Case: National Treasury Employees Union v. Vought
1:25-cv-00381 | U.S. District Court for the District of District of Columbia
Filed Date: Feb. 9, 2025
Case Ongoing
Clearinghouse coding complete
Case Summary
This case challenged the Trump Administration's endeavor to dismantle the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). On February 7, 2025, Elon Musk posted, “CFPB RIP” on social media. The next day, the Acting Director of the CFPB instructed CFPB staff to “immediately” stop all work and informed the Federal Reserve that the CFPB would not take any additional funding for its operations in the next quarter. This action happened in the larger context of the Trump Administration’s effort to dismantle several federal agencies and shrink others.
On February 9, 2025, the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), as the representative of CFPB employees, filed a short complaint (later supplemented) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the Acting Director of the CFPB. The plaintiff sought both declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint alleged that the Administration violated the separation of powers by beginning to dismantle the CFPB, an agency created by Congress through its established authority to define and fund agencies. This case was assigned to District Judge Amy Berman Jackson.
The plaintiff asserted that Congress had specifically established the CFPB to safeguard American consumers. It claimed that the government's actions to effectively halt the CFPB's mandated work—by ordering the workforce to “cease” all activity, engagement, and enforcement actions and to close the agency’s headquarters–were a direct violation of the separation of powers, citing the Constitution. The complaint emphasized Congress's comprehensive authority over the creation, operational mission, and financial resourcing of Executive Agencies. The plaintiff sought judgment declaring that the CFPB directive was unlawful and enjoining the government from further attempts to halt the CFPB’s work.
On February 13, 2025, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding as plaintiffs the National Consumer Law Center, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Virginia Poverty Law Center, a Pastor, and the CFPB Employee Association; they also added CFPB as a defendant. The amended complaint further alleged violations of constitutional tenets and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). It asserted that the CFPB was planning mass firings and its acting director's actions were unlawful because he lacked Senate confirmation.
That same day, plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a limited administrative stay and a temporary restraining order, aiming to prevent the imminent firing of CFPB employees and to mandate the agency's return to its statutorily defined operations. Plaintiffs contended that the challenged actions would precipitate immediate and irreparable harm to the affected employees, consumers, and the broader public interest.
On February 14, 2025, the court issued an administrative stay order to maintain the status quo, ordering, pending resolution of the motion for preliminary injunction, that the defendants were prohibited from deleting or impairing any CFPB data, terminating employees without just cause, or transferring funds from the CFPB’s reserve. The court stated it would consider the motion for a temporary restraining order as a motion for a preliminary injunction.
On February 21, 2025, a group of 13 states and the District of Columbia filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction.
After hearing the issues in the case, the court granted a preliminary injunction to preserve the CFPB on March 28, 2025. 774 F. Supp.3d 1. The order mandated that the defendants maintain all CFPB data, reinstate terminated probationary and term employees, and refrain from further terminations or reduction-in-force notices. The stop-work order could be enforced, and the defendants had to facilitate employees' ability to perform statutory functions, including remote work access. Further, all contract termination notices issued after February 11th were to be rescinded, and while specific contracts could be halted based on necessity for statutory functions, no terminations could be finalized.
The court granted the preliminary injunction due to a strong showing that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims and would suffer irreparable harm without it. Regarding the likelihood of success, the court found that “the defendants were in fact engaged in a concerted, expedited effort to shut the agency down entirely when the motion for injunctive relief was filed.” The court reasoned that “the defendants are not free to eliminate an agency created by statute on their own, and certainly not before the court has had an opportunity to rule on the merits,” indicating a likely overreach of executive authority. Additionally, the court viewed the stop-work order as a discrete and final agency action taken “in violation of law and without a rational basis to support it,” as it halted all work, including legally required duties.
The court also concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to suffer irreparable harm absent the injunction. The opinion noted that “the elimination of the agency was interrupted only because plaintiffs sought and obtained the court’s intervention on the day the overwhelming majority of the employees were going to be fired,” highlighting the disruption of the CFPB's crucial functions in protecting the borrowing public. The potential loss of agency data and the harm to the missions of consumer advocacy organizations, which rely on the CFPB's work, also contributed to the finding of likely irreparable harm. The court emphasized that “if the defendants are not enjoined, they will eliminate the agency before the court has the opportunity to decide whether the law permits them to do it, and as the defendants’ own witness warned, the harm will be irreparable.” 2025 WL 942772.
In response to this court order, the defendants filed a notice of appeal and a request for a stay of the preliminary injunction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on March 29, 2025. [Case No. 25-5091] The D.C. Circuit granted a partial stay on April 11, permitting the government to conduct Reductions in Force (RIFs) of employees “whom defendants have determined, after a particularized assessment, to be unnecessary to the performance of defendants’ statutory duties.” 2025 WL 1721068.
The government announced an intended RIF of over 1400 employees--over 90% of the agency's employees--prompting the plaintiffs to file an emergency motion to enforce the preliminary injunction. They argued that this large and broad RIF was not covered by the stay and therefore violated the preliminary injunction.
On April 18, 2025, in the district court, Judge Jackson issued an order suspending the RIF. 778 F.Supp.3d 144. The court expressed concern that the defendants were not complying with the injunction, citing the scope and speed of the RIF, the apparent lack of consultation with heads of statutorily mandated offices, and troubling accounts of RIF meetings suggesting that the focus was on numbers rather than a particularized assessment. The court scheduled further briefing and an evidentiary hearing to determine compliance but deemed it necessary to preserve the status quo by suspending the RIF and maintaining system access in the interim. The court emphasized its power to enforce its unstayed judgments.
The government filed a second appeal, challenging Judge Jackson's suspension of the RIF, on April 19, 2025. [Case No. 25-5132] The two appeals were consolidated in the appellate court.
On April 28, 2025, the Court of Appeals panel revisited the stay issue. 2025 WL 1721136. Noting the ongoing dispute as to whether its prior stay language permitted judicial review of announced RIFs, the court (with one judge dissenting) said,
we think it best to restore the interim protection of paragraph (3) of the preliminary injunction, which ensures that plaintiffs can receive meaningful final relief should the defendants not prevail in this appeal, rather than continue collateral litigation over the meaning and reviewability of the “particularized assessment” requirement imposed by this court’s stay order.
To accommodate the government's concerns about the separation of powers, the court scheduled expedited resolution of the appeal, with oral argument three weeks later. The same day, April 28th, the trial court denied without prejudice as moot the plaintiffs' motion to enforce the preliminary injunction in light of the order issued by the D.C. Circuit. The court also held in abeyance the motion to compel records and deferred the defendants' obligation to respond to the complaint until the court of appeals had ruled on the preliminary injunction.
On May 7, 2025, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to voluntarily dismiss the government's second appeal (No. 25-5132, challenging the suspension of the RIF), noting that the order appealed from had expired by its own terms and the appeal was therefore moot. The appellate court granted the motion and dismissed that appeal on May 12, 2025. 2025 WL 1385557.
The court of appeals held oral argument in the remaining appeal (No. 25-5091, challenging the preliminary injunction) on May 16, 2025. On August 15, 2025, the court issued its ruling vacating the preliminary injunction and remanding the case for further proceedings in the district court. 2025 WL 2371608. It first held that the court lacked jurisdiction over the claims of the organizational plaintiffs, NTEU and the CFPB Employees Association, pertaining to their members' loss of employment, which must be brought under the specialized-review scheme established in the Civil Service Reform Act. As to the remaining plaintiffs, it concluded that their claims were not reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act. It reasoned: "The plaintiffs seek to set aside an abstract decision, inferred from a constellation of discrete actions, to prophylactically ensure that the Bureau can fulfill its statutory mandate. This theory contravenes all the APA limits discussed above—agency action, finality, ripeness, and discreteness alike. If the plaintiffs’ theory were viable, it would become the task of the judiciary, rather than the Executive Branch, to determine what resources an agency needs to perform its broad statutory functions." Finding no express cause of action under the APA, the court considered whether the claims were reviewable in equity; finding no implied equitable claim, it held that the claims failed as a matter of law. Judge Pillard, in dissent, rejected the majority's "constricted view of our statutory and equitable power," cautioning that "[t]he notion that courts are powerless to prevent the President from abolishing the agencies of the federal government that he was elected to lead cannot be reconciled with either the constitutional separation of powers or our nation’s commitment to a government of laws."
On September 29, 2025, the plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing en banc in the DC Circuit. Writing that "[t]he decision empowers the Executive to shut down any agency without congressional authority and shield that decision from judicial review until it’s too late," they argued that the panel majority had erred by holding that the actions dissolving the agency were not reviewable and that the decision would have negative consequences for the ability to maintain separation of powers and check executive overreach.
While the petition for rehearing en banc was pending in the D.C. Circuit, the parties continued to bring matters to the district court’s attention.
On November 10, 2025, the defendants filed a “Notice of Potential Lapse in Appropriations to Pay the Expenses of the Bureau” in the district court, which transmitted a copy of a November 7 Memorandum issued by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel at defendant Vought’s request. The Notice acknowledged that the court’s injunction remained in effect, but notified the court that the Federal Reserve currently lacks combined earnings from which the CFPB can draw, and that the CFPB’s funds will be exhausted by early 2026, which may hinder the defendants’ compliance with the preliminary injunction.
Following the defendants’ notice to the district court, the plaintiffs filed a motion to clarify the preliminary injunction on November 23, 2025. The plaintiffs sought “clarification that the defendants may not justify a violation of the preliminary injunction by refusing to request” funding from the Federal Reserve, as, they maintained, the Dodd-Frank Act requires.
On December 30, 2025, the district court issued a memorandum opinion and order clarifying the preliminary injunction. The district court found that the defendants’ notice announcing the agency’s intention to forego asking for funding is inconsistent with the text and stated purpose of the injunction as modified by the Court of Appeals, and it does not require a modification of the injunction to say so. The district court maintained that the statutory text of the Dodd-Frank Act governs, and it prescribes a process through which the CFPB is to request the funding it needs to carry out the mission it was assigned by Congress, and the Federal Reserve must provide that funding from its “combined earnings.” The district court thus clarified that “the defendants’ unilateral decision to decline to request funding, based on an unsupported interpretation of the Dodd-Frank Act, contravenes the preliminary injunction.” 2025 WL 3771192
Meanwhile, the D.C. Circuit Court granted the petition for rehearing en banc on December 17, 2025, and scheduled oral arguments for February, 2026. In the same per curiam order, the court also vacated the August 15 judgment, which had vacated the preliminary injunction. The partial stay pending appeal entered on April 11, 2025, and later modified on April 28, 2025, remained in effect.
On February 24, 2026, the circuit court heard oral arguments. On March 31, the defendants moved to modify the stay pending appeal, for a limited remand, and to place the appeal in abeyance, citing a new RIF plan adopted by the Acting Director of the CFPB.
On June 19, 2026, the circuit court issued a per curiam order denying the defendants’ motion to modify the stay pending appeal and granting both the motion for a limited remand and the motion to hold the appeal in abeyance. The court remanded the case to the district court to decide whether to modify, suspend, or dissolve the preliminary injunction in light of the CFPB’s issuance of a revised RIF plan.
In the district court on July 9, 2026, the parties filed a joint status report and motion for partial stay of proceedings pending the result of the nomination of Brian Johnson as Director of the Bureau. The parties agreed that Mr. Johnson, if confirmed, should be allowed to review the 2026 RIF Plan and decide whether he would like to pursue it. The parties also agreed that the preliminary injunction would remain in effect while the confirmation process continued. The following day, the court granted the joint motion for partial stay. The court stated that if a new CFPB director is confirmed by the Senate, the parties are ordered to file a joint status report within two days of confirmation. If a new director is not confirmed by January 3, 2027, the parties are ordered to file a joint status report on January 4, 2027.
This case is ongoing.
Summary Authors
Ian Gibson (7/16/2026)
Aanvi Jhaveri (5/8/2025)
Jeremiah Price (6/20/2025)
Taite Puhala (10/15/2025)
Sofia Yoder (3/5/2026)
People
For PACER's information on parties and their attorneys, see: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/69624423/parties/national-treasury-employees-union-v-vought/
Attorney, Adam R. (District of Columbia)
Beck, Gregory A. (District of Columbia)
Bennett, Jennifer (District of Columbia)
Attorney, Melissa Nicole (District of Columbia)
Attorney, Eric Dean (District of Columbia)
Attorney, Adam R. (District of Columbia)
Beck, Gregory A. (District of Columbia)
Bennett, Jennifer (District of Columbia)
Chess, Gabriel Edward (District of Columbia)
Counsel, Paras Naresh (District of Columbia)
Friedman, Robert D. (District of Columbia)
Garlock, Stephanie (District of Columbia)
Giles, Allison Conrey (District of Columbia)
Gupta, Deepak (District of Columbia)
Liu, Wendy (District of Columbia)
Ostrowski, Stefanie (District of Columbia)
Pulver, Adam R. (District of Columbia)
Rosenbaum, Adina H. (District of Columbia)
Shah, Paras N. (District of Columbia)
Skocpol, Michael (District of Columbia)
Attorney, Melissa Nicole (District of Columbia)
Attorney, Eric Dean (District of Columbia)
Gardner, Joshua Edward (District of Columbia)
Holland, Liam (District of Columbia)
Jerome, Simon Gregory (District of Columbia)
Kennedy, Kevin J. (District of Columbia)
Padhi, Catherine M. (District of Columbia)
Roberts, Charles E.T. (District of Columbia)
Blumin, Matthew Stark (District of Columbia)
Brockner, Dustin J. (District of Columbia)
Brozinsky, Noah Hy (District of Columbia)
Counsel, Harold Hongju (District of Columbia)
Counsel, Ariel B. (District of Columbia)
Counsel, Elizabeth Wydra, (District of Columbia)
D'Angelo, Christopher Michael (District of Columbia)
Dashan, Nanshelmun (District of Columbia)
Ditkowsky, Marissa Ariel (District of Columbia)
Esquire, William Jeffrey (District of Columbia)
Frazelle, Brian Rene (District of Columbia)
Friedl, Kevin E. (District of Columbia)
General, Caroline S. (District of Columbia)
General, Barbara D. (District of Columbia)
Glickstein, Jed Wolf (District of Columbia)
Goin, Lucia (District of Columbia)
Goodman, Erik (District of Columbia)
Gorod, Brianne Jenna (District of Columbia)
GRENADIER, JANICE WOLK (District of Columbia)
HEDLING, BOREALIS S. (District of Columbia)
Hollender, Sarah (District of Columbia)
Hong-Huber, Andrew James (District of Columbia)
Huber, Andrew James (District of Columbia)
Kieschnick, Hannah Meredith (District of Columbia)
Levinson-Waldman, Ariel B. (District of Columbia)
Lopez, Anne E. (District of Columbia)
Mermin, Seth (District of Columbia)
Morse, Josephine (District of Columbia)
Nahmias, David Sidney (District of Columbia)
Nicholls, Leah (District of Columbia)
Oser, Andrea (District of Columbia)
Phatak, Ashwin P. (District of Columbia)
Pittard, William Bullock (District of Columbia)
Reigstad, Christian (District of Columbia)
Swift, Alethea Anne (District of Columbia)
Documents in the Clearinghouse
Docket
See docket on RECAP: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/69624423/national-treasury-employees-union-v-vought/
Last updated July 22, 2026, 4:50 a.m.
Case Details
State / Territory:
Case Type(s):
Presidential/Gubernatorial Authority
Special Collection(s):
Trump Administration 2.0: Challenges to the Government
Key Dates
Filing Date: Feb. 9, 2025
Case Ongoing: Yes
Plaintiffs
Plaintiff Description:
The National Treasury Employees Union, National Consumer Law Center, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Virginia Poverty Law Center, a Pastor, and the CFPB Employee Association are Plaintiffs in this case.
Plaintiff Type(s):
Non-profit NON-religious organization
Public Interest Lawyer: Yes
Filed Pro Se: No
Class Action Sought: No
Class Action Outcome: Not sought
Defendants
Federal
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Defendant Type(s):
Case Details
Causes of Action:
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.
Ex parte Young (federal or state officials)
Constitutional Clause(s):
Other Dockets:
District of District of Columbia 1:25-cv-00381
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 25-05091
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 25-05132
Available Documents:
Injunctive (or Injunctive-like) Relief
Outcome
Prevailing Party: Plaintiff OR Mixed
Relief Sought:
Relief Granted:
Preliminary injunction / Temp. restraining order
Source of Relief:
Content of Injunction:
Follow recruitment, hiring, or promotion protocols
Issues
General/Misc.:
Presidential/Gubernatorial Authority:
Impoundment (mandatory spending)
Case Summary of National Treasury Employees Union v. Vought, Civil Rights Litig. Clearinghouse, https://clearinghouse.net/case/46090/ (last updated 3/5/2026).