Filed Date: April 18, 2008
Case Ongoing
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This case concerns the City of Atlanta’s acquisition of property near Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport and its impact on the voting population of the City of College Park, a municipality separate of Atlanta near the airport and with a majority African-American population. On April 18, 2008, the plaintiffs, the City of College Park and a councilperson in College Park’s fourth ward, represented by private counsel, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against the City of Atlanta, Shirley Franklin, in her capacity as Mayor of the City of Atlanta, and the State of Georgia. The case was assigned to Judge Julie Carnes.
Plaintiff alleged that defendant used its statutory powers under Georgia law to operate Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport to acquire property near the airport, clear that property of any structures or voters, and then allow it to lie fallow indefinitely. Plaintiff alleged that by doing so, defendant fundamentally altered the territorial boundaries of College Park for electoral purposes; diminished the voting population of College Park; and changed the racial composition of the voting population of College Park. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that defendant's planned acquisition of Wynterbrook Apartments, a multi-family apartment complex in College Park and other multi-family complexes in College Park, was a de facto annexation of portions of College Park and a change in the “standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting” within College Park. Plaintiff alleged that defendant had not sought preclearance for these changes as required by Section 5 of the Voting Right Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a). Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief to remedy defendant’s alleged violations of the preclearance procedures of the Voting Rights Act. Plaintiff also asked the Court to apply to the Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit to appoint a three-judge court to hear the case. Plaintiff was represented by three private law firms.
The case involved the complicated relationship between noise abatement laws found in the Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act of 1979 (ANSA), 49 U.S.C. § 47501 et seq., and Part 150 of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations, a municipality's authority to acquire property, and the Voting Rights Act. Notably ANSA provided grants to facilitate defendant's acquisition of property. By accepting the grants, however, defendant was precluded from using the property for residential purposes.
The Complaint alleged that defendant had been steadily acquiring property within College Park since the 1960s. At the time plaintiff filed its Complaint in 2008, defendant owned 36% of College Park. The population of College Park steadily decreased from 28,203 in the 1970s to 18,414 at the time the Complaint was filed. For the first forty years of its acquisition activity in College Park, defendant acquired only single-family residences. Starting in 2006, however, defendant began acquiring multi-family dwellings in College Park. The Complaint alleged that defendant proposed to acquire Wynterbrook Apartments and several other multi-family complexes that had the same noise exposure from the airport. Since defendant planned to use ANSA grants to acquire these properties, none of them could be used for residential purposes. According to the Complaint, these acquisitions would increase defendant’s ownership of College Park to approximately 38%, and decrease the voter base of College Park’s fourth ward by approximately 3,000 voters, almost all of whom were African-American.
At the same time plaintiff filed its complaint, plaintiff also filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to prevent defendant from acquiring Wynterbrook Apartments or any other property in College Park until further briefing on the matter of injunctive relief and on the propriety of a three-judge court. The Court granted the TRO on April 18, 2008 but also vacated as moot part of the Order that same day because defendant represented that it had completed its acquisition of the Wynterbrook site before the Court entered the TRO. The Court maintained the part of the Order that barred defendant from acquiring any other property in College Park.
On April 21, 2008, the Court held a status conference denying injunctive relief at that time. The Court further ordered plaintiff to file a detailed pleading as to their likelihood of success on the merits. Defendant was granted thirty days to file a response to plaintiff's supplement. The parties agreed to a six-week injunctive period prohibiting defendant from razing any property in College Park. Thereafter, plaintiff filed its supplemental brief and defendant filed its answer.
On June 2, 2008, the Court issued a Consent Order dismissing the State of Georgia from the case without prejudice. On September 4, 2008, plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File a First Amended Complaint. Defendant opposed plaintiff's Motion. No further substantive activity occurred for several months.
On March 31, 2009, the Court issued [i] an Order and Opinion; and [ii] Judgment, ruling on plaintiff's Request for Three-Judge Court and Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint. The Court denied these motions, dismissed the case in its entirety, and vacated its previous injunction. Regarding the Request for a Three-Judge Court, which the Court construed as a Motion, the Court denied the Motion because plaintiffs did not meet the requirements for declaratory relief and plaintiffs' allegations did not give rise to claims under Section 5. The Court ruled that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act did not apply to a purchase of land under the facts alleged in the Complaint because defendant's purchase of land within College Park's boundaries did not change the composition of the electorate that may vote for candidates in a given office. Defendant had not altered municipal boundaries in College Park, which could only be altered through annexation or de-annexation procedures as defined by State law. With no jurisdiction over College Park, it was not possible for defendant to change College Park's boundaries. The Court noted that Plaintiffs had cited no case, nor had the Court found any case, in which an entity's purchase of property in a separate governmental voting jurisdiction violated Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The Court also found no case in which a plaintiff had successfully sued a jurisdiction that had no power over the electoral process in another jurisdiction. The Court also described Plaintiffs' Section 5 claim as "pretextual" because Plaintiffs' real grievances had nothing to do with voting rights; rather, the majority of plaintiffs' concerns related to other issues, such as loss of taxes, loss of utility payments, loss of contractual and business relationships, and loss of property values. Finding Plaintiffs' claims "wholly insubstantial" and "completely without merit," the Court denied the Motion for a Three-Judge Court.
The Court also rejected Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint. Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may deny a motion for leave to amend when the amendment is "futile," i.e., subject to dismissal. Here, the amendment would be futile because Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for relief under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The Court also noted that even if Section 5 allowed a Court to undo Atlanta's land purchases over the last forty years, there were several practical problems with attempting to undo old land purchases, such as who would buy the land and at what price. Since the land had been purchased under ANSA, the land could not be used for residential purposes, a condition with which plaintiff would have to abide if it became the owner of the property. Thus, the Court questioned how the litigation would have helped plaintiff since voters could not occupy the property. While the Court recognized plaintiffs' frustration with defendant's land purchases in College Park over the years, the Court held that plaintiffs' quarrel with defendant should be waged before Congress, and that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act "provides no solace" for addressing plaintiffs' concerns.
On April 30, 2009, plaintiff appealed the Court’s Order and Opinion to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (docket 09-12255-FF) and moved to restore the injunction pending the appeal.
On September 10, 2009, pursuant to a directive from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the parties mediated the case and reached a tentative settlement. On May 24, 2010, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Relief from Order and Opinion with the District Court. On August 2, 2010, the District Court entered a consent order which dismissed the case and set forth the terms of the settlement. Among other things, the settlement required defendant to invite and allow one representative to attend planning meetings and advance notice of any proposed action that, in the good faith determination of Atlanta, could materially affect the interests of College Park or a significant number of its citizens. The settlement also requires defendant to give plaintiff the option to purchase the Wynterbrook site at fair market value. If plaintiff declined to purchase the Wynterbrook site, defendant was required to engage an economic development specialist/land planner to assist it in returning the Wynterbrook site to productive use. Defendant further agreed to modify its Part 150 program to eliminate authorization to acquire any apartment complex within College Park other than one complex located at 3800 Herschel Road. Defendant further agreed to consult with plaintiff on what properties, identified in its existing and future Part 150 documents as eligible for receipt of noise mitigation funds, are mitigated and the timing of the mitigations. The Consent Order further required plaintiff to dismiss with prejudice two other lawsuits pending in Fulton County Superior Court.
While the Consent Order ended all litigation between the parties, the Consent Order remains effective until further order of the Court or for fifty years, whichever shall first occur.
Summary Authors
Denise Gunter (11/19/2023)
For PACER's information on parties and their attorneys, see: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/12437212/parties/city-of-college-park-v-city-of-atlanta/
Carnes, Julie E. (Georgia)
Bowers, Michael J. (Georgia)
Denmark, Winston A. (Georgia)
Caput, Robert B. (Georgia)
Dunn, Dennis Robert (Georgia)
See docket on RECAP: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/12437212/city-of-college-park-v-city-of-atlanta/
Last updated March 9, 2024, 3:04 a.m.
State / Territory: Georgia
Case Type(s):
Special Collection(s):
Law Firm Antiracism Alliance (LFAA) project
Key Dates
Filing Date: April 18, 2008
Case Ongoing: Yes
Plaintiffs
Plaintiff Description:
City of College Park is a Georgia municipal corporation located in Fulton County, GA. Charles E. Phillips, Sr. is a citzen, voter, and council person of College Park's fourth ward.
Public Interest Lawyer: No
Filed Pro Se: No
Class Action Sought: No
Class Action Outcome: Not sought
Defendants
City of Atlanta (Atlanta, Fulton), City
Defendant Type(s):
Case Details
Causes of Action:
Voting Rights Act, section 5, 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (previously 42 U.S.C. § 1973c)
Available Documents:
Injunctive (or Injunctive-like) Relief
Outcome
Prevailing Party: Mixed
Nature of Relief:
Injunction / Injunctive-like Settlement
Source of Relief:
Form of Settlement:
Court Approved Settlement or Consent Decree
Order Duration: 2010 - None
Issues
Discrimination Basis:
Affected Race(s):
Voting: