Filed Date: Dec. 30, 2021
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This is a case about redistricting in Georgia.
On December 30, 2021, the Georgia State Conference of the NAACP (NAACP), Georgia Coalition for the People’s Agenda (GCPA), and Galeo Latino Community Development Fund, Inc (GALEO) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Plaintiffs sued the State of Georgia, the Governor of the State of Georgia, and the Secretary of State of Georgia (collectively, “Defendants”) for racial gerrymandering in violation of the 14th and 15th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution (42 U.S.C. § 1983) and for voting dilution under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (52 U.S.C. § 10301). Represented by counsel from the Laywers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law and from Crowell & Moring LLP, Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin Georgia from enforcing or giving effect to the boundaries of specified voting districts. They claimed that the redistricting plans for the Georgia Senate, Georgia House of Representatives, and Congress were racial gerrymanders in violation of the 14th and 15th Amendments to the Constitution and that these plans diluted the voting power of racial and ethnic minorities in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA).
On January 4, 2022, the Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit designated a three-judge court to hear and decide this action as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2284. The parties disputed whether the three-judge panel was required only for the racial gerrymandering claims arising under the 14th and 15th amendments of the constitution, or whether the three-judge panel should also hear and decide the statutory claims arising under Section 2 of the VRA. The dispute centered around the wording of the Three-Judge Court Act, which required parties to seek a three-judge panel for any claims “challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts or the constitutionality of the apportionment of any statewide legislative body.” Defendants argued that the three-judge panel should be instituted for all claims, but that they would seek to dismiss the statutory claims for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs argued that the three-judge panel should only hear the constitutional claims, and a single judge should rule on the statutory claims. On February 3, 2022, this action was consolidated with Common Cause, et al. v. Raffensperger et al., Case No. 1:22-CV-00090, which was also based on allegations of improper redistricting in violation of the Constitution and the VRA. In the consolidation order, the Court decided that all claims would be tried before a three-judge panel based on ancillary jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
On March 4, 2022 (and later again on May 20, 2022 after Plaintiffs amended their complaint), Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the claims related to Section 2 of the VRA for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants argued that Section 2 of the VRA did not create any explicit or implied right of action for private parties to seek relief. Defendants instead argued that the text of Section 2 only provides a right to relief for the State Attorney General. On June 3, 2022, Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that the VRA created an implied private right of action under Section 2. Plaintiffs’ argument described that this private right of action had been recognized since the passage of the act, and was supported by both congressional intent and legislative history. On June 17, 2022, Defendants filed a reply arguing that there was no binding precedent establishing a private right of action under Section 2, urging the Court to consider the act anew based on its explicit text. On September 26, 2022, while noting that the issue remained an open question in the Supreme Court that could require further clarification, the Court ruled that Section 2 of the VRA created an implied private right of action. The Court analyzed this issue under the Sandoval framework, which requires that a statute include both “rights-creating” language and language creating a private remedy before allowing private parties to raise a claim. The Court’s determined that Section 2 of the VRA satisfied both elements of the Sandoval framework, creating an implied private right of action. Specifically, the Court reached its opinion after finding that Section 2 of the VRA guaranteed the right not to have one’s vote denied or abridged on account of race or color, and created and a private remedy to “enforce the voting guarantees of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment.”
On September 9, 2022, certain third parties involved in the legislative process (“Third-Party Movants”) that led to the enacted redistricting maps sought a protective order in response to subpoenas seeking production of documents. Third-Party Movants claimed the documents sought were protected by both the legislative privilege and the speech and debate clause. Third-Party Movants further claimed that federal interests did not sufficiently outweigh these privilege so as to require their production. On September 23, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition. Plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to discovery because neither the legislative privilege nor speech and debate clause applied here, and that to the extent the legislative privilege applied, it must yield to federal interests. Plaintiffs specifically noted that the evidence they sought related to the motive and intent of the legislators during the redistricting process, constituting the most probative direct evidence for proving the intent-based voting claims in this action. On September 30, 2022, the Third-Party Movants replied arguing that the scope of legislative privilege was broad enough to cover the information sought. On November 1, 2022, the Court found that the Movants failed to identify the specific documents they sought to protect, preventing the Court from either assessing the applicability of legislative privilege or weighing it against federal interests. The Court accordingly directed Third-Party Movants to produce all responsive documents to which they had no objection, to meet and confer with Plaintiffs to try to resolve any remaining objections on bases other than legislative privilege, to produce a privilege log for any documents withheld solely on the basis of legislative privilege, and to provide the withheld documents to the Court for in camera inspection.
On March 27, 2023, Defendants filed a motion seeking summary judgment on all claims. Defendants argued that Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge Georgia’s redistricting plans, that Plaintiffs failed to show that race predominated in the creation of the redistricting maps in order to prove unconstitutional racial gerrymandering, and that Plaintiffs failed to show that the three preconditions set forth in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1984) were met so as to sustain claims under Section 2 of the VRA. As to standing, Defendants argued that since the Plaintiffs were organizations, they lacked associational standing because they had not identified an individual member in each district alleged to be gerrymandered, and that the Court should either render summary judgment in their favor either as to all claims. Defendants asked the Court to dismiss all claims due to lack of standing, or at least to limit the claims to districts where Plaintiffs have identified members. As to the constitutional claims, Defendants argued that Plaintiffs could not show that the redistricting maps were dominated by racial concerns, and at most could only show there were concerns relating to political performance. Defendants argued that any of Plaintiffs’ evidence was circumstantial and inconclusive, and therefore could not serve as basis for surviving summary judgment. As to the claims arising under Section 2 of the VRA, Defendants argued that Plaintiffs failed to meet the three Gingles prerequisites requiring that (1) the racial group can constitute a majority in a single-member district; (2) that the racial group is politically cohesive; and (3) that the majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it to usually defeat the minority’s preferred candidate of choice. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to meet the first prerequisite because they did not show that their illustrative plans could also be a proper remedy. Defendants further argued that Plaintiffs could not meet the second and third Gingles prerequisites because they had not shown legally significant racially polarized voting. To this point, Defendants specifically urged the Court to conduct a closer review of Gingles to find that racially polarized voting must be causally based on race rather than merely a divergence of political interests, and that the third Gingles prerequisite should require proof of racial bloc voting. In the context of this request, Defendants raised additional arguments as to the constitutionality of Section 2 of the VRA under Plaintiffs’ interpretation. Defendants argued that Plaintiffs’ interpretation finding racial block voting present wherever a minority group happens to vote for a different candidate than the majority would be unconstitutional in violation of the equal protection clause.
On April 26, 2023, Plaintiffs filed an opposition arguing that Defendants had not met their burden of proving the conclusiveness of the evidence to support a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs first argued that they had both associational and organizational standing. Plaintiffs then argued that they had provided sufficient circumstantial evidence that race was the predominant consideration in drafting the enacted redistricting plans and sufficient evidence of racially polarized voting to raise a material issue of fact precluding summary judgment as to the constitutional claims. As to claims arising under Section 2 of the VRA, Plaintiffs argued first that sovereign immunity did not immunize the State of Georgia from liability under Section 2, and further that Plaintiffs had raised issues of material fact as to whether the Gingles prerequisites were satisfied so as to preclude summary judgment. As to the first prerequisite, Plaintiffs argued that their illustrative maps were drawn consistently with traditional redistricting principles and that districts that were comprised of a coalition of two or more racial groups were not barred as a matter of law under 11th Circuit precedent. As to the second and third prerequisites, Plaintiffs argued that the causation of racially polarized voting should be considered as a part of an analysis of the totality of the circumstances rather than as a part of the Gingles prerequisites. Plaintiffs further argued that the Section 2 claims were not foreclosed by proportionality concerns. Finally, Plaintiffs argued for the application of the standard set forth in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, 429 U.S. 252 (1977) for evaluating intent in their discriminatory purpose claim under the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the VRA, rather than the standard from Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) advanced by Defendants. The inferences from the factors under the Arlington Heights standard typically create a genuine dispute defeating summary judgment.
On May 10, 2023, Defendants replied arguing that the good faith of the legislature must be presumed, and that Plaintiffs’ arguments were insufficient to overcome this presumption so as to survive a motion for summary judgment. Defendants argued that Plaintiffs lacked associational standing because they failed to disclose that they had members in each district during discovery and further argued that Plaintiffs cannot establish organizational standing in redistricting causes of action. As to the constitutional claims, Defendants argued that Plaintiffs failed to put forward sufficient evidence to show that the redistricting plans constituted unconstitutional racial gerrymandering because Plaintiffs’ expert did not rule out political purposes underlying the redistricting plans. In relation to Georgia’s sovereign immunity defense, Defendants argued Plaintiffs only cited to non-binding precedent without any further persuasive arguments, and that Georgia was entitled to sovereign immunity. As to the Section 2 claims, Defendants argued that Plaintiffs failed to meet the first Gingles prerequisite because minority coalitions are not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Section 2, and because Plaintiffs’ illustrative redistricting plans could not be remedies. Defendants further argued that Plaintiffs failed to meet the second and third Gingles prerequisites because Plaintiffs had only shown the existence of partisan polarization among races, not polarization based on race. Defendants’ argument sought to require evidence showing racial bias caused polarization before concluding that the Gingles preconditions were met. Defendants restated their argument as to proportionality, again raising a constitutional challenge against Section 2 of the VRA to the extent it was being used to compel political outcomes. Defendants also opposed Plaintiffs’ application of Arlington Heights in evaluating the challenge to Section 2 of the VRA rather than the Miller standard, on the grounds that it could lead to two different analyses with two different results.
Before the three-judge panel ruled on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1 (2023), finding that a similar redistricting plan enacted in Alabama violated Section 2 of the VRA. The parties in this action submitted supplemental briefing in light of the Supreme Court’s guidance.
Defendants sought to distinguish this action from Milligan on the grounds that Milligan provided minimal additional guidance and that the Court rendered its decision at least in part based on illustrated districting maps that Alabama could enact. Defendants argued that the Plaintiffs in the instant action provided illustrative maps that would be considered racial gerrymanders if enacted by the state. Defendants also argued that their proposed definition of “racially polarized voting” requiring racial causation was consistent with precedent and was not disturbed by Milligan, such that the Court still needed to consider how to interpret the VRA so as to preserve its constitutionality.
Plaintiffs argued that Milligan supported denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgement because Georgia’s enacted redistricting plans were at least as dilutive if not more dilutive than the redistricting plan in Milligan. Plaintiffs further argued that Milligan’s reaffirmance and application of the Gingles framework supported a denial of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, specifically noting that illustrative maps simply showed the potential for a state to enact redistricting plans enabling minority groups to elect their candidate of choice, not to provide a plan to enact as a remedy. Plaintiffs further noted that the maps in Milligan and the instant action were virtually identical, and since the maps in Milligan were found to be race conscious rather than race motivated, they could not be found to be racial gerrymanders even if the Court were to consider this inquiry. Plaintiffs also described how in Milligan, the Court rejected the argument that parties seeking to enforce Section 2 must prove that deviations between enacted plan and “race-neutral” benchmarks could be explained only by racial discrimination. In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court cited Arlington Heights in support of the proposition that a party bringing suit need not show that conduct underlying the claim was solely motivated by discriminatory intent in redistricting cases.
On October 17, 2023, the Court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to all claims. On October 26, 2023, the Court issued a written opinion with respect to this order. The Court found that Plaintiffs had associational standing for each of the Challenged Districts in which one of their members resided. The NAACP, Common Cause, and League Plaintiffs had standing in every challenged district, while GALEO and GCPA lacked associational standing for districts where no member resided. However, since the districts challenged by GALEO and GCPA were encompassed by those challenged by the NAACP such that the Court could proceed to try all the challenged districts. Given that Plaintiffs established associational standing, the Court did not find it necessary to consider Defendants’ novel argument that organizational standing cannot be applied in a redistricting case. The Court next denied Georgia’s sovereign immunity argument, although Circuit Judge Branch dissented as to this point. As to the constitutional claims, the Court determined that Plaintiffs pointed to enough evidence to raise an issue of material fact as to whether race predominated the redistricting process for each challenged district. In relation to discriminatory purpose claim, the Court denied summary judgment based on the same underlying factual issue, and described that considerations as to whether the Miller or Arlington Heights standard should apply was intertwined with a more complete analysis of this claim. As to Plaintiffs’ claims of vote dilution under Section 2 of the VRA, the Court denied summary judgment because Plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the Gingles preconditions to survive summary judgment. The Court found that the first Gingles precondition was met even under the assumption that minority coalitions could not be used to propose a viable remedy since Defendants failed to point to any illustrative district where the black voting age population was less than 50%, and because it refused to conclude as a matter of law that Plaintiffs’ expert’s illustrative maps were improper racial gerrymanders. The Court found that the second and third Gingles preconditions were met, explaining that the Gingles prerequisites do not require that race is the cause of the cohesion or block voting, and that causation is to be considered within an analysis of the totality of the circumstances after finding that the preconditions are met but before finding a violation of Section 2 of the VRA. Finally, the Court described that it would be inappropriate to conclude that Defendants’ proportionality argument barred the Section 2 claims.
On October 30, 2023, Defendants sought to hold the case in abeyance after the redistricting maps at issue were held unenforceable in Alpha Phi Alpha v. Raffensperger. On November 1, 2023, Georgia’s Secretary of State notified the Court that while he planned to appeal the rulings in cases that found the redistricting maps unenforceable under Section 2 of the VRA, he would not seek a stay of the orders enjoining the use of the 2021 redistricting plans during the pendency of these appeals. On that same day, the Court granted the motion to hold the case in abeyance.
Before the case was held in abeyance, the Court notified the U.S. attorney general that the constitutionality of VRA Section 2 was called into question and requested the attorney general’s position on October 1, 2023. On November 3, 2023, the United States sought to intervene in this case to provide the attorney general’s input. The attorney general described that Section 2 of the VRA is a permissible exercise of Congress’s Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment enforcement powers, and that Defendants’ argument that the Section 2 must be interpreted as requiring racial causation was incorrect. The attorney general further described that Defendants were seeking to improperly use doctrine of constitutional avoidance to render the VRA inoperative to the instant case. The attorney general further explained that Defendants’ as-applied constitutional defenses were flatly inconsistent with Milligan’s rejection of Alabama’s arguments that Section 2 exceeds Congressional enforcement powers. Moreover, the attorney general reiterated the propriety of the Gingles framework in the present day and described that the issue of racial causation is considered as a part of the totality of the circumstances test rather than as part of the Gingles preconditions. On November 17, 2023, Defendants responded to maintain arguments as to constitutionality by arguing that without proper consideration of causation related to voting patterns, courts seeking to enforce Section 2 would be acting beyond constitutional limits. There has not been subsequent activity in this case since.
Summary Authors
Gillian Schutt (8/27/2025)
Georgia NAACP v. State of Georgia, Northern District of Georgia (2021)
Pendergrass v. Raffensperger, Northern District of Georgia (2021)
Alpha Phi Alpha Fratern v. Raffensperger, Northern District of Georgia (None)
Grant v. Raffensperger, Northern District of Georgia (None)
For PACER's information on parties and their attorneys, see: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/61688506/parties/georgia-state-conference-of-the-naacp-v-state-of-georgia/
Aguiar, Tiffany Celestino (Georgia)
Berry, Crinesha B. (Georgia)
Canter, Jacob (Georgia)
Davis, Alexander (Georgia)
Boyle, Donald P. (Georgia)
See docket on RECAP: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/61688506/georgia-state-conference-of-the-naacp-v-state-of-georgia/
Last updated Sept. 4, 2025, 9:08 p.m.
State / Territory: Georgia
Case Type(s):
Special Collection(s):
Law Firm Antiracism Alliance (LFAA) project
Key Dates
Filing Date: Dec. 30, 2021
Case Ongoing: Perhaps, but long-dormant
Plaintiffs
Plaintiff Description:
Plaintiffs are organizational plaintiffs representing minority groups in Georgia. The three organizational plaintiffs are (1) Georgia State Conference of the NAACP; (2) Georgia Coalition for the People's Agenda, Inc.; and (3) GALEO Latino Community Development Fund, Inc.
Plaintiff Type(s):
Non-profit NON-religious organization
Attorney Organizations:
Lawyers Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law
Public Interest Lawyer: Yes
Filed Pro Se: No
Class Action Sought: No
Class Action Outcome: Not sought
Defendants
Georgia Secretary of State, State
Defendant Type(s):
Case Details
Causes of Action:
Voting Rights Act, section 2, 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (previously 42 U.S.C. § 1973)
Constitutional Clause(s):
Special Case Type(s):
Available Documents:
Outcome
Prevailing Party: None Yet / None
Nature of Relief:
Source of Relief:
Issues
Affected National Origin/Ethnicity(s):
Affected Race(s):
Voting: