to expire sometime in June 2017.
In June 2017, the FBI submitted a third renewal application, which FISC judge Raymond J. Dearie granted later that month under docket 17-679. This third renewal expired sometime in September 2017.
The non-redacted portions of the original warrant application and the three renewal applications were largely identical. Due to the redacted nature of the applications, it is unclear whether the FBI provided the FISC courts with additional intelligence, gained from its original wiretap, in support of its renewals.
II. Protecting the Information in the Warrants
On December 9, 2019, the FBI Office of the Inspector General (OIG) published the “Crossfire Hurricane” Report, named after the FBI’s codename for its investigation into Page. The report found that there had been "material misstatements and omissions" in the FISA warrant applications that led to the four orders listed above. For more information on the Crossfire Hurricane report, see In re Accuracy Concerns Regarding FBI Matters Submitted to the FISC.
In response to the Crossfire Hurricane report, Judge James E. Boasberg issued an order on docket 16-1182 requesting government comment on the four Carter Page surveillance warrants on January 7, 2020. Judge Boasberg's order directed the government to produce a disclosure detailing the steps it had already taken to protect the information in the four warrants and future steps to protect the information by January 28, 2020. On January 23, 2020, the Government requested additional time to respond to FISC's order. Judge Boasberg approved the request, and the new deadline became February 5, 2020.
The disclosure was not publicly released to the docket. Subsequent filings reveal that the government provided two supplemental responses to the January 7 order on February 28 and April 17, though neither were publicly released.
Judge Boasberg released an opinion and order on June 25, 2020 responding to the Government filings and discussing future situations where disclosure might be necessary. Judge Boasberg noted that FISA sections 1807 and 1827 forbid the government from releasing illegally obtained information, like the information in the Page FISA warrants, but highlighted an exception from a 2010 FISC opinion for "actions that are necessary to mitigate or prevent the very harms at which [that section] is addressed" (emphasis in original), as long as minimization procedures are followed. He discussed how these tensions play out in five situations where disclosure may be necessary:
On November 23, 2020, Judge Boasberg issued an order permitting disclosure of the warrants to attorneys in the U.S. Attorney's office in the Eastern District of Missouri and the District of the District of Columbia. He expressed confidence in both offices' abilities to protect confidential information in the warrants after hearing their responses to questioning in a November 6 hearing. These disclosures likely were linked to an investigation these offices were conducting into the Page warrants specifically.
On June 7, 2023, the government filed a motion to permit the disclosure of classified information about the FISA applications targeting Page that had been included as an appendix to Special Counsel John H. Duram’s report about the 2016 Presidential Campaigns. The information would be shared with select members of Congress and staff who have oversight over FISA. On June 8, 2023, the FISC granted the motion and allowed the government to give access to the information in the classified appendix to members and staff of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, and the House Judiciary Committee, and other specific members. On June 29, 2023, the government informed the court that it was now allowing members of Congress and staff to view the documents in a secure facility.
As of November 17, 2023, the case is ongoing.
Summary Authors
Lisa Limb (2/13/2019)
Ellen Aldin (12/16/2020)
Venesa Haska (11/17/2023)
James Madison Project v. U.S. Department of Justice, District of District of Columbia (2017)
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States DOJ, Southern District of New York (2018)
Judicial Watch, Inc. v. United States DOJ, District of District of Columbia (2018)
Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Justice, District of District of Columbia (2018)
Page v. U.S. Department of Justice, District of District of Columbia (2019)
Page v. Comey, District of District of Columbia (2020)
Boasberg, James Emanuel (District of Columbia)
Collyer, Rosemary M. (District of Columbia)
Conway, Anne C. (Florida)
Dearie, Raymond Joseph (New York)
Boente, Dana J. (District of Columbia)
Last updated March 17, 2024, 3:11 a.m.
Docket sheet not available via the Clearinghouse.State / Territory: District of Columbia
Case Type(s):
Special Collection(s):
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act -- All Matters
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act -- Telephony Metadata
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act—Internet Metadata
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
Key Dates
Filing Date: Oct. 1, 2016
Case Ongoing: Yes
Plaintiffs
Plaintiff Description:
The U.S. Department of Justice
Plaintiff Type(s):
U.S. Dept of Justice plaintiff
Public Interest Lawyer: Yes
Filed Pro Se: No
Class Action Sought: No
Class Action Outcome: Not sought
Defendants
Carter W. Page, Private Entity/Person
Case Details
Causes of Action:
FISA Title I Warrant (Electronic Surveillance), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812
FISA Title VII targeting order (Sections 702, 703, 704), 50 U.S.C. 1881a, 1881b, 1881c
Constitutional Clause(s):
Unreasonable search and seizure
Special Case Type(s):
Warrant or subpoena application
Available Documents:
Outcome
Prevailing Party: Plaintiff
Nature of Relief:
Warrant/Order allowing surveillance
Source of Relief:
Order Duration: 2016 - 2017
Issues
General/Misc.: