Case: Talbott v. Trump
1:25-cv-00240 | U.S. District Court for the District of District of Columbia
Filed Date: Jan. 28, 2025
Case Ongoing
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Case Summary
This is one of several cases challenging President Donald J. Trump’s January 27, 2025 executive order banning openly transgender people from serving in the military, which reversed the U.S. Armed Forces’ policy of permitting transgender people who meet military standards to serve. (To see the Clearinghouse's collection of transgender rights-related legal challenges to actions by the second Trump Administration, click here.)
On January 27, 2025, President Trump signed an executive order directing the Secretary of Defense to adopt a policy stating that transgender identity is incompatible with “high standards for troop readiness, lethality, cohesion, honesty, humility, uniformity, and integrity.” The following day, the plaintiffs—six transgender service members in the U.S. military and two prospective service members—filed a complaint against President Trump and the federal agencies and departments responsible for implementation of his executive order, including the Department of Defense (DoD) and its three military departments and the Defense Health Agency. (On February 13, 2025, Judge Reyes dismissed President Trump, in his official capacity, as a defendant.) The plaintiffs were represented by GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, and private counsel. The lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
In the complaint, the plaintiffs argued that the categorical exclusion of transgender people from military service was not based on any legitimate governmental purpose and was issued without any study of the effectiveness of transgender service members or assessment of whether their service entailed greater costs. Further, the plaintiffs contended that the ban on transgender people serving in the military discriminated against them based on their sex and their transgender status in violation of the Equal Protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment that the President’s executive order was unconstitutional, a preliminary and permanent injunction barring implementation of the order, and attorneys' fees.
On January 29, 2025, the case was assigned to District Judge Ana C. Reyes.
The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction on February 3, 2025, and moved for a temporary restraining order (TRO) the following day, asking the court to bar implementation of the executive order until it could adjudicate the case.
On the same day, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. In addition to adding a new plaintiff, the filing referred to a second executive order, titled “Defending Women from Gender Ideology Extremism and Restoring Biological Truth to the Federal Government,” signed by President Trump on January 20, 2025. The January 27, 2025, executive order expressly incorporated the definitions of “sex” and “gender identity” from the January 20, 2025, executive order.
In response to a Joint Status Report, on February 5, 2025, Judge Reyes ordered the defendants to immediately notify the plaintiffs and the court of any policy or guidance promulgated by the DoD implementing the challenged executive orders. In addition, the order stated that the defendants must immediately notify the plaintiffs and the court before making any changes to the plaintiffs’ circumstances. If such a change occurred, then Judge Reyes would consider a TRO before the preliminary injunction hearing on February 18, 2025. The defendants provided their first notice on February 6, 2025, listing various implementing documents promulgated by the DoD related to the challenged order.
The court held a preliminary injunction hearing on February 18-19, 2025. The hearing was scheduled to continue in March. In the meantime, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on February 24, 2025. On the same day, the court ordered the defendants to notify the plaintiffs and the court when the Secretary of Defense issued guidance implementing EO 14183. The defendants filed this notice on February 26. In response, the next day, Judge Reyes ordered that the defendants provide additional information including: details on DoD spending from 2015 through 2024 (including spending on psychotherapy and surgical care for all service members); identification of any "mental health constraint," other than gender dysphoria, that DoD has previously found to be inconsistent with "honesty, humility, and integrity"; a determination, for each plaintiff, of whether implementation of the memo would require the plaintiff to be separated from the Armed Forces; and DoD’s most recent estimate of the number of transgender individuals currently serving. The defendants filed a response on March 1.
The plaintiffs filed their third amended complaint on March 4, 2025, and a renewed application for preliminary injunction on March 7. The court heard the motion on March 12 and granted it on March 18. 775 F.Supp.3d 283. The order preliminary enjoined the defendants from implementing EO 14183, "Additional Guidance on Prioritizing Military Excellence and Readiness" (Dkt. 63-1), and any other communications issued pursuant to those directives, in order to "maintain the status quo of military policy regarding transgender service that existed immediately before [President Trump] issued Executive Order 14183." However, on its own motion, the court stayed the effect of the order until March 21 at 10:00 a.m. Eastern Time, giving the defendants a couple of days to consider filing an emergency stay with the court of appeals. In her accompanying opinion, Judge Reyes noted, "[t]he Court’s factual findings, the vast majority conceded by Defendants and all supported by the Record, make it highly unlikely that the Military Ban will survive judicial review, whether it be rational basis or intermediate scrutiny." Additionally, responding to the defendants that the court must "defer to the military’s judgment," the opinion said:
"The Court must defer. But not blindly. The President issued EO 14183 within seven days of taking office, and Secretary Hegseth issued the Policy thirty days later. There is no evidence that they consulted with uniformed military leaders before doing so. Neither document contains any analysis nor cites any data. They pronounce that transgender persons are not honorable, truthful, or disciplined—but Defense counsel concedes that these assertions are pure conjecture."
In response, on March 21, 2025, the defendants filed a motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction and to extend the district court's stay of the injunction pending resolution of the motion to dissolve, or alternatively, to stay the injunction pending appeal. Judge Reyes heard the motion the same day. She reinstated the court's stay of the injunction until 48 hours after the court ruled on the defendants' motion. She also requested briefing from the plaintiffs by March 25; requested additional information from the defendants; and stated that if any action occurred that negatively affected a service member based on the service member’s transgender status before the court lifted its stay, that individual could file a TRO (including if the plaintiffs need to amend their complaint to add the individual(s)).
On March 24, 2025, the plaintiffs filed their fourth amended complaint, which added twelve individual plaintiffs--all current service members who are transgender. Additionally, they filed a motion for a TRO, requesting specific relief for five of the new plaintiffs while the court decides on the defendants' March 21 motion. The requests included returning four of the individuals to active duty from administrative absence and prohibiting the defendants from requiring any of them to serve as their birth sex while the order was in effect, among other relief. Judge Reyes heard this motion on the same day and requested additional information from the defendants while she considered it.
Later that week, on March 26, 2025, District Judge Reyes issued an order and opinion denying the defendants' March 21 motion to dissolve the court's preliminary injunction and for a stay pending appeal. However, on its own motion, the court stayed the effect of the order until March 28 at 7:00 p.m. Eastern Time, giving the defendants a couple of days to consider filing an emergency motion for a stay with the D.C. Circuit. In her accompanying opinion, Judge Reyes noted that a newly-issued guidance document—the Military Department Identification Guidance—continues to reflect the defendants' argument that the military ban is concerned with "military readiness, deployability, and costs associated with a medical condition." However, the opinion stated:
Gender dysphoria is not like other medical conditions, something Defendants well know. It affects only one group of people: all persons with gender dysphoria are transgender and only transgender persons experience gender dysphoria. Does this mean that all transgender persons have gender dysphoria? No, of course not. But it does mean that when Defendants regulate gender dysphoria, they knowingly and necessarily regulate only transgender persons.
Within hours, the defendants appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia; the appeal was docketed as 25-5087. The next day, the defendants filed an emergency motion in the appellate court, requesting an immediate administrative stay of the district court's preliminary injunction and a stay pending appeal. The court of appeals responded with an order setting deadlines for additional briefing and ordering:
[T]hat the district court’s order filed March 18, 2025, granting appellees’ renewed application for preliminary injunction be administratively stayed pending further order of the court. The purpose of this administrative stay is to give the court sufficient opportunity to consider the emergency motion for stay pending appeal and should not be construed in any way as a ruling on the merits of that motion . . . If any action occurs that negatively impacts service members under the Hegseth Policy and MDI guidance before the court lifts the administrative stay, the plaintiffs may file a motion to lift the administrative stay, and the court will consider it expeditiously.
The D.C. Circuit Court held oral argument on April 22 before Judges Pillard, Katsas, and Rao.
On May 6 2025, the Supreme Court issued a ruling in Shilling v. United States that allowed the transgender military ban to go into effect after the administration sought an emergency stay from the Court. After this, the administration began implementing the transgender military ban. The Court did not provide any reasoning to accompany this order.
Meanwhile, in the district court, the plaintiffs filed a notice with the court, informing it that two individuals had been dismissed as plaintiffs from the action. On August 1, 2025, Defendants filed their response to the amended complaints.
In the D.C. Circuit on August 18, 2025, the plaintiffs filed a Letter Request to Lift Administrative Stay, alerting the court to a Memorandum issued by the U.S. Air Force on August 14, 2025, that detailed specific procedures that the plaintiffs claim will force transgender people out of the military (August 14 Memo). These policies included requiring transgender Air Force members to appear at their separation hearing as their sex assigned at birth and use their deadname, or waive their right to a personal hearing. The plaintiffs argued that the administrative stay should be lifted because the August 14 Memo details Air Force policies violate Due Process of transgender service members. Defendants filed their response to the letter on August 21, 2025, arguing that the new procedures do not turn on sex, because all service members are required to appear in sex-specific dress consistent with their sex assigned at birth.
On December 9, 2025, a divided three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dissolved the previous administrative stay and granted the government's motion for stay pending appeal. The majority, applying the standard four-part test for stays pending appeal, concluded that the government had made a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits and that the policy likely did not violate equal protection principles. The majority deferred substantially to military judgment, finding that the Hegseth Policy reflected the considered judgment of military authorities and advanced legitimate interests, including readiness, unit cohesion, and cost control. Circuit Judge Pillard dissented, arguing that the Hegseth Policy was driven by animus toward transgender individuals, as evidenced by the demeaning language in Executive Order 14183, and that the government had failed to demonstrate likelihood of success on the merits because the policy lacked an evidence-based military justification and contradicted the military's positive experience with transgender servicemembers.
Oral arguments were held on January 22, 2026, regarding the Defendants' initial appeal, in front of Circuit Judges Wilkins and Walker, and Senior Circuit Judge Rogers. After oral arguments, the plaintiffs continued to file letters with the Court of Appeals, informing them of instances of transgender individuals facing involuntary separation from their positions. Defendants filed response letters denying these allegations.
In the district court, on March 4, the plaintiffs filed a motion asking the court to set an initial scheduling conference while the parties awaited a decision from the Court of Appeals. Defendants filed a response to this motion along with a motion seeking to stay the district court proceedings until the Court of Appeals fully adjudicated the appeal. After a status conference on March 16, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion in part and denied the government's motion for a stay. Further, the court ordered the government to produce to the plaintiffs the certified administrative record and documents it produces to the plaintiffs in Shilling v. United States by April 30, 2026.
In the district court, on April 15, 2026, the plaintiffs moved to certify a class of all transgender individuals who were serving in, or had applied to accede to, the military on or after January 28, 2025, the date the action was filed.
On June 1, 2026, a divided D.C. Circuit panel decided the government’s appeal. Circuit Judge Wilkins, writing for the panel, concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their equal protection claim, finding that the Hegseth Policy contained classifications not sufficiently related to a legitimate government interest and was based, at least in part, on animus. Senior Circuit Judge Rogers concurred in part, agreeing that the policy was likely unconstitutional as to retention and accession. Circuit Judge Walker dissented, arguing that the policy was entitled to substantial military deference and was legitimately based on national security concerns. The panel affirmed the preliminary injunction for plaintiffs already serving in the military when the suit was filed. On accession, however, Judge Wilkins and Walker formed a majority to vacate the injunction because the district court had not separately weighed the equities for that group. Citing Trump v. CASA, Inc., the panel further held that the injunction should be narrowed from a universal injunction to relief for the named plaintiffs only. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
Following a hearing on June 30, 2026, the district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. The court, however, identified concerns with the proposed class definition and ordered the parties to (1) submit supplemental briefing on the impact, if any, of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in West Virginia v. B.P.J.; (2) meet and confer—together with counsel for the plaintiffs in the related case Shilling—to propose a revised class definition addressing commonality and typicality concerns and aligning the definition of “transgender” with the Hegseth Policy’s own terms; and (3) propose a schedule governing the remainder of the litigation, including next steps in light of the D.C. Circuit’s June 1 decision. The court also directed that class representatives obtain independent counsel before accepting any assistance from outside appellate counsel who had approached them regarding further Supreme Court proceedings.
In a joint status report filed July 7, 2026, the parties proposed a revised class definition tracking the Hegseth Policy’s criteria for gender dysphoria, along with three subclasses: individuals who voluntarily separated or retired under the policy, those subject to involuntary separation proceedings, and those seeking accession. The proposed class excluded the named plaintiffs and organizational members in the parallel Shilling litigation. The government opposed certification, arguing that the class was not ascertainable given its inability to identify members of the Gender Justice League, a plaintiff in Shilling; class-wide relief could interfere with a related case Ireland v. United States, pending in the Court of Federal Claims; and that the accession and voluntary-separation subclasses lacked commonality because relief would require individualized assessments. The parties proposed a schedule culminating in a bench trial set for January 4–22, 2027. The report also noted that the district court lacked jurisdiction to modify or expand its preliminary injunction to cover the certified class until the D.C. Circuit issued its mandate, then being withheld pending any petition for rehearing or certiorari.
On August 28, 2026, the government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court, asking the Court to review the D.C. Circuit’s June 1 decision and to hold that the Hegseth Policy did not violate equal protection. The petition argued that the policy should be evaluated under rational-basis review, that it satisfied that standard, and that the courts below had erred in inferring animus from the policy’s language. As of September 2, 2026, the Supreme Court had docketed the petition; the plaintiffs had not yet filed a response.
This case is ongoing.
Summary Authors
Haylee Thomas (9/2/2026)
Lacie Melasi (1/30/2025)
Zoe Hayes (12/10/2025)
Maddy Ligon (3/23/2026)
People
For PACER's information on parties and their attorneys, see: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/69583866/parties/talbott-v-trump/
Attorney, Sara Elizabeth (District of Columbia)
Austin, Sarah K. (District of Columbia)
Bernstein, Inga S. (District of Columbia)
Attorney, Michael S. (District of Columbia)
Attorney, Andrew Marshall (District of Columbia)
Attorney, Sara Elizabeth (District of Columbia)
Austin, Sarah K. (District of Columbia)
Bernstein, Inga S. (District of Columbia)
Bonauto, Mary L. (District of Columbia)
Bradshaw, Benjamin G. (District of Columbia)
Haley, Michael R. (District of Columbia)
Kannan, Shruti (District of Columbia)
Kropf, Sara E. (District of Columbia)
Levin, Jennifer (District of Columbia)
Minter, Shannon P. (District of Columbia)
Stoll, Christopher F. (District of Columbia)
Wardenski, Joseph J. (District of Columbia)
Weinstein, Lauren Marguerite (District of Columbia)
Attorney, Michael S. (District of Columbia)
Attorney, Andrew Marshall (District of Columbia)
Bombard, Robert (District of Columbia)
Honold, Ashley Cheung (District of Columbia)
Kambli, Abhishek (District of Columbia)
Layendecker, Elizabeth Brooke (District of Columbia)
Lin, Jean (District of Columbia)
Littman, M. Jared (District of Columbia)
Lynch, Jason C. (District of Columbia)
Manion, Jason D. (District of Columbia)
Bonta, Rob (District of Columbia)
Brown, Nicholas W. (District of Columbia)
Brown, Anthony G. (District of Columbia)
Buchert, Sasha (District of Columbia)
Campbell, Andrea Joy (District of Columbia)
Chang, Robert Seungchul (District of Columbia)
Counsel, Elizabeth Wydra, (District of Columbia)
Ellison, Keith P. (District of Columbia)
Esquire, William Jeffrey (District of Columbia)
Ford, Aaron D. (District of Columbia)
Frey, Aaron M. (District of Columbia)
Gonzalez-Pagan, Omar Francisco (District of Columbia)
Gorod, Brianne Jenna (District of Columbia)
Jackson, Jeff (District of Columbia)
James, Letitia (District of Columbia)
Jennings, Kathleen (District of Columbia)
Kane, Ryan P. (District of Columbia)
Koch, Robert Acheson (District of Columbia)
Lopez, Anne E. (District of Columbia)
Mayes, Kristin K. (District of Columbia)
Morgan, Jeremiah Lee (District of Columbia)
Neronha, Peter F. (District of Columbia)
Nessel, Dana (District of Columbia)
Platkin, Matthew J. (District of Columbia)
Raoul, Kwame (District of Columbia)
Rayfield, Dan (District of Columbia)
Rose, Jonathan T. (District of Columbia)
Stratton, Samuel B. (District of Columbia)
Tong, William (District of Columbia)
Documents in the Clearinghouse
Resources
Docket
See docket on RECAP: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/69583866/talbott-v-trump/
Last updated Nov. 9, 2026, 4:21 a.m.
Docket for: TALBOTT v. TRUMP
Case Details
State / Territory:
Case Type(s):
Special Collection(s):
Trump Administration 2.0: Challenges to the Government
Key Dates
Filing Date: Jan. 28, 2025
Case Ongoing: Yes
Plaintiffs
Plaintiff Description:
Several transgender service members in the U.S. military and prospective service members.
Plaintiff Type(s):
Attorney Organizations:
GLAD (GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders)
National Center for Lesbian Rights (NCLR)
Public Interest Lawyer: Yes
Filed Pro Se: No
Class Action Sought: Yes
Class Action Outcome: Pending
Defendants
Federal
U.S. Department of Defense
Defendant Type(s):
Case Details
Causes of Action:
Ex Parte Young (Federal) or Bivens
Ex parte Young (federal or state officials)
Constitutional Clause(s):
Other Dockets:
District of District of Columbia 1:25-cv-00240
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 25-05087
Supreme Court of the United States 26-272
Available Documents:
Injunctive (or Injunctive-like) Relief
Outcome
Prevailing Party: None Yet / None
Relief Sought:
Relief Granted:
Preliminary injunction / Temp. restraining order
Source of Relief:
Content of Injunction:
Issues
Discrimination Area:
Discharge / Constructive Discharge / Layoff
Discrimination Basis:
Affected Sex/Gender(s):
LGBTQ+:
Case Summary of Talbott v. Trump, Civil Rights Litig. Clearinghouse, https://clearinghouse.net/case/45984/ (last updated 3/23/2026).