Filed Date: July 25, 1997
Case Ongoing
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This is a state court case challenging an abortion restriction in the state of Alaska. SB 24 (the "Parental Consent Act" or "PCA") enacted on May 2, 1997, prohibited any unemancipated or unmarried woman under 17 years of age from having an abortion unless she first obtained the consent of a parent, guardian, or custodian or a court order authorizing the procedure. Anybody providing an abortion on a minor in non-compliance with this consent requirement would be subject to criminal and civil liability.
Plaintiffs—Planned Parenthood of Alaska and two obstetrician-gynecologists, on behalf of themselves and their patients, and ten anonymous pregnant minors who may seek future abortion services without complying with the law—filed suit in the Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District at Anchorage on July 25, 1997. Represented by attorneys from the Alaska Civil Liberties Union Foundation and the predecessor to the Center for Reproductive Rights, plaintiffs filed suit against the State of Alaska, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs brought three counts of relief under the Alaska Constitution. Count I alleged that the PCA unlawfully infringed upon a minor’s right to reproductive choice under the state Constitution’s right to privacy, which Alaska Courts had interpreted as conferring broader privacy protection than afforded under the U.S. Constitution. Count II alleged that the PCA violated the equal protection and inherent rights clauses of the state Constitution by unjustly discriminating among “suspect and arbitrary classifications,” including but not limited to, between minors in urban and rural areas, between minors who seek abortion services and other services, and between people who are married and emancipated and who are not. Count III alleged violations of the due process clause of the state Constitution because the PCA is not substantially related to any lawful, valid purpose, and Count IV alleged violations of plaintiffs’ constitutional civil rights because the law imposed substantial restrictions on the constitutional rights of young women despite the constitutional provision that “[n]o person is to be denied the enjoyment of any civil or political right because of sex….”
Later, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. On February 25, 1998, the superior court granted that motion on equal protection grounds because the PCA required consent or judicial authorization for pregnant minors who chose abortion, but not for those who chose to continue their pregnancy. Addressing the issue about minor’s right to privacy, Superior Court Judge Sen K. Tan relied on the Alaska Constitution’s guarantee of privacy, the Alaska Supreme Court’s case law interpreting that right, and relevant cases from other states to determine that privacy is a fundamental individual right encompassing a pregnant woman’s reproductive choices that coextensively applies to minors and adults. Judge Tan acknowledged differences may exist between a minor’s and adult’s capacity to make mature reproductive choices. However, he reasoned that those differences did not dilute the fundamental quality of a minor’s constitutional right but instead may vindicate the state’s interest in controlling the circumstances under which minors can exercise their privacy right without supervision. Because the PCA’s stated purposes and supporting findings did not establish a compelling state interest, the trial court found no need to resolve open issues in requiring consent and granted summary judgment to plaintiffs. On October 5, 1998, the superior court granted final judgment, consistent with its summary judgment opinion, and awarded attorney's fees.
The defendant appealed the case to the Alaska Supreme Court. It rendered an opinion on November 16, 2001 that affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the district court. Writing for the majority, Justice Alexander O. Bryner concluded that the superior court erred in declining to hear evidence on the state’s compelling interests in enforcing its parental consent statute and on whether the statute was narrowly tailored to promote such interests. The Alaska Supreme Court adopted the superior court’s approach positing a constitutional right of privacy that extends fully to all Alaskans but may be limited for compelling reasons, rather than the state’s approach positing a privacy right limited to adults only, therefore requiring no demonstrated compelling reasons to restrict the privacy rights of minors. 35 P.3d 30.
In the same opinion, Justice Bryner also addressed whether equal protection bars the state from enforcing parental consent or judicial authorization requirements because of impermissible discrimination among different classes of similarly situated minors, those who elect to have abortions and those who elect to carry to term. He first laid out Alaska’s equal protection standard, a flexible, “three-step sliding-scale test.” First, the nature of the right must be established. Second, the court examines the importance of the state purpose served. Finally, the court considers whether the particular means the state selects to further its purpose. For a more fundamental right, the state must prove a compelling interest under the second step and demonstrate that no less restrictive alternative measures exist to accomplish its purpose under the third step. Justice Bryner noted that the trial court failed to probe the second step—whether the state had shown a compelling interest—and therefore also failed to analyze thoroughly under the third step whether the parental consent and judicial authorization requirements achieved the state’s interests by the least restrictive means. The case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing on that issue. 35 P.3d 30.
Upon remand, Judge Tan held a bench trial from January 6 to January 24, 2003. His October 13, 2003 opinion answered a narrow question: whether the PCA could selectively burden the exercise of the privacy right by requiring pregnant minors under age 17 to obtain parental or judicial consent before getting an abortion. The State asserted interests in “protecting minors from their own immaturity; protecting the health of minors; preserving the integrity of the family, including protecting the rights of parents; preserving the rights to a civil action; and, promoting the social benefits of reducing teenage high risk sexual activity.” Judge Tan analyzed whether the PCA was narrowly tailored to serve each interest. First, he concluded the PCA was not the least restrictive means to protect minors from their own immaturity because it arbitrarily treated the decision to terminate a pregnancy differently from the decision to carry to term, though both decisions required the same level of maturity. Second, the PCA also did not further the state interest of protecting the health of minors because the act only burdened one set of medical risks—those associated with abortions—and not the generally higher risks associated with pregnancy or childbirth. Third, Judge Tan identified that the State could not have a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of the family, including protecting the rights of parents to raise their children, that would justify intrusion into every family and the pregnancy choice of every minor woman, because that in “highly functional” families, the PCA would be “irrelevant and redundant” but in “highly dysfunctional” families, such as in circumstances involving parental abuse, the PCA could be detrimental to to the minor. Fourth, Judge Tan found the PCA did not further rights to a civil action because the State failed to show that people experienced difficulties suing doctors for malpractice for abortions, and noted that the legislature could create new causes of actions or extend statutes of limitation instead. Finally, Judge Tan addressed the final interest in promoting the social benefits of reducing teenage high-risk sexual activity. He found that while the State had a compelling interest in protecting the health and safety of minors, it only had an “important” interest in reducing their sexual activities. Judge Tan concluded the PCA was not an appropriately tailored means, because (1) evidence in other states with parental involvement laws showed teenagers did not learn about the law until after they became pregnant, (2) other directly tailored means could achieve the same goals, and (3) the number of abortions dropped in states with similar laws but could have been influenced by other factors such as traveling out-of-state for abortions or the general national reduction in teen pregnancy rates. Finally, the judicial authorization requirement infringed on a minor’s right to privacy and treated pregnant minors within Alaska differently depending on many variables, such as where they lived. Travel could be detrimental to the minor both socially (missing school) and physically (delaying the abortion). Ultimately, Judge Tan concluded the PCA failed to further compelling state interests using the least restrictive means. 2003 WL 25446126.
Judge Tan entered judgment on January 7, 2004 declaring the PCA unconstitutional under Alaska Constitution Article I, sections 1 and 22, and permanently enjoining the State of Alaska, its officers, agents, servants, and employees from implementing or enforcing the act.
Defendant appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court again. On November 2, 2007, writing for the majority, Justice Dana A. Fabe held that the State failed to establish that parental consent was necessary to achieve its compelling interests. Though she agreed that the State had legitimate interests in “protecting minors from their own immaturity” and “aiding parents in fulfilling their parental responsibilities,” she found the PCA did not advance those interests using the least restrictive means because parental notification, rather than parental consent, could successfully avoid the constitutionally suspect “veto power” that a parent could exercise over their minor child’s right to choose. The judicial authorization alternative also failed to lessen the restrictiveness or intrusiveness of the parental consent requirement, compared to the alternative of parental notification. The Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision striking down the PCA. 171 P.3d 577.
The defendant's motion for rehearing was denied on December 14, 2007. This case is now closed.
Summary Authors
Emily Liu (11/20/2022)
Planned Parenthood of Alaska v. Perdue, Alaska state trial court (1998)
Planned Parenthood of Alaska v. Campbell, Alaska state trial court (2009)
Last updated Aug. 30, 2023, 1:29 p.m.
Docket sheet not available via the Clearinghouse.State / Territory: Alaska
Case Type(s):
Key Dates
Filing Date: July 25, 1997
Case Ongoing: Yes
Plaintiffs
Plaintiff Description:
Planned Parenthood of Alaska and two obstetrician-gynecologists, on behalf of themselves and their patients, and 10 anonymous minor pregnant women
Attorney Organizations:
Center for Reproductive Rights
Public Interest Lawyer: Yes
Filed Pro Se: No
Class Action Sought: No
Class Action Outcome: Not sought
Defendants
Case Details
Causes of Action:
Available Documents:
Injunctive (or Injunctive-like) Relief
Outcome
Prevailing Party: Plaintiff
Nature of Relief:
Injunction / Injunctive-like Settlement
Source of Relief:
Order Duration: 2004 - None
Issues
Reproductive rights:
Reproductive health care (including birth control, abortion, and others)
Type of Facility: