Filed Date: Aug. 9, 1966
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Filed in 1966 and still ongoing as of 2022, this is one of the most significant housing desegregation cases ever, leading to the nation's first desegregative housing mobility voucher program.
In collaboration with BPI, the Chicago public interest organization that has for decades represented the plaintiffs in this case, the Clearinghouse has acquired and posted the full litigation record—over 2100 documents, all told. About 230 "core" documents are set to display here; if you click on "show more" you'll see about 800 more. Another 45 are displayed in the record for the companion case. The rest are archived in a google folder.
Filing and Liability, 1966-1969
During 1966, Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and others involved in the Chicago Freedom Movement initiated a series of marches and demonstrations in and around Chicago. At a rally held in Soldier Field, Dr. King said, "For our primary target we have chosen housing. As of July 10  we shall cease to be accomplices to a housing system of discrimination, segregation and degradation. We shall begin to act as if Chicago were an open city." The housing marches were met with violence and widespread hostility and received nationwide attention.
On August 9, 1966, six Black tenants of Chicago public housing projects filed this class-action lawsuit against the Chicago Housing Authority (“CHA”) in the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs, represented by Alexander Polikoff as lead counsel, alleged that CHA built public housing projects only in predominantly Black neighborhoods, resulting in further entrenchment of Chicago’s segregated housing pattern. The plaintiffs alleged that this practice discriminated against them in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by physically isolating Black Chicagoans and inhibiting their access to social benefits–such as certain schools–that were enjoyed by white Chicagoans. They also alleged discriminatory waiting list/leasing practices. The plaintiffs sought to certify a class of what was at the time approximately 43,000 Black Chicagoans who lived in or had applied to Chicago public housing, to proceed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. They asked for declaratory and permanent injunctive relief preventing the defendants from continuing racially discriminatory housing practices and remediating the effects of segregation by building future public housing units in predominantly white areas.
This case was filed as Docket No. 66-C-1459, and was assigned to Judge Richard Austin along with a companion case, Gautreaux v. Housing Assistance Administration (No. 66-C-1450), which sought to hold the federal government liable for nearly identical claims.
When the case was filed, lead counsel Alex Polikoff appeared as a cooperating attorney for the ACLU. He soon joined Chicago's BPI (Business and Professional People for the Public Interest), which had just been founded, and which has provided plaintiffs' class representation to the present.
CHA filed a motion to dismiss the claims against it. Judge Austin denied the motion in part and granted it in part on March 2, 1967. 265 F. Supp. 582. Judge Austin denied CHA’s motion with regards to the Civil Rights Act Title VI claim, but he granted the motion with regards to the other claims because the plaintiffs did not allege facts that showed CHA intentionally selected its sites to perpetuate racial discrimination in Chicago housing. The plaintiffs subsequently amended their complaint alleging that the defendants deliberately selected public housing sites to separate Black Chicagoans from white Chicagoans.
Following discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment. Judge Austin held in favor of the plaintiffs on February 10, 1969. 296 F. Supp. 907. He cited evidence that the City Council rejected building new public housing projects in white neighborhoods despite those neighborhoods otherwise meeting the eligibility criteria. He also cited statements made by CHA officials evidencing that the local government assigned tenants to certain housing locations based on race.
On July 1, 1969, Judge Austin entered a Judgment Order setting out the conditions of the injunction. 304 F. Supp. 736. The court ordered CHA to build its next 700 family units in predominantly white areas of Chicago. The order also outlined specific procedures for CHA to follow when identifying new sites for development, and instructed CHA to “affirmatively administer its public housing system in every respect … to the end of disestablishing the segregated public housing system which has resulted from CHA’s unconstitutional site selection and tenant assignment procedures.” In language that became the operative ruling for the case over the next five decades, it contained specific parameters for new building relating to location, concentration, height and more. The concentration and height restrictions meant that CHA could only build small low-rise developments going forward; these were known as scattered site developments. The 1969 Judgment Order, which CHA did not appeal, also specified rules for choosing tenants of the new scattered site units.
Remediation & Compliance with the Injunctive Order, 1969-1980 (Including Approval of Metropolitan Area Remedies)
To comply with the 1969 Judgment Order, CHA first addressed its procedures for assigning tenants to public housing. CHA submitted a proposed tenant assignment plan to ensure that applicants for public housing were each afforded an equal opportunity to housing options. The plan created five waiting lists that offered varying housing sizes (people on List 1 sought housing for 1-2 people, people on List 2 sought housing for 3-4 people, and so on). As new housing options became available, they would be offered to applicants on the applicable waiting list. Applicants could decline the housing option and wait for something more desirable, but if they declined and did not accept housing within a year, their eligibility for public housing would be reassessed. Judge Austin approved this plan on November 24, 1969.
Judge Austin then sought to address the portion of injunctive relief involving new construction of public housing. On July 20, 1970, he issued an order instructing CHA to provide a plan for identifying new building sites. CHA appealed this order, contending that Judge Austin had not given the defendants an adequate opportunity to present their case before ordering them to comply with an altered timetable. But on December 16, 1970, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that it had not abused its discretion in imposing deadlines and ordering CHA to use its best efforts to increase the supply of homes as quickly as possible. 436 F.2d 306. CHA petitioned for rehearing en banc, but the Seventh Circuit denied this request on February 18, 1971. CHA then filed a petition for certiorari review by the U.S. Supreme Court, and also moved to stay the injunction pending the Court's decision. Both the Seventh Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court denied the stay request, and the Supreme Court ultimately denied review on April 19, 1971 (though Justice Douglas noted that he would have granted certiorari). 402 U.S. 922 (1971).
On November 11, 1971, in the companion case against HUD, the district court enjoined HUD from providing approximately $26,000,000 to the City of Chicago as part of the Model Cities Program, unless the City certified to the district court that 700 units had been identified and processed in a non-discriminatory manner. At this point, on November 26, 1971, the two cases were officially consolidated for all purposes.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the November 1971 injunction on March 8, 1972. 457 F.2d 124. The Seventh Circuit found that the Model Cities Program—which authorizes the HUD Secretary to provide federal funds to cities to benefit low-income people—was not tainted by the racially discriminatory practices exhibited by the City of Chicago. Although part of its funds went toward housing, the Model Cities Program was also intended to subsidize other social and educational programs for low-income families. Therefore, although the district court’s efforts to force the City of Chicago to create additional housing in predominantly-white areas was “laudable,” the Seventh Circuit held that it was an abuse of discretion because the district court failed to consider the interest of other poor people who would be harmed by the withholding of these federal funds. The Seventh Circuit remanded the case back to the district court. The plaintiffs asked for a rehearing en banc, but this request was denied.
Back in the district court, the plaintiffs filed a supplemental complaint on February 2, 1972. The complaint named a number of City Council members as defendants and alleged that since 1971, the City Council had failed to approve the acquisition of real property by CHA. Plaintiffs argued that this failure violated the district court’s July 1969 order requiring CHA to “use its best efforts to increase the supply of Dwelling Units as rapidly as possible.” In an order issued on April 10, 1972, the district court found that the City Council's decisions not to approve acquisitions violated the Equal Protection Clause and failed to conform with the district court’s previous orders. Therefore, the district court waived application of the local statute requiring the City Council to approve CHA property acquisitions. Instead, the court ordered the City of Chicago to comply with a detailed timeline for identifying the property needed to construct 1,500 new dwelling units. 342 F. Supp. 827. CHA appealed this order, but the Seventh Circuit affirmed it on May 18, 1973. 480 F.2d 210, and denied rehearing en banc. The defendants then filed a petition for certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, but this request was denied as well. 414 U.S. 1144.
The parties submitted competing plans to remediate the racially segregated public housing system. The plaintiffs sought a broader remedial plan that would encompass not just Chicago but also its surrounding metropolitan area; both CHA and HUD sought to prevent the relief from extending beyond the borders of the city of Chicago. On September 11, 1973, Judge Austin adopted the defendants’ plan. 363 F. Supp. 690. He found that “the wrongs were committed within the limits of Chicago and solely against the residents of Chicago.” So, because plaintiffs never alleged that CHA or HUD discriminated against people living in the suburbs, Judge Austin found it improper to extend the relief to that area.
Plaintiffs appealed, and in a crucially important ruling, the Seventh Circuit reversed this decision. 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. Aug. 26, 1974). In an opinion written by retired Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark, who sat by designation, the court of appeals held that a broader metropolitan remedy was necessary. The Seventh Circuit distinguished this case from Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (the Detroit school desegregation case) in which the Supreme Court had just a month before held that an interdistrict school desegregation remedy exceeded the federal court’s remedial authority. Public housing, unlike education, is not “deeply rooted in the tradition of local control” and therefore federal courts could order broader injunctive relief. Also, there were fewer administrative concerns with building public housing units outside of the Chicago city limits than were implicated by bussing thousands of children to suburban schools everyday.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted the defendants’ petition for certiorari, but then found for the plaintiffs, affirming the Seventh Circuit in an opinion by Justice Potter Stewart. 425 U.S. 284 (1976). The Supreme Court found that HUD, unlike the suburban schools in Milliken, had itself violated the Constitution and therefore an equitable remedy could be imposed against the federal agency. And even though the district court would have to devise a new remedial scheme on remand, the Supreme Court held that the scheme could plausibly extend beyond Chicago’s borders because HUD’s statutory directive required the agency to provide fair housing in the metropolitan areas surrounding Chicago in addition to the City itself. Moreover, the Court pointed to Congress's 1974 creation of the Section 8 rent subsidy program, under which HUD could contract directly with private owners and developers to provide housing without interfering with the rights of local governments to comment, impose zoning restrictions, etc.
While the case was being appealed up to the Supreme Court, Judge Austin referred the case to a special master to develop “a plan of action that will expedite the realization” of the various orders and judgments. 384 F. Supp. 37. U.S. Magistrate Olga Jurco was appointed as special master. She held 68 sessions over four years and worked with a court-appointed urban consultant, Richard F. Babcock, to develop her findings. On August 31, 1979, she surveyed the previous four years of housing construction by CHA and concluded that CHA failed to aggressively take all practicable steps to comply with the 1969 judgment order. Although she noted that CHA bore a significant part of the blame, she acknowledged that some external factors also contributed to the delay. She recommended, among other things, that CHA employ additional personnel with real estate expertise to identify and secure additional land sites, and improve procedures for owner identification.
Around this time, District Judge John Powers Crowley took over the case from Judge Austin. In an opinion he issued on June 6, 1980, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion to appoint a receiver. 498 F. Supp. 1072. The opinion noted that CHA had developed around 114-117 new apartments since 1969, but had not rehabilitated a single building. The court expressed frustration with the inefficiency of CHA’s activity, but noted various bureaucratic difficulties. The opinion pointed out that some of these roadblocks had been removed through the provision of more funds and the hiring of additional staff, so the court denied the receivership motion without prejudice, to give CHA the opportunity to take advantage of these improvements. But the court directed CHA “to make an immediate and substantial start toward full compliance … within six months. Best efforts will no longer suffice; compliance will be measured by results, not intentions.”
On the federal side of the case, the plaintiffs and HUD agreed to a "Letter of Intent" shortly after the Supreme Court decision, in which the parties agreed to a plan for implementing the desegregation measures. The letter was renewed repeatedly in the following years as the parties continued try to implement the court’s orders. On December 11, 1980, the plaintiffs and HUD submitted a proposed consent decree that was essentially an extension of this Letter of Intent. Many objectors filed their opposition with the court. These objections included alleging that they had been given inadequate notice of the proposed consent decree, and that the decree had the effect of reducing housing availability in the areas the objectors wanted to live. One of the defendants in this case, the Illinois Housing Development Authority (“IHDA”), also filed a counter-claim against HUD alleging that the remedial relief agreed upon in the consent decree extended beyond HUD’s statutory authority.
Ultimately, after many fairness hearings and revisions to the consent decree, Judge Crowley approved it on June 16, 1981. 523 F. Supp. 665. The consent decree provided for: (1) placement of up to 7,100 persons in assisted units; (2) 500 set-asides for Section 8 housing; and (3) availability of at least $3 million in Block Grants for use in the Chicago area. The IHDA appealed their objections, but the Seventh Circuit affirmed the consent decree. 690 F.2d 616. The innovative program at the heart of the the letter agreements and consent decree was what is now labeled a “housing mobility program”; it used HUD Section 8 rent subsidies and counseling to help low-income Black families in Chicago public housing to move to private-sector apartments either in mostly white suburbs or elsewhere in the city. Importantly, the Gautreaux Assisted Housing Program was administered by a local fair housing organization, not CHA or HUD. The Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities had been founded in the summer of 1966, against the background of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s marches for open housing in Chicago. Over time, this approach assisted thousands of Chicago families, and served as a model for many similar programs in other cities, both implemented in housing desegregation litigation and freestanding.
Post-Supreme Court Remediation, Early 1980s
The plaintiffs also moved for supplemental relief. In a previous order issued on September 18, 1980, the court ordered that HUD’s approval of the City of Chicago’s application for Block Grant funds would be conditioned on specific housing production goals. The September 1980 order also directed the City of Chicago to submit a report regarding the City’s efforts at compliance. The case was transferred to Judge Marvin E. Aspen in mid 1981. On September 25, 1981, the court determined that the City failed to comply with the September 1980, but explained that could not determine whether the failure was the City’s fault. Plaintiffs sought to extend these conditions on HUD for another year, and the court granted that supplemental relief.
In the early 1980s, the Reagan Administration proposed eliminating the Government National Mortgage Association Tandem Financing program, (“GNMA”), a federal program that provided a source of financing for housing development serving low-income people. The GNMA was one of the HUD programs that the consent decree had anticipated would help implement the desegregation plan. So when the Reagan Administration proposed eliminating this program, the plaintiffs sought to enforce or modify the consent decree to set aside $324 million of the GNMA’s budget for new Section 8 projects. On January 25, 1982, Judge Aspen denied the plaintiffs’ motion. 535 F. Supp. 423. He found that this relief would change the terms of the consent decree rather than enforce them, and no exceptional circumstances had occurred to justify such a change. Judge Aspen also denied a motion filed by the Illinois Housing Development Authority (“IHDA”) for the same reasons. The IHDA sought to charge a fair-market rent to increase the income stream generated by the development to meet higher financing costs, but Judge Aspen determined this was outside the scope of the original consent decree. 538 F. Supp. 1009.
Negotiation in the Shadow of the Judgment Order, and the End of the Federal Consent Decree, 1980s-1990s.
Since the 1980s a key aspect of the case has been the willingness of the court, upon request of the parties, to approve many orders allowing CHA to construct public housing in areas otherwise subject to court-ordered restrictions when the parties demonstrate that the area is “revitalizing” or otherwise would provide relief to the plaintiffs consistent with the goals of the Judgment Order. This kind of issue arose periodically. For example, property developers wanted to use Section 8 funding from HUD to finance a new construction project in Academy Square. But the consent decree prohibited HUD from spending Section 8 funds on developments that would (with other subsidized housing) constitute more than 15% of the total housing in a census tract; here, the new development would represent 18.25% of the relevant tract’s dwelling units. Nevertheless, Judge Aspen allowed the development. In an August 25, 1982 order, Judge Aspen explained that the decree “was not intended to prevent HUD from attempting to aid the development of housing in an area that might be well on its way to becoming an urban wasteland without such aid,” but rather “to prevent the dumping or clustering of assisted housing.” The district court also issued a waiver that would allow development even if the court of appeals found that the consent decree conflicted with the project. 548 F. Supp. 1284. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in a per curiam opinion issued on April 29, 1983, in which it found that the district court’s decision to issue a waiver was not clearly erroneous. 707 F.2d 265.
Frustrated by the extremely slow progress, in early 1983, the plaintiffs filed a motion to hold CHA in contempt, and after a hearing on that motion, a second request for appointment of a receiver. The Court initially granted the receivership, but then quickly rescinded it, instead appointing an advisory committee. Still progress remained elusive, and at the plaintiffs' renewed request, on August 14, 1987, Judge Aspen appointed Daniel Levin and The Habitat Company to serve as receiver under both the (HUD) consent decree and (CHA) judgment order, for the “scattered sites” program--that is, for the numerous buildings and vacant sites around Chicago to be developed as Gautreaux relief. The receiver filed routine status reports as it helped CHA identify new sites and construct new developments.
As CHA/Receiver implemented the consent decree, additional episodes in the litigation focused on specific developments. For example, in 1990, Judge Aspen denied two community organization’s motion to intervene after they sought to prevent construction in their neighborhood. But beginning with the redevelopment of the Henry Horner housing project on the City's near west side in 1995, the Gautreaux class counsel negotiated with CHA and when those negotiations were successful, joined CHA in requests for district court waivers of various decree restrictions, so that construction of replacement public housing units could go forward. In 1996, Judge Aspen appointed five Special Masters to ensure that the receiver heard the views of community residents.
In 1997, the plaintiffs filed a motion to modify the consent decree (that is, the governing court order relating to HUD). They argued that federal housing policy had shifted toward Section 8 vouchers, instead of constructing new public housing from scratch, so they wanted the consent decree to reflect this shift. Around the same time, HUD moved to terminate the consent decree because the decree's primary goal was met: 7,100 public housing units had been created in predominantly-white areas. On August 26, 1997, Judge Aspen denied the plaintiffs' sought modification, and granted HUD's motion to terminate. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to show that the consent decree was still necessary to remediate the effects of discrimination, and agreed with the federal defendants that HUD’s obligations under the consent decree had ended. 981 F. Supp. 1091. CHA’s obligations under the 1969 judgment order remained.
HOPE VI, Plan for Transformation, and Waiver Negotiations, 1990s- 2000s
Major litigation continued, however, when CHA was granted $50 million from HUD under the HOPE VI program, a federal program intended to “empower residents of severely distressed and obsolete public housing.” CHA had applied for this funding without asking for input from the receiver. But in its application, CHA represented to HUD that the location of any new housing units created through the funding would comport with the consent decree. After HUD awarded CHA the money, the receiver asked to be involved in its allocation, but CHA did not actively include the receiver in its decisions. Then, in September 1997, CHA filed an emergency motion asking the district court for an order clarifying that the 1969 Judgment Order did not extend to any aspect of the HOPE VI program. CHA wanted to use this money to develop housing in distressed areas of Chicago, which were also the areas occupied by predominantly Black Chicagoans. The plaintiffs argued that this money should instead be used to develop new housing in predominantly white areas, especially since they had lost their motion to develop Section 8 housing in those areas. On February 23, 1998, Judge Aspen held in favor of the plaintiffs, ruling that “any construction of public housing in Cook County must conform to the judgment order's locational requirements.” Gautreaux v. CHA, 4 F.Supp.2d 757, 760 (N.D.Ill.1998).
Despite this order, CHA continued to refuse to cooperate with the receiver. The receiver then asked the court to compel CHA’s cooperation, and the court granted this motion. In August 1998, after the receiver learned through a news report that CHA had entered into a settlement with Cabrini-Green residents without input from the receiver (see Cabrini-Green Local Advisory Council v. CHA, 1997 WL 31002), the receiver filed a second emergency motion to compel CHA’s cooperation with the 1987 receivership order. The district court enjoined CHA “from developing or negotiating or otherwise pursuing any agreement with any person or entity regarding the development of dwelling units . . . without the full participation of the Receiver.” CHA appealed all three of these orders, but the Seventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal on May 28, 1999. 1999 WL 342776.
In 2000, CHA announced its "Plan for Transformation," under which it proposed to replace all of Chicago's high-rise public housing projects with lower density mixed-income developments. CHA complained that the continued application of the Gautreaux remedial order to this new construction was a major obstacle, but under the 1969 Judgment Order it had to continue to negotiate new building plans with Gautreaux plaintiffs' counsel. The particulars of each negotiation are beyond the scope of this summary, but the flavor is captured in the Court of Appeals’ description in a subsequent attorneys' fee order, 491 F.3d 649, 658–59 (7th Cir. 2007):
The CHA . . . had to change its position in order to win plaintiffs' approval of the waiver orders, and that change in position is embodied in judicial orders. The success on the merits that plaintiffs achieved through the agreed orders is most evident in the December 12, 2002, order. The court concluded in this order that it should allow building of more new housing in the Horner Revitalization Area because there has been "a sufficient showing of 'revitalizing' circumstances such that a responsible forecast of economic integration, with a longer term possibility of racial desegregation could be made...." Moreover, the order conferred numerous benefits and powers on the plaintiffs: it gave them control over “the initial location and configuration” of the units in which Gautreaux families would be housed above the third floor; it fixed the maximum number of units of public housing (271); it fixed the maximum ratio of public to nonpublic units that could be built in the designated area (35.5% public housing); it required equal distribution of the public units throughout the complex; it required annual written reports to be provided by CHA to plaintiffs; and it permitted the plaintiffs to allocate some of the moneys from the “set aside” decree in a companion case (Gautreaux v. Weaver, 66 C 1460 N.D. Ill.) to the building of the new housing.
The order of September 7, 2001, reflects the same attention to the plaintiffs' demands. That order rests on a similar conclusion about the possibility of creating “viable mixed-income and desegregated housing opportunities for CHA plaintiff families” in the area in which the restrictions were being waived. The order specified the number of units to be built in each of four mid-rise and 14 walk-up buildings. For example, the order waived the three-story height restriction in the Renaissance North Mid–Rise Building, which was to be built at 535 West North Avenue and was *659 to have 59 units, 18 of which would be public housing dispersed throughout the building. It did the same for the 11 buildings in the order. The third order dealing with revitalization, issued September 11, 2002, added approximately 100 acres to the North Kenwood–Oakland revitalizing area, which had been the subject of a June 3, 1996, order. The later order identified the portion of the Limited Areas in which the receiver would be permitted to develop up to 850 units of public housing. Finally, a fourth order, issued on August 29, 2002, resulted in an improved procedure for placing families displaced from public housing that had been destroyed as a result of the Plan into scattered-site units, which are all located in the General Area. This was designed to provide housing for the displaced families as well as to try to help reduce chronic vacancy in the scattered-site units built by the Gautreaux receiver. Even if the fifth order did not deliver as much relief to the plaintiffs, nothing says that they must have prevailed on every single request during the time period at issue in order to be viewed as “prevailing parties.” They achieved substantial results, embodied in court orders, and that is enough.
There were three particularly contentious developments: Horner, Cabrini-Green, and ABLA. The above excerpt describes Horner. For the other two, see, e.g., 1999 WL 1023916 & 2013 WL 5567771 (Cabrini-Green); 2004 WL 1427107 (ABLA).
Disputes also emerged about how to allocate space in newly revitalized subsidized housing. For example, the court directed that half of the new units in the North Kenwood-Oakland neighborhood be reserved for families earning from 0 to 50% of the area median income, and the other half reserved for families earning from 50% to 80% of the area median income. That caused a problem when too few individuals in the 50% to 80% range applied. A public housing tenants' group asked the court to allow lower-income families to move in, worried that the developer would bypass ordinary waitlists for public housing. The parties generally resisted, due in part to promises they had made that the development would be mixed-income. The district court generally left the original plan intact, but on July 14, 2005, it did allow the developer to solicit applications from families earning from 50% to 60% of the area median income regardless of whether they were on a Chicago Housing Authority waitlist already. The tenants' group appealed, but the Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of standing on January 19, 2007. 475 F.3d 845.
New Settlement Agreement, 2019-present.
With the litigation more than fifty years old, the parties began to work on a settlement to replace the 1969 Judgment Order and eventually bring the case to a close. They submitted a proposed Settlement Agreement to the court on January 16, 2019. The parties argued that the court should modify the 1969 Judgment Order because intentional discrimination had dissipated over time and all the parties were now working to desegregate Chicago’s housing.
The new Settlement Agreement provided detailed development plans for specific housing complexes and initiatives to help residents escape housing segregation; limited CHA’s ability to develop new non-elderly public housing in areas where it would result in racial segregation; provided early learning programs to CHA residents at no cost; and required CHA to meet quarterly with the plaintiff's class counsel for monitoring. CHA also must discuss improvements to its (voluntary) mobility program with class counsel.
On January 23, 2019, Judge Aspen approved the Settlement Agreement, which was set to remain in effect until July 31, 2024, subject to extension if CHA failed to meet its development goals. The case is ongoing as of June 2022.
Justin Hill (6/25/2022)
For PACER's information on parties and their attorneys, see: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/5388674/parties/gautreaux-v-chgo-housing-auth/
Aspen, Marvin E. (Illinois)
Austin, Richard William (Illinois)
Bauer, William Joseph (Illinois)
Anderson, Mary E. (Illinois)
Ammarell, Scott William (Illinois)
Aspen, Marvin E. (Illinois)
Austin, Richard William (Illinois)
Bauer, William Joseph (Illinois)
Coar, David H. (Illinois)
Crowley, John Powers (Illinois)
Cummings, Walter Joseph (Illinois)
Duffy, Francis Ryan (Illinois)
Kiley, Roger J. Jr. (Illinois)
Pell, Wilbur Frank Jr. (Indiana)
Posner, Richard A. (District of Columbia)
Ripple, Kenneth Francis (Indiana)
Stevens, John Paul (District of Columbia)
Stewart, Potter (District of Columbia)
Wood, Diane Pamela (Illinois)
See docket on RECAP: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/5388674/gautreaux-v-chgo-housing-auth/
Last updated July 11, 2023, 3:05 a.m.
State / Territory: Illinois
Filing Date: Aug. 9, 1966
Case Ongoing: Yes
African Americans in Chicago who are in or have applied to Chicago public housing not specially designated for the elderly.
Public Interest Lawyer: Yes
Filed Pro Se: No
Class Action Sought: Yes
Class Action Outcome: Granted
Causes of Action:
Prevailing Party: Plaintiff
Nature of Relief:
Source of Relief:
Form of Settlement:
Order Duration: 1969 - 2024
Content of Injunction: