Case: United States v. Dugan
2:25-cr-00089 | U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
Filed Date: April 24, 2025
Case Ongoing
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Case Summary
This case is a highly unusual federal criminal prosecution of a sitting state court judge who the Trump administration alleges to have interfered with an immigration arrest.
On April 24, 2025, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Wisconsin indicted Wisconsin Circuit Judge Hannah Dugan on two counts: (1) obstruction of a federal administrative proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 1505, and (2) concealment of a person from arrest under 18 U.S.C. § 1071. The case was assigned to U.S. District Judge Lynn Adelman and referred for pretrial matters to Magistrate Judge Nancy Joseph.
According to the indictment, Judge Dugan, while presiding over her courtroom in Milwaukee County Circuit Court on March 14, took steps to prevent U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers' arrest of a noncitizen criminal defendant under an immigration detainer. Federal prosecutors alleged that she challenged the agents’ authority, directed them to speak with the chief judge, resumed the hearing off the record, and permitted the defendant to leave through a secure non-public exit. The government contended that these actions constituted deliberate obstruction of lawful federal enforcement efforts.
Judge Dugan moved to dismiss the indictment on May 14. Represented by former U.S. attorneys and experienced criminal defense counsel, she argued that her alleged conduct was fully within the scope of her judicial duties and was protected by absolute judicial immunity. She contended that the charges violated the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, the Tenth Amendment’s federalism protections, and the longstanding principle that judicial acts—especially those involving courtroom management—cannot be criminalized. Her briefing drew heavily from Trump v. United States (2024), where the Supreme Court held that the President cannot be prosecuted for official acts, and argued that the same logic applied to judges. She also invoked constitutional avoidance and argued that the relevant criminal statutes could not be construed to reach judicial conduct without raising serious constitutional questions.
Amici curiae briefs were filed in support of both sides. A coalition of 138 former federal and state judges moved to support dismissal, emphasizing the risk of chilling judicial independence and public trust. They argued that courtroom decision-making must be insulated from criminal sanction and that accountability for judges is properly handled through appeal or state judicial conduct commissions. In response, the Center for American Rights filed an amicus brief arguing that public officials, judges included, are not immune from prosecution for obstructing justice and that allowing immunity here would set a dangerous precedent.
On July 7, Magistrate Judge Nancy Joseph issued a report and recommendation, recommending that the court deny the motion to dismiss. 2025 WL 1870854. She concluded that no federal court had recognized absolute judicial immunity as a bar to criminal prosecution, rather than civil liability. While the alleged conduct may have occurred near or within the courtroom, she found that whether it was "judicial in nature" and immune from prosecution was not a question that could be resolved on the pleadings. The report emphasized that judges have historically been held criminally liable for corruption or obstruction where warranted, citing precedents such as United States v. Claiborne and United States v. Joseph. She recommended that the case proceed to trial, with the motion to dismiss denied in full.
On July 22, Judge Dugan filed objections to Judge Joseph's report, reiterating her constitutional arguments and asserting that the magistrate failed to address the controlling authority on judicial independence. On July 29, the government filed its response, urging the district court to adopt the magistrate’s recommendation and allow the case to proceed to trial.
On August 26, 2025, the district court adopted the Judge Joseph's report and recommendation and denied Judge Dugan's motion to dismiss. 2025 WL 2452678. The Court first rejected Judge Dugan's assertion of a general rule of immunity from criminal liability for judicial acts, agreeing instead with the government that "there is no general rule of immunity, and what defendant calls exceptions are simply examples of the types of prosecutions that have been brought against judges." Even applying a more limited version of judicial immunity that shields judges from criminal liability for official acts taken in good faith, the court reasoned that viewing the facts alleged in the indictment in the light most favorable to the government, as required on a motion to dismiss, the Judge Dugan's alleged conduct would fall outside the scope of that more limited immunity. Next, the Court rejected Judge Dugan's Tenth Amendment arguments, noting the absence of authority for the proposition that federal criminal statutes of general applicability cannot be applied to state court judges. The Court reasoned that the indictment did not purport to command or commandeer the defendant to participate in federal immigration enforcement but rather charged obstruction with those efforts under a statute of general applicability -- and not one that targeted the states or state officials. Finally, the court rejected the defendant's constitutional avoidance argument related to alleged ambiguity in two of the words used in count two of the indictment. In their reasoning, the Court rejected defendant's assertion of ambiguity and noted that she did not propose a competing, plausible construction of the terms she claimed were ambiguous. Judge Dugan filed a motion to reconsider the decision on September 4, 2025.
On September 19, 2025, the Court addressed the parties’ proposed jury questionnaires. The Court first issued an order allowing the government to submit a questionnaire identifying the case, reasoning that identifying the case will promote judicial efficiency by allowing the Court to identify potential jurors who have already formed an opinion about the case to dismiss them early. The Court next addressed Judge Dugan’s proposal to include questions that touch on hobbies, activities, news sources, and politics. The Court indicated that given the particular circumstances of the case, it was appropriate to ask some questions about political issues to ensure a fair and impartial jury.
On November 7, 2025, the defendant and prosecution filed motions in limine. The parties disagreed as to the scope of permissible arguments at trial regarding motive and governmental conduct. Defendant Dugan's first motion in limine argued that evidence of some of her acts must be excluded because they were lawful official acts within her scope of authority as a Wisconsin judge, which Seventh Circuit precedent holds cannot "obstruct or hinder" the due administration of justice. The Government, in contrast, sought to narrowly focus the trial by precluding arguments designed to induce jury nullification, including appeals based on personal views of immigration policy or mention of potential punishment and collateral consequences of Judge Dugan's potential conviction. Additionally, the Government sought to bar evidence of the defendant's alleged "good motives" or "prior good acts," while Judge Dugan sought to introduce statements from the Attorney General and FBI Director to show bias in the investigation and prosecution.
On November 17, 2025, the prosecution filed an additional motion in limine seeking to preclude the defendant’s proposed expert witness from introducing legal-opinion testimony on the meaning of statutes and regulations that would effectively instruct the jury on the elements of one of the criminal counts.
Between November 7 and November 22, 2025, the parties also sought to introduce various jury instructions and filed their motions in opposition to each others' motions in limine.
The parties selected jurors on December 11, 2025, and the case proceeded to trial on December 15, 2025.
At the end of the three day jury trial, which lasted from December 15 to December 18, 2025, the jury found Judge Dugan guilty of obstructing or impeding a proceeding before a department or agency of the United States, but found her not guilty of concealing an individual to prevent his discovery and arrest.
Prior to the conviction, on December 17, 2025, the Defendant submitted a motion for Judgment of Acquittal. The motion maintained that Judge Dugan’s conduct was legally authorized and did not actually hinder federal law enforcement efforts to arrest the individual. After the conviction, on December 23, 2025, the Defendant moved for a new trial and requested that the Court extend the briefing schedule on the motion for Judgment of Acquittal, given the complexity of the case. On January 5, 2026, the court granted Judge Dugan's motion to extend the briefing schedule, extending the deadline for her to file post-verdict motions until January 30, 2026.
On January 3, 2026, Judge Dugan sent a letter to Wisconsin Governor Tony Evers resigning from her position on the bench. Judge Dugan wrote: "the Wisconsin citizens that I cherish deserve to start the year with a judge on the bench in Milwaukee County Branch 31 rather than have the fate of that Court rest in a partisan fight in the state legislature."
On April 6, 2026, the court denied the defendant's post-trial motions for judgment of acquittal and new trial. 2026 WL 926249. Judge Lynn Adelman rejected Dugan's arguments regarding civil arrest privilege, jury instruction errors, narrow construction of § 1505, and immunity for official judicial acts – finding sufficient evidence supported the conviction.
On April 21, 2026, the defendant modified her motion to reconsider. The defendant argued that a case the court had relied upon, United States v. Hernandez, had been reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on April 16, 2026. The Fourth Circuit held that obstructing an ICE arrest warrant did not constitute a violation of 18 U.S.C. §1505, which, the defendant argued, was the same conduct charged in this case. In response, the Government argued that Hernandez was neither binding nor persuasive, and that the court should thus deny the defendant’s motion and proceed with sentencing. The court held a hearing on this motion on June 3, 2026.
On June 16, 2026, the court denied the defendant’s motion for reconsideration, holding that she failed to meet the “heavy burden” required for reconsideration. The court found that Hernandez, which the defendant relied upon, did not apply in this case because the factual circumstances were different. In Hernandez, the court stated that a deportation order had already been issued, whereas in this case, ICE was still conducting an investigation, and an order had not yet been signed. The court then pointed to various cases in other circuits where courts adopted a broader meaning of the term “pending proceeding.” Those courts rejected the defendant’s contention that an ICE investigation was “mere law enforcement” unapplicable to §1505 because the agency has its own power to issue warrants, conduct removals, and adjudicate immigration proceedings without court involvement.
On July 1, 2026, both parties filed memornda on their sentencing recommendations. The government advocated for a “serious sentence” reflecting that “no one is above the law, particularly those entrusted with administering it.” The government cited data from other cases in which the average sentence imposed was sixteen months. The defendant maintained that she had already lost her judicial position, so anything more than this would be contrary to the interest of justice. It was noted that her arrest was public and multiple government officials had publicly commented on the case. Consequently, she argued that she had been forced “into a life as a recluse.”
The court issued the defendant’s sentence on July 8, 2026. The court imposed a $5,000 fine along with time served. The court declined to impose a term of imprisonment or probation. A $100 special assessment fine was also due immediately.
On July 9, 2026, the defendant notified the court that she had appealed the final judgment entered in the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (26-2440).
This case is ongoing as of July 16, 2026.
Summary Authors
Kara Wilczynski (7/17/2026)
Brian Chen (8/4/2025)
Sofia Yoder (12/23/2025)
Maddy Ligon (4/10/2026)
People
For PACER's information on parties and their attorneys, see: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/70255703/parties/united-states-v-dugan/
Adelman, Lynn S. (Wisconsin)
Alexander, Keith S (Wisconsin)
Attorney, Jonathan H. (Wisconsin)
Attorney, Steven M. (Wisconsin)
Biskupic, Steven M (Wisconsin)
Documents in the Clearinghouse
Docket
See docket on RECAP: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/70255703/united-states-v-dugan/
Last updated July 28, 2026, 5:58 p.m.
Case Details
State / Territory:
Case Type(s):
Special Collection(s):
Trump Administration 2.0: Litigation and Investigations By the Government
Key Dates
Filing Date: April 24, 2025
Case Ongoing: Yes
Plaintiffs
Plaintiff Description:
The United States.
Public Interest Lawyer: No
Filed Pro Se: No
Class Action Sought: No
Class Action Outcome: Not sought
Defendants
State
Judge Hannah C. Dugan
Case Details
Constitutional Clause(s):
Federalism (including 10th Amendment)
Other Dockets:
Eastern District of Wisconsin 2:25-mj-00397
Eastern District of Wisconsin 2:25-cr-00089
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 26-02440
Special Case Type(s):
Available Documents:
Outcome
Prevailing Party: Plaintiff OR Mixed
Relief Sought:
Relief Granted:
Source of Relief:
Amount Defendant Pays: $5,100
Issues
General/Misc.:
Immigration/Border:
Case Summary of United States v. Dugan, Civil Rights Litig. Clearinghouse, https://clearinghouse.net/case/46498/ (last updated 4/10/2026).