Filed Date: March 15, 2025
Case Ongoing
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This case is one of several lawsuits challenging the Trump administration’s use of the Alien Enemies Act to detain and deport noncitizens without due process. You can see all of the cases here.
This case challenged the Trump Administration’s authority to invoke the Alien Enemies Act to circumvent removal procedures and order the immediate removal of Venezuelan nationals from the United States. On March 15, 2025, five detained Venezuelan nationals filed this class action lawsuit in the District Court for the District of Columbia against President Donald J. Trump, the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), and the Department of State. Represented by the ACLU and Democracy Forward, the plaintiffs challenged the Administration’s invocation of the AEA to remove them from the United States without any opportunity for a hearing or judicial review. The AEA is a wartime measure that authorizes the removal of citizens from countries with whom the United States is at war. On March 15, 2025, President Trump issued a proclamation declaring that the United States was “under invasion” by Tren de Aragua, a Venezuelan gang and designated foreign terrorist organization, and invoking the AEA. The plaintiffs filed their complaint the same day, arguing that the defendants had exceeded their authority under the AEA and violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (“FARRA”), the Administrative Procedure Act, the Fifth Amendment right to due process, and Habeas Corpus. The plaintiffs sought a temporary and permanent injunction, declaratory relief, writs of habeas corpus, and attorney’s fees. The case was assigned to Chief Judge James Boasberg.
Also on March 15, the plaintiffs filed a motion for temporary restraining order (“TRO”). The court granted the motion on the same day, ordering that the defendants were prohibited from removing the plaintiffs from the United States for 14 days without further order from the Court. That same day, the defendants appealed the TRO (25-5067) and the class certification order (25-5068) to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. The court consolidated the two appeals.
Also on the same day, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify the class. They defined the class as “[a]ll noncitizens who were, are, or will be subject to the Alien Enemies Act Proclamation and/or its implementations.” Following a hearing, the court certified the class on March 15 and set a hearing for March 21, 2025.
On March 16, based on numerous news reports and the defendants’ own notice to the court, the plaintiffs raised concerns that the defendants had violated the temporary restraining order by deporting detained noncitizens pursuant to President Trump’s March 15 Proclamation. Accordingly, the court set a hearing for 5:00 pm on March 17 to address these concerns. Shortly before the March 17 hearing was set to begin, the defendants filed a motion to vacate the hearing, arguing that Judge Boasberg’s oral directives at the March 15 hearing were not enforceable against the Executive Branch, and that the court’s written order was entered after the planes carrying the Venezuelan migrants had already departed U.S. airspace. Judge Boasberg denied the motion to vacate, and the hearing proceeded as scheduled. Following the hearing, Judge Boasberg ordered the defendants to file a notice by March 18 that included
1) A sworn declaration that no one on any flight departing the United States after 7:25 p.m. on March 15, 2025, was removed solely on the basis of the Proclamation at issue; 2) A sworn declaration setting forth when the Proclamation at issue was signed, when it was made public, and when it went into effect; 3) The Government's best estimate of the number of individuals subject to the Proclamation currently remaining in the United States and how many are currently in U.S. custody; and 4) The Government's position on whether, and in what form, it will provide answers to the Court's questions regarding the particulars of the flights.
Following the March 17 hearing, the defendants filed a motion in the district court to vacate the TRO.
The defendants filed a notice on March 18 purporting to respond to the first, third, and fourth parts of the court’s March 17 order (excerpted above). In response, the Court entered a minute order on March 18 requiring the defendants to file
[E]x parte and under seal (or submit to the Court) a declaration providing the following details regarding each of the two flights leaving U.S. airspace before 7:25 p.m. on March 15, 2025: 1) What time did the plane take off from U.S. soil and from where? 2) What time did it leave U.S. airspace? 3) What time did it land in which foreign country (including if it made more than one stop)? 4) What time were individuals subject solely to the Proclamation transferred out of U.S. custody? and 5) How many people were aboard solely on the basis of the Proclamation?
On March 19, the defendants filed an emergency motion to stay the March 18 minute order, arguing that the district court had exceeded its authority in demanding answers to its questions and that the answers it sought were immaterial to the legal issues in the case. The court issued an order the same day, granting the motion in part by allowing the government an additional 24 hours, until March 20, to decide if it was going to invoke the state-secrets privilege, a common law principle allowing the Executive Branch to withhold information from the judiciary where it determines disclosure would threaten national security or foreign policy interests. Judge Boasberg denied the remainder of the defendants’ motion, making clear that his interest was not in micromanaging the government, but in “determin[ing] whether if the Government deliberately flouted [the Court’s] Orders issued on March 15, 2025 and, if so, what the consequences should be.”
On March 20, the court issued an order in response to the defendants’ ex parte submission of a declaration of an ICE field office director stating that he understood that Cabinet Secretaries were in discussion about whether to invoke the state-secrets privilege and that it was a consideration that required more than 24 hours to decide. Judge Boasberg rejected this declaration, finding it “woefully insufficient” and ordering the defendants to submit a declaration by a “person with direct involvement in the Cabinet-level discussions regarding invocation of the state-secrets privilege” by March 21. The court also ordered the defendants to determine whether or not they would invoke the privilege by March 25, 2025. The defendants were also ordered to submit a brief by March 25 showing why they didn’t violate the TRO by failing to return the class members on the first two planes to depart on March 15. The plaintiffs were ordered to file their response to this brief by March 31, 2025.
On March 21, the defendants filed a declaration from Todd Blanche, the Deputy Attorney General, attesting from his personal knowledge and involvement to the accuracy of the statements made in the ICE field office director’s March 20 declaration that Cabinet-level officials were considering whether to invoke the state-secrets privilege.
Judge Boasberg denied the defendants' motion to vacate the TRO on March 24, 2025, finding a sufficient likelihood that the plaintiffs would succeed on their claims based on the theory that they were entitled to an individualized hearing before they could be deported.
Also on March 24, the defendants invoked the state secrets privilege, and notified the court that they would not disclose any further information in response to the court's March 18 minute order seeking more information about the flights that departed on March 15. The court ordered the plaintiffs to file any response by March 31.
The plaintiffs notified the Court on March 26 that they did not wish the TRO motion to be converted to a motion for a preliminary injunction, that they would be filing a separate motion for a preliminary injunction that included additional factual material, and that they would file a separate motion to extend the TRO. The Court issued an order that day directing the plaintiffs to file their motion to extend the TRO by March 27, with the defendants' opposition filed by March 28. Additionally, the plaintiffs were ordered to file their preliminary injunction motion by March 28. Briefing on the preliminary injunction motion is scheduled to be complete by April 4, with a hearing scheduled for April 8.
Meanwhile in the D.C. Circuit, the plaintiff-appellants filed their response in opposition on March 18. Several parties filed amici curiae: 26 states and a Texas Congressman who supported the defendant-appellants; and State Democracy Defenders Fund ("SDDF") and a number of former government officials who supported the plaintiff-appellants. The court held oral arguments before a three-judge panel on March 24, and on March 26 they issued an order denying both the emergency stay motions relating to the TRO and the class certification. The court also granted the motions to participate as amicus curiae from the Texas Congressman and SDDF & the former government officials.
On March 28, the Acting Solicitor General filed an application in the U.S. Supreme Court to vacate the TRO and class certification and requesting an immediate administrative stay. The Court ordered the plaintiff-appellees to respond by April 1, 2025.
In accordance with the District Court's order, the plaintiffs filed their motion for a preliminary injunction ("PI") on March 28. The defendants filed their opposition on April 1; on April 4, the plaintiffs filed their reply.
On March 31, the plaintiffs filed their response to the defendants' invocation of the state secrets privilege. The hearing on the court's show cause motion was held on April 3.
The Supreme Court vacated the TRO on April 7. In a per curium opinion, the Court held that individuals subject to removal under the AEA are entitled to due process and thus must receive notice of their removal and an opportunity to challenge it through judicial review. The Court also held that challenges to AEA removals must be brought in a habeas petition. Because habeas petitions must be filed in the district of confinement, the Court stated that venue was improper in D.C. in this case because the detainees were never held there.
In light of the Supreme Court's ruling, the District Court vacated the April 8 hearing on the PI motion and ordered the plaintiffs to file a notice by April 16 "indicating whether they believe that they still have a basis to proceed on their Motion for Preliminary Injunction in this Court and, if so, proposing a briefing schedule."
Within a day of the Supreme Court's ruling, the named plaintiffs had filed separate habeas petitions in the Southern District of New York and the Southern District of Texas, where they were being held.
On April 16, Judge Boasberg issued an order on the show cause motion, finding probable cause that the defendants had violated his March 15 TRO. The opinion found "that the Government’s actions on that day demonstrate a willful disregard for [the Court's] Order, sufficient for the Court to conclude that probable cause exists to find the Government in criminal contempt." Judge Boasberg further found that the Supreme Court's decision to vacate the TRO after the events of March 15 did not excuse the defendants failure to obey it, pointing to the core legal concept that a judicial order must be followed, even if erroneous, until a court reverses it. The court ordered the defendants to either file by April 23 a declaration explaining steps they're taking to purge their contempt; or, if they chose not to purge their contempt, to identify by April 23 individuals who knew about the March 15 TRO and made the decision not to stop the transfer of class members out of U.S. custody.
The defendants immediately appealed the District Court's order and opinion on the cause motion to the D.C. Circuit (case no 25-5124), which on April 18 granted an administrative stay, noting "the purpose of this administrative stay is to give the court sufficient opportunity to consider the emergency motion for a stay pending appeal or a writ of mandamus and should not be construed in any way as a ruling on the merits of that motion." Briefing was set to conclude the following week. The defendant-appellants notified the Court of Appeals of their intent to move to dismiss the appeal on May 8, citing the Supreme Court's April 7 decision that vacated the district court orders that were the subject of this appeal.
In the meantime, the government moved forward toward additional deportations, providing affected Venezuelans with almost no notice (and in English, only). The ACLU filed motions to stop the impending removals in A.A.R.P v. Trump, in the Northern District of Texas. When that motion was not ruled on right away, the ACLU filed a similar motion in the Supreme Court in that case, and also in this case. Judge Boasberg held an emergency hearing on the matter on Friday, April 18, but said at that hearing that he lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the deportations, even if they were noncompliant with the Supreme Court's opinion.
On Friday, April 25, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding seven plaintiffs and simultaneously moved for a preliminary injunction and class certification. The request for class certification requested the following definition: "All noncitizens who were, are, or will be subject to the March 2025 Presidential Proclamation entitled 'Invocation of the Alien Enemies Act Regarding the Invasion of the United States by Tren De Aragua' and/or its implementation."
The petitioners also asked the court to certify two subclasses: (1) the “CECOT Subclass” comprised of "[a]ll noncitizens in custody at the Terrorism Confinement Center (“CECOT”) in El Salvador who were, are, or will be subject to the March 2025 Presidential Proclamation . . . and/or its implementation" and (2) the “Criminal Custody Subclass” comprised of "[a]ll noncitizens in criminal custody who were, are, or will be subject to the March 2025 Presidential Proclamation . . . and/or its implementation."
The defendants filed their opposition to the PI motion on May 1 and to the class certification motion on May 7.
The court held a hearing on the PI motion on May 7, after which it issued the following order:
1) By May 9, 2025, Respondents shall submit any declarations they wish to provide regarding whether the United States has constructive custody over the proposed CECOT class; 2) By May 12, 2025, Petitioners shall submit to the Court a notice regarding whether they wish to seek jurisdictional discovery, and, if so, the specific discovery they propose to propound; and 3) By May 14, 2025, Respondents shall submit any response to Petitioners' discovery proposal.
The parties completed this discovery process by May 27.
in a strongly worded opinion dated June 4, which opened quoting Kafka, Judge Boasberg certified the CECOT Class, recognized the likelihood of success on the merits of the CECOT plaintiffs' claim that their summary removal violated their due process rights, and imposed a preliminary injunction that required the government to facilitate class members' ability to "proceed through habeas and ensure that their cases are handled as they would have been in if the Government had not provided constitutionally inadequate process" (p. 67). The court required the government to "submit a Notice to the Court advising how they intend to facilitate the ability of the CECOT class to seek habeas relief" by June 11.
Judge Boasberg limited the CECOT Class to "All noncitizens removed from U.S. custody and transferred to the Terrorism Confinement Center (CECOT) in El Salvador on March 15 and 16, 2025, pursuant solely to the Presidential Proclamation entitled, “Invocation of the Alien Enemies Act Regarding the Invasion of The United States by Tren De Aragua.” He did not include individuals alleged to have been transported since March 16, but noted "[t]o the extent such individuals believe they have meritorious due-process claims, they may seek separate relief or Plaintiffs may move to amend the Class definition." He denied class certification as to the Criminal Custody Class without prejudice, noting that he lacked jurisdiction on claims raised by prisoners held in criminal custody in other parts of the United States and not yet subject to transfer under the March 2025 Presidential Proclamation.
Focusing only on the CECOT Class, Judge Boasberg summarized the alleged due process violations and the importance of process:
“Defendants plainly deprived these individuals of their right to seek habeas relief before their summary removal from the United States — a right that need not itself be vindicated through a habeas petition. Perhaps the President lawfully invoked the Alien Enemies Act. Perhaps, moreover, Defendants are correct that Plaintiffs are gang members. But — and this is the critical point — there is simply no way to know for sure, as the CECOT Plaintiffs never had any opportunity to challenge the Government’s say-so. Defendants instead spirited away planeloads of people before any such challenge could be made. And now, significant evidence has come to light indicating that many of those currently entombed in CECOT have no connection to the gang and thus languish in a foreign prison on flimsy, even frivolous, accusations” (p. 4).
He observed, as detailed above, that the CECOT Class members "did not even receive the anemic process that the Government subsequently committed to provide" (p. 35).
The court rejected petitioners' assertions that habeas was appropriate because they were in the constructive custody of the United States, finding that the ongoing detention of the CECOT Class was "not solely at the 'behest' of the United States, nor [was] El Salvador 'indifferent' to their detention" (p. 23-24). He gave credit to the government's assertions that "El Salvador has chosen — in negotiation with the United States and for reasons far outside the ken of a federal district court — to detain Plaintiffs at CECOT, and it can choose to release them as well" and noted that this precluded habeas jurisdiction. Judge Boasberg acknowledged in his opinion that this "conclusion, to be sure, presumes the truthfulness and reliability of the [government's evidence], which is rendered more difficult given the Government’s troubling conduct throughout this case.”
Judge Boasberg found, however, that the plaintiffs' due process challenge arose under the Court's equitable authority and did not require habeas jurisdiction. He held that the due process claim existed as a precondition to the effective exercise of habeas rights and therefore need not be raised through habeas. He noted, "Just like litigants have since the beginning of our legal tradition, they may invoke this Court’s equitable authority to restrain the Government from infringing upon constitutional protections. They need not do so in habeas, nor are they obligated to identify a cause of action conferring that right" (p. 31).
On June 10, the government filed a emergency motion seeking to stay Judge Boasberg's order in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. A three-judge panel at the D.C. Circuit granted an administrative stay on the same day pending appeal.
On June 24, the D.C. Circuit granted a joint motion to dismiss the appeals because the Supreme Court vacated the district court’s orders that were the subject of this appeal in Trump v. J.G.G., 145 S. Ct. 1003, 1006 (2025).
On June 25, the petitioners submitted supplemental authority to the D.C. Circuit Clerk concerning a whistleblower complaint filed on June 24 by Mr. Erez Reuveni, formerly the Acting Deputy Director for the Office of Immigration Litigation of the Department of Justice., alleging plans by the Department of Justice not to follow court orders in immigration cases.
This case is ongoing.
Summary Authors
Meredith Ulle (3/21/2025)
Clearinghouse (4/18/2025)
Catherine Grosso (6/30/2025)
G.F.F. v. Trump, Southern District of New York (2025)
J.A.V. v. Trump, Southern District of Texas (2025)
A.S.R. v. Trump, Western District of Pennsylvania (2025)
W.M.M. v. Trump, Northern District of Texas (2025)
For PACER's information on parties and their attorneys, see: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/69741724/parties/jgg-v-trump/
Attorney, Daniel Galindo,
Attorney, Cecillia Derphine
Attorney, Christina P.
Backer, Dan (District of Columbia)
Block, Andrew (District of Columbia)
Coogle, Christine L. (District of Columbia)
Danforth-Scott, Evelyn (District of Columbia)
Galindo, Daniel Antonio (District of Columbia)
Gelernt, Lee (District of Columbia)
Girard, Bradley (District of Columbia)
Gorski, Ashley (District of Columbia)
Jadwat, Omar C. (District of Columbia)
Mahfooz, Sidra (District of Columbia)
Michelman, Scott (District of Columbia)
Netter, Brian D. (District of Columbia)
Ngo, My Khanh (District of Columbia)
Perryman, Skye (District of Columbia)
Roman, Oscar Sarabia (District of Columbia)
Shah, Aditi (District of Columbia)
Shamsi, Hina (District of Columbia)
Smith, Noelle (District of Columbia)
Spitzer, Arthur B. (District of Columbia)
Tan, Michael King (District of Columbia)
Toomey, Patrick (District of Columbia)
Trivedi, Somil (District of Columbia)
Wang, Cecillia D. (District of Columbia)
See docket on RECAP: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/69741724/jgg-v-trump/
Last updated July 7, 2025, 4 p.m.