Filed Date: Feb. 6, 2014
Closed Date: Aug. 2, 2019
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This case challenged the constitutionality of Arkansas’ statutory ballot access requirements for independent candidates.
On February 6, 2014, three registered voters and potential independent candidates for the 2014 Arkansas general election filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. Plaintiffs sued the Secretary of State of Arkansas in his official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by private counsel, Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that Arkansas Code Ann §§ 7-7-101, 7-7-103, and 7-7-203(c)(1) were unconstitutional because the statutes violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs also sought injunctive relief against enforcement of said statutes for purposes of future Arkansas general elections, as well as prevailing party attorneys’ fees and costs.
Plaintiffs claimed that the statutes, which had been amended by the Arkansas Legislature in 2013, set an unconstitutionally early and vague petition filing deadline of March 3, 2014 (the statutory deadline had previously been May 1) for independent candidates during election years. They asserted that this burdened Plaintiffs’ rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendment as independent candidates, as well as those of individual Arkansas registered voters who support those candidates’ ballot access. Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed that the law required independent candidates to gather petition signatures in December, January, and February, when political interest among the voting public was low and the weather was less conducive to gathering signatures. The case was initially assigned to Former District Judge James M. Moody, but, due to Former District Judge James M. Moody’s retirement, it was then reassigned to his son, District Judge James M. Moody Jr.
On April 7, 2014, the Secretary filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and an alternative motion for a more definite statement. The Secretary argued (1) lack of jurisdiction; (2) failure to state sufficient facts upon which relief could be granted, (3) failure to join necessary parties to the action; and (4) that the Complaint was too vague and ambiguous. Specifically, the Secretary asserted that the Complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiffs lacked standing under Article III of the United States Constitution, as they filed their complaint on February 6, 2014, which was prior to the “party filing period” of February 24, 2014 through March 3, 2014 for candidates, and therefore, Plaintiffs had failed to allege an actual, concrete injury in fact. The Secretary also claimed that Plaintiffs had failed to allege that they had actually filed or attempted to file for office candidacy, that they fulfilled all the other requisite filing requirements for candidates that were unchallenged in the complaint, or that their attempts at filing appropriate materials were denied. The Secretary further argued that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because they failed to allege that they had met or attempted to meet all of the other filing requirements. Additionally, the Secretary asserted that one of the Plaintiffs was not entitled to relief because he claimed to be running for county judge for White County, Arkansas, yet failed to name the appropriate County Clerk as a party defendant. The Secretary claimed that the White County Clerk was a necessary and proper party to the lawsuit because the Secretary of State did not have the power or authority to review candidate petitions for county offices, and the complaint should be dismissed. Finally, the Secretary sought, in the alternative, an order from the court requiring Plaintiffs to provide a more definite statement of all their claims. The Secretary argued that Plaintiffs failed to allege that the Secretary, as of February 6, 2014, had taken any action which would form the basis for their cause of action, or how the Secretary could be ordered to provide relief to a Plaintiff concerning a county office over which the Secretary had no jurisdiction. On August 4, 2014, the court denied the Secretary’s motion to dismiss and found that Plaintiffs sufficiently stated claims that would entitle them to relief. 2014 WL 12914805.
On November 26, 2014, the Secretary filed a motion for summary judgment against Plaintiffs and asked the court to enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Secretary. The Secretary argued that Plaintiffs’ case was moot due to the 2014 Arkansas general election having already passed and final results certified. Without Plaintiffs having tendered or attempted to tender any candidate petition signatures as independent candidates for the election, Plaintiffs failed to make the requisite legally required efforts to become independent candidates for the 2014 general election. The Secretary asserted that the relief sought by Plaintiffs was no longer available, and Plaintiffs lacked standing as there had been no harm to Plaintiffs caused by the Secretary.
On May 12, 2015, the parties filed a joint stipulation of partial dismissal as to one of the Plaintiffs—specifically, the Plaintiff who claimed to have been running for county judgeship. After the joint stipulation of partial dismissal as to the one Plaintiff, the remaining two Plaintiffs no longer sought to be put on the Arkansas ballot as independent candidates. Rather, they only requested that the Court declare the current election laws regarding the early deadline for petition signatures for independent candidates unconstitutional as applied, and permanently enjoin the enforcement of said laws.
On May 13, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a cross motion for summary judgment, and on August 25, 2015, the court entered an order denying Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and granting the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment. The court rejected the Secretary’s arguments that the case was moot or unripe for review and that Plaintiffs lacked standing. However, the court’s analysis of the merits under a strict scrutiny test found that the Arkansas ballot access restrictions requiring signatures of 3% of the qualified electors of the state, a ninety-day circulation time, and a March petition deadline for independent candidates were narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest. Specifically, the court found that while the March deadline for filing as an independent candidate placed a substantial burden on Plaintiffs’ rights, the regulations of Ark. Code §§ 7-7-101, 7-7-103, and 7-7-203(c)(1) were narrowly tailored and necessary to advance the compelling state interest of timely certifying independent candidates who wish to be placed on the ballot, as well as candidates who wished to qualify for election by petition and those who sought to promote ballot initiatives. The court relied on an affidavit submitted by the Arkansas Director of Elections, which stated that the increased number of initiative petitions and candidates petitioning for inclusion on the ballot for nonpartisan office left Arkansas election officials with insufficient time to process the petitions using the previous May 1st submission deadline. The court further found that given the year-round interest in all things political and the fact that Arkansas weather may be equally oppressive in the spring as in the winter, the ballot access requirements were not unreasonable. 2015 WL 13343585.
On September 22, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider and alter or amend the court’s summary judgment order and judgment, but the court entered an order denying Plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider on October 7, 2015. 2015 WL 13849961.
On November 6, 2015, only one of the two remaining Plaintiffs in the lawsuit appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
On April 26, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s order denying the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granting the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit found that the district court correctly noted that the March 1st filing deadline for independent candidates imposed a burden of some substance on Plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and that Arkansas had a compelling interest in timely certifying the independent candidates for inclusion on the general election ballot. However, the Eighth Circuit found that the district court erred in concluding that there was no genuine dispute of material fact whether the March 1st deadline was narrowly drawn to serve that compelling interest. The Eighth Circuit questioned whether the increase in the number of nonpartisan petitions necessitated the petition deadline change from May 1 to March 1 in light of the fact that the Secretary was statutorily required to verify the nonpartisan petitions prior to the independent candidate petitions’ due date. The Eighth Circuit noted that although the increase in nonpartisan petitions may have resulted in an increase in litigation regarding those petitions, which might have interfered with the processing of independent candidate petitions, the record was unclear as to any such effect. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit found that the increase in the number of nonpartisan petitions did not by itself establish the existence of a compelling interest that the March 1 deadline was narrowly tailored to serve. The Eighth Circuit concluded that genuine factual disputes existed as to whether the verification of independent candidate petitions would conflict with the processing of other signature petitions under the former May 1 deadline. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit held that the district court erred in granting the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment because of the existence of a factual dispute but did not err in denying Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit found that Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was therefore rendered moot and remanded the case back to the district court.
On July 25, 2017, the Secretary filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court and on October 16, 2017, the United States Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari.
The district court held a bench trial on December 12, 2017 and on January 25, 2018, the court entered an order finding judgment in favor of Plaintiff. Specifically, the court found that the Secretary failed to show why the March 1st petition deadline rather than a May 1st petition deadline for independent candidates was necessary to process independent candidate petitions. The court determined that the Arkansas election laws at issue were unconstitutional as a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution to the extent they set an unnecessary March 1st deadline which was not narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest. The court dismissed the case and granted injunctive relief permitting Plaintiff to file his petition to run for office as an independent candidate on or before May 1, 2018. On January 31, 2018, the court entered an amended order containing the same findings and relief as the January 25, 2018 order but correcting an error as to a misstated fact. 2018 WL 10320761.
On February 2, 2018, Plaintiff filed his first motion for a bill of costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920, and a motion for attorney’s fees and costs on February 7, 2018 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54.
On February 22, 2018, the Secretary appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit from the district court’s January 25, 2018 and January 31, 2018 orders and final judgment entered in favor of the Plaintiff.
On March 7, 2018, the Secretary filed a motion to vacate the injunction issued by court, and in the alternative, a motion to stay the injunction pending the Secretary’s appeal. The Secretary argued that because the court’s injunction allowing Plaintiff to file his petition to run as an independent candidate in the 2018 Arkansas general election at any time up to May 1, 2018 did not include the filing deadline for other required candidate documents, such as the political practices pledge, affidavit of eligibility, and notice of candidacy, Plaintiff was required to file those documents on March 1, 2018 as stated in Ark. Code Ann. § 7-7-103. The Secretary claimed that because Plaintiff failed to file those documents on March 1, 2018, he was ineligible to file his signature petitions on May 1, 2018, and therefore sought an order from the court vacating the injunction. The court entered an order on March 29, 2018, deferring ruling on the motion to vacate pending the appeal. It also held Plaintiff’s motions for costs and attorney’s fees in abeyance pending the appeal.
On April 26, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit entered an order remanding the case back to the district court for purposes of considering an amendment to its January 31, 2018 order.
On April 30, 2018, the district court amended its January 31, 2018 order to state that Plaintiff could file his petition to run for office as an independent candidate, political practices pledge, affidavit of eligibility, and notice of candidacy on or before May 1, 2018. Also on April 30, 2018, the district court denied the Secretary’s motion to vacate injunction as moot.
On May 18, 2018, the Secretary filed a motion to vacate the January 25 and 31, 2018 orders and judgment as moot. Specifically, the Secretary argued that Plaintiff failed to qualify as an independent candidate for any state office for the 2018 general election because his independent candidate petition lacked the requisite number of valid signatures, and therefore, his case lacked standing. The district court denied the Secretary’s motion to vacate on July 12, 2018.
On May 22, 2018, the Secretary amended notice of appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit from the district court’s prior judgment and orders in favor of the Plaintiff.
On July 1, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit dismissed the Secretary’s appeal as moot. The Eighth Circuit noted that after the Secretary filed the appeal and the parties submitted their briefs, the Arkansas state legislature amended the petition filing deadline for independent candidates to May 1 of the general election year, which was scheduled to take effect later in 2019. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit found that no controversy remained and that it lacked the authority to adjudicate any further issues surrounding the matter. 928 F.3d 753.
On July 11, 2019, Plaintiff filed a supplemental motion for attorney’s fees. On August 2, 2019, the district court granted the Plaintiff’s first motion for attorney’s fees and supplemental motion for attorney’s fees in part, as well as Plaintiff’s motion for costs. The court awarded Plaintiff a total of $55,973.62 for attorney’s fees and costs. 2019 WL 7592424. The case is now closed.
Summary Authors
Melissa Scott (11/29/2023)
For PACER's information on parties and their attorneys, see: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/6069128/parties/moore-v-martin/
Moody, James Maxwell (Arkansas)
Linger, James C. (Arkansas)
Rosenzweig, Jeffrey M. (Arkansas)
Fincher, Michael J. (Arkansas)
Kelly, A. J. (Arkansas)
See docket on RECAP: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/6069128/moore-v-martin/
Last updated March 16, 2024, 10:25 p.m.
State / Territory: Arkansas
Case Type(s):
Special Collection(s):
Law Firm Antiracism Alliance (LFAA) project
Key Dates
Filing Date: Feb. 6, 2014
Closing Date: Aug. 2, 2019
Case Ongoing: No
Plaintiffs
Plaintiff Description:
Independent candidates and registered voters of the State of Arkansas
Plaintiff Type(s):
Public Interest Lawyer: No
Filed Pro Se: No
Class Action Sought: No
Class Action Outcome: Not sought
Defendants
Secretary of State of the State of Arkansas, State
Defendant Type(s):
Case Details
Causes of Action:
Constitutional Clause(s):
Due Process: Procedural Due Process
Due Process: Substantive Due Process
Available Documents:
Injunctive (or Injunctive-like) Relief
Outcome
Prevailing Party: Plaintiff
Nature of Relief:
Injunction / Injunctive-like Settlement
Source of Relief:
Content of Injunction:
Amount Defendant Pays: $55,973.62
Order Duration: 2018 - 2019
Issues
Voting: