Case: Davis v. Buckley

In 1980, a intellectually disabled resident of the Southside Virginia Training Center ("Southside") filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on behalf of himself and 98 other Southside residents with intellectual disabilities who desired community placement. Plaintiffs, represented by the Central Virginia Legal Aid Society and the Peninsula Legal Aid Center, sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the defendants, who included Southside employees, officials with the City of Richmond, state mental health and public welfare agencies, and the federal Department of Health and Human Services, to provide them with community residential placements and social, educational and rehabilitative programs.

The plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on August 17, 1981, asserting claims under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, as amended, 29 U.S.C.§ 794; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for due process, equal protection, and cruel and unusual punishment clause violations; and Virginia state law. The Plaintiff claimed that Southside did not adequately prepare its residents with the necessary social and life skills for them to transition into the community and that defendants failed to provide appropriate residential placement programs for them.

On July 24, 1980, the plaintiff filed a motion for class certification; at this early stage in the litigation, plaintiff was seeking to certify a class of all mentally disabled persons in "The catchment area of Southside Virginia Training Center, including those held at Southside Virginia Training Center." This claimed class consisted of over 5,000 mentally disabled Virginians. The plaintiffs also tried to establish a defendant class: "all communities and their officials who charged with any duties and obligations with respect to mentally [disabled] persons in the defendant communities served by Southside." In September of 1980, Defendants all moved to dismiss the plaintiff's amended complaint, and the case continued to proceed through discovery.

On August 12, 1981, plaintiff and the federal Department of Health and Human Services filed a consent decree, which stipulated the conditions for the dismissal of the department from the case. In the decree, the Department agreed to investigate Southside and issue a Findings Letter to the plaintiffs within six months of the order.

Litigation with the state defendants continued. On August 17, 1981, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. Though the Clearinghouse does not have a copy of this complaint, later opinions indicate that this complaint lessened the class from all mentally disabled persons in the catchment of Southside to only those residing within Southside

On November 17, 1981, the court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. In their motions to dismiss, defendants asserted that plaintiffs must bring their claims through a petition of habeas corpus, and must therefore have exhausted state remedies before a suit could be brought. The court asserted that this was a mischaracterization of the plaintiffs' claims; the plaintiffs were seeking treatment, habilitation, and an opportunity to be in the community, not simply release.

The court also interpreted Virginia state law as requiring placement in the least restrictive environment possible, as well as requiring social and residential services that were not offered to the residents of Southside. The court also sided with the plaintiffs in their assertion that Southside was discriminating against them in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. Although the court was less convinced that a due process right to treatment existed for the plaintiffs, it noted that the dismissal of the claim would be "improper." 526 F. Supp 985 (1981).

On February 25, 1982, class certification for both the plaintiff and defendant class was denied. On August 25, 1982 the defendants moved for summary judgment, and on September 17, 1982, the plaintiff amended his complaint, adding one more private party and removing the request for class certification.

On April 25, 1983, the parties filed a stipulation and order of dismissal. The content of the stipulation is unknown, but the court dismissed the case on the same day, April 25, 1983.