Filed Date: Aug. 17, 2017
Case Ongoing
Clearinghouse coding complete
On August 17, 2017, an individual from White Plains, New York who uses a motorized scooter to travel filed this putative class action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Represented by private counsel and the Westchester Independent Living Center, the plaintiff sued Lyft, Inc., alleging a failure to provide accessible service to people with mobility disabilities in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12181), the New York State Human Rights Law (N.Y. Exec. Law § 290) (“NYSHRL”), and the New York City Human Rights Law (N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-101) (“NYCHRL”). The case was assigned to District Judge Nelson Stephen Román.
Under Title III of the ADA, a private entity primarily engaged in the business of transporting people may not discriminate from use of its services on the basis of disability. Additionally, under section 12184(b)(2)(A), covered entities must provide reasonable modifications to their services that would enable persons with disabilities to enjoy those services. In her initial complaint, the plaintiff alleged that Lyft was a public accommodation within the meaning of the ADA, that Lyft provided worse service to individuals with mobility disabilities than to individuals without disabilities, and that Lyft failed to make reasonable modifications that would have made the service equally reliable for the disabled and non-disabled alike. The plaintiffs also alleged that Lyft violated the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL under similar theories, along with a claim that Lyft’s policies resulted in a detrimental disparate impact on people with mobility disabilities in violation of a separate provision of the NYCHRL.
The plaintiff sought certification to represent a nationwide class of similarly situated persons protected by the ADA—including all residents and visitors of all cities and regions serviced by Lyft—as well as two subclasses of similarly situated individuals protected by the NYSHRL and NYCHRL respectively. The plaintiff sought declaratory relief defining Lyft as a public accommodation within the definitions of the above statutes and that Lyft’s policies violate said statutes. She also sought injunctive relief to force Lyft to remediate their service into compliance with the ADA and New York statutes, as well as compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees.
On December 6, 2017 the individual plaintiff amended her complaint to add the non-profit organization Westchester Disabled on the Move, Inc. (WDOMI) as a plaintiff.
Lyft filed a motion to dismiss on January 24, 2018 (docketed on March 30, 2018) on the basis of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Lyft argued that the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring the claim because they had not signed up for a Lyft account, and that Lyft’s terms of service included an arbitration agreement and a class action waiver, which, Lyft argued, should prevent the plaintiffs from recovering under the principles of direct benefits estoppel. Lyft also argued that the plaintiffs failed to allege a concrete and particularized injury and actual or imminent harm. Lyft also took issue with WDOMI’s associational and organizational standing. Furthermore, Lyft further argued that, if the court retained jurisdiction, the plaintiffs failed to state a claim because Lyft was a technology company rather than in the transportation business and the remedy sought—that Lyft be required to purchase or lease wheelchair accessible vehicles (WAVs)—was not required under the ADA or New York statutes. Finally, Lyft argued the class claims should be dismissed because membership in the classes was dependent on a “purely subjective criterion.”
On March 6, 2018, the plaintiffs filed their response to the motion to dismiss, arguing that individuals were not required to engage in “futile gestures” to allege concrete injury under the ADA. The plaintiffs also submitted declarations from individuals with disabilities who were associated with the lawsuit indicating their desire to use Lyft’s services and their perceptions of the shortcomings of Lyft’s services that prevented them from signing up.
On April 5, 2018, the National Council on Independent Living requested the court’s leave to file an amicus brief on behalf of the plaintiffs, which Judge Román granted on April 17. The brief largely bolstered the plaintiffs’ argument that downloading the Lyft app would be a futile gesture and therefore not required to obtain standing under the ADA. The brief also argued that Lyft is in fact a transportation company under the definition of the ADA.
Judge Román entered his opinion and order concerning Lyft’s motion to dismiss on November 29, 2018, granting in part and denying in part. He denied the motion with respect to the individual plaintiff, agreeing that the ADA does not require parties to engage in futile gestures where they know they can’t use a service because of their disability. The individual plaintiff’s allegation that she had notice that Lyft’s service had accessibility issues was sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss. Judge Román further agreed that the individual’s injury was fairly traceable to Lyft and that the court would be able to redress the injury. Lowell v. Lyft, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 3d 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
Judge Román granted Lyft’s motion to dismiss the NYCHRL and NYSHRL claims for lack of standing with respect to plaintiff WDOMI, agreeing with Lyft that WDOMI did not have associational standing because the amended complaint requested compensatory damages, which would require the participation of the organization’s members. Judge Román also held that WDOMI lacked organizational standing, disagreeing with WDOMI that it suffered a concrete injury due to Lyft’s policy because it was forced to divert resources to advocate for its members i.e., bring this lawsuit. The court held that litigation costs alone are not sufficient to allege a concrete injury, and dismissed the amended complaint with regard to WDOMI because it failed to allege separate harms. Lowell v. Lyft, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 3d 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
Judge Román further denied Lyft’s motion with regard to enforcement of the arbitration clause. He held that direct benefits estoppel did not apply because the plaintiffs were not attempting to benefit from Lyft’s terms of service—indeed their entire claim was that they were unable to benefit from Lyft’s services due to discrimination. Lowell v. Lyft, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 3d 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
Regarding Lyft’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Judge Román granted the motion with respect to the plaintiffs’ NYCHRL claim but denied it with respect to their ADA and NYSHRL claims. Judge Román held that the NYCHRL claims could not advance because Lyft did in fact offer accessible services within the city, and longer wait times did not give rise to a violation of the statute. In denying the motion with regard to the ADA and NYCHRL claims, which are analyzed under the same standards, Judge Román disagreed with Lyft’s characterization that the plaintiffs’ amended complaint asked the court to order Lyft to provide WAV service. Instead, he held that the plaintiffs merely requested that the court enjoin Lyft from further violations of the ADA and NYCHRL, which was sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Lowell v. Lyft, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 3d 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
Following the court’s ruling, Lyft filed its answer to the plaintiffs’ amended complaint on January 15, 2019, denying almost all allegations and raising 15 affirmative defenses in total, essentially disputing that Lyft was a transportation company as defined by the ADA and alleging that the modifications sought by the plaintiffs were unreasonable and so not required by the ADA. The case then proceeded to discovery.
On April 8, 2019, the plaintiffs withdrew their demand for a jury trial. On April 3, 2020, the case was reassigned to District Judge Phillip M. Halpern.
On October 15, 2021, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s ruling on Lyft’s 2018 motion to dismiss because, according to the plaintiffs, the Second Circuit had examined and explicitly overruled the court’s ruling regarding the individual plaintiff’s NYCHRL claim (but not the WDOMI claim). Lyft did not oppose the motion, and on November 1, 2021 the court reinstated the plaintiff’s claim under the NYCHRL due to the Second Circuit’s ruling.
On March 30, 2022, the Paralyzed Veterans of America, the United Spinal Association, and the National Council for Independent Living submitted requests to file amicus briefs in support of the plaintiffs’ claims, which the court granted the next day. The Association of Programs for Rural Independent Living, and the African-American Advocacy Center for Persons with Disabilities submitted amicus requests on April 6 and April 12 respectively, each granted the following day.
Between January 2019 and August 2022, the parties filed numerous motions to seal discovery containing Lyft’s proprietary information and motions to compel discovery. Notably, on May 10, 2022, Lyft moved for the court’s permission to file a Daubert motion to exclude expert testimony offered by the plaintiffs in conjunction with their motion to certify the class. One of Lyft’s main arguments against class certification was that the plaintiffs could not satisfy the commonality and typicality requirements because their proposed modifications wouldn’t provide equal benefits to the whole class. Lyft argued that the testimony of an expert would be required to prove these elements, and it sought to challenge the expert’s qualifications.
Lyft’s motion was referred to Magistrate Judge Andrew E. Krause for report and recommendation, which he returned on July 5, 2022. Judge Krause denied Lyft’s motion, holding that it went to the merits of the plaintiffs’ underlying claim and was more appropriately raised at the motion in limine stage of the litigation. The plaintiffs did suggest modifications in their motion to certify the class, but Judge Krause pointed out that in certifying a class, the court is not ruling on whether a reasonable modification exists. Rather, the question is whether the alleged injury the class has in common could be resolved with a single injunction. 2022 WL 17585670.
While plaintiffs originally submitted their motion to certify the class on May 3, 2022, they formally moved to certify the class on August 26, 2022 after the court resolved several motions to seal. The plaintiff sought to certify the following classes:
On August 29, 2022, Judge Halpern scheduled a bench trial for January 17, 2023 and set a September 2, 2022 deadline for the parties to file letters informing the court whether they intended to move for summary judgment in advance of trial. The parties filed a letter on September 2, 2022 jointly agreeing to forgo pre-trial summary judgment briefing, and the case proceeded into the pre-trial phase.
The court held a pretrial conference on November 8, 2022 and subsequently ordered the parties to submit a new proposed pretrial order and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. In response, the parties submitted a letter on November 21, 2022, in which they agreed that the plaintiffs would withdraw the fifth claim of their complaint, which was for declaratory relief. The parties also indicated that they were unable to agree on which issues to present for trial. Lyft subsequently filed a motion requesting leave to file separate proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the court summarily denied on December 2, 2022, directing the parties to continue working to agree on simplified filings.
On December 13, 2022, the court held another pretrial conference in which Judge Halpern adjourned the January 17, 2023 trial without rescheduling because the parties could not come to an agreement on a proposed joint pretrial order. The court gave the parties a new deadline of January 13, 2023 to file their proposed joint pretrial order and a January 20, 2023 deadline to file a brief outlining their disagreements over the burdens of proof for each claim.
On December 22, 2022, Magistrate Judge Krause filed a recommendation that the plaintiffs’ motion to certify classes be granted in part and denied in part. Judge Krause recommended the court certify the plaintiffs’ proposed “Non-Access Region Class,” the “New York State Other Than NYC Class,” and the “Westchester Class” as defined above. He recommended that the court not certify the “NYC Class” and the “Access Regions Other Than NYC Class” on the grounds that the proposed class representatives for those groups lacked standing to pursue the claim. Specifically, those plaintiffs did not allege sufficiently concrete facts to support the claim that they had actual knowledge that downloading the Lyft app to try to receive service would be a “futile gesture,” which is the doctrine that originally conferred standing to the named plaintiff. Excluded from these classes were people who had downloaded the Lyft app (because of arbitration agreements and class waivers), who had filed separate lawsuits over WAV access, or who attended Ohio State University or the University of Texas at Austin and did not leave campus (because Lyft contractually provides service on those campuses). 2022 WL 19406561.
To certify a class, plaintiffs must satisfy the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. They must show that “(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” If the Rule 23(a) prerequisites have been satisfied, then class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate when “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”
Judge Krause’ recommendation found that these elements were satisfied for the three remaining plaintiffs. Plaintiffs proved the numerosity requirement with statistics showing that 2.3 percent of the people living in the areas that would be covered by the class categories use wheelchairs and 36 percent of Americans have used rideshare services. Plaintiffs estimated that the Westchester Class alone would contain more than 6,000 members, which is well above the District’s numerosity threshold of 40 class members. Commonality and typicality were satisfied because the putative class’s alleged injury arose out of Lyft’s uniform policies of not offering WAV access on its app. Judge Krause indicated that Lyft’s challenge to these elements of class certification actually amounted to either challenges to plaintiffs’ standing or the merits of the underlying claim. Because Rule 23(a) was satisfied, Judge Krause further found that the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiffs could be provided to all members of each class, as required by Rule 23(b)(2). 2022 WL 19406561.
Lyft subsequently filed an objection to Judge Krause’s report, again arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they didn’t identify when they intended to use the app, contravening the injury in fact prong of Article III standing. It also argued that the plaintiffs failed the numerosity and ascertainability requirements for class actions because they could not identify specific individuals who would benefit from the ruling. Several disabilities-rights organizations filed an amicus curiae brief in response to Lyft’s objection on February 23, 2023. The brief, filed by Paralyzed Veterans of America, the United Spinal Association, the National Council on Independent Living, and Association of Programs for Rural Independent Living, argued that plaintiffs only need to indicate they intend to use the service when possible in order to satisfy the injury prong of standing, and that Lyft’s argument regarding numerosity and ascertainability were irrelevant because the injunctive relief sought could equally apply to 700 people or 7,000 people.
On March 24, 2023, Judge Halpern issued an opinion that largely adopted Judge Krause’s recommendation, with the additional holding that WDOMI did not have standing to assert the NYSHRL claims, as Judge Román had ruled earlier in the case. The court rejected each of Lyft’s objections to Judge Krause’s recommendation, with substantial analysis of the Article III injury in fact requirement, holding that the named plaintiff’s testimony and declarations sufficiently established her intention to use Lyft’s service if and when the app allows WAV access in her region. 2023 WL 2622925.
After the March 24, 2023 class-certification, the parties continued to confer about their proposed joint pretrial order and prepared for trial. On October 2, 2023, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed counts III and IV of their complaint—the counts pertaining to the NYCHRL—because the court had declined to certify the class of New York City plaintiffs. The new proposed joint pretrial order deadline was set to November 13, 2023, with an evidentiary hearing scheduled for December 12, 2023.
As of November 1, 2023, the case was ongoing.
Summary Authors
Terry Howard (11/13/2022)
Terry Howard (10/12/2023)
Terry Howard (11/1/2023)
For PACER's information on parties and their attorneys, see: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/6140248/parties/lowell-v-lyft-inc/
Appel, Marie Noel (New York)
Acosta, Nefi D. (New York)
Agnolucci, Simona Alessandra (New York)
Ahearn, Christopher M. (New York)
Baskin, Stephen E. (New York)
Halpern, Philip Morgan (New York)
Agnolucci, Simona Alessandra (New York)
Ahearn, Christopher M. (New York)
Blavin, Jonathan Hugh (New York)
Brady, Julie Singer (New York)
Bryant, Jennifer Lynn (New York)
Buchanan, Mary Beth (New York)
Caldwell, Christopher G. (New York)
Christoff, Annie Tauer (New York)
Dryer, Alexander Barnes (New York)
Ercole, Brian Michael (New York)
Fidler, Harry Kinsler (New York)
Gardner, Allen Franklin (New York)
Hulme, Nathaniel F. (New York)
Kemp-Gerstel, Andrew (New York)
Manning, Stephen V. (New York)
Marmolejo, Matthew H. (New York)
Maroney, Michael T. (New York)
McInerney, Patrick A. (New York)
Meny, Rachael Elizabeth (New York)
Nelson, Jonathan Edward (New York)
Parasharami, Archis A. (New York)
Petersen, Kyle Anne (New York)
Punak, Rebekah Leigh (New York)
Quimby, Paul Alexander (New York)
Santeusanio, David J. (New York)
Schreiner, Barrett L (New York)
Shudofsky, Sara Lynn (New York)
See docket on RECAP: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/6140248/lowell-v-lyft-inc/
Last updated March 8, 2024, 3 a.m.
State / Territory: New York
Case Type(s):
Public Accommodations/Contracting
Key Dates
Filing Date: Aug. 17, 2017
Case Ongoing: Yes
Plaintiffs
Plaintiff Description:
One individual with a mobility disability requiring the use of a motorized wheelchair and one nonprofit disability resources organization, seeking to represent a class of similarly situated individuals.
Plaintiff Type(s):
Non-profit NON-religious organization
Public Interest Lawyer: No
Filed Pro Se: No
Class Action Sought: Yes
Class Action Outcome: Granted
Defendants
Lyft, Inc. (San Francisco, California), Private Entity/Person
Defendant Type(s):
Case Details
Causes of Action:
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq.
Available Documents:
Outcome
Prevailing Party: None Yet / None
Nature of Relief:
Source of Relief:
Issues
General:
Access to public accommodations - privately owned
Disability and Disability Rights:
Discrimination-basis: