Filed Date: Dec. 12, 2007
Case Ongoing
Clearinghouse coding complete
On December 12, 2007, a group of plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in United States District Court for the District of Arizona against the County of Maricopa and the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO), as well as Sheriff Joe Arpaio. The plaintiffs sought to represent a class of Latino persons who have been or will be stopped, detained, interrogated, or searched by the Sheriff or his agents in moving or parked vehicles in Maricopa County. They alleged claims under the Fourth Amendment (search and seizure) and Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection) to the U.S. Constitution; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and the Arizona state constitution. The plaintiffs were represented by private pro bono attorneys, the American Civil Liberties Union (both local and national), and the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund. The United States Department of Justice (Civil Rights Division and local U.S. Attorneys) appeared in the case as amicus, explaining that it had a strong interest in the matter because of its separate civil rights lawsuit against the County, United States v. Maricopa County. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendants, claiming that the defendants had engaged in a widespread pattern and practice of racial profiling and racially or ethnically discriminatory treatment in "enforcing" federal immigration laws against Latino persons without regard for actual citizenship or immigration status.
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had launched a series of "crime suppression sweeps" to target Latino persons for investigation of immigration status, using pretextual and unfounded stops, racially motivated questioning, searches, and/or baseless arrests. These sweeps include a volunteer "posse" that helped to carry out defendants' policies and practices. The defendants had claimed authority under a limited agreement with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). However, the plaintiffs alleged that the ICE agreement prohibited these practices, because the agreement only allowed for questioning immigration status if someone was suspected of violating a state or federal law more severe than a traffic offense. The plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants' pattern and practice of racial profiling went beyond those "sweeps" to include widespread, everyday targeting and mistreatment of drivers and passengers in Maricopa County who appeared to be Latino. The plaintiffs alleged that Latino drivers and passengers were stopped at higher rates, treated more intrusively, and detained longer than similarly situated Caucasian drivers and passengers (even within the same vehicle). The plaintiffs also alleged that defendants had set up a "hotline" for "tips" on undocumented immigrants, which they alleged invited individuals to equate race with immigration status. Finally, the plaintiffs alleged a failure to train personnel and volunteers adequately and to promulgate appropriate policies to prevent infringement of plaintiffs' rights. Allegedly, the Sheriff made many public statements about his intent to "go after illegals" and said publicly that physical appearance was a basis to question someone about their immigration status.
On January 3, 2008, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. On July 16, 2008, the plaintiffs moved to amend the complaint. The court granted the motion to amend the complaint and denied the motion to dismiss as moot. The plaintiffs filed the amended complaint on September 5, 2008, removing the right to travel claims and the due process claims under the state and federal constitutions and the request for punitive damages.
On September 29, 2008, the defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently pled their claims, the organization Somos America did not have Article III standing, Maricopa County could not be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that MCSO was a non-jural entity and could not be sued. On February 10, 2009, the court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss because the plaintiffs all had cognizable Fourth Amendment claims that they were pulled over without reasonable suspicion that they were undocumented immigrants. The court also upheld the equal protection claims because the plaintiffs had pled sufficient evidence to show discriminatory purpose, like Sheriff Arpaio’s statement that physical appearance was sufficient to question an individual about their immigration status, and effect, for example that one plaintiff was pulled over while riding in a car with white people and he was the only one questioned about his citizenship. The court did not decide if Somon America had standing because the other plaintiffs had Article III standing, and once one plaintiff had standing, then the court did not need to decide if the others had standing. The court also decided that Maricopa County could be sued under § 1983 because Sheriff Arpaio was a decisionmaker under Monell and the MCSO was a jural entity because it received federal funds, so it could be sued for misuse of those funds
On September 3, 2008, a man from Phoenix tried to intervene in the case on behalf of a class of Phoenix citizens to show support for the defendants’ claims in the litigation. On September 30, 2008, the court denied the motion to intervene because the defendants were capable of raising all relevant defenses. The intervenor appealed to the Ninth Circuit, but the appeal was dismissed for failure of the intervenor to respond.
On July 15, 2009, the court (Judge Mary H. Murgia) granted the defendants’ motion for recusal. The defendants claimed that only the day after Judge Murgia ruled against them on the motion to dismiss did they become aware that Judge Murgia's (identical twin) sister was the President and CEO of the National Council of La Raza (NCLR); they argued that accordingly, Judge Murgia must recuse herself. On the one hand, the court found that the motion was untimely, that the defendants had not shown any evidence of the court's bias, and that her sister's position was not enough to compel recusal. On the other, however, the court found that NCLR's "Stop the Hate" online campaign, which contained articles that were highly disparaging of the defendants and which took a strong stand on disputed legal and factual matters in this case (and which contained pictures of the judge's identical twin sister) might lead the public to question Judge Murgia's impartiality, and that she should recuse herself in this close call. 2009 WL 2132693. The case was reassigned to Judge G. Murray Snow.
On August 13, 2009, Judge Snow denied the County's motion to stay proceedings pending DOJ investigations. 2009 WL 2515618. On October 13, 2009, the court approved a joint motion and stipulation of plaintiffs and defendant Maricopa County to dismiss Maricopa County without prejudice.
On December 23, 2011, the court issued an order denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in part, sending the case to trial in large part. For the equal protection claim, the court found that the plaintiffs had presented enough evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact based on statements made by Sheriff Arpaio and the MSCO operations conducted after receiving anonymous letters describing Latino people but no crime being committed. However, the court did not grant summary judgment for the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim because the MCSO claimed that they did not use racial profiling and the operations were conducted on the basis of multiple criteria, not just citizen complaints. The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims because MCSO did not have authority to enforce federal immigration law and they were detaining people for state human trafficking laws without reasonable suspicion that state human trafficking laws had been violated. On the basis of finding for the plaintiffs on their Fourth Amendment claim, the court preliminarily enjoined MCSO and its officers from detaining any person only because they believe or know that the person is unlawfully present in the United States. In the same order, the court certified a class of "all Latino persons who, since January 2007, have been or will be in the future, stopped, detained, questioned, or searched by MCSO agents while driving or sitting in a vehicle on a public roadway or parking area in Maricopa County, Arizona."
On the same day, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions because MSCO destroyed evidence. Plaintiffs sent letters to MCSO in 2008 demanding the preservation of evidence, but no action was taken and officers shredded stat sheets, documenting each officer’s contacts and arrests of undocumented immigrants, and intentionally deleted emails. Based on the few statistical sheets that were available, the court held that the finder of fact might draw the following inferences from other statistic sheets that MCSO had shredded. First, that the stat sheets would have suggested officers involved in special operations did not follow a "zero tolerance" policy requiring them to stop all traffic offenders, which meant that the officers had a broader discretion to stop certain people. Second, that they would have included a significantly higher number of arrests in the categories "Illegal Alien turned over to ICE/LEAR" and/or "Suspected Illegal Alien arrested on state charges" than records documenting ordinary patrol activity. Based on recovered emails, the court found that the finder of fact could draw the following inferences from emails that MCSO irretrievably purged: that MCSO maintained a file of citizen complaints making requests for special operations; that MCSO conducted operations in areas named in the complaints; and that at least some of the citizen communications complained about "Mexicans," "day laborers," or "illegal immigrants" but did not provide a description of any criminal activity. 2011 WL 6740709.
The Maricopa County Sheriff's Office filed an interlocutory appeal with the Ninth Circuit, concerning summary judgment, class certification, and the preliminary injunction. On September 25, 2012, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's order. 695 F.3d 990.
In the meantime, the matter proceeded to a bench trial, held in July and August 2012. On May 24, 2013, Judge Snow issued a 142-page decision finding for the plaintiffs. The court found the plaintiffs entitled to injunctive relief to remedy the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations caused by the Sheriff's Office past and continuing operations, and entered a permanent injunction forbidding the MCSO from:
The defendant appealed this decision, along with the denial of their initial motion to dismiss, to the Ninth Circuit.
The parties negotiated a consent decree to ensure the Maricopa Sheriff's Office complied with the court's findings of facts for the plaintiffs. On October 2, 2013, after hearing the terms on which the parties could and could not agree, the district court issued an order making the December 2011 injunction permanent and establishing the methods for compliance for the December 2011 and May 2013 injunctions. The order required the Sheriff's Office to create a unit to aid in compliance and a system for identifying problematic behavior and provided for an independent monitor to ensure compliance. It further demanded that all of the Sheriff's policies and procedures conformed to the US and AZ constitutions and laws, that the monitor review any of the Sheriff's immigration-related policies and practices, that all officers receive training on nondiscriminatory policing, that the Sheriffs created an accountable system for documenting traffic stops including dash-cam recording, that all complaints were brought forward and addressed, and that the Sheriffs got involved in the community to rebuild public trust.
The Sheriffs appealed this order to the Ninth Circuit, and it was consolidated with their previous appeal.
On April 4, and October 10, 2014, the district court issued orders amending the permanent injunction, giving the monitor, rather than the Sheriff's Office, the community outreach responsibility to serve as a liaison between the public and the Sheriff's Office. The second of the orders amended the injunction to allow for body-mounted cameras as opposed to dash-mounted cameras, for the purpose of recording traffic stops.
On September 11, 2014, the district court (Judge Snow) awarded attorneys' fees and costs to the plaintiffs, as the prevailing party in a civil rights case, totaling $4,439,241.66. The court retained jurisdiction of this action for all purposes until such time as the defendants had achieved full and effective compliance and maintained such compliance for no less than three years.
On February 12, 2015, Judge Snow entered an order for an evidentiary hearing to address whether MCSO committed contempt of the court. This order was in response to a 2013 video released of Sheriff Arpaio telling his officers to disregard the court's order requiring them to track the race and ethnicity of the individuals they stopped. Further videos were retrieved showing officers had detained people against the court's earlier orders and that the officers had been unlawfully taking detainees’ possessions.
On April 15, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded Judge Snow's May 24, 2013, permanent injunction. The court held that the named plaintiffs were adequate class representatives and the district court had not abused its discretion in granting class certification. The panel further found the requirement within the permanent injunction that monitors consider "disciplinary outcomes for any violation of department policy" and assess whether deputies should be subject to "civil suits or criminal charges for off-duty conduct" was overbroad. 784 F.3d 1254. On August 26, 2015, Judge Snow issued an order amending the supplemental permanent injunction in line with the Ninth Circuit's ruling. Judge Snow narrowed the monitor's considerations to only include violations pursuant to this particular case and injunction.
Meanwhile, the United States moved to intervene based on the "general public importance" of the matter. Judge Snow granted the motion on August 13, 2015. The United States' intervenor complaint cited violations of 42 USC § 14141(b) and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It sought equitable and injunctive relief. This intervention was prompted by the resolution in United States v. Maricopa County, in which Judge Silver for the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, settled certain issues but required the DOJ to pursue further relief within this case.
The parties then litigated evidentiary issues for several months. On May 13, 2016, Judge Snow issued a Finding of Fact holding defendants in civil contempt of the court and setting a hearing date for May 31, 2016. 2016 WL 2783715. The court found that the defendants had failed to implement the court's preliminary injunction, failed to disclose thousands of relevant discovery items, and deliberately violated court orders. These actions harmed the plaintiff class, impeded litigation, and led to a trial that did not adequately address plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Judge Snow therefore issued an amended supplemental permanent injunction on July 22, 2016. The Injunction required MCSO to investigate all allegations of employee misconduct related to the issues in this case; implement misconduct related training, develop a civilian complaint intake, implement transparency measures, and ensure document preservation and production. It further demanded that all policies, procedures, protocols, training materials, and other relevant materials remain subject to review and comment by the compliance monitor implemented in the first supplemental permanent injunction. 2016 WL 3965949.
In November 2016, Paul Penzone defeated Joe Arpaio in the Arizona election for Sheriff. On January 13, 2017, the court replaced Penzone as the named defendant for the case.
Prior to the change in defendant, Judge Snow issued an order on August 19, 2016 referring Sheriff Arpaio to a randomly selected judge for criminal proceedings to determine whether he should be held in criminal contempt for:
The criminal proceedings took place in a separate action (United States v. Arpaio, 16-cr-01012) and, on July 31, 2017, District Judge Susan R. Bolton issued an order finding Sheriff Arpaio guilty of criminal contempt. 2017 WL 3268180. The court found that Judge Snow’s preliminary injunction was clear and spelled out that detaining persons past the time sufficient to conduct a criminal investigation was a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights and that Sheriff Arpaio had to cease the practice immediately. Further, the court found that Sheriff Arpaio had the requisite knowledge of the order and that, based on public statements demonstrating flagrant disregard for the order, he had willfully violated the preliminary injunction order. On August 14, 2017, Sheriff Arpaio filed a motion for a new trial, and/or that the verdict be vacated, arguing that he was wrongfully denied a trial by jury. On that same date, he also filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal. After President Trump issued an executive grant of clemency to Sheriff Arpaio on August 28, 2017, Arpaio filed an additional motion to vacate the verdict. Subsequently, the court dismissed the first two motions with prejudice, reserving only the motion to vacate the verdict.
On October 19, 2017, Judge Bolton denied Sheriff Arpaio's motion to vacate the verdict, insofar as it sought relief beyond dismissal with prejudice. 2017 WL 4839072. The court held that although the presidential pardon spared Sheriff Arpaio from any punishment that otherwise might have been imposed, it did not "revise the historical facts" of the case. Thus, the judgment of conviction was maintained. Sheriff Arpaio appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit. On April 17, 2018, the Ninth Circuit issued an order appointing a special prosecutor to defend the district court’s decision. 887 F.3d 979. The role of the special prosecutor under the order was limited to providing briefing and argument to the merits panel. A judge of the appeals court sua sponte called for a vote on whether to rehear en banc the order appointing a special prosecutor. Rehearing en banc was denied. On October 25, 2018, the court stayed briefing to allow the Solicitor General to consider whether to file certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States. On January 1, 2019, the Solicitor General determined that the government would not seek certiorari in the Supreme Court and the appeals court reinstated a briefing schedule.
Meanwhile, in the original district court action, the parties continued litigating over legal fees. Mediation was unsuccessful. On March 3, 2017, the Ninth Circuit ordered Maricopa County to pay $400,395.55 to the plaintiffs to cover legal fees. On March 1, 2018, the Ninth Circuit ordered that an employee of Maricopa County pay the plaintiffs $52,877.42 in additional attorneys' fees for work performed on a motion to dismiss the employee's appeal of the district court's order finding that he had committed civil contempt for violating the injunction.
In 2017, the monitor noted that MCSO had completed the delivery of misconduct investigations training. As of November 2018, the monitor noted steady improvement in the quality of internal investigations, particularly since completion of the training.
On May 24, 2018, MCSO published its Third Traffic Stop Annual Report. The monitor noted issues with the underlying data due to a lack of quality control procedures with MCSO’s contracted vendor responsible for the various analyses. MCSO has since contracted with a new vendor. Despite the monitor's concerns with the data, the Report found that the issue of racial differences in post-stop outcomes was systemic and could not be attributed only to a small number of deputies. The Report did, however, identify several deputies who were outliers when compared to their geographic peers and noted that MCSO was working to address those outliers.
The monitor continued to oversee MCSO's compliance with the multiple supplemental injunctive relief orders entered. The plaintiffs filed a supplemental motion for attorneys' fees incurred from June 1, 2016, through August 31, 2017, in the total amount of $1,237,192.10. On April 12th, 2019, the court granted plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of $747,836.24.
On June 11, 2019, the Independent Investigator, assigned in the Second Amended Second Permanent Injunction/Judgment Order, announced that he had completed his duties and that he was no longer needed to investigate MCSO affairs. On January 3, 2020, he submitted a letter to the judge charting the work he did and notifying him that he would be available to the court if he was required to testify.
On November 16, 2020, the monitor found that the MCSO had a backlog of 1,954 citizen and internal complaints about the MCSO under investigation, which were supposed to be investigated within 85 days, but the wait time had risen to 501 days. The monitor found that the significant number of extensions were not reasonable because rather than take substantive steps to resolve the backlog, MSCO was repeatedly granting itself extensions. The monitor also found that MSCO had filled only one of eleven positions approved in the Professional Standards Board (PSB) budget. Therefore, the monitor found that the MCSO was not in compliance with the injunction’s personnel or timeliness of investigations requirements.
On December 10, 2020, Sheriff Penzone filed a motion for relief citing retroactive changes in the monitor’s methodology, arguing that the monitor had changed his methodology without notice resulting in the rejection of the Sheriff’s last self-authorization to extend time to comply with the terms of the permanent injunction. On December 18, 2020, the court denied the motion for relief without briefing from the plaintiffs, holding that determinations of non-compliance were not changes in the methodology.
On March 9, 2021, the United States and the plaintiffs brought a joint motion to enforce paragraph 70 of the July 2016 injunction, which required that if traffic stop data indicated an individual or systemic problem with racial profiling that MCSO must take appropriate corrective or disciplinary measures. The United States asserted that the current methodology for flagging problematic officers was flawed because it “(1) fail[ed] to properly accommodate for location and time in generating comparison stops, resulting in false positive and false negative results; and (2) employ[ed] a descriptive rather than comparative analysis on the data from deputies who perform[ed] less than twenty stops in a twelve-month period—approximately 40% of all MCSO deputies.” On October 29, 2021, the court declined to make any adjustments to the enforcement of paragraph 70 because the data collection program had been largely collaborative, and the United States did not supply the court with sufficient information to make the requested changes. However, the court ordered that the data from the study be given to the United States’ independent expert, Dr. Dean Knox, and ordered the parties and the monitor to work together to find a solution.
On March 10, 2021, the plaintiffs moved for an order to show cause, seeking to initiate civil contempt proceedings for violation of the injunction. They argued that defendants had not conducted timely investigations of employee misconduct as required. At the show cause hearing, the court stated that even if it accepted that the defendants’ reasons for the delayed investigations were true, the court would still hold Sheriff Penzone in contempt. In a joint report requested by the court after the hearing, the defendants said they would forego any defenses for the delays and focus on remedies. On August 12, 2021, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for an order to show cause. To aid in bringing the defendants into compliance, the court decided to appoint a management expert to prepare a management study to identify the sources of MCSO’s failure to comply with deadlines for investigations and to recommend the actions necessary for MSCO to comply with the injunction. After the parties submitted recommendations, the court ultimately appointed Michael Gennaco of the OIR group, an independent police oversight consulting group, as the management expert, on September 7, 2021.
During the briefing for the motion for a show cause order, defendants also moved to modify the July 2016 injunction. On May 28, 2021, defendants moved to modify the July 2016 injunction to relax the investigative timeline, in line with a new state law allowing for 180 days. On July 26, 2021, defendants also moved to amend or correct paragraph 244 of the July 2016 injunction, which required that the form to file a complaint not contain language that could be construed as discouraging filing complaints, such as warning of criminal consequences for filing a false complaint. MSCO wanted to change the complaint form because Arizona had passed a new law mandating that every person filing a complaint be given written notice of the criminal consequences of filing a false complaint. On September 29, 2021, the court rejected this motion. It held that the provision in the July 2016 injunction superseded state law because it was necessary to remedy a constitutional violation by facilitating a constitutionally adequate internal investigation process. The court held that informing complainants of the criminal consequences could function as a form of intimidation, deterring complaints and interfering with the investigator process.
On July 26, 2022, the management expert, Michael Gennaco, filed his report on the delayed internal investigations at MSCO. The report found that the backlog and the time to complete investigations had continued to grow, with the average time to close an investigation rising from 520 days in the third quarter of 2020 to 611 days by the first quarter of 2022. The root causes of the backlog included: conducting more investigative work than was necessary to assess misconduct; committing insufficient resources to investigations; lacking internal controls in the Professional Standards Board (PSB), including the ability to self-grant extensions of time; and lacking flexibility to modify investigative protocols or use non-investigative interventions. MCSO had tried several methods to alleviate the backlog that ultimately did not work, including screening out complaints that did not involve MCSO employees, “coaching” to address minor misconduct, allowing telephonic interviews, hiring more staff (but not more investigators), and moving the case load to other departments with supervision. The report primarily recommended creating a new Constitutional Policing Advisor role, with the aim of increasing the external confidence in the legitimacy of the internal investigation process and implementing adjustments to streamline the process. The report also recommended that MCSO immediately fill all vacancies in the PSB, increase the use of contract investigators, and increase the resources dedicated to investigations by 30%.
On November 8, 2022, the court found Sheriff Penzone in contempt and granted in part and denied in part his May 28, 2021 motion to modify the injunction. As to the contempt ruling, the court cited the Sheriff’s “knowing and continuous” non-compliance regarding the investigations. Since the management expert began his report, the MCSO had done nothing to remedy the backlog, and the backlog had worsened, rendering the investigations “completely ineffectual.” The court mandated remedies, enforced by fines that would go to staffing fund for the PSB, that included: hiring seven more investigators in the PSB within 60 days; authorizing MCSO to use approved private contractors; and demonstrating that MCSO is effectively using overtime and other administrative tools to increase the hours committed to investigations. The monitor was given the authority to oversee all of MCSO’s complaint and intake routing, including making changes to the process to make it more efficient. The court also required MCSO to propose to the monitor new policies for investigations in the following scenarios: the complaint was filed more than a year ago; the officer no longer works for MCSO; the complainant is unable or unwilling to cooperate; a health related in-custody death; workplace relationships; mitigated penalties where the officer accepts responsibility; and minor misconduct. The court further required that, going forward, priority be given to the oldest cases in the backlog, and that for each month that the PSB could not reduce the backlog by 20 cases, the MCSO was to pay into the PSB staffing funds two times the amount required to recruit, hire, train, and compensate a PSB sergeant for one year. On November 30, 2022, the court added these requirements, and additional reporting requirements, to the injunction as the “Amended Third Supplemental Permanent Injunction.”
Since the change to the injunction, the defendants filed, on November 16, 2022, a request for a consultant to aid in clearing the backlog and completing mandated updates on their methodology, staffing, and the state of the backlog. On January 9, 2023, the defendants appealed the changes to the injunction to the Ninth Circuit; the appeal remains pending as of February 28, 2023.
Summary Authors
Emily Goldman (3/2/2013)
Benjamin St. Pierre (11/20/2014)
Gabriela Hybel (4/13/2017)
Eva Richardson (1/25/2019)
Jack Hibbard (6/8/2020)
Sophia Weaver (3/15/2023)
United States v. Maricopa County, District of Arizona (2012)
For PACER's information on parties and their attorneys, see: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/4132339/parties/melendres-v-penzone/
Berzon, Marsha Siegel (California)
Bolton, Susan Ritchie (Arizona)
Graber, Susan (Oregon)
Murguia, Mary Helen (Arizona)
Snow, G. Murray (Arizona)
Tallman, Richard C. (Washington)
Tashima, Atsushi Wallace (California)
Wallace, John Clifford (California)
Albarran, Tammy (California)
Arellano, Casey (Arizona)
Berzon, Marsha Siegel (California)
Bolton, Susan Ritchie (Arizona)
Graber, Susan (Oregon)
Murguia, Mary Helen (Arizona)
Snow, G. Murray (Arizona)
Tallman, Richard C. (Washington)
Tashima, Atsushi Wallace (California)
Wallace, John Clifford (California)
Albarran, Tammy (California)
Arellano, Casey (Arizona)
Bendor, Joshua David R. (Arizona)
Bodney, David Jeremy (Arizona)
Brizgys, Molly Patricia (Arizona)
Brody, Kathleen E. (Arizona)
Byrnes, Andrew Carl (California)
Byun, Hyun Sik (California)
Campbell, Kristina Michelle (California)
Castillo, Jorge Martin (California)
Cataldo, Simon Joseph (District of Columbia)
Chanin, James B. (California)
Chien, Stephen C. (California)
Cincotta, Caroline (California)
Dodson, Priscilla G. (District of Columbia)
Flood, Kelly Joyce (Arizona)
Furnish, Brenda Munoz (Arizona)
Gallagher, Lesli Rawles (California)
Goldfaden, Robin Lisa (California)
Gomez Hernandez, Julia Alejandra (California)
Hartman-Tellez, Karen J. (Arizona)
Hernandez, Isaac Pasaret (Arizona)
Hickey, Kevin Joseph (California)
Huddleston, Kathryn Lynn (Arizona)
Hults, David (California)
Jacobs, Rebecca Ariel (California)
Kappelhoff, Mark (District of Columbia)
Keller, John Dixon (District of Columbia)
Kozinets, Peter Shawn (Arizona)
Lai, Anne (Arizona)
Lieberman, Martin (Arizona)
Limon, Gladys (California)
Lockwood, Aaron James (Arizona)
Lyall, James Duff (Arizona)
Moffa, Luis R. Jr. (New Jersey)
Morin, Michelle L. (California)
Pace, Julie A. (Arizona)
Pedley, Lauren Elizabeth (California)
Pochoda, Daniel Joseph (Arizona)
Preston, Judith (Judy) C. (District of Columbia)
Ramirez, Nancy A. (California)
Ramírez, Mónica M. (California)
Sadasivan, Bhanu K. (California)
Salgado, Victor R (District of Columbia)
Segura, Andre Ivan (New York)
Steilen, Matthew James (California)
Vidutis, Nida (California)
Wang, Cecillia D (California)
Wee, Christine Keeyeh (Arizona)
Young, Stanley (California)
Ackerman, Justin Michael (Arizona)
Branco, Joseph James (Arizona)
Brandon, Maria R. (Arizona)
Casey, Timothy James (Arizona)
Cooper, Charles Justin (District of Columbia)
Danneman, Dale A (Arizona)
Dowell, Leigh Eric (Arizona)
Elston, Diana Jean (Arizona)
Fry, John Michael (Arizona)
Garner, Deborah L. (Arizona)
GilBride, Eileen Dennis (Arizona)
Goldman, Mark David (Arizona)
Hartsig, Charitie L. (Arizona)
Hillbo, Alec R. (Arizona)
Iafrate, Michele Marie (Arizona)
Jirauch, Charles W. (Arizona)
Kennedy, Simon Peter (Arizona)
Kirk, Michael W. (District of Columbia)
Liddy, Thomas P (Arizona)
Martin, Kerry Scott (Arizona)
Masterson, John T. (Arizona)
Mathis, Casson N. (Arizona)
Mayr, Vincent Rene (Arizona)
McDonald, Andrew Melvin Jr. (Arizona)
Metcalf, Drew (Arizona)
Mitchell, Barry D. (Arizona)
Moberly, Michael D. (Arizona)
Palmer, Brian Joseph (Arizona)
Popolizio, Joseph John (Arizona)
Rapp, Christopher Thomas (Arizona)
Reeves, Harold S. (District of Columbia)
Schwab, Douglas Arthur (Arizona)
Selden, David A. (Arizona)
Stack, Thomas George (Arizona)
Stein, Lee David (Arizona)
Surdakowski, Jeffrey Sinclair (Arizona)
Tivorsak, Linda Kim (Arizona)
Uglietta, Ann Thompson (Arizona)
Vigil, Joseph (Arizona)
Walker, Richard K (Arizona)
Wilenchik, Dennis Ira (Arizona)
Williams, James Lawrence (Arizona)
Aftergut, Dennis (California)
Bassin, Ian (District of Columbia)
Bowman, Locke E. III (Illinois)
Cabou, Jean-Jacques (Arizona)
Calderon, Ernest (Arizona)
Caspar, Edward G. (District of Columbia)
Cheema, Puneet (District of Columbia)
Coe, Cynthia (District of Columbia)
Farley, Alexis Margaret (Arizona)
Fein, Ronald A (Massachusetts)
Florence, Justin (District of Columbia)
Glass, Nancy (District of Columbia)
Hamilton, April Marie (Arizona)
Hammond, Larry A. (Arizona)
Harwood, Ann Elizabeth (Arizona)
Johnston, Maureen (District of Columbia)
Jung, Je Yon (District of Columbia)
Killebrew, Paul (District of Columbia)
Kimmins, Lynnette C (Arizona)
Klayman, Larry (District of Columbia)
May, Katherine Elizabeth (Arizona)
Milovic, Maya (Arizona)
Mondino, Jennifer L. (District of Columbia)
Moseley, Jonathon Alden (District of Columbia)
Mygatt, Timothy D (District of Columbia)
OGara, Rosaleen Tobin (Arizona)
O'Gara, Rosaleen Tobin (Arizona)
Patrie, Aparna (District of Columbia)
Perez, Sergio (District of Columbia)
Piccarreta, Michael L (Arizona)
Renne, Louise H. (California)
Scharff, Spencer Garrett (Arizona)
Shapiro, David M. (Illinois)
Smith, Jonathan Mark (District of Columbia)
Spector, Phil (Massachusetts)
Strange, Elizabeth A. (Arizona)
Swindle, Shane R. (Arizona)
Woods, Terrence P (Arizona)
Aminfar, Amin (District of Columbia)
Austin, Roy L. (District of Columbia)
Gayle, Winsome (District of Columbia)
Warshaw, Robert S. (New Hampshire)
See docket on RECAP: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/4132339/melendres-v-penzone/
Last updated May 3, 2023, 3:18 a.m.
State / Territory: Arizona
Case Type(s):
Special Collection(s):
Key Dates
Filing Date: Dec. 12, 2007
Case Ongoing: Yes
Plaintiffs
Plaintiff Description:
All Latino persons who, since January 2007, have been or will be in the future, stopped, detained, questioned or searched by MCSO agents while driving or sitting in a vehicle on a public roadway or parking area in Maricopa County, Arizona.
Plaintiff Type(s):
U.S. Dept of Justice plaintiff
Attorney Organizations:
U.S. Dept. of Justice Civil Rights Division
Public Interest Lawyer: Yes
Filed Pro Se: No
Class Action Sought: Yes
Class Action Outcome: Granted
Defendants
County of Maricopa (Maricopa), County
Maricopa County Sherriff's Office (Maricopa), County
Defendant Type(s):
Case Details
Causes of Action:
Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act, 34 U.S.C. § 12601 (previously 42 U.S.C. § 14141)
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201
Title VI, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.
Constitutional Clause(s):
Unreasonable search and seizure
Available Documents:
Injunctive (or Injunctive-like) Relief
Outcome
Prevailing Party: Plaintiff
Nature of Relief:
Injunction / Injunctive-like Settlement
Preliminary injunction / Temp. restraining order
Source of Relief:
Amount Defendant Pays: 4,892,514.63
Order Duration: 2013 - None
Content of Injunction:
Develop anti-discrimination policy
Provide antidiscrimination training
Implement complaint/dispute resolution process
Goals (e.g., for hiring, admissions)
Issues
General:
Placement in detention facilities
Staff (number, training, qualifications, wages)
Discrimination-basis:
National origin discrimination
Type of Facility:
Immigration/Border:
Undocumented immigrants - state and local regulation
National Origin/Ethnicity: