A motorist brought this suit under § 1983 against Utah State Troopers, corrections officers, and the state of Utah on August 1, 1994 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah. The motorist alleged that the officers violated her Fourth Amendment rights and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) when they strip searched after a traffic stop. The motorist sought damages for these alleged violations. She was represented by McCullough, Jones & Ivins and the American Civil Liberties Union, Salt Lake City Chapter. The case was assigned to Judge David Winder. 

On May 8, 1994, the motorist and her passenger—who was shirtless, had long hair, and whose arm-length tattoos were clearly visible—were driving when state troopers pulled them over purportedly for a suspected fraudulent registration and driving too slow in the passing lane. Based on the motorist's slow speech and bloodshot eyes, the officers arrested her for driving under the influence and brought her to a local jail. While at the jail, and prior to her booking, a correctional deputy strip-searched the plaintiff.

The motorist claimed that the officers violated the ADA by failing to recognize the symptoms of her neurological problems and, instead, concluding that she was under the influence of drugs. She also claimed that the stop was pre-textual; that the officers stopped the car due to her passenger's unusual appearance. In addition, the motorist alleged that the officers lacked legal justification for: (1) detaining her once they had verified her registration; (2) searching her vehicle (3) arresting her; and (4) strip searching her. She also alleged a general conspiracy amongst the officers

On October 23, 1995, the court ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment. 903 F. Supp. 1463. Defendants' motions for summary judgment were granted on the issues of lawful arrest, lawful search of the vehicle, and supervisory liability. The court denied defendants motion for summary judgment as to the motorist's pretextual stop allegation. However, the court granted the motorist's motion for summary judgment as to unlawful detention and unreasonable strip search despite the officers' qualified immunity claims. The court also dismissed the motorist's general conspiracy claim.

The parties cross-appealed parts of the October 23 order, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals requested briefing on the appealability of these issues. The Tenth Circuit issued its order regarding appealability on July 8, 1997. 118 F.3d 1416. The officers appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in the motorist's favor regarding her roadside detention and strip search claims. Citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) the officers claimed that they were entitled to qualified immunity on those two claims. The Tenth Circuit requesting briefing on these claims because not all pre-trial denials of qualified immunity are appealable. An order denying qualified immunity on summary judgment is not appealable if it merely determined the plaintiff's asserted facts were sufficiently supported by evidence in the record to survive summary judgment. But the Tenth Circuit held that the officers' denial of qualified immunity was appealable on each ground (continued detention and the strip search). However, as to the continued detention issue, the Tenth Circuit limited its holding to the clearly established law prong of qualified immunity. On that point, whether the unlawful continued detention of the motorist violated clearly established law, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court.

The motorist appealed the district court's order granting the officers summary judgment as to the legality of initial stop and her arrest. Here, the Tenth Circuit requested briefing on appealability because it was unsure whether it possessed pendant appellate jurisdiction over these claims. The Tenth Circuit held that these issues were not appealable and dismissed the motorist's cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction. They reasoned they could address the officers' appealable issues without reviewing the motorist's issues, so pendant jurisdiction was lacking.

The motorist moved for summary judgment on the legality of her strip search once again on remand. On February 23, 1998 the district court held that the the strip search was unlawful and denied the intake officer, who conduced the search, qualified immunity. 995 F.Supp. 1347. The district court also held the county liable for failing to promulgate an adequate strip search policy.

With liability established as to the strip search, a jury trial ensued to establish damages on that issue as well as liability and damages on remaining issues. The jury awarded Foote nominal damages of $1.00 for the strip search. On the remaining fourth amendment issues, the jury found that no liability. Namely, the officers did not violate the motorist's rights when they stopped her car, nor did they violate her rights when they detained her at the scene to investigate whether she was driving under the influence.

On February 23, 1999, the district court ruled on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment as to whether the motorist was protected under the ADA. 36 F.Supp.2d 1320. The court ruled against the motorist. To hold that the ADA protected the motorist in this case, the court reasoned, would extend the ADA beyond its scope because the motorist was not substantially limited in a major life activity by her neurological issues.

The motorist eventually appealed the earlier jury verdict. On February 16, 2001, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on her appeal. 2001 WL 135687. First, the motorist alleged that the district court erred in instructing the jury that it could decide to grant only nominal damages. The Tenth Circuit rejected this claim. Second, the motorist argued that the fourth amendment liability issues at trial—the stop's justification and continued detention—should have been decided on summary judgment. Second, the motorist argued in the alternative that the jury's verdict finding no liability on these issues was unsupported by the evidence. The Tenth Circuit disagreed, affirming the district court.

Next, the motorist argued that the district court erred when it granted the officers summary judgment on her false arrest claim. This claim, she argued, should have been presented to the jury. Here, too, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court decision. Finally, the motorist argued that she was entitled to attorney's fees on a theory that, because the state updated its strip search policy while this case was litigated, she had caused these changes. But the Tenth Circuit denied her claim. 

After this series of appeals, the case came to a close in 2001.