Case: In re Accuracy Concerns Regarding FBI Matters Submitted to the FISC [FISC Docket Misc. 19-02]

19-00002 | Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court

Filed Date: Dec. 17, 2019

Case Ongoing

Clearinghouse coding complete

Case Summary

This Clearinghouse entry focuses on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’s (FISC) response to revelations of flawed Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant applications against Trump 2016 campaign foreign policy advisor Carter Page. It includes the following dockets: • The FBI Office of the Inspector General “Crossfire Hurricane” Report. This isn’t a docket, but important background information that influenced the FISC’s decision-making. • Misc. 19-02 in the FISC For more in…

This Clearinghouse entry focuses on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’s (FISC) response to revelations of flawed Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant applications against Trump 2016 campaign foreign policy advisor Carter Page. It includes the following dockets:

• The FBI Office of the Inspector General “Crossfire Hurricane” Report. This isn’t a docket, but important background information that influenced the FISC’s decision-making.

• Misc. 19-02 in the FISC

For more information on litigation to disclose the warrants that inspired this case, please see this link. For a summary of the warrants and information on ongoing efforts by the FISC to protect the confidential information in them, see this link.

FISA requires the government to obtain a warrant from the FISC before it may conduct any domestic electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information. The warrant applications are made ex parte and must include a sworn statement by a federal officer of the facts and circumstances relied upon to justify the government's belief that the target of surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Once a FISC judge receives a warrant application, the judge can order approval of the surveillance only if the judge finds that there is probable cause to believe that the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Because the orders only authorize surveillance up to 90 days, the government must file an application for an extension that meets the same requirements as the initial warrant application and obtain a renewal order from the FISC for continued surveillance. For the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse collection of FISA matters, see our special collection.

I. Background: The “Crossfire Hurricane” Report

On December 9, 2019, the FBI Office of the Inspector General published the “Crossfire Hurricane” Report, named after the FBI’s codename for its investigation into Page. This report was not docketed in the FISC, but it informed future action from the body.

According to the report, the FBI began Crossfire Hurricane on July 31, 2016, shortly after receiving information from a friendly foreign government that, in May 2016, then Trump campaign foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos "suggested the Trump team had received some kind of suggestion from Russia that it could assist this process with the anonymous release of information during the campaign that would be damaging to Mrs. Clinton (and President Obama)." In August 2016, the FBI opened individual cases on four U.S. persons—Papadopoulos, Carter Page, Paul Manafort, and Michael Flynn. All four were affiliated with the Trump campaign at the time the cases were opened. In October 2016, the Crossfire Hurricane team sought and obtained FISA surveillance authority for surveillance targeting Page, and this application was renewed four times. All told, the FBI conducted 11 months of FISA surveillance targeting Carter Page from October 21, 2016, to September 22, 2017.

The FISC Rules of Procedure and FBI policy required that the FISA applications contain all material facts. The FISC Rules do not define or otherwise explain what constitutes a "material" fact. FBI policy guidance states that a fact is "material" if it is relevant to the court's probable cause determination. Additionally, FBI policy mandates that the case agent ensure that all factual statements in a FISA application are "scrupulously accurate."

The initial application's statement of facts supporting probable cause to believe that Page was an agent of Russia was had five main elements:

• The efforts of Russian Intelligence Services (RIS) to influence the upcoming U.S. presidential election;

• The Russian government's attempted coordination with members of the Trump campaign, based on the information reporting the suggestion of assistance from the Russians to someone associated with the Trump campaign;

• Page's historical connections to Russia and RIS;

• Page's alleged coordination with the Russian government on 2016 U.S. presidential election activities, based on Christopher Steele's reporting; and

• Page's statements to an FBI confidential informant in October 2016 that that he had an "open checkbook" from certain Russians to fund a think tank project.

The subsequent IG investigation stated:

Our review found that FBI personnel fell far short of the requirement in FBI policy that they ensure that all factual statements in a FISA application are "scrupulously accurate." We identified multiple instances in which factual assertions relied upon in the first FISA application were inaccurate, incomplete, or unsupported by appropriate documentation, based upon information the FBI had in its possession at the time the application was filed. We found that the problems we identified were primarily caused by the Crossfire Hurricane team failing to share all relevant information with OI [DOJ Chief of Oversight in the Office of Intelligence] and, consequently, the information was not considered by the Department decision makers who ultimately decided to support the applications. As more fully described in Chapter Five, based upon the information known to the FBI in October 2016, the first application contained the following seven significant inaccuracies and omissions:

1. Omitted information the FBI had obtained from another U.S. government agency detailing its prior relationship with Page, including that Page had been approved as an "operational contact" for the other agency from 2008 to 2013, and that Page had provided information to the other agency concerning his prior contacts with certain Russian intelligence officers, one of which overlapped with facts asserted in the FISA application;

2. Included a source characterization statement asserting that Steele's prior reporting had been "corroborated and used in criminal proceedings," which overstated the significance of Steele's past reporting and was not approved by Steele's handling agent, as required by the Wood Procedures;

3. Omitted information relevant to the reliability of Person 1, a key Steele sub-source (who was attributed with providing the information in Report 95 and some of the information in Reports 80 and 102 relied upon in the application), namely that (1) Steele himself told members of the Crossfire Hurricane team that Person 1 was a "boaster" and an "egoist" and "may engage in some embellishment" and (2) the FBI had opened a counterintelligence investigation on Person 1 a few days before the FISA application was filed;

4. Asserted that the FBI had assessed that Steele did not directly provide to the press information in the September 23 Yahoo News article based on the premise that Steele had told the FBI that he only shared his election-related research with the FBI and Fusion GPS, his client; this premise was incorrect and contradicted by documentation in the Woods File-Steele had told the FBI that he also gave his information to the State Department;

5. Omitted Papadopoulos's consensually monitored statements to an FBI CHS [confidential human source] in September 2016 denying that anyone associated with the Trump campaign was collaborating with Russia or with outside groups like Wikileaks in the release of emails;

6. Omitted Page's consensually monitored statements to an FBI CHS in August 2016 that Page had "literally never met" or "said one word to" Paul Manafort and that Manafort had not responded to any of Page's emails; if true, those statements were in tension with claims in Report 95 that Page was participating in a conspiracy with Russia by acting as an intermediary for Manafort on behalf of the Trump campaign; and

7. Included Page's consensually monitored statements to an FBI CHS in October 2016 that the FBI believed supported its theory that Page was an agent of Russia but omitted other statements Page made that were inconsistent with its theory, including denying having met with Sechin and Divyekin, or even knowing who Divyekin was; if true, those statements contradicted the claims in Report 94 that Page had met secretly with Sechin and Divyekin about future cooperation with Russia and shared derogatory information about candidate Clinton.

None of these inaccuracies and omissions were brought to the attention of OI before the last FISA application was filed in June 2017. Consequently, these failures were repeated in all three renewal applications. Further, as we discuss later, we identified 10 additional significant errors in the renewal applications.

As a result of this report, the Department of Justice notified the FISC that there had been "material misstatements and omissions" in the four FISA applications to electronically surveil Carter Page. The DOJ stated that in the applications in Docket Numbers 17-375 and 17-679 there was insufficient evidence for probable cause, rendering those applications invalid. The FBI also agreed to sequester all the information acquired in the four applications pending the outcome of related litigation and investigations.

II. Reforming FISA Requests

On December 17, 2019, shortly after the release of the Crossfire Hurricane report, Judge Rosemary M. Collyer issued an order saying that the report indicated that the FBI had acted antithetically to its "heightened duty of candor" in its handling of the Page reports. Judge Collyer ordered the Government to, by January 10, 2020, inform FISC about the steps it had taken and intended to take to ensure that FBI statements of fact were reliable and accurate. The order further stipulated that if the FBI was unable to make this deadline, it would submit a proposed timetable for the measures and detail why the information coming from the FBI should be considered reliable.

On January 10, 2020, Judge James E. Boasberg issued an order appointing David S. Kris to serve as amicus curiae "to assist the Court in assessing the Government's response to the December 17, 2019, Order."

Also on January 10, 2020, the U.S. Government submitted its response to the FISC December 17, 2019 Order. The FBI outlined new procedures to "ensure factual accuracy and completeness of information in applications." These included revisions to the forms used for applications and improved training. The Government also stipulated that the DOJ's National Security Division and FBI were in the process of amending the 2009 Memorandum, which governed some of the FISA querying procedures, to "ensure accurate and complete FISA applications."

The response also included the Declaration of Christopher W. Wray, the Director of the FBI, which explicitly identified actions the FBI intended to take to address the revelations of the OIG Report. Wray outlined twelve corrective actions specific to FISA:

1. Supplementing the FISA Request form with new questions, including a checklist of relevant information, which will direct agents to provide additional information and to collect all details relevant to the consideration of a probable cause finding, emphasizing the need to err on the side of disclosure;

2. Requiring that all information known at the time of the request and bearing on the reliability of a CHS whose information is used to support the FISA application is captured in the FISA Request Form and verified by the CHS handler;

3. Adding re-verification directives to the FISA Verification Form, known as the Woods Form, which will require agents and their supervisors to attest to their diligence in re-verifying facts from prior factual applications and to confirm that any changes or clarifying facts, to the extent needed, are in the FISA renewal application;

4. Improving the FISA Verification Form by adding a section devoted to CHSs, including a new certification related to the CHS-originated content in the FISA application by the CHS handler, and CHS-related information that requires confirmation by the CHS handler, which will be maintained in the CHS's file;

5. Adding an affirmation to the FISA Verification Form that, to the best of the agent's and supervisor's knowledge, OI has been apprised of all information that might reasonably call into question the accuracy of the information in the application or otherwise raise doubts about the requested probable cause findings or the theory of the case;

6. Adding a checklist to the FISA Verification Form that walks through the new and existing steps for the supervisor who is affirming the case agent's accuracy review prior to his or her signature, affirming the completeness of the accuracy review;

7. Formalizing the role of FBI attorneys in the legal review process for FISA applications, to include identification of the point at which SES-level [executive] FBI OGC personnel will be involved, which positions may serve as the supervisory legal reviewer, and establishing the documentation required for the legal review;

8. Creating and teaching a case study based on the OIG Report findings, analyzing all steps of that particular FISA application and its renewals to show FBI personnel the errors, omissions, failures to follow policy, and communication breakdowns, and to instruct where new or revised policies and procedures will apply, so that mistakes of the past are not repeated;

9. Requiring serialization of completed FISA Verification Forms in the FBI's case management system to increase accountability and transparency;

10. Developing and requiring new training focused on FISA process rigor and the steps FBI personnel must take, at all levels, to make sure that OI and the FISC are apprised of all information in the FBI's holdings at the time of an application that would be relevant to a determination of probable cause;

11. Identifying and pursuing short- and long-term technological improvements, in partnership with DOJ, that will aid in consistency and accountability; and,

12. Directing the FBI's recently expanded Office of Integrity and Compliance to work with the FBI's Resource Planning Office to identify and propose audit, review, and compliance mechanisms to ensure the above changes to the FISA process are effective.

These actions would be implemented "with enhanced communication and training to the workforce." The timeline for the implementation of the Corrective Actions ranged from January 2020 to June 2020.

In the interim, Mr. Wray stipulated heightened standards for applications while the Corrective Actions were implemented.

On January 15, 2020, Amicus Curiae David Kris filed a brief evaluating the proposed actions of the FBI. Kris argued that the proposed Corrective Actions were not sufficient. Kris outlined several potential additional steps, including: changing who signed the requests, increased use of technology, increased recording and reporting, and additional and expanded accuracy reviews. Kris argued that all the reforms should be implemented with the goal of changing FBI culture and instilling more individual responsibility. He also recommended that the court stipulate that the FBI implement more disciplinary measures for misrepresenting facts in order to deter others. In the interim, Kris recommended that FISC hold additional hearings to further convey its concerns to the FBI.

On January 31, 2020, the United States issued a response to the Kris amicus brief. The Government asserted that the "FBI and DOJ will need time to assess if the corrective actions are effective and to think strategically as to whether additional measures need to be put in place on the results of the measures."

On March 5, 2020, Judge Boasberg released an opinion responding to the government’s January 10 response and the Kris amicus brief. He stated that while the government had implemented some promising measures, more needed to be done.

He began by analyzing the revised plan for implementing FISA applications. He was skeptical about whether requiring agents to "collect all details relevant to the consideration of a probable cause finding, emphasizing the need to err on the side of disclosure" on FISA applications would lead to any meaningful change, and asked the FBI to follow up with an analysis of its efficacy, since the form was already in circulation. He was also interested to hear more about a new checklist on how to handle Confidential Human Sources (CHS) in the FISA warrant application, and asked the FBI to provide the FISC with a copy of the checklist once it is in use, which was expected to be March 27. Judge Boasberg was also encouraged by a new, multilayered review process for the Woods Forms, but wanted the FBI to update its guidance on what Woods Form-reviewing attorneys and agents are supposed to look for on review. Citing the Kris amicus brief, Judge Boasberg next urged FBI attorneys to make changes outside of these already-mentioned areas, including implementing due diligence checklists for FBI attorneys and requiring an attestation from a submitting attorney and the case agent that the FISA warrant application "[t]o the best of [their] knowledge, this application fairly reflects all information that might reasonably call into question the accuracy of the information or the reasonableness of any FBI assessments in the application, or otherwise raise doubts about the requested probable cause findings."

Turning to trainings, Judge Boasberg was encouraged by the implementation of a new training plan on the revised forms, a case-study based approach on the Carter Page FISA warrant mistakes, and on process rigor in FISA warrant applications. However, he also supported suggestions from the amicus in favor of attorney participation in these trainings and using disciplinary procedures to punish people that incorrectly use the FISA warrant system.

On oversight, Judge Boasberg highlighted the brief discussion on new oversight plans in the FBI submission, and again supported the amicus brief’s call for a routine and robust monitoring program, even though it might be cost-prohibitive. He asked for further reporting on the FBI’s monitoring plan as it develops.

To close out the order, Judge Boasberg asked the FBI to provide the following updates by March 27: a copy of the CHS checklist and a report on the status of its implementation, a description of the responsibilities of FBI lawyers, an update on any planned technological improvements to the FISA warrant system, a report on improving the proactiveness of DOJ officials, a report on the status of FBI field agents as declarants in FISA warrants, and a description of oversight programs. He requested a copy of the training materials by May 4, and a description of any audit or review by the FBI’s oversight team by May 22. Judge Boasberg also announced the following immediate reforms: a ban on FBI officials under disciplinary proceedings from participating in FISA warrant drafting and that all new FISA warrants after March 9 must be submitted with an attestation of their accuracy.

On March 25, the government requested a one-week extension in submitting the materials due on March 27. Judge Boasberg granted the motion.

On March 31, the government submitted a classified memorandum on its audit of the Woods Forms from 29 non-active FISA warrants. In an order issued on April 3, 2020, Judge Boasberg wrote that the memorandum showed “None of the 29 cases reviewed had a Woods File that did what it is supposed to do: support each fact proffered to the Court” [emphasis in original]. He stated that this brought the viability of other FISA warrants into question, and ordered the government to name the targets in the 29 filings to the court, assess if any material misrepresentations occurred in those FISA warrant applications, update the FISC every two months starting June 15 on compliance with the Woods principles, take remedial steps if necessary, and describe any audit of the Woods filings. The order for these documents came down on April 3.

According to subsequent filings, the government complied with the extended deadline from the March 5 order on April 3. The initial responsive documents remain classified, but some supplemental documents are public. On April 30, 2020, the FISC declassified the FBI’s submission related to training programs. FBI General Counsel Dana Boente confirmed that the training would include both a case study and a process training on each step of the FISA warrant application process for all FBI employees that work on FISA warrants. As of that date, the case study training was complete, and the process training was being revised to meet enhanced internal standards issued in February 2020. He added that FBI Director Christopher Wray was stressing the need for internal compliance with FISA warrant application standards in internal emails and video messages, and that he had appointed a member of the Senior Executive Service to oversee compliance with the new regulations and provide a last review of FISA warrants. Information on technical updates to the FISA warrant system was classified.

On May 22, 2020, the FISC declassified another supplemental response to the March 5 order on auditing and internal compliance review. Boente again wrote the FBI’s attestation, and he stated that Director Wray had implemented a new compliance reporting protocol through Business Record (BR) and Tap and Trace (TT) forms, which forced agents working on a FISA warrant to follow certain reporting protocols. He added that these forms would be submitted to the FISC whenever a FISA warrant is submitted, but he did not discuss the content of the forms. Regarding auditing, Boente mentioned that the FBI was seeking proposals from external consulting firms to audit its internal procedures; he promised an update on the search by July 31, 2020. Finally, he noted that the FBI had created an accuracy review strategy that it would apply in the coming months.

On May 29, 2020, the DOJ Chief of Oversight in the Office of Intelligence (OI) submitted its second monthly report on technological improvements for FISA case management. He reported that it was transitioning away from the outdated FISA Management System (FISAMS) to a new program called "The Bridge." The OI explained that The Bridge would interface with Sentinel, the FBI's case management system for non-FISA cases, and would improve data collection and cross-referencing between the two systems. The OI stated that it expected the transition from FISAMS to The Bridge to be complete no earlier than the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2021.

On June 15, 2020, the FBI filed a supplemental response to the April 3 order asking for review of 29 FISA warrant applications for compliance with the Woods Procedures. FBI General Counsel Dana Boente stated that the Bureau was only able to conduct a review of 14 of the files, but found that only one contained a material misstatement or omission, but that misstatement or omission did not render the resulting warrant invalid. He noted that there were errors in filing supporting documents, and that many things that appeared to be omissions or misstatements were in fact supported by facts in different parts of the accuracy subfile of the FISA application. However, Boente stated that there were 63 non-material misstatements or omissions in the reviewed files, which included typographical errors, misrepresenting the source of surveillance authorization, or only partially sourced assertions not material to the central argument for the warrant. The response discussed why these mistakes were immaterial to the specific warrants reviewed, but the details of these discussions were classified.

Boente closed the supplemental response by asking for an extension of time to comply with the March 30 order for the remaining 15 unreviewed FISA warrant applications. He cited staffing concerns due to the coronavirus as justification for the delay in compliance.

On June 23, 2020, the FISC granted a motion for extension of time to comply with the April 3 order on the Woods filings. The new due date for the submissions was July 29, 2020.

In keeping with the deadlines set in the March 5 order, the OI provided a filing discussing the implementation of new FISA warrant application forms and training on June 30, 2020. Reiterating discussion from the largely classified April 3 filing, the DOJ stated that it was in the process of implementing a new Confidential Human Source (CHS) checklist to verify accuracy of information from sources and FISA warrant request forms with new attestations of accuracy to replace the interim process of heightened agent review implemented earlier in the year. The OI stated that implementation of the new forms began on February 14, 2020, and implementation of the CHS checklist began on March 27, 2020. It confirmed that all personnel in the Office of Intelligence and the FBI that would be working with FISA warrants received training on the new forms after implementation. Even though the forms had only been in use for a few months, the FBI and OI assessed the efficacy of the new forms and checklist later in the filing, but their assessments were classified. OI promised to continue complying with the timetable set forth in the March 5 order at the end of the filing.

FBI General Counsel Dawn Browning updated the court on the FBI's revision to the Pen Register-Tap and Trace (PR-TT) and BR request forms on July 31, 2020. She confirmed that the FBI drafted new BR and PR-TT request forms, but was still working on updating the request procedures to ensure accuracy. Once this update was complete, she expected the FBI would update its training programs on the request forms accordingly. She noted that agents would need to keep an accuracy subfile with their BR and PR-TT requests going forward. She closed her filing by saying that the FBI issued a public request for information from external auditors to update the FBI's internal processes in this area in early June, but the details of this request were classified.

The OI provided his third report on technological updates in keeping with the schedule from the March 5 order on August 28, 2020. This report notified the FISC that the Bridge team had finished creating a digital interface for the new FISA request form and a platform to upload documents related to the CHS checklist. In addition, the Bridge team created a case validation feature, which cross referenced information from the FISA application to information stored in the Sentinel case file. OI closed by stating it was working on a tool that would export documents from a FISA accuracy sub-file to others working on the same case automatically.

The OI's November 30 report is not available publicly. On March 1, 2021, the OI provided more information regarding the development of the Bridge. Specifically, the report described ongoing efforts at finalizing the user interface and testing its functionality within the FBI network. The March report reiterated the completion of the Bridge-Sentinel cross-referencing feature that was reported in the publicly unavailable November 30 report. Additionally, the March report set forth that the Bridge team demonstrated the Woods Procedures, to be integrated into the Bridge, to "stakeholders within the FBI and DOJ" and pushed it to production for a limited launch in some field offices.

The OI provided its next report on June 1, 2021. In the report, the OI described ongoing efforts at building the user interface and streamlining request integration so that FISA subject information can be extracted from a corresponding Sentinel file. The OI further reported that it had rolled out the Woods Procedures to select field offices. In this report, the OI also pushed back its projected completion date from the fourth quarter of FY2021 to the second quarter of FY2022.

On August 31, 2021, the OI submitted its seventh report regarding its technological updates. In this report, the OI described its ongoing revisions regarding PR-TT requests as well as the team's build-out of the Bridge system's "pre-production environment," which the OI regarded as "a significant milestone" in the operationalization of the Bridge. The OI also reported that the Electronic Woods Capability (EWC) related to the Woods Procedure was deployed "enterprise wide in or about July 2021."

On July 16, 2021, the FBI provided its own update with respect to the accuracy of FISA applications. Its previous updates in November 2020 and March 2021 are unavailable to the Clearinghouse. Specifically, the FBI reported that it developed new guidance to ensure the accuracy of FISA applications, which was finalized in May and took effect on July 6. The guidance incorporated changes to both the PR-TT and BR systems and required accuracy subfiles to be created in both instances, which was not previously protocol. In tandem with these policy changes, the FBI developed changes to its training to include the guidance revisions. These also took effect on July 6.

In September 2021, the DOJ submitted an audit report relating to this matter. Adding to its March 2020 report that revealed all 29 surveyed FISA warrants were deficient, the DOJ found an additional 179 applications dating between January 2015 and March 2020 that were missing complete information pursuant to Woods Procedures. As such, the DOJ recommended the FBI lay out more concrete policies for verifying accuracy of information on applications and emphasize the seriousness of Woods compliance. However, in its ninth update (Feb. 28, 2022), the OI revealed that despite the enterprise-wide deployment of the Bridge, the new system was not expected to be fully functional until at least the first quarter of fiscal year 2023.

The OI submitted its tenth update on May 31, 2022, where it stated that the FBI had continued to work on transitioning to the Bridge program. In addition, the OI noted that the EWC that interfaces with the Bridge program was in an operational state, with the FBI focusing on making incremental adjustments to address maintenance issues. Lastly, the FBI had continued to work on finalizing requirements and enhancements for other information technology systems used for Confidential Human Sources. 

The OI submitted its eleventh update on August 29, 2022, as the FBI continued to work on transitioning to the Bridge program and addressing maintenance issues associated with the EWC. The FBI also started using the Disclosure of CHS Identify Form. The twelfth update on November 28, 2022, provided similar updates as the FBI continued to work on the Bridge Program and the EWC, with a product delivery to the FBI’s National Security Branch scheduled for final user testing. The thirteenth update on March 1, 2023, provided similar updates, including that the FBI obtained an authority to operate the Bridge program and began the administrative process to set it up for operational FISA use. The FBI also implemented the CHS Contact Report.

On May 17, 2023, the FBI filed a motion for relief from the Court’s March 5, 2020 order requiring periodic reporting on the FBI’s technological improvement to the FISA process, stating that the improvements have “reached a level of maturity” that requiring updates every 90 days provides “little substantive information” to the court. The FBI pointed to several changes they had completed, including secure videoconferencing with the court, courses to train FBI employees on FISA issues, and systems for electronically storing CHS information. On May 22, 2023, the court granted the motion in part and allowed the motion to satisfy the requirement of an update letter due June 1, 2023, but the court still ordered the FBI to submit its next report by October 13, 2023. The court stated that if the Bridge program was not completed by that date, update letters must continue every 90 days until deployment was completed. 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117223.

On October 13, 2023, the FBI responded with updates to the court, including that the Bridge was fully deployed and the FVI was gathering user feedback. As a result, the FBI was still in the process of transitioning users fully to the Bridge based on the feedback it received from users.

As of November 9, 2023, the case is ongoing, with another update from the FBI due within 90 days of October 13, 2023.

Summary Authors

Cedar Hobbs (2/22/2020)

Ellen Aldin (12/15/2020)

Achutha Raman (4/1/2022)

Venesa Haska (11/9/2023)

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FISA Court Matters relating to disclosure of Carter Page surveillance records: Four FISC cases [FISC Misc. 18-01, Misc. 18-02, Misc. 18-03, and Misc. 19-01], Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (2018)

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Boasberg, James Emanuel (District of Columbia)

Collyer, Rosemary M. (District of Columbia)

Attorney for Plaintiff

Boente, Dana J. (District of Columbia)

Gonzalez, Jorge Luis (District of Columbia)

Attorney for Defendant

Browning, Dawn M (District of Columbia)


show all people

Documents in the Clearinghouse




In re Accuracy Concerns Regarding FBI Matters Submitted to the FISC [Misc. 19-02]

Dec. 17, 2019

Dec. 17, 2019


411 F.Supp.3d 411





Order Regarding Handling and Disposition of Information

In Re Carter W. Page, A U.S. Person [Misc. 16-1182]

Jan. 7, 2020

Jan. 7, 2020



Order Appointing an Amicus Curiae

In re Accuracy Concerns Regarding FBI Matters Submitted to the FISC [Misc. 19-02]

Jan. 10, 2020

Jan. 10, 2020



Response to the Court's Order Dated December 17, 2019

In re Accuracy Concerns Regarding FBI Matters Submitted to the FISC [Misc. 19-02]

Jan. 10, 2020

Jan. 10, 2020

Pleading / Motion / Brief


[Amicus Curiae of David S. Kris]

In re Accuracy Concerns Regarding FBI Matters Submitted to the FISC [Misc. 19-02]

Jan. 15, 2020

Jan. 15, 2020

Pleading / Motion / Brief





Scheduling Order

In Re Carter W. Page, A U.S. Person [Misc. 16-1182]

Jan. 23, 2020

Jan. 23, 2020



Response to the Amicus's Letter Brief Dated January 15, 2020

In re Accuracy Concerns Regarding FBI Matters Submitted to the FISC [Misc. 19-02]

Jan. 31, 2020

Jan. 31, 2020

Pleading / Motion / Brief


Corrected Opinion and Order

In re Accuracy Concerns Regarding FBI Matters Submitted to the FISC [Misc. 19-02]

March 5, 2020

March 5, 2020



Order Extending Time to Respond

In re Accuracy Concerns Regarding FBI Matters Submitted to the FISC [Misc. 19-02]

March 25, 2020

March 25, 2020




In re Accuracy Concerns Regarding FBI Matters Submitted to the FISC [Misc. 19-02]

April 3, 2020

April 3, 2020


2020 WL 2020


Last updated April 24, 2024, 3:09 a.m.

Docket sheet not available via the Clearinghouse.

Case Details

State / Territory: District of Columbia

Case Type(s):

National Security

Special Collection(s):

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act -- All Matters

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court

Key Dates

Filing Date: Dec. 17, 2019

Case Ongoing: Yes


Plaintiff Description:

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

Plaintiff Type(s):

U.S. Dept of Justice plaintiff

Public Interest Lawyer: Yes

Filed Pro Se: No

Class Action Sought: No

Class Action Outcome: Not sought

Case Details

Causes of Action:

FISA Title I Warrant (Electronic Surveillance), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812

FISA Title VII targeting order (Sections 702, 703, 704), 50 U.S.C. 1881a, 1881b, 1881c

Constitutional Clause(s):

Unreasonable search and seizure

Freedom of speech/association

Available Documents:

Injunctive (or Injunctive-like) Relief

Non-settlement Outcome

Any published opinion


Prevailing Party: None Yet / None

Nature of Relief:

Injunction / Injunctive-like Settlement

Source of Relief:


Content of Injunction:





Required disclosure


Order Duration: 2020 - None





Records Disclosure

Search policies

Terrorism/Post 9-11 issues